| FY | CVN | SC | LCS | SSN | SSGN | SSBN | AWS | CLF | MPF(F) | Support | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 10 | 0 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 8 |
| 11 | 0 | 2 | ? | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | ? | 7+ |
| 12 | 1 | ? | ? | 2 | 0 | 0 | ? | ? | ? | ? | 3+ |
| 13 | 0 | ? | ? | 2 | 0 | 0 | ? | ? | ? | ? | 2+ |
| 14 | 0 | ? | ? | 2 | 0 | 0 | ? | ? | ? | ? | 2+ |
SC = Surface Combatant, AWS = Amphibious Warfare Ship, CLF = Combat Logistics Force
One of the interesting aspects of the Navy today is that realistically, the future Navy is a blank slate beginning in FY 2012. In terms of future funding and planning, only the rate of 2 SSNs annually and the FY 2012 CVN are being paid for beyond FY 2011. Everything else is on the table for debate, supposedly.
The next surface combatant to retire is USS Bunker Hill (CG 52), which if she serves 35 years will retire in 2021, or 2026 if she serves 40 years. It should be noted that even as USS Bunker Hill (CG 52) emerges this year from modernization, she cannot perform a primary blue water function for the US Navy. With the SPY-1A, all 7 baseline-2 cruisers (CG52 - CG58) are unable to support AEGIS Ballistic Missile Defense.
On the other hand, we are rapidly approaching a major decline in submarines. Current plans that include building 2 SSNs per year in FY2011 suggests that the Navy will fall 7 submarines below the current requirement of 48 SSNs, specifically for 11 years between FY22 - FY33. With the SSGNs expected to retire in FY26 and with no replacements planned, the total numerical decline of submarines is actually greater than 7.
We do know some force requirement objectives for the future force. We know the plan for aircraft carriers appears to be one every five years, which comes out to a fleet of 10 based on their 50 year life. We know the Navy will have 22 cruisers, 65 DDG-51s, and 3 DDG-1000s which totals 90 major surface combatants by 2020. All 22 cruisers will retire between FY26-FY34, so the Navy needs to build 22 cruisers by FY29 to replace the Ticonderoga class one-for-one. We know the Navy plans on building 55 Littoral Combat Ships by 2020. We also know the Navy plans on building at least 14 JHSVs by 2020.
With the amphibious force, it has been revealed in testimony the agreed upon requirement is 3 LHA(R)s and 8 LHDs for 11 total big deck amphibious ships. It has also been agreed upon that the LSD(X) will be a variant of the LPD-17 hull, and there will be 11 LPD-17s and 12 LSD(X)s, with 4 additional LPD-17 variants to support Global Fleet Stations for a total of 38 amphibious ships.
The next combat logistics ship to be replaced will be Fleet Oilers (T-AO) which will begin funding sometime in the FY18 time frame, while for the support fleet the Fleet Tugs (T-ATF) will need replacing sometime in the FY15 time frame.
This is the challenge facing the Navy. The shipbuilding budget is somewhere around $14 billion, being optimistic. Every year for the next decade the Navy loses $4 billion to submarines, and $2 billion to aircraft carriers in order to maintain 10 aircraft carriers and keep from falling below 40 submarines.
That leaves $8 billion annually from FY2011-2020, roughly 80 billion dollars. Without building any future surface combatants, and meeting the requirements for replacing retiring vessels and stated requirements for LCS and amphibious ships, the Navy will spend the following:
Build 48 Littoral Combat Ships ($26.5 billion)Total of the list above = $72 billion.
Build 2 DDG-51s (FY11) ($4.4 billion)
Build 13 JHSVs ($2 billion)
Build 2 LHA(R)s ($7 billion)
Build 1 LPD-17 (11th) ($2 billion)
Build Sea Basing Ships ($12.6 billion)
Build the first SSBN replacement (FY19) ($5 billion)
Build 2 Command Ship replacements ($4 billion)
Build 4 Fleet Tug Replacements ($1 billion)
Build 3 Oiler Replacements ($2 billion)
Build 1 Ocean Surveillance Ship replacement ($.5 billion)
Build 1 LSD replacement (FY20) ($2 billion)
Build 1 LHD replacement (FY20)($3 billion)
That leaves $8 billion for nuclear refuelings, future surface combatants, SSGN replacements, and any cost overruns due to low estimates on the ships listed. The nuclear refuelings alone will consume all $8 billion.
This list includes 2 CVNs, 20 SSNs, 1 SSBN(X), 48 LCS, 2 DDG-51s, 13 JHSVs, 2 LHA(R)s, 11 Sea Basing ships (3 MLPs, 1 T-AKEs, 3 LMSRs, 2 Fast Cargo Ships, 2 Large Conventional Aviation Support Ships), 2 JCC(X), 4 T-ATF(X), 1 T-AGOS(X), 1 T-AO(X), 1 LPD-17, 1 LSD(X), and 1 LH(X) for a total of 110 ships, or 11 ships annually.
For the record, the list above combined with the current fleet would get the Navy to about 300 ships by 2020, far below the 313 ship "bottom." With major surface combatants costing a minimum of $2 billion per, never mind the expensive CG(X) replacement that will likely run around $5.5 billion, the Navy has no chance at all reaching the 313 ship plan without more than $14 billion SCN + NDSF annually for the next ten years.
That means every ship the US Navy proposes not on the list above begins unfunded, and either replaces something on the list or must be purchased with additional funding. This comes at a time when the Navy needs to reduce manpower on major surface combatants, nuclear power is adding to the cost of large ships, ballistic missile defense is being turned over as a primary Navy role, and the Navy is restarting the DDG-51 line despite the lack of funding for more.
It is also the decade before the Navy sees the greatest retirement of naval vessels per ton since WWII. In the decade between FY21-FY30, the Navy will be replacing retiring CVNs, CGs, DDGs, SSNs, SSBNs, and LSDs with SCN funding while also replacing Oilers, Salvage Ships, Ocean Survallience Ships, and Submarine Tenders. All of those ships being replaced, all of them, contribute to keeping the number of total ships at 300, so unless they are replaced one-for-one, the fleet will begin falling below 300 again after 2020.
Statistical Analysis
Eric Labs recently presented at the Hudson Institute with some slides (PPT) that I think we can apply to the coming decade. The 9th slide in particular can be applied, as it lists the percentage of the budget spent on ship type from 1994-2009 (last 15 years) within the Navy budget. I have slightly modified that slide to factor in the FY2011-FY2020 data provided above.
| Ship Type | Last 30 Years (1980-2009) | Reagan Buildup (1982-1989) | Last 15 Years (1994-2009) | Next 10 Years (2011-2020) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Surface Combatants | 36 | 34 | 36 | 22 |
| Aircraft Carriers | 16 | 14 | 19 | 14/20* |
| Submarines | 30 | 34 | 27 | 32 |
| Amphibious Ships | 11 | 9 | 14 | 13 |
| Other Ships | 8 | 10 | 4 | 13 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
* - 14% is new construction, 20% includes $8 billion counted for nuclear refuelings for existing CVNs
If the $8 billion for nuclear refueling was applied to surface combatants instead, and the nuclear refuelings were the additional funds request to Congress, the surface combatant % of construction would rise to only 29%, still well below the normal funding. If the nuclear refuelings were maintained, and the Sea Base was canceled in favor of surface combatant construction, that would bring surface combatant construction up to 31%, dropping the "Other Ships" category to 4%.
Comparing the next ten years with the previous 30 years, it looks to me like the Sea Base is currently substituting for surface combatant construction, and the cost of aircraft carriers is higher than historical norms primarily because of the cost of nuclear refuelings.
This leads me to a question. If your budget is $14 billion annually, and you only have wiggle room for $12.6 billion dollars that could be recouped by canceling the Sea Base, at best the Navy could only get 6 additional DDG-51s, 8 total for the 10 year period when including the 2 purchased in FY2011. Assuming the $12.6 Sea Basing funds did get switched to surface combatants, if you look at the total spending in this model on surface combatants, it breaks down 39% for DDG-51s and 61% for the LCS.
Add both the Sea Base and nuclear refueling funds to surface combatants, and the percentage for surface combatants rises to 37%, a slightly higher percentage than the last 30 years during a 10 year period in which no major surface combatants are retiring. With that said, the extra $20.6 billion would be able to cover the cost for the three cruiser replacements.
As I have looked at the upcoming QDR results, I believe these these are some of the statistics the Navy will utilize to push a traditional force structure that looks like a transformational structure due to ~ 40/60 high / low mix force structure, although that doesn't include the CG(X) replacement. As soon as the you add CG(X) into the math, specifically by canceling the Sea Base and adding in the $8 billion refueling fund, the surface combatant spending begins to look more like 50 high / 50 low over the 10 year period. The LCS makes up the entire low end.
What is interesting is this. As it is right now, even if the Navy trades the Sea Base for 6+ more DDG-51s or nuclear refuelings for -23 CG(X) of some type, or any combination with that extra $20.6 billion SCN, the fleet never gets anywhere near 313, and barely gets over 300 just in time for the bulk of the Reagan Naval buildup of the 80s to retire.
The Navy needs a supporting narrative for more money, which means a Plan B, and needs it in a bad way. Luckily for the Navy, in FY 2012 the Navy begins with a blank slate for the future if they want it. The question is, what does an alternative look like?
I've got more posts on this topic all week.
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