U.S. Navy for the 21st Century--RealClearPolitics Panel 9 May in DC

The folks at RealClearPolitics and RealClearDefense are holding a breakfast panel Friday, 9 May from 0745 to 0945 at Charlie Palmer's Steakhouse in DC.  HASC Seapower and Projection Forces Subcommittee Chairman Randy Forbes (R-VA) will keynote, to be followed by a panel including Mackenzie Eaglen (AEI), Paul Scharre (CNAS), Kirk Lippold and me (Hudson Center for American Seapower).

Online signup at this link.

Bryan McGrath

Carriers and Air Wings

Somewhat lost in all the discussion this year on whether or not to proceed with the CVN 73 RCOH has been the analytically questionable conflation of the number of aircraft carriers with numbers of air wings.  As the narrative currently goes, we need one air wing for each active aircraft carrier (N) minus one to account for the one in RCOH, or ten air wings for eleven carriers.  As the Navy provided its budget story for the costs of the RCOH, the costs of the attendant air wing were always cited, in my view unnecessarily "gilding the lily" of how much cost there was.

Additional analytical rigor needs to be brought to bear on the number of air wings necessary to meet operational requirements.  It strains credulity that the maintenance and training requirements of an air wing are gear-tooth locked in with that of an assigned carrier.  The "N minus 1" formula has the potential to create excess "excess capacity", a luxury that current budgetary pressures discourage.

Congress should direct the Navy to report in detail on this matter, giving the chance for the Navy to justify the requirement or re-do its math.

Bryan McGrath

HASC Sends Navy a Strong Message on UCLASS

Great story here from the folks at USNI on the Subcommittee Mark brought forward by the HASC Seapower and Projection Forces Subcommittee which contains rather strong evidence of congressional displeasure with the discerned direction of the Navy's UCLASS program.  I've written here before of my personal sense of unease with how the Navy is going about bringing UCLASS along.  This move by the HASC is a good one, as it buys time for the return to the debate of the most eloquent proponent of unmanned carrier-based airpower I know, Bob Work.  His voice and intellect on this matter as Under Secretary of the Navy was strong, and once he moved to CSBA, was ably represented by others.  However, their lack of positional authority mattered in these intramural debates.

The Naval Aviation enterprise MUST begin to recognize that attacks on the relevance of the aircraft carrier will only gain momentum the longer it chooses to log-roll effective, moderately stealthy, carrier-based unmanned strike.

Bryan McGrath

What to Do With Those 11 Cruisers

First Aegis cruiser Ticonderoga slumbers in mothballs.
Many of her younger sisters will soon join her

       Speculation on the fate of the 11 Ticonderoga class guided missile cruisers that have been slated for “reduced operating status” in response to budget shortfalls continues to mount.  The plan would seem to involve long periods of inactivity in virtual “mothball” status for the ships as facilities and funding become available for modernization work. The age and hard use of the CG 47 class cruisers (the newest was commissioned in 1994) have raised questions on whether the class can continue on much past its estimated 35-year life span. Some experts have raised doubts as to whether a 1980’s era ship designed in the 1970’s can or should be part of the Navy’s front line defense against ballistic and cruise missiles in the 2040’s. The U.S. Navy would appear to have chosen to keep a minimum of 11 ships constantly in commission for the next 20+ years. There is still time however for the Navy to “hedge its bets” by partially preserving some of the Ticonderoga’s in a non-deploying reserve condition in the hope that future funding for a cruiser replacement becomes available. Mr. Putin’s recent shenanigans aside, the drawdown in ground wars in Southwest Asia, and mounting concern over Chinese intentions in the Indo-Pacific basin may yet convince lawmakers to fund large, dedicated air defense ships like the cancelled CG(X) class as a replacement for the aging Tico’s. They have performed in a magnificent manner in both the Cold War and the period of violent peace that followed, but they should not be expected to shoulder on to 50 years of active service.

Spruances and Ticonderogas share a common hull

     The plan for the modernization of the 11 selected ships appears to be arranged so that for each modernized cruiser returned to the fleet, one older, previously upgraded vessel would be retired. This is an even more draconian cut than the previous Navy plan to retire 7 cruisers outright from the order of battle. While perhaps surprising to some, the Navy’s reasoning has some sound basis in fact. The CG-47 class has been “rode hard” over the last twenty five years. Shortfalls in training and maintenance in the decade of the 2000’s as highlighted in the Balisle report further indicate the class has been proverbially “put away wet” without necessary attention as well. The Spruance class destroyers, on whose hull and basic machinery the Ticonderoga class is built, had a programmed life of 35 years. Of these ships, only the first ship of the class, USS Spruance (DD 963), reached 30 years of commissioned service. The newest ship in the class, USS Hayler (DD 997), had only 20 years of active employment. Although hull life is but one indicator of many, it would suggest that the common hull shared by both classes may not have a 35 year life span without significant attention. Deterioration of that hull is accelerated by multiple long transits to and from overseas assignments. Cracks in cruiser superstructures, fuel oil service tanks, and aluminum decks are clear indications that the clock is ticking on the class’ service life.  

     Although they are deteriorating as they age, it may be useful for the Navy to keep more than 11 CG’s in a modified condition of readiness until they can be replaced. This can be done by moving all 11 cruisers into non-deploying reserve fleet status in place of the retiring Oliver Hazard Perry class frigates. Operating costs of the CG’s could be further diminished by placing much of their combat systems equipment in layup maintenance and providing them with skeleton “nucleus crews” as Great Britain’s Royal Navy did with aging battleships and cruisers in the decade before World War 1. Ships in this classification had their crew complements reduced by 1/3 or 2/3 given their re-mobilization status and went to sea for limited training opportunities not to exceed 15 days per quarter. While not as cost effective as complete inactivation, nucleus crew status keeps the ships “on the books” as commissioned members of the fleet and capable of more rapid reactivation in case of national emergency. The RN nucleus crew ships were reactivated in 1914 for World War 1 and gave sterling, useful service as patrol and shore bombardment ships, thus freeing more modern combatants for battle force service.

Scope of cruiser modernization

A Ticonderoga class cruiser shorn of most of its combat systems, operations, and supply departments would qualify for nucleus crew status. A U.S. nucleus crew might spend a week to 10 days per quarter underway with these opportunities spread out rather than concentrated in one at sea event. Underway periods need be no greater than 24 hours in duration in order to provide elements of basic crew training. Crews could eat pre-prepared meals for short underway periods, and a shore-based centralized supply office could support individual ship’s logistics and maintenance support needs. All CG’s selected for such a program would be assigned to geographic areas relatively free from foul weather sortie requirements. The program would need to be flexible in order to be resilient through periods of fluctuating budget support. 

     A nucleus crew option for the cruisers that preserves some of their capabilities might allay Congressional fears of a sharp drop in the most capable air warfare class of U.S. surface combatant. The end of costly ground conflicts in Southwest Asia should free defense spending for naval, vice ground warfare concerns. If aggressive behavior from China continues, Congress might yet be convinced to fund a logical replacement to the CG-47 class cruiser if funds are available. The Navy will save some significant funds in cutting the cruiser rolls to 11. Congress however may not be interested in purchasing a capable successor to the CG 47 class if they linger on into the 2040’s.

     The Ticonderoga class cruisers are rapidly aging and it is perhaps unwise to assume the Navy will get much more than 30 years service out of the hulls of this class. Taking 11 out of service as long-term replacement assets for those that remain active is a good solution. A better solution would be to reduce all 11 to nucleus crew status while they wait for their modernization window. Although substantially reduced in capability, nucleus crew Tico’s would remain functioning assets that could be reactivated for service much faster than an essentially “mothballed” counterpart. The budget outlook remains grim for defense projects in the immediate future. The continued rise or renaissance however of potential maritime opponents might yet guarantee the Navy a modern force of air warfare combatants more capable than the Arleigh Burke Block III. Holding on to more of the CG 47’s for a little longer rather than stringing them out far beyond the lifespan of their hulls and machinery may be the right choice.

H.R. McMaster Makes Time 100; Some Earlier Thoughts on the Sage of Land Power

Congratulations to Army Major General H.R. McMaster, for making Time's List of the 100 Most Influential People in the world.

I've written about the good General twice before, here and here.

Those who would see Seapower advanced as a tool of American grand strategy would do well to understand the thinking of this man.

Bryan McGrath

Submarines for Taiwan

Sam LaGrone--USNI's best find in years--has a piece up today entitled "Taiwan to Simulate Chinese Carrier Attack in Upcoming Training Exercise".  The story raises for me the important--but somewhat underplayed--question of Taiwan and submarines.

The Bush Administration's first go at a Taiwan arms deal included eight diesel submarines.  This, at a time in which China's carrier program was naught but a gleam in Admiral Liu Huaqing's eye.  Exactly how they intended to carry out this part of the proposal was unclear, as the US does not build diesel submarines--at least as warships--and those who do in the world would be unlikely to sell them to Taiwan because of fear of alienating China.

Thirteen years later, Taiwan's quest for submarines continues, with the US having done virtually nothing to move the deal along even as China has put its first carrier to sea with plans for several more in the near future.

As I've written here and elsewhere, China's carrier program is NOT aimed at the United States, but at our friends and allies in the region.  Taiwan is one of those friends.  The United States should follow through with its plan to help Taiwan obtain submarines, either by building them here or by helping Taiwan to build them there.  China must understand that every time Liaoning or her future sisters puts to sea, there is a good chance that it is being trailed by a submarine capable of sinking it, US or otherwise.  The more of our friends in the region that possess the wherewithal to accomplish this task, the more risk the PLAN must take into account.

Update:  I should have known  Jim Holmes from the Naval War College would have already written about this!


Bryan McGrath

AEI/Heritage Project for the Common Defense (Navy) Weekly Read Board

"China Has Begun Listening for American Submarines," by David Axe (War is Boring, 04/14/14)

"US Navy Needs Fast Missile Craft- And LCS- in Persian Gulf," by Luke Tarbi (Breaking Defense, 04/14/14)

"A Tale of Two Ships: On DDG-1000, LCS Faults Are Strengths," by Craig Hooper (Next Navy, 04/15/14)

"Instead of Mothballing Navy Ships, Give Them to Our Allies," by Michael Moran (Los Angeles Times, 04/15/14)

"The Asian Pivot: Does America Still Rules the Waves?" by Dennis Halpin (Weekly Standard, 04/16/14)

"The Real Reason China Wants Aircraft Carriers," by Bryan McGrath and Seth Cropsey (Real Clear Defense, 04/16/14)

"Delivery of Submarine North Dakota Delayed," by Chris Cavas (Defense News, 04/16/14)

"Navy Issues Restricted UCLASS Draft Request for Proposal," by Dave Majumdar (USNI News, 04/17/14)

Bryan McGrath

Military Sealift Command: Flexible. Forward. Seapower.

Cesar Chavez (T-AKE 14) conducts a replenishment-at-sea
with Royal Australian frigate HMAS Toowomba (FFG 156). 
(U.S. Navy photo by Master Capt. Rollin J. Bellfi/Released)

Like most of my fellow authors at ID, I’m an unabashed supporter of American Seapower and disappointed to see the slow decline in the Navy’s battle force ship-count.  Bryan has made some pretty compelling arguments for increasing our high end naval combat fleet combatants. But Seapower manifests in many forms. An often over-looked component of U.S. Navy Seapower is our fleet auxiliary force, run by the Military Sealift Command.  Most people are familiar with the oilers and supply ships that deliver fuel, food, parts, and ammo to our combatants, but the MSC’s fleet is much more diverse than combat logistics.

To get a better idea of the variety and importance of this force, allow me to highlight three ongoing missions, in three different theaters, using three completely different platforms.  In the far reaches of the southern Indian Ocean, a handful of international ships continue a wide-ranging search for any trace of missing Malaysia Air flight 370.  Keeping these ships moving and fed is USNS Cesar Chavez (T-AKE 14). This sort of underway replenishment combat logistics mission is MSC's bread and butter, with dozens of similar operations occurring around the globe every day and night.

In the Mediterranean, another MSC ship is deployed for a unique and historical mission - to dispose of Syria’s chemical weapons.  MV Cape Ray, part of the Transportation Department Maritime Administration’s Ready Reserve Force, departed Portsmouth in late January.  The ship has spent most of its deployment pier-side in Rota while Syria stalls in fulfilling its UN-mandated obligations to aggregate the stockpiles at Latakia for transport and neutralization at sea. Whether or not the ship will ever get to execute its intended mission remains to be seen. Nevertheless, the fact that this operation was able to spin up so quickly and embark the U.S. Army’s chemical neutralization equipment demonstrates the agility of our heavy sealift ships.

Along the volatile west coast of Africa, USNS Spearhead (JHSV 1) and her joint training teams are deployed for Africa Partnership Station (APS), conducting maritime security capacity building, and exercises.  The ship has even embarked African coast guards and navies for real-world fisheries enforcement operations.  Although APS deployments have been happening for several years, this marks the first trial of the concept using the new Joint High Speed Vessel.  Eventually 10 JSHVs will become part of MSC’s sealift fleet, conducting a wide range of logistics and combat support missions. From everything I’m hearing, they are already being fought over by the geographic combatant commanders.

U.S. Navy Sailors and members of the Liberian Coast Guard observe boat operations during a joint familiarization exercise aboard the U.S. Navy's joint high-speed vessel USNS Spearhead (JHSV 1). Spearhead, the U.S. Navy's first-in-class joint, high-speed vessel, is on its maiden deployment supporting theater security cooperation efforts and the international collaborative capacity-building program, Africa Partnership Station, in the U.S. 6th Fleet area of operations. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist Seaman Justin R. DiNiro/Released)  

At this point, I should brag on my fellow citizen Sailors.  Two of the missions I've mentioned couldn't happen without the dedication of Navy Reservists on extended active duty.  While the ships themselves are operated by the MSC's civil mariners, reservists make up a significant portion of the mission teams aboard Cape Ray and Spearhead, to include some key leadership positions. Reservists are also part of USS Ponce's mission in the Arabian Gulf.  Naval operations are often come-as-you-are affairs, and there are no better folks at rapidly and seamlessly partnering with the MSC for operational pick-up games than our reserve Sailors.

When considering long term budgets and acquisition plans, our capital combat ships are extremely important.  But the flexibility and strategic reach of our military sealift force is what makes us a global naval power.  The above ships represent just a small part of the MSC's inventory.  Other vessels are prepositioned around the world to support major contingency operations. Still others support salvage, submarine rescue, or special operations missions.  Time after time, MSC has demonstrated the ability to get equipment to the fight and sustain our warfighters.

Any opinions expressed in the preceding post are those of the author alone and not representative of the U.S. Navy or any other organization.

AEI/Heritage Project for the Common Defense (Navy) Weekly Read Board

"The 2020 Navy- Bigger, Tougher, Possibly Broke," by David Axe (War is Boring, 04/07/14)

"Surface Warfare: Lynch-pin of Naval Integrated Air/Missile Defense," by Jim Kilby (CIMSEC, 04/07/14)

"Navy's Magnetic Super Gun To Make Mach 7 Shots At Sea in 2016: Adm. Greenert," by Sydney Freedberg (Breaking Defense, 04/07/14)

"Nation Must Preserve Shipbuilding Industry," by Terry McKnight (USNI News, 07/04/14)

"Navy Has Finalized Specifications for New Ohio-Replacement Boomer," by Sam LaGrone (USNI News, 04/07/14)

"DDG-1000 Christening Pioneers New Technology," by Kris Osborn (Military.com, 04/08/14)

"Navy Axes Griffin Missile In Favor of Longbow Hellfire for LCS," by Sam LaGrone (USNI News, 04/09/14)

"The Navy is in Decline and the CNO Believes the Answer is More Jointness," by Bryan McGrath (Information Dissemination, 04/09/14)

"Lockheed Revives an Old Idea for New Carrier Cargo Plane," by Christopher Cavas (Defense News, 04/09/14)

"Norway's Naval Strike Missile Aims for the Pacific," by Christopher Cavas (Defense News, 04/09/14)

"Navy Makes Plans for New Destroyer for 2030s," by Kris Osborn (DoD Buzz, 04/09/14)

"Littoral Ship's Fitness for Asia Questioned by Some in U.S. Navy," by Tony Capaccio (Bloomberg News, 04/10/14)

"Ignoring the Law on Carrier Numbers," by Bryan McGrath (War on the Rocks, 04/10/14)

"U.S. Frigate Transfer Bill Advances," by Chris Cavas (Defense News, 04/11/14)

Bryan McGrath

ID Contributor Guest on MIDRATS

I spent an enjoyable hour with Commander Salamander and Eagle One on their weekly internet radio show, MIDRATS.  We talked a good deal about carriers, the importance of the Navy, and what the future might hold.

Listen here if you like.

Bryan McGrath

PLAN surface combatant fleet now and future

With the recent induction of No. 172 and the appearance of Type 055 full scale land simulation structure, there has been some questions about how many of these ships will join PLAN and the number of sailors that will need to be trained to operate them. This entry will focus on the hardware part, since that is an easier factor to quantify than the software part. Before all of that, I want to take a quick look at Type 055. Based on the dimensions of the land simulation structure, estimate for width of the ship have been 21+ m and length to be 175 m based on photos. That would make this ship larger than the neighboring Atago class and KDX-III class, which are both over 10,000 ton in displacement. It would be comparable in size to Slava class and only smaller than Kirov class and Zumwalt class. Based on work by online PLAN fans, it seems like Type 055 would be able to comfortably hold 128 VLS cells ¬¬¬and still have enough endurance long range missions. To the best of my knowledge, China has only built land based simulation structures for aircraft carrier and nuclear submarine. Therefore, the construction of such a structure shows the high regard that PLAN has for Type 055. Work for Type 055 is said to be starting at JN this year, so it’s quite interesting to me that they are building the training structure so early.

Looking at PLAN right now, we still have a good mix of Soviet-era ships and modern ships. Amongst what PLAN considers to be destroyers, we have the very old Type 051 class and the very new Type 052C/D class along with many interim classes in between (Type 052, Type 051B, Sov, Type 051C and Type 052B). About half of Type 051 Luda class ships have already been decommissioned and the remaining ones should be retiring over the rest of the next few years as they come up to 30 years in service. After that, it will be interesting to see what PLAN does with those interim classes. Type 052 Luhu class have been in service for 20 years, but just receive mid life upgrade in 2011, so will probably service until next decade. Similarly, No. 167 of Type 051B Luhai class has been active since entering service in 1998, but looks to be getting a mid life upgrade very soon, so will probably stay in service until middle of next decade. The 4 Sov destroyers have the problem that they are using combat system and data link that simply don’t work that well with PLA’s new inter-service data link protocol. Even though they are still relatively new, their combat system and electronics are so backward that the smaller Type 054A frigates are more effective in combat and leading fleet. I had previously advocated that PLAN just retire all 4 of them early, but now it looks like China will put them through extensive mid life upgrade with indigenous parts replacing the older Russian systems. At least, that should allow these ships to communicate better with the rest of the fleet. The 2 Type 051C destroyers have the same problem as the Sovs. They are the last PLAN destroyers to use steam turbine propulsion and also use a different type of VLS (and Air defense system) that needs its own industrial support. Since the latter 2 Sovs and Type 051C ships joined service at the same time as the first Type 052C ships, they will remain in service for a while serving minor roles while Type 052C/D form the backbone of air defense for PLAN. The production run for Type 052C will stop at 6, while Type 052D will probably hit 12 ships. If we add in the 2 Type 052B, 2 Type 051C and 2 recent Sov destroyers, that will total 24 destroyers or 2 flotilla of 4 destroyers for each of PLAN’s 3 fleets. In reality, PLAN will probably have more destroyers than that in service in order to form a permanent blue water fleet, but this provides a simple breakdown for 2020 to 2030.

PLAN’s frigates do not have nearly the number of interim classes. Nearly every jianghu-1 class ships have already been decommissioned as Type 054A have been joining the fleet in mass. By the end of this decade, I would think all of the remaining Jianghu ships will be either be decommissioned or refurbished/upgraded for export or coast guard. The 4 Jiangwei-I frigates should also be close to decommissioning. Aside from that, PLAN has 16 Type 054As (which will become 20 over the next 2 years), 2 Type 054 and 10 Type 053H3 Jiangwei-II frigates. By the end of this decade, these 36 frigates (22 054/A + 14 Jiangwei) will form 3 flotillas for each of the 3 fleet. In order to replace the retiring Jiangwei class and provide escort for the new blue water fleet, a new class of frigates will likely start construction in the next few years using the new universal VLS. It could also be argued that with the induction of the Type 056 class, PLAN no longer needs as many frigates for the nearby waters. In that case, the class that comes after Type 054A will be closer in size to 052B/C and the European “frigates” than the 4000-ton class frigates we see today.

It’s always interesting to speculate how a rapidly modernizing naval force like PLAN will look like in 5 or 10 years time. With most of the older Soviet era ships are close to retiring, we finally have a good idea to project into future, because they are no longer just building interim classes. For me, a major symbolic milestone will hit once all Luda and Jianghu class ships retire. The majority of PLAN’s main fleet will be modernized by then. On the other hand, questions about modernization in software are a lot harder to answer and quantify.

China Thinks ASW

Lyle Goldstein at the China Maritime Studies Institute is a national treasure (along with his colleague, Andrew Erickson), and he has teamed up once again with Shannon Knight from the Naval Undersea Warfare Center to produce a fascinating article in this month's Proceedings, which is unfortunately behind the firewall (hey, why aren't you a member?)  The piece, "Wired for Sound in the Near Seas" details China's development of a sophisticated network of fixed ocean floor acoustic sensors off its coasts.  After reminding readers that analysts have for years rightly downplayed China's ASW capabilities, Goldstein and Knight make this assertion:

"Defense analysts who follow Chinese military literature closely, however, will have noticed over the past several years that the massive Chinese military-industrial complex has now come around to the great importance of ASW, and China’s substantial military and science-research energies have shifted accordingly. The fruits of these major research efforts are now gradually coming into view. Most startling is the revelation in numerous Chinese scientific and strategy publications since 2012 that China has deployed fixed ocean-floor acoustic arrays off its coast, presumably with the intent to monitor foreign submarine activities in the “near seas.”

This report by the China Maritime Studies Institute is something many have been waiting for, as there never seemed to be much logic in China's utter cession of the undersea domain.  It is my view that there is nothing the U.S. military does better than undersea warfare, and so the PLA has a long way to go.  I've had conversations with U.S. submariners who welcome China spending money to try and close this gap, as they are quite confident that the advantage we maintain is insurmountable.  It would appear the PRC sees things differently, and only time will tell who is correct.

Bryan McGrath

China's Carrier "Nothing to Fear"--Bloomberg Editors

Bloomberg has an editorial up today that attempts to pooh-pooh the threat of the Chinese aircraft carrier program.  They do so with a mix of decent analysis and factual citation, but ultimately, their conclusion is flawed because of assumptions about what China hopes to do with its carriers.

First, the good news.  They raise important threat-related issues in this paragraph:  "The greater danger is China's other military investments. It's deploying thousands of surface-to-surface missiles near its eastern shore, and it is also building a fleet of quiet diesel submarines and advanced anti-ship ballistic-missile batteries. China's cyber-attacks on U.S. government agencies and private defense corporations have become increasingly aggressive."  They are speaking here of course, of the greater danger to U.S. forces, which is a defensible position.

But that's not (in my view) why the Chinese are building aircraft carriers.  They are not building aircraft carriers to become a "...globe-spanning Chinese navy capable of operating across deep oceans" and in the process, challenge the U.S. for global naval dominance.  They are building aircraft carriers in order to project power in their near abroad, so that their regional dominance is enhanced and their influence over neighbors is increased.  China wishes to create the impression that they are capable of operationalizing their claims in order to provide additional pressure to settle them in their favor.

The focus of the Chinese effort is not the US Navy; rather it is our system of friendships and alliances.

Bryan McGrath

The Navy is in Decline and the CNO Believes the Answer is More Jointness

The Navy is bureaucratically trying to kill a carrier it believes it can no longer afford.  It is proposing long term lay-up of eleven cruisers as a fall-back force structure preservation measure.  It is truncating its small surface combatant program (under pressure) in search of additional lethality and survivabilty, injecting unwelcome churn into a program that has finally begun to hit reasonable unit production costs, while likely creating a hole in its shipbuilding plan. It is reducing its buy of fifth generation fighters.  It is closing down the production line of one of is most successful weapons--the Tomahawk Land Attack Missile--without an identified replacement and several years until that replacement is in production. It is struggling to afford two attack submarines a year even as its highest priority acquisition program--the follow-on ballistic missile submarine--looms on the horizon with its cost likely to consume nearly half the shipbuilding budget for ten years.  And its shipbuilding plan--the one now aiming at 308 ships--is underfunded to the tune of nearly $4B a year when compared to historical levels of spending, realistically pointing toward a fleet at least 20% smaller than is planned.

Simultaneously, the importance of a powerful, globally employed Navy to our security and prosperity rises. China continues to play the part of the rising power whose respect for the current global order and what it takes to maintain it is questionable.  Russia has decided to use its military and economic power to re-assert itself as a brooding Eurasian power. North Africa and the Mediterranean rim are increasingly unstable, Turkey is having a hard time figuring out what kind of nation it wants to be, and Israel remains in the crosshairs of nations and movements who want it gone.

All of which it occurs to me, argues for a greater emphasis on American Seapower, for the kinds of capabilities ONLY a force that is persistent, powerful, and self-sustaining can provide.  A force that brings with it both the helping hand for those facing disaster and the mailed fist of deterrent strength to remind those who would disturb regional security.

Which brings me to the CNO's speech yesterday at the Navy League's Sea Air Space Symposium.  In it, he debuted what appears to be a new line of strategic communication for him, that of pursuing greater joint force interdependence.   While I applaud the CNO's commitment to eliminate overspending and to investigate avenues of cooperation among the Services in research and development/science and technology, it baffles me that he would select the most prestigious forum for American Seapower to make a case that what we need now is MORE Jointness.  I believe quite the opposite.  What we need now is more Seapower, and more reliance on it.  For most of the joint era, land power has been the supported force, with Seapower and air power in support.  Jointness--the kind which the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs advocates and to which the CNO refers--meant everyone being jointly in support of land operations, which is one of the reasons the Army was the Service that supported Goldwater Nichols most strongly.  Hewing to this line in a maritime era will dramatically mis-allocate scarce resources and leave the United States less capable of responding to growing threats.

More jointness will not arrest a Navy in decline; more Navy will.  And no one is in a better position to advocate for that than the CNO.


Bryan McGrath


UPDATE (4/10/2024)
Thank you for the comments below--a good crop.  I have a couple of thoughts:

1. Some believe more jointness is the best way to respond to diminishing resources.  Indeed, more jointness would make the force better prepared for a greater range of futures--but it would necessarily make the force less prepared for either the most likely future or the most dangerous future--which in my view, merge with China.  This is for me, why more jointness is less preferable to more Seapower. But I acknowledge that the other view is logical.

2.  Elsewhere, someone asked  "Am I wrong for thinking that the two things McGrath is placing into opposition are not actually mutually exclusive?"  A very good question.  The answer is yes, he is wrong.  In order for his view to be right--jointness--properly understood in its modern context--would have to change, and fairly dramatically--from its land focused nature today to a more strategic and maritime focus.  That kind of jointness is a very different creature than this.

AEI/Heritage Project for the Common Defense (Navy) Weekly Read Board

"Don't Bury the Tomahawk," by Seth Cropsey (Real Clear Defense, 03/31/14)

"The U.S. Navy and the Pivot: Less Means Less," by William Kyle (The Diplomat, 03/31/14)

"It's Time for a Sea-Control Frigate," by Zachary Howitt (Proceedings, 04/01/14)

"LCS Wargame Reveals New Tactics Amid Controversy," by Kris Osborn (DoD Buzz, 04/02/14)

"UCLASS Could Be Used As Tanker for Carrier Air Wing," by Dave Majumdar (USNI News, 04/02/14)

"The Navy's Newest Destroyer is a Drone," by Drake Bennett (Bloomberg, 04/02/14)

"Navy Unfunded Request for Carrier Refueling Removed," by Sam LaGrone (USNI news, 04/03/14)

"Navy: Decision to Pull Unfunded Carrier Refueling Request was CNO's Choice," by Sam LaGrone (USNI News, 04/03/14)

"Sleepless in Singapore: LCS is Undermanned and Overworked, Says GAO," by Sydney Freedberg (Breaking Defense, 04/04/14)

"Surface Warfare: Lynchpin of Naval Integrated Air/Missile Defense" by Captain Jim Kilby (CIMSEC, 04/04/14)

Bryan McGrath

Giving LCS Critics What They Want

USS Freedom and USS Independence underway in company

In late March there were two war games/experiments with focus on the littoral combatant ship (LCS). One held by the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) focused on the littoral/green water potential of the ship while the event held at the Naval War College (NWC) examined the potential for LCS to serve in a variety of missions and environments, including blue water employment in company with battle group units. Sadly, but not surprisingly, critics of the LCS immediately pounced on the news reports coming from the Newport game that suggested LCS was potentially effective in a variety of roles. No one would argue that the LCS program has been plagued by management problems, an operational vision restricted perhaps to mission module capabilities, and a less than effective public affairs program over much of its history. Critics however need to take a step back and give current Surface Warfare leaders the chance to experiment and figure out what are the strengths and weaknesses of the LCS class. LCS has matured from concept to physical form in a much more visible and hostile environment than past surface warship designs. A shrinking defense budget complicates the future of LCS, as well as that of a proposed follow-on frigate FF(X). Many of the concerns advanced by LCS critics regarding a lack of operational concept evaluation are being addressed in war games and events such as those held at NWC and NPS. Give the Navy the space to fix them and ensure LCS realizes its full potential as an active component of the fleet. 

                                                     A Harsh Program and Budgetary Environment

The LCS program inhabits a much more reactionary and harsh program management world than past large Navy shipbuilding efforts. The DD-963 (Spruance) class, the CG-47 (Ticonderoga) class and the FFG-7 (Perry) classes all came to fruition in a much more closed and benign world of professional shipbuilding analysis. News of warship program faults was limited to a few specific trade journals and the odd article in the Naval Institute Proceedings or the Naval War College Review. Now nearly anyone with an opinion, whether informed by actual facts or mere speculation can get into the game of warship analysis via the internet. The aforementioned ship classes all had significant “bugs” to work out in the course of their introduction to the fleet. The Spruance’s lack of armament, faults with the AEGIS combat system and ship stability in the Ticonderoga’s, and the complaints about the SQS-56 sonar and sparse manning on the Perry’s all received significant attention from critics. The relative pace of this attention however was slower and easier for the Navy to manage than perhaps it is in the present.Current Defense budgetary considerations also do not offer LCS a safe harbor. The LCS program has already been reduced from 52 to 32 vessels and while a new frigate (FFX) design has been requested by the Department of Defense, no such ship has been authorized. FF(X) could quickly join the nuclear strike cruiser, the sea control ship, the CG 21 and a host of other never-built ships in the naval architect’s rubbish bin if the Defense budget continues to shrink. For this consideration alone the Navy must do its utmost to make the LCS a valuable addition to the fleet. “A bird inthe hand” is indeed “worth two in the bush” in the case of actual fleet inventory of ships.

Two Events: Two Concepts

War gaming and analysis are vital to the continued development of the LCS operational concept. This is especially true in a period of transition such as that which confronts the U.S. surface fleet at the present. The LCS concept was originally developed during a period of assumed U.S. naval superiority throughout most of the world’s maritime spaces. As the “low end” component of the SC 21 “family of ships”, LCS was not tasked with gaining sea control in a disputed region, but rather the “mopping up” operations against small craft, mines, and coastal submarines in the wake of larger and more capable combatants. LCS can no longer be confined to such limited roles in the present. Diminished fleet strength means that every surface ship must be flexible and capable of multiple missions in both the littoral and blue water environments.

     The Newport war game event evaluated the ability of LCS to support those new missions. The participants were given the latitude to pursue multiple employment options. They found LCS to be useful in blue and green water antisubmarine warfare, potential surface strike missions if given an improved antiship cruise missile (ASCM), and as an substitute for the guided missile destroyer (DDG) in low-threat operations like escort and counter piracy. The NPS workshop on the other hand was more focused on keeping LCS in the littoral and employing it as a network-dependent flotilla combatant. LCS would remain focused on the capabilities inherent in the mission module installed and would be operated more like an aircraft than a surface warship.

     This author is a known opponent of the flotilla combatant concept and would rather see LCS be evaluated for as many green and blue water missions as possible. LCS is approximately the same size as the World War Two destroyers that made their mark in both high seas and littoral combat. That said, the experimentation and evaluation of LCS as exemplified by the NWC and NPS is exactly what critics of the LCS program have demanded. Rather than focus on the “transformative” elements of the LCS’ design, its minimum manning, or its real or perceived equipment problems, both events emphasized real operational uses for the ship. A comparison of final results from these two prestigious naval education institutions will likely contribute to a continued healthy debate on what missions and responsibilities the LCS platform will assume now and twenty five years hence. LCS critics would be well advised to perhaps pause and give the Navy a chance to work out the ship’s operational best uses. Mistakes from the past have been acknowledged, but it does little good to revisit them again and again, especially in the light of war game events like these. Be happy for a change; this is what you asked the Navy to do.

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Sunday Book Review: Billy Mitchell's War with the Navy

Why, in the wake of World War I, did the relationship between the US Army Air Service and the US Navy go so bad so quickly? Thomas Wildenberg's Billy Mitchell's War with the Navy: The Interwar Rivalry Over Air Power chronicles the conflict between aviation enthusiasts (personified and led by William Mitchell) and the establishment Navy during the interwar period. With control over aviation assets at stake, the sides argued over the effectiveness of airpower against warships and shipping. Mitchell and his acolytes took a maximalist position, holding the air forces had effectively rendered surface navies obsolete, and that the United States government should redirect money away from battleships and aircraft carriers and towards heavy bombers. Fighting the Navy couldn't win Mitchell organizational independence, but it did hold the opportunity for gaining control of the immense resources that an independent air force would require.

The Navy and the Air Service fought for high stakes.  In the United Kingdom, the Royal Air Force was stitched together from the Royal Flying Corps and the Royal Naval Air Service, putting all military aviation assets under one banner.  The USN wanted to avoid this outcome at all costs, while Billy Mitchell wanted to create a similar arrangement in the US. In context of severe defense cuts at the end of the World War I, everything seemed to be on the table.

Wildenberg devotes considerable attention to the exercises that led to the sinking of the SMS Ostfriesland and several other old warships. With respect to the sinking of Ostfriesland, both sides had legitimate points to score.  Ostfriesland was older than most of the American battleships of the day, but not all, and not much older.  If bombers could sink her, then they could likely sink all but the most modern of the American standard type battleships. Three other issues made the exercise problematic, however.  First, Ostfriesland was stationary, considerably simplifying the problem of bombing.  In one of his more absurd moments, Mitchell explained this away in a passage that likely sets some sort of record for military dishonesty:

It does not make very much difference because we employ a massed attack.  A ship on the surface of the water in motion is much easier to hit than an object at rest because the relative speed between the airplane and the object being fired at is the thing that makes it difficult to secure hits.  If a water vessel could be moving at the same rate as an airplane there would be absolutely no trouble whatever hitting it because all you would have to do would be to get over the object and drop the bomb and as both the airplane and its taget would be going at the same speed you would be certain to get a hit.  Therefore the faster that a water vessel goes the easier it is to hit from the air.  This is not understood at all by people unfamiliar with bombing.  As to turning and zigzagging, the turns of surface vessels of any kind are so slow as to be almost negligible from the air.

Second, Ostfriesland was in poor shape, and lacked a crew. German battleships were well-known for their thorough compartmentalization and their watertight integrity, but looters and poor maintenance had made sealing Ostfriesland impossible.  The battleship was already taking on water before the bombing began. More importantly, with no damage control teams on board, even relatively minor damage could prove lethal.

Finally (and in the only point that supports Mitchell) Ostfriesland had no munitions aboard.  This rendered the battleship effectively immune to loss through catastrophic explosion, although the ability of the bombs used by the Army Air Service to penetrate Ostfriesland's magazines is in considerable question. Mitchell did violate the rules of the exercise, but not to the extent that it made much of a difference to the outcome.

The Army Air Service sank Ostfriesland and a variety of other old American and German vessels, helping both services to learn a great deal about targeting and bomb damage.  Mitchell's interest was in propaganda, however; he used the sinking of the old battleship to argue that surface vessels of any kind were effectively obsolete in the face of determined air attack.  It bears note that Mitchell was not predicting that surface ships would become vulnerable at some point in the future; he made clear his belief that the USN was already obsolete as of the early 1920s.

It's fair to say that Wildenberg is not impressed by Billy Mitchell, and that he generally tilts towards the Navy's side of the conflict. Wildenberg lands clear punches, demonstrating that while Mitchell was an effective organizational commander and an excellent propagandist, he had severe shortcomings as a strategist.  The subject is complicated, because while planes can't sink battleships as easily as Mitchell suggested, they surely can sink them. Mitchell's claims for the capacity of aircraft to sink warships were wildly overstated, and were wrong in many of the particulars. But it's less clear that they were so wrong as to be unproductive. The extent to which the battleship was obsolete prior to 1939 has been (in part because of Mitchell and his partisans) strongly overstated, but then most major powers either curtailed battleship construction or ended it entirely once World War II began.  It also bears note that Mitchell was quite right about the pointlessness of lighter-than-air aviation, and about many aspects of the interwar military aviation complex.

But then Mitchell's advocacy was surely unproductive in terms of the details of how aircraft could be used for coastal defense. Heavy, level bombers were nearly useless in World War II for attacks against naval vessels, as warships proved far too fast, maneuverable, and heavily armed to succumb to high altitude level bombing. In a prediction that didn't pan out, Mitchell suggested:

If the same method of battleship construction is continued, in the future no crw will stay on a battleship when aircraft comein sight.  The captian will have to stick at his post and will probably send for a bottle of torpedo fluid to help him, and everyone else will immediately jump overboard.  When the alarm of airplanes in sight is given, the crew will immediately put on gas masks, kapok coats in order to float in the water, asbestos shoes and gloves so as to be able to touch the hot metal, and parachutes so that they will be able to open them and come down alright when blown into the air.

Hyperbole yes, but not particularly helpful hyperbole. Dedicated dive and torpedo bombers, usually (although not always) developed by navies, would sink the vast majority of warships during the war.  Level bombers did better against civilian shipping, but this was not envisioned to be a serious operational task  in the early inter-war period.  And Mitchell was egregiously wrong about the effectiveness of carriers and carrier aircraft, which he believed would always be at a disadvantage against land-based air.  Granting that Mitchell had a point with respect to aircraft sinking warships also requires appreciating that he got the details entirely wrong, and that he advocated policies that would have produced tactical and organizational disaster. 

But Wildenberg probably goes too far when he draws Mitchell's personal history into the dispute.  He illustrates his narrative with passages from Mitchell's life, stories that generally do not reflect well on the aviator. These passages  add color to the account (he probably shot his first wife, for example), but also tend to obscure the argument by portraying Mitchell more cartoonishly than is strictly necessary. There were undoubtedly a significant number of officers on each side of the three way argument between the Army, the Air Service, and the Navy who suffered from alcoholism, who liked the ponies a bit overmuch, and who wildly overspent their means. Detailing these characteristics primarily for Mitchell and not for the other antagonists leaves a lopsided story that is, if anything, unfair to Mitchell.

Wildenberg doesn't present much in the way of a general theory of inter-service conflict, but it's not hard to develop one.  Essentially, inter-service tension in the interwar period precluded the development not only of good cooperative procedures in areas of common interest, but also of the development of knowledge.  Mitchell had a sincere interest in the bombing exercises, but his goals were mainly political, rather than the development of tactics, techniques, and technologies for using air and naval assets together.  Mitchell wanted to prove that aircraft could kill specific battleships in order to kill the idea of battleships. The Navy appreciated that someone would try to sink its ships with aircraft, and even if it believed that Mitchell overstated the air threat, it did need a technical understanding of how bomb damage affected warships. The question was under what conditions, and what factors could either enhance the ability of friendly aircraft to sink enemy ships, or prevent the sinking of friendly ships by enemy aircraft. But faced with the political threat posed by Mitchell and his enthusiasts,  the Navy grew understandably reluctant to put even its older ships at the service of the Army.

In the long run, this dynamic would hurt the Army Air Corps more than the Navy.  Navy exercises and planning in the 1930s demonstrated the potential effectiveness of dive and torpedo bombers, even if it took some time in practice to develop effective anti-aircraft techniques.  The Air Corps entered the war with an excess of optimism about the role that B-17s could play in coastal defense, while simultaneously lacking any understanding of how heavy bombers might support the anti-submarine effort (although obviously the Navy hardly covered itself with glory on this score in the first year of the war). Threatening the Navy forced it to circle the (battle) wagons, which limited the extent to which the Air Service could prepare for the next war.  Everybody likes aggressive, enthusiastic activism than threatens entrenched interests, but those interests may respond in generally unproductive ways.

This is an interesting book, and if it had come out earlier I would have found it useful in my own work.  The research appears sound, and the argument is largely correct.  I can't help feel, however, that the case could have been made more carefully. The book could also have been organized more clearly, as some of the early chapter are much longer than their later counterparts (this may be my own pet peeve). Nevertheless, it's a good one volume account of how bitterly the Navy and the Air Service fought for prominence in the interwar period. Cross-posted at LGM.

Navy IAMD

The folks at CIMSEC have posted an informative piece on the future direction of Navy IAMD by Captain Jim Kilby of the OPNAV Staff.  Jim has forgotten more about IAMD than most of us know, and his appearance on the One-Star List last week was a surprise to no one.

The bottom line for Kilby is that the threats and the systems we field to counter them will drive us toward a higher state of readiness and professionalism in IAMD.  Surface Warfare is returning to its Sea Control roots, and IAMD is a big part of that mission.  The plain truth is that the world's most devastating power projection force cannot do its job unless it controls the (maritime) terrain from which it operates.  IAMD is key to that proposition.

Bryan McGrath