Thursday, April 30, 2024

Carrier costs as a SWAG unit

According to an AP story, the maintenance currently underway for the USS Enterprise(CVN 65), intended to allow her to continue to serve at least until the completion of her next deployment in 2012-2013, has gotten more expensive.  The 16-month process is currently slated to cost (after this latest rise) around $480 million.

That sounds like an awful lot for a three to four year capability.  Bear in mind that this does not include the normal operating costs of the Enterprise; this is purely capital expense work done to make the ship able to deploy.  It also sounds like a lot given that we have been arguing on this blog over ship costs ranging from $500 million to $2 billion in total, and calling them 'expensive' in a lot of cases.

I just wanted to post this and add a small bit of perspective, because I know I needed the sanity check when I saw it.  The latest (and probably last) Nimitz class carrier, the CVN 77 USS George W. Bush, is reported (also by the AP) as costing around $6.3 billion current dollars to procure.  The Enterprise is looking at a usable life of around 50 years if she retires around 2012, having made her maiden shakedown cruise in January 1962.  If you divide it out, that means we're paying $120 million per year for the continuation of Enterprise.  Dividing out the cost of the GWB, if she serves fifty years, she'll cost us $126 million per year in original capital expense.  

I'm no finance person, but those numbers are pretty darn close. If they are reliable, it means that refurbishing a 50-year-old carrier carries roughly the same cost as building one new in terms of usable ship-years.  Now I know I'm just using Kentucky windage; I haven't addressed the fact that the maintenance is required to get 4 of those original fifty years which were (theoretically) already paid for, and that the ship has had several maintenance cycles in the past.  None of this is solid in terms of actual cost calculations.  But it does indicate that the 'rule of thumb' numbers that are sometimes used (productively) for shipbuilding and maintenance are actually fairly consistent.

When I was actively doing research on this stuff in the 1990s, we used to call a carrier a $5 billion expense, with another $5 billion for the airwing (which you would buy twice over the carrier's lifespan what with new models, attrition, etc). and another $5 billion for the escorts.  Although the Enterprise may cost more in terms of her operational expenses due to her unique reactor configuration and the fact that she's a single-ship class, it looks like the SWAG number for a 'carrier year' is around $120-130 million exclusive of operations costs.  Potentially useful as we argue over carrier fleet sizes in 10 or 20 year increments.

Photo of the Enterprise under construction at Newport News via Navsource.org

Tough Love for My British Brothers...

Following the failures of the Boer wars Kipling wrote, "Its a difficult thing to admit it, but as a grown-up nation we should; we’ve had a hell of a beating, it will do us no end of good." Is there a Kipling in Great Britain today? If so, he or she is probably a journalist or blogger, and likely dismissed as a malcontent.

I'm asking the tough question at the USNI Blog today: Was the British military defeated in Iraq?

Phase 0 Operations For Failed States MIA

The question continues to be asked, what is the solution to the piracy problem? The question was posed by the Senate during the nomination process of Ray Mabus and Bob Work, just like it is continuously asked every where else. I think there are plenty of good ideas, although I am not sure which ideas would be seen as compelling at this time. For example, I think as part of the arsenal of soft power, the United States maritime services need to have the strategic capability to organically establish a Coast Guard, but all of the supporting reasons and analysis of this idea would take three thousand words, at least. Perhaps some other time.

What the question reveals is what bothers me. First, the question reveals the reality that the answer doesn't exist. Nobody in the Navy knows, and before that is considered a problem it is still being debated whether this is a problem to be solved by the Navy, or the Coast Guard. The policy suggests this is law enforcement thus a Coast Guard problem, because if it was a Navy problem we would be discussing use of force and rules of engagement, a conversation I have not seen in public.

What the question also reveals however is even more troubling. The United States National Defense Strategy, National Security Strategy, Cooperative Maritime Strategy, and virtually all operational guidance produced for decades has never specifically addressed how the military would manage this issue. Cooperation with allies is not an end of strategy, it is a way to execute a strategy. There is no strategy for piracy with an end that is currently possible under the limitations of current policy.

Somalia is a failed state, which leads me to a question. Where is the PPT that discusses Phase 0 shaping operations for failed states. I have spent considerable time lately researching Phase 0 concepts for both the Navy and Marines, and I have not seen any analysis regarding shaping operations, what is called Phase 0, for failed states. None.

Piracy is a symptom of a failed state, just like hunger, violence, drugs, and an abundance of other illegal activities. If the Navy or Marines had Phase 0 plans for a failed state, then those plans would be in motion right now. For whatever reason, all Phase 0 planning conducted by the Navy and Marines has been based on a Westphalian system of sovereign states assuming governments that could be worked with.

If I was the Navy, I would be calculating the cost of developing, building, deploying, and sustaining at sea for an extended period of time a Coast Guard in the ungoverned waters off a failed state. A cost comparison of that effort against what it is currently costing the international community in their anti-piracy efforts would determine whether that idea is even realistic. I would suggest that because there is no plan to organically generate a Coast Guard for a foreign country, the process of building the Iraqi Coast Guard has been a painfully expensive and time consuming exercise.

If I was the Marines, I would be asking whether the SC MAGTF has properly accounted for the conditions of a failed state for Phase 0, because from everything I have read it does not. This raises an important question, if Phase 0 is the population engagement to build working relationships and partnerships, does Phase 0 for the Marines in regards to a failed state begin at sea? After all, there is a population at sea who as recently as Tuesday, appears to have segments fed up enough with the troublemakers that they are willing to confront them. That suggests there is something to be gained by a population engagement exercise at sea, if we had the distributed, persistent presence to actually engage the population in a meaningful way.

The case for small ships that can support squads of Marines, and enough of those small ships to insure the integrity of platoons, perhaps even company's of Marines can be made, but first we have to accept the possibility that a requirement for Phase 0 operations for failed states exists. As of today, as evidenced by our mostly unsuccessful reaction to Somalia piracy, the possibility that a requirement for Phase 0 operations for failed states does not appear to exist in either the Navy or Marine Corps.

It is one thing to suggest the need to address piracy specifically is not a strategic priority for the maritime services, but it is strategically unsound to suggest that the absence of Phase 0 strategic, tactical, and operational capabilities that curb symptoms of failed states is an acceptable condition.

2010 QDR Terms of Reference Fact Sheet

Press release from here (PDF)

The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) is a legislatively-mandated (USC 10, Sec. 118 (a)) review of Department of Defense (DoD) strategy and priorities. DoD is preparing now to conduct this review, which takes place every four years and will be provided to Congress in early 2010.

The QDR will assess the threats and challenges the nation faces and re-balance DoD’s strategies, capabilities and forces to address today’s conflicts and tomorrow’s threats.
  • The QDR is one of the principal means by which the tenets of the National Defense Strategy are translated into potentially new policies, capabilities and initiatives.
  • The QDR will set a long-term course for DoD to follow and will provide a strategic framework for DoD’s annual program, force development, force management, and corporate support mechanisms.
  • Other strategic reviews, as well as day-to-day decisions will be carried out while the QDR is underway and will inform its deliberations.
  • Previous QDRs were conducted in 1997, 2001, and 2006.
The strategic environment we face is complex and the security challenges - both current and those on the horizon - are wide ranging. The global economic downturn adds to the complexity.
  • Key security challenges include violent extremist movements, the spread of weapons of mass destruction, rising powers with sophisticated weapons, failed or failing states, and increasing encroachment across the global commons (air, sea, space, cyberspace).
  • U.S. strategy must also increasingly account for a series of powerful trends that are reshaping the international landscape and will dramatically complicate the exercise of American statecraft and overseas relations.
  • In addition to the current global economic downturn, these trends include climate change, cultural and demographic shifts, increasing scarcity of resources and the spread of destabilizing technologies.
  • The U.S. must prevail in current conflicts while preparing for future contingencies.
  • The 2010 QDR will address these emerging challenges and explore ways to improve the balance of efforts and resources between:
  1. Trying to prevail in current conflicts and preparing for future contingencies, and
  2. Institutionalizing capabilities such as counterinsurgency and foreign military assistance and maintaining the United States’ existing conventional and strategic technological edge against other military forces.
The specific areas of emphasis for this QDR include:
  • Further institutionalizing irregular warfare and civil support abroad capabilities and capacities, to include building partnership capacity,
  • Addressing threats posed from the use of advanced technology and WMD,
  • Global Force Posture,
  • Strengthening DoD support to civilian-led operations and activities, and
  • Managing the Department’s internal business processes to improve their efficiency and effectiveness.
The QDR process embraces a “whole of government” approach. As such, DoD will consult with other U.S. Government departments and agencies and appropriate Congressional committees.
  • The QDR will be informed by similar reviews being conducted by the Department of Homeland Security (Quadrennial Homeland Security Review), the Director of National Intelligence (Quadrennial Intelligence Community Review), and incorporate guidance from relevant National Security Council (NSC) reviews.
  • In addition, a series of separate congressionally-directed reviews of the Department’s nuclear, space and missile defense postures will be closely coordinated with the QDR, but still provide separate reports to Congress.
  • The 2010 QDR process will also include consultation mechanisms with key allies and partners.
  • The Secretary of Defense has established a governance structure to manage the coordination of the QDR.
  • The QDR will be led by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and Joint Staff. OSD and Joint Staff leadership will work closely with representatives from the Military Services and Combatant Commands and across OSD components.
  • Combatant Commanders and Service Chiefs will engage often in helping to shape issues and frame decisions for the review.

Wednesday, April 29, 2024

The Cost Of A Few Pictures

The Air Force and White House Military Office thought it a good idea to spend $328,835 to update the PA pictures of Air Force One. In that price they see shiny, new photos to give away and I see a week's worth of underway time lost.

Latest Anti-Piracy Efforts

The weather must be pretty good out in the Indian Ocean off the African east coast, because the daily reports streaming in are beginning to suggest the activity of both sides is very high.

Are you reading these stories? Most of them are frustrating, for example, the Indian Navy has captured 9 pirates who attempted to hijack the cruise ship Melody. That's the good news, but check out the events that proceeded the pickup.
The European Union's Maritime Security Centre (MSC) said the pirates were intercepted by a Spanish warship, the Numancia. The suspects, who were "in poor health," were released as a result of lack of evidence, but the Seychelles coastguard then picked them up.

"The capture operation was conducted in co-operation with a... French maritime patrol aircraft and a warship from the Indian Navy which also discovered an abandoned skiff not far from the scene," the MSC said.
In other words, first the Spanish caught the pirates, then the Spanish released the pirates. Then the Seychelles coast guard caught the pirates, and now the Indians have taken them into custody. There is a Vince Lombardi quote waiting to be shouted with these stories.

Pirates attacked a tanker on Monday, but news reports tell the story of the Russian crew fighting off the pirates with fire hoses. The Russian Navy destroyer Admiral Panteleyev went hunting for the pirate attackers and ended up picking up 29 pirates. The equipment found is noteworthy.
"Seven Kalashnikov rifles, various pistols and an aluminum ladder were discovered during a search of the ship," RIA Novosti quoted the source as saying. Satellite navigation equipment and a large amount of ammunition was also seized.

"This allows us to assume that this group of pirates undertook two unsuccessful attempts to seize the TF Commander tanker with a Russian crew that was traveling through this region yesterday," RIA quoted the source as saying.
Depends on the court, but if the pirates are sent to a court in Russia these pirate dudes are done. In Kenya, the Russians may be assuming too much.

38 pirates captured, but unfortunately, there are questions whether any of them will be charged. Still, it is good to see both Russia and India in the fight.

Lind's Blinders...

Due to my current contract, I am not allowed to embrace the technical debate that would explain how William Lind apparently doesn't know anything about the Information Technology business, much less Cyber Security for the Department of Defense for the United States of America. He can chase black helicopters and conspiracy theories all day, but I'd bet at least 5 shots of Canadian Whiskey (I'm a Crown Royal fan until summer gets here) that the problem that triggered his rant doesn't originate in the DoD or any government entity, rather the private sector.

But I will say this. There are several legitimate reasons why websites, blogs, and other forms of social media sites on the web are blocked. If your website or blog is blocked, please understand you can do something about it besides whine.

Use Feedburner, or some other form of syndication software to distribute your content, including by email. Organizations including the military may block Blogger but typically they do not block syndication service sites because from an IT perspective, syndication services like Feedburner is a better way to manage bandwidth for larger enterprises. If an organization is blocking syndication sites too, then your organization has a very strict IT policy, BUT if your favorite websites are distributing content by email, problem solved.

For all you Pentagon folks, I have no idea what man made act of God has allowed this blog to survive the kill lists. All I know is that I owe someone, somewhere a drink. However, if it ever does get blocked, you know how to get around that problem. Also, the reason why you are restricted to so many places you believe you should have access to is because technology has not evolved as far as we would all like. The DoD, just like every other large enterprise, can only afford a single backbone for most internet access, and because private information tends to run on that same backbone, until the services can come up with the money, equipment, and manpower to deploy multiple backbones and separate internal and external access, you will be in the same boat as the vast majority of major companies in the United States...

and live with some form of website filtering restrictions.

UNITAS Gold 50-09 Order of Battle

Not a complete list, but SOUTHCOM public affairs do an outstanding job. For the record, this picture is one of my favorites in a awhile. One of my favorite US ship classes with one of my favorite European ship classes in one photo.

One day I'll do a post on all the reasons why I love the Berlin class, because while it may not look it, those are two of the most scalable medical capable military vessels afloat in the world. In my world, that looks like part of the high mix in a high/low Influence Squadron.

United States

24th Marine Regiment
Air Test and Evaluation Squadron ONE (VX-1)
Amphibious Squadron 8
Carrier Air Wing 3
Destroyer Squadron Four Zero
Florida Air National Guard
Patrol and Reconnaissance Wing 11 (CPRW 11)
Riverine Group One
U.S. Naval Forces Southern Command / U.S. Fourth Fleet
USCGC Thetis (WMEC 910)
USS Ashland (LSD 48)
USS Donald Cook (DDG 75)
USS Doyle (FFG 39)
USS Forrest Sherman (DDG 98)
USS John L. Hall (FFG 32)
USS Kauffman (FFG 59)
USS Mesa Verde (LPD 19)
USS Oscar Austin (DDG 79)
USS San Jacinto (CG 56)

Brazil

BNS Constituicao (F42)
BNS Tikuna (S 34)

Canada

HMCS Montreal (336)
HMCS Corner Brook (S 878)

Chile

CF Blanco (CF-15)

Colombia

ARC Almirante Padilla (FL 51)
ARC Catagena De Indias (BL 161)

Germany

FGS Sachsen (F219)
FGS Lubeck (F214)
Franfurt Am Main (A1412)

Mexico

ARM Mina
ARM Oaxaca

Peru

BAP Palacios (FM 56)

Tuesday, April 28, 2024

Serious, but Entertaining

So I've been reading all day about the various folks undergoing the nomination process today on Capitol Hill, generally attempting to stay informed as I like to do... when an otherwise serious discussion turns... intergalactic.
Two new Obama administration senior officials got sent up for nomination today: Philip Mudd, undersecretary-designate for intelligence at the Department of Homeland Security; and Kurt Campbell, assistant secretary-designate for East Asian and Pacific Affairs at the State Department....

Campbell is, with Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Michele Flournoy, a co-founder of the Center for a New American Security, which is the most powerful global-affairs institution since the Trilateral Commission, except that one day it will come up with a plan for intergalactic exploration and conquest. I hear Andrew Exum is writing a paper about a population-centric-counterinsurgency approach for the Alpha Centaurions.
I'm such a nerd. Rather than follow up on the meat of the article, all I could focus on was how Spencer misspelled Alpha Centaurians. Art Bell is not impressed.

Given my own history of terrible grammar, I should just walk away. In the meantime, I wanted to highlight the written Q&A testimony of Ray Mabus (PDF) and Bob Work (PDF) who had their turn today. A webcast of the testimony is available here (have not seen this yet).

I thought the questions were more revealing than the answers in many cases.

Preparing Officers and Selecting Leaders

The current senior generation of officers has answered the nation’s call. It has both staffed and commanded more operations involving joint and interagency activity than any other since the Second World War. But many of these officers were “self-made” or “trained on the job,” gaining the necessary credentials, experience, and foreign-language skills through their own initiative. Just as the Navy formalized the creation of superb pilots and elite nuclear engineers, so should it enhance its formal mechanisms to create the new naval officer,with the ability to work in the joint, international, and interagency arenas.

One important point—at the end of the day, the heart of a naval officer is not defined by training tracts or career patterns, for these will eventually pass away and be replaced, as they always have.

What lies at the heart of this profession are the core beliefs of our lives: the courage, honor, and commitment to duty we must each find within ourselves. Yet beyond those vital and central elements, there lies the terrain of education, training, and experience. Those elements can and must be shaped to best advantage in this emerging and unruly twenty-first century.

A sense of historical perspective may inspire us to action. In 1919, Ernest J. King, then a captain, reflected on the events of the FirstWorldWar. Though the U.S. officer corps appeared to have acquitted itself in battle and had emerged victorious against the German U-boat, King knew it could have done better. He recognized that though the Navy had helped “win” the war, the old officer development system and “prewar career patterns had been overtaken by events.”

King and his generation profoundly reformed the Navy officer corps in the years after 1919 and laid the foundation for the creation of the officer corps that would lead theNavy to victory in the SecondWorldWar. Today we face similar challenges; our officer corps model has been “overtaken by events” and is in need of reform.

The Heart of an Officer: Joint, Interagency, and International Operations and Navy Career Development, Admiral James Stavridis, U.S. Navy, and Captain Mark Hagerott, U.S. Navy, Naval War College Review Spring 2009
A friend of mine who works in a Washington think tank recently asked if there were any questions I would ask Ray Mabus in the Senate confirmation hearings. Uhm... hell yes! It took me about 2 minutes to get on the phone and go through a short list. Among the many questions one could ask the incoming Secretary of the Navy, the most important question I think that needs to be asked would go something like this:

In the 21st century the United States has nearly lost one war in Iraq and may be losing another today in Afghanistan, despite winning every single major tactical engagement on the battlefield. Despite clear tactical and operational success in action on the ground, it has been strategic thinking that has defined the success and failure of our military engagements in the 21st century. As part of the Army's reaction to near fatal strategic failure in Iraq, General Petreaus was pulled off the battlefield in Iraq to chair a promotion board for brigadier generals. It was unprecedented for the commander of an active theater to be brought back to head something like that.

Leading up to this, the Army had long been criticized for rewarding conventional military thinking and experience in traditional combat operations. The Navy has long been criticized for the same thing. My questions would be whether the Navy needs to change the promotion process, and if so how can the Navy inject some new thinking into the promotion process to insure future Naval leadership is prepared properly for the challenges of the 21st century? How does the Secretary of the Navy guard against peacetime processes that fail the service in preparing for war? As far as I am concerned, the CNO hasn't been asked that question enough to produce a meaningful answer.

I spent several hours over the weekend Googling the names of the folks on this list. There are some studs, what I would call "no brainers" on that list. There were also a bunch of folks I couldn't find any information on, which doesn't mean anything. I have no problem with the list, I am sure everyone selected is qualified. However, I do have problems with some of the patterns one finds among the folks on the list. Of all the folks I found information on, all the aviators were basically the same, and all the SWOs were basically the same. I'm not talking about their personalities, I know each individual is unique, but I am saying it is difficult to find very many variations in terms of career path. From a career path perspective, the list is essentially a bunch of clones. In my opinion, the current career track that drives the promotion system is part of the culture of copy I have discussed in the past.

For example, if you are an aviator who is a CO of a special mission squadron, I am sorry to tell you sir but if this list sets the standard you are unlikely to find promotion. If you took time to learn a foreign language, you know, as the maritime strategy suggests... this 0-6 list does not appear based to list your name (unless you squeezed this in during a command assignment, which is not likely). The number of names that turned up something unique was around 30, mostly in the form of a previously earned award, someone who commanded a NECC unit, worked in patrol boats, or was a SEAL TEAM leader. I do not want to suggest I am diminishing the quality of the selections, there are some real studs on that list, but there are also patterns that could suggest the culture of copy is built into the career track promotion system.

Want to be really disappointed? Google the names and look at how folks on that list have written an article, anywhere. Who would have thought when Admiral Stavridis told junior officers to "Read, Think, Write, Publish" he was potentially giving bad career advice.

In the article quoted above, Admiral Stavridis and Captain Hagerott offer an alternative idea regarding the career tracks that would influence the promotion process.
It is possible to structure the line community so as to accommodate new expertise we need now,make the line more adaptive to unexpected changes we know the future will hold, and at the same time preserve core competencies in the platform communities. Specifically, the line could be restructured into three career “tracks” that complement but cut across the existing platform communities; we call them the Joint/Interagency Operations track, the Technical track, and the General Operations track.

The three-track career construct for the Unrestricted Line explicitly acknowledges that its officers are currently expected to do too much in the time allotted. The three-track system recognizes that a growing number of officers need to develop expertise going beyond the platform. The three-track system would point line officers earlier in their careers to paths that would prepare some for joint/interagency operational careers (language, culture, regional knowledge, interagency activities), some for technically oriented careers, and some for more general and maritime operational careers. The modified system would, however, preserve both core platform competencies and the Navy’s culture of “command at sea.”
Like any article published in the NWC Review, this article is comprehensive in explanation and a very interesting idea. I am not sure if it is the right way ahead, but I do think it offers a compelling argument why the Navy needs to make a course correction for a process of developing naval leaders several decades old and clearly in need of adjustment. Today, the Navy promotion system is essentially a culture of copy. A broader demand of skills is being required according to the Navy's own leaders as expressed in the Navy's own strategic concept, and yet the promotion process is a cold war legacy absent reflection of the changing environment the Navy is operating in.

Any change to the current system would probably not be in place by next year, so if I was making recommendations, I would review the career tracks and target 2011 for implementing adjustments into the career tracks. For 2010, and perhaps longer if indeed a transition period is required from the current career track system to a new system, I would suggest adopting the Army's model and shaking things up a bit.

For new flag officers, I would suggest that Admiral Roughead appoints Admiral Stavridis to head the promotion board. I would also suggest that Admiral Roughead appoints Admiral Crowder to chair the 0-6 promotion board. If the Navy is serious about executing the maritime strategy, put the Navy's two big name maritime strategists in charge of these two very critical promotion boards. Given how many ships we are moving to the Pacific, it may also be prudent to put Admiral Willard in charge of the 0-5 board, because if the Pacific is the focus of the fleet, would anyone in the Navy know better than Admiral Willard what kind of CDRs the fleet needs right now? Think about it...

I'd like to see Ray Mabus asked about the Navy's career track and promotion systems, a prudent question I think following what many in the Army have called a disastrous peacetime promotion process that nearly lost the war in Iraq. The Navy hasn't faced a major challenge at sea in over 6 decades, so more than any other service the Navy must guard against peacetime processes that potentially fail to keep the Navy preparing leadership for the future. It begins with leadership, not only by executing necessary adjustments to insure the Navy is on the right path, but selecting future leadership prepared for the challenges of the future.

What to Watch For...

If you are not following the short video clips Commandant Thad Allen is uploading to the iCommandant blog, you are missing something interesting. Knowing the DoD, these videos are probably blocked to the folks reading this from your work location, so you may have to see it for yourself at home. This is a very clever idea. I got some detail from the Coast Guard regarding the technology at work here.
It is really low-tech effort with some good potential ROI. The videos are shot with a standard digital still camera with some basic video capability and then uploaded onto Flickr, which can then be blogged out through iCommandant which links to his Facebook.
This is a very clever way to leverage low tech stuff for strategic communications, and there are few limits to how useful this could be. The videos are short and sweet, leveraging simple technology for video-blogging that could realistically be done by any public affairs person on any ship in the fleet under virtually any circumstances, and the small size of the short & simple videos supports lower bandwidth requirements.

It reminds me of something VADM Harvey said the other day.
Just an example that woman from Scotland who sang [Susan Boyle]… I think the number of views of that 4-5 minute video is up to a fairly staggering number. Now clearly there is a fairly large human interest piece in that story, but I think of how, if we had on Facebook, the ability to respond rapidly to the events of Easter Sunday went down in terms of getting our hostage Captain Phelps back. I think that would have been seen by lots of people as an opportunity to talk about the Navy and why we have a role to play and what the role is and establish that broad level of awareness that I think is lacking in the nation for a large number of reasons.
VADM Harvey clearly understands that strategic communications is about capturing moments. It looks like the Coast Guard has found a clever way to do something exactly like that with a popular medium: video, and promote it not only through a blog, but also through a Facebook page. When I talk about leveraging social media for strategic communications, I try to emphasize consistency and congruency, because when implemented with consistency a social network can build expectations with the target audience and connect.

With something like this video-blogging concept, the Coast Guard connects directly to the target audience by bypassing the filters (opinion shaping) of the press. With a short video, one doesn't have to worry about which quote becomes the story, because the entire short video is available to all to be quoted by anyone.

This technology in the hands of some smart Coast Guard PA folks could be fascinating to observe when hurricane season comes. Add the two way content flow and ease of use (cell phone) potential of Twitter to the information flow possibilities available to the Coast Guard this upcoming hurricane season, and I'd suggest it is going to be very interesting to see how the new information tools the Coast Guard is leveraging influences the information flow in future hurricane emergencies. With a bit of planning ahead, the Coast Guard could potentially capture the moment that VADM Harvey is talking about.

Now you might be wondering how the Navy could use this type of technology. Easy. Interview folks on the USNS Comfort (T-AH 20) with a quick video 30 second clip every day and upload the videos to the Continuing Promise 2009 blog (and Facebook page).

But if they were really thinking, they would also do a video every day in Spanish and upload it to a Spanish language Continuing Promise 2009 blog targeting the media, naval enthusiasts, health experts and organizations, and every local charity, organization, or group that can be found online in the regions the ship is visiting. And when you get to those places, you interview the locals in the videos. With a bit of tactical success hitting the target audience of these regions, local politicians will request to be on the videos.

More Submarine Orders in the Pacific

With Russian exports to China drying up, a new market for submarines is a good thing during tough economic times. This is unlikely to be well received in China.
Admiralty Shipyards in St. Petersburg will build six Kilo class diesel-electric submarines for delivery to Vietnam, the Russian business daily Kommersant said on Monday.

The paper quoted company general director Vladimir Aleksandrov as saying that Russia's state arms exporter Rosoboronexport would soon sign a contract with a foreign state, and that Admiralty Shipyards had been chosen to fulfill this contract.

Sources in Rosoboronexport later confirmed that Russia and Vietnam had been negotiating a $1.8 billion deal on the delivery of six Kilo-class submarines to the Vietnamese navy for about a year.

Admiralty Shipyards is currently building two Kilo class submarines for Algeria to be delivered in 2009 and 2010.
When you begin to think about all of the nations operating submarines in the Pacific, it becomes quite clear why moving the Virginia class program to 2 boats a year is an important priority for the Navy. Nations currently ordering, building, fielding, or preparing to build modern submarines in the Pacific include Russia, South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, China, Singapore, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Australia.

If we include the rest of Asia, the list would include India, Pakistan, Iran, Israel, and potentially Saudi Arabia and the UAE in the near future.

More than any other 21st century technology, the US Navy needs something akin to an underwater superiority system; which I think would be a networked technology that is not only effective in detecting and neutralizing very quiet submarines, but also doesn't kill sea life which will get the environmental lobby off the Navy's back.

Monday, April 27, 2024

If a Chinese Aircraft Carrier Moves 2 Miles, Is it News?

That didn't take long. The ex-Varyag was moved to the other side of Dalian shipyard today, most likely for the purposes of being fitted out. Based on the 3rd photo below, it looks to me (and I am ready to be corrected) that the carrier has been moved to 38.937131N / 121.611831E, which is about a 2 mile trip by sea.

These are not great resolution, sorry about that. Feel free to speculate, but there is no reason to move the carrier into that spot unless they are ready to do some serious work on the carrier.

More images here.

USS New Orleans in Dry Dock

I posted some pictures here you may want to see.

The Service Academy Debate Continues

This has gone from something I rejected outright to something I am learning a lot about, and it is changing my opinion.

Monday Notes

In contrast with the scuttlebutt going around regarding the less than flattering approach to bloggers by RADM Thorp at Milbloggers 2009 conference, we have an interview with VADM Harvey on the subject of blogging.

I noted the good news for the Joint Strike Fighter VSTOL version.
"The performance level measured was absolutely exceptional," said J.D. McFarlan, Lockheed Martin F-35 Air Vehicle lead. "We demonstrated 41,100 pounds of vertical thrust against our requirement of 40,550 pounds. This means we will deliver excellent margin for the vertical landing and short takeoff performance we've committed to our STOVL customers," he said.
Now lets hope the jet fighter doesn't burn up flight decks.

Southern Partnership Station = mission accomplished. Story here.

Question. Is this what a peacetime posture looks like in the Indian Ocean, or is this a good thing?

Finally, UNITAS GOLD is the 50th iteration of the longest running multinational maritime training exercise in the world. See the US Order of Battle here. Also check out the photo gallery here.

Photo: ATLANTIC OCEAN (April 23, 2024) -- Ships from eleven countries sail in formation during the photo exercise (PHOTOEX) of UNITAS Gold, the 50th iteration of the annual multinational maritime exercise. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Alan Gragg/RELEASED) (Hi-Res)

Australian Defense Will Focus on China

Just as Australia’s strategic outlook has been dominated in past decades by American primacy in Asia, so in future will it be shaped more than anything else by what follows as American primacy fades and China grows. The biggest risk is not that China itself becomes a direct threat to Australia, but that the erosion of American power unleashes strategic competition among Asia’s strongest states, which in turn increases the risk that Australia could face a number of military threats to its interests or even its territorial security.

We can escape that risk if the US, China, Japan and eventually India can avoid escalating strategic competition by negotiating a new set of understandings to replace those that have kept Asia so peaceful for the past forty years. The essential basis of any new understanding would be a more equal sharing of power among these key states.

But is America really willing to treat China as an equal? Will China settle for anything less? And can either treat Japan as an equal? And will Japan — still a huge power — settle for less than China gets? Unless these questions can be resolved, it is hard to see how escalating strategic competition can be avoided in the longer term.

A FOCUSED FORCE: Australia’s Defence Priorities in the Asian Century, Lowy Institute Paper 26, April 2009, Hugh White, Executive Summary
Hugh White's report set the stage a few weeks ago for the upcoming release of the Australian Defense White paper, which in case you have not heard, is expected to reach conclusions in stark contrast to the United States. News reports in Australia have not been able to resist discussing the gap between the US and Australia regarding the future strategic environment of the Pacific. First it was reported that Australia's military planners asked the US to reconsider their dove-like assessment of China, and also rejected the broader "Gates View" that unconventional non-state conflicts being the primary strategic threat over the next 20-30 years. The rebuff was mutual, as 2 days later The Australian reported the CIA and Pentagon rejected the hawkish arguments made by Australia's Defense leaders about the threat poised by China.

It is noteworthy that Australia is calling China the "next cold war" and when they came to Washington earlier this month, the Australian military leaders has expectations to recruit the US towards this view. On the contrary, the US rejected this assessment, and agreed with opinions of Australia's Defense Intelligence Organization and the Office of National Assessments, also known as Australia's spy agencies, which suggest China's military build-up is defensive in nature and unlikely to pose a long-term threat to Australia's security.

Following that assessment, the Rudd Government appointed the head of the Lowry Institute, Allan Gyngall, as the new head of ONA. It is noteworthy that another former ONA chief, Geoff Miller, had recently stated the following regarding the strategic threat regarding China as reported on The Australian blog.
CAMERON Stewart and Patrick Walters ("Defence plan rejects US strategy”, 13/4) report that “a group of senior Defence officials and ... army, navy and air force chiefs” have successfully argued, in the context of the coming defence white paper, that “Australia’s future defence force should be structured primarily for involvement in conventional warfare”, with China as “the greatest strategic danger to Australia”. To meet this danger, Australia should have new frigates, destroyers and 12 new generation submarines.

This view of China as a strategic danger seems at odds with our existing national policies towards China, our second largest trading partner and source of thousands of students at our universities. The main points of current difference are over the non-war-like topics of the timing and content of a free trade agreement, and how much and what kinds of investment each should allow from the other.

Setting aside the question of the validity of the reported “China threat” analysis, it is surely the height of hubris to suppose that if China—a nuclear power and a country now frequently mentioned as a member, with the US, of a coming global “Group of Two”—decided, against all expectations, to threaten us militarily, we could deter it or defend against it by our own efforts. In such extreme circumstances we would have one recourse, and that is our alliance with the US.

We need to question the rationale for this proposed force build-up. Apparently a force including 12 “new generation” submarines is envisaged. How realistic is this when we can only muster crews for half of the six Collins-class submarines we presently have?
I have a serious question. Wouldn't a massive naval and air force buildup in Australia be in best interests of the US? If the United States is going to reorganize towards a balanced force, wouldn't a military buildup by Australia be a good thing right now? We know that absent a major change in global conditions, the Obama administration plan is to maintain static and potentially reduced defense budgets over the next few years. Under these conditions, and with both shipbuilding a mess and the retirement of the F-22 line, the US is making choices that reduce mid-term capabilities in major war in favor of dealing with the current wars the nation is in. Under those conditions, why wouldn't an offset in the Pacific in the form of Australia doing a major upgrade of naval and air force capabilities be a welcome thing for US strategy?

The way I see it, there are plenty of domestic debates that will come out of the defense white paper, most of which will be useful in informing the Australian public about the major military growth taking place in the Pacific. While I think the specifics regarding what kind of equipment is certainly a legitimate debate, particularly in regards to submarines because there have been severe crew shortages with the Collins class, the strategic direction expected in the Defense White Paper that focuses on China as the primary strategic challenge appears to me to be very much aligned with US interests.

It is important to note, the strategic direction of Australia does not necessarily need to match the strategic direction of the US, and the way I see it, a strategic direction that expands the capabilities of Australia in the Pacific at the high end is probably better for US strategic interests right now than creating a force optimized for small wars at this time. If Australia, South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan become more hardened against the potential threat of China, this reduces the risk to the US as we shift towards a balanced force.

Until the intentions of China are more transparent and better understood, the increase of defense capabilities at the high end in the Pacific decreases the risk for both the US and Europe who can then increase the capabilities of their military at the lower end. In this way, I see the strategic direction of Australia to make China the central strategic threat to Australia to be very much aligned with the current US direction towards a balanced force.

Sunday, April 26, 2024

Israels Naval War Against Iran... ?

Last month Israel supposedly sunk an Iranian arms ship off the Sudan intended to deliver weapons just south of Egypt, which is apparently widely accepted as a practice that Iran has been involved in getting weapons into Gaza. The attack, which supposedly sunk a ship that has no name, has never been confirmed even as the attack on the ground in Sudan of a convoy has been confirmed.

We now have word that someone has sunk a second ship in the same area. The ship is supposedly Iranian and the location is off the Sudan in the Red Sea.
An Iranian vessel loaded with weapons to transfer to Hamas via Sudan was recently sunk in the Red Sea by an unidentified missile ship believed to be Israeli, according to Arab media.

The vessel was attacked by either an Israeli or American ship and destroyed, according to a report Sunday in the Egyptian weekly Al-Usbua.

"The ship was destroyed at sea near the Sudanese coast," sources told the weekly, adding that the cargo was to be taken through the Sudanese and Sinai deserts. They said the incident occurred within the past two weeks.
IF it happened, and I still say both reports are big IFs...., but if it happened it was not a US ship. How do I know? Because the US doesn't have any ships that could have done it, primarily because none of our warships in the area have Harpoons. Could Israel have done this?

I never say never with Israel, but I still find it hard to believe Israel would be able to sink two ships in two months in the Red Sea and it would remain this quiet. The real issue isn't the regional nations, it is all the European ships in the region including the Red Sea that would probably see this type of event happen.

Maybe these events happened, but call me a skeptic.

Somali Pirate Tactics Evolving in Gulf of Aden

Looks like we are seeing another evolution, or at least good reporting on how they are operating. EagleOne has a must read up, follow all the way to the bottom of the post and pay attention.

Milbloggers Conference: The CHINFO Quote

From here.
The Navy seemed like it could not care less about the medium and basically told they have no time to deal with our requests. “I have to choose between the New York Times, the Pensacola Tribune, or a blog,” said Admiral Thorpe while raising his arms like a scale and placing the MSM on a higher plain.
For the sake of transparency, I should say Admiral Thorp has been nothing but good to me, and I do and will continue to defend him against his critics. I think that when you have to make the choice Frank is discussing, I think Frank is making the right choice.

With that said, organizations that understand and integrate social software into their public affairs don't have to make that choice though. I note that even the Coast Guard, which is way ahead of the Navy and other services regarding social media, doesn't understand that point. I've tried to explain it, but I think ultimately someone is going to have to show them. Based on what I've seen, that someone will end up being a defense contractor or think tank.

I can see how Admiral Thorp's comments would be seen as critical by milbloggers who have been blogging awhile. It appears there is a story yet to be told regarding a conversation between Maggie and RADM Thorp on this topic. The thing is, social software in the large enterprise is still new, and because a lot of mainstream media companies are still struggling with revenue models the maturity of social software as an enterprise function in public affairs is just not there for the Navy to be impressed yet.

If you believe that public affairs will likely be an online function of the enterprise in the future, then someone could fairly assume that it will be done with social software due to the two-way communication nature of the medium.

So while I think Frank is on target with the specific point he is making regarding social software, there may also be a point he is missing. It may not matter thought.

I would argue public affairs isn't really part of the problem because CHINFO is not organized to be part of the solution to the Navy's information challenges. The blogosphere isn't a media agent, for the most part blogs do not generate news. What blogs do is much more dangerous to the Navy, they help shape broader opinion, and right now it is the shaping of opinions in the strategic, operational, and industrial conversations where the blogosphere is operating without resistance, a space CHINFO largely does not operate because the primary voices CHINFO would promote are largely not engaged, and never can be under the current design with enough consistency to build consensus.

How many people outside the Navy know who Admiral Crowder is, what he does, or how he got to his current position? Clearly, Thomas Ricks doesn't, and he is more informed than 99% of Americans. Is that CHINFO's fault? A press release can't fix that problem, but a blog could.

But here is the kicker. How much harder does Admiral Roughead have to work on issues like shipbuilding because there is no consistent engagement on the strategic challenges of today's Navy? How does this influence conversations like the fighter gap? What about the LCS? How do ideas in the Navy become popular, or propagated? What makes a MSM reporter outside the defense media interested in a specific Navy discussion? Why has piracy led to the embrace of Influence Squadrons?

How many flag officers even realize that groups like CNAS are crowdsourcing ideas with social software right into the defense budget whether the military likes it or not? I think the Air Force gets it. Just wait until those folks get good at it, and their competitors start doing it too.

Why are certain strategic ideas floated in the think tanks more popular than others? Where does Congress go when looking for opinion? What makes an article about the Navy written in Proceedings, Armed Forces Journal, or National Defense Magazine influential? How much control does the Navy have regarding insuring the accuracy of events? A certain blue boat incident comes to mind.

If the Navy cannot answer those questions, then maybe the question should be asked how I know the answer and they don't. A blog is a lot of things, and one of those things is an interconnected input and output networked connection on the information highway. I'm not sure if the Navy needs a blog or not, but I would suggest that in an era of rapid demand for information, a lot of Navy leaders could sure use the effective functional inputs and outputs that social software offers, and in most cases the purposes would not be for public affairs so much as for purposes of strategic communications.

April a Record Month for Modern Piracy

This is clearly the two statistics of the day. Global piracy on the rise, via the Independent:
Piracy is enjoying its busiest month since modern records began, official figures show. With three days still to go, there have been 44 attacks on ships around the world - four more than in the whole of March, itself a record-breaking month.
This isn't good either.
Records kept by the International Maritime Bureau, which monitors commercial crime at sea, show that in all there were 102 attacks worldwide in the first three months of 2009, almost twice as many as a year ago.
That is because the folks in other parts of Africa are getting into the action. Check out the live piracy map (click image above for link) to see what I mean. Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, South China Sea, and Malacca Strait continues to be a problem. There are concerns that Somali type piracy could spread to other ungoverned and contested regions globally.

Finally, Somalia...
The seas off Somalia and the Gulf of Aden have become the most dangerous in the world, seeing 61 incidents from January to March, 10 times as many as during the same period in 2008.
April hasn't been a good month for setting 2nd quarter trends. Historically off Somalia, May comes with a lot of wind so we may see number of attacks drop if the weather isn't good, however historically the summer months are supposed to be a monsoon season, and yet piracy went up anyway last year.

Given how the pirates have picked up on modern technology, they are probably watching the weather just like the experts. In the case of piracy in the Strait of Malacca earlier this decade, the massive south east Asian tsunami played a major role in curbing the activity. One thing to watch for is a tsunami that could potentially hit one of these pirate cities and wipe out the boats used for piracy. Weather is a significant factor one should always keep an eye on.

Saturday, April 25, 2024

CTF-151 Goes International

The US Navy likes to share the responsibility with others. Combined Task Force 151, the task force formed to deal with Somali piracy, is a perfect example. It is not very well publicized who is and is not participating, although we know Great Britain, Singapore, Denmark, South Korea, and Turkey either are or have participated.

Now Turkey is going to lead CTF-151 beginning in May.
"The US Navy will transfer command of Combined Task Force (CTF) 151 to the Turkish Navy on Sunday May 3, 2009," Lieutenant Nathan Christensen of the Bahrain-based US Fifth Fleet said in a statement.

Rear Admiral Michelle Howard will hand over control of the task force to Turkish Rear Admiral Caner Bener in a ceremony aboard the Naval Support Activity (NSA) Bahrain, the Navy said.

"Turkey will be the second nation to command the counter-piracy task force. This also marks the first time Turkey will command a Combined Maritime Forces Task Force," the statement said.
By rotating leadership of the international task forces, the US Navy shares the burden of responsibility with international partners. It should also be noted that this is great for cooperation purposes, and over time could be a way the US Navy entices larger navies looking to form better integration of their forces with other international naval forces.

I'm thinking specifically of China and India. Russia has been working with the EU force, although the nice thing about CTF-151 is that when the EU finishes its first year long tour, the Europeans can either choose to do it again themselves another year, or choose to participate with CTF-151.

I think the EU will go with CTF-151, because it isn't about sharing the credit when it comes to Somali piracy, it is about sharing the blame. Getting every nation under a single command will improve the international response though, and getting that command under a UN flag could, potentially, provide legal and political coverage to nations who know that more needs to be done to curb piracy.

ONR's New Zamboni

The Office of Naval Research has built a Zamboni.



I like it, cleaning flight decks is not a small task, and getting all the slick nasty stuff off the deck is not an easy task. Even with no-skid it gets slick out there, and this looks like a smart, inexpensive way to address the issue.

Full Navy.mil article here.

HT: NOSI blog

More Photo's PLA Navy Parade

Several folks are sending links from MSM sources where a few photo albums have a handful of pictures from this past weeks International naval review in celebration of the 60th anniversary of the PLA Navy held in Qingdao. If you are looking for the gouge of military photo's, go to the experts.

See these individual threads here and here. As you should always expect, the folks at the militaryphotos.net forum deliver the goods.

It is noteworthy that none of the modern submarines either under construction or in service were displayed. China is apparently still very hesitant to show off it's latest submarine technology.

Somali Pirates Sieze Cargo Ship in Gulf of Aden

A German owned, Maltese-flagged Cargo ship was seized early this morning in the Gulf of Aden according to news reports.
Pirates captured the Maltese-flagged MV Patriot in the Gulf of Aden about 150 nautical miles southeast of the Yemeni coastal city of Muqalla, said U.S. Navy 5th Fleet spokesman Lt. Nathan Christensen
MV Patriot is a 31,000-tonne grain carrier. There are very few details of the hijacking. The MV Patriot is owned by Patriot Schiffahrts and managed by Blumenthal JMK of Hamburg, Germany. MV Patriot has a Polish Master, a Ukrainian Chief Engineer, and 15 Philippino crew members on board.

This morning the German Navy was reported to be assisting the US Navy in response to a call from help from the recently released Philippine-flagged tanker M/T Stolt Strength which was drifting out of fuel off the east coast of Somalia. It would appear pirate activity off the east coast of Somalia has thinned out the number of ships in the Gulf of Aden to protect convoys. This is tactically challenging for international naval forces, with pirates operating off both the northern and eastern commercial transit routes, the international warships attempting to protect commercial shipping have had to cover more area, making protection much more difficult.

Photo: (Blumenthal JMK)

5th Fleet Focus: Order of Battle

Dwight D. Eisenhower Carrier Strike Group

USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN 69)
USS Gettysburg (CG 64) (CTF-151)
USS Vicksburg (CG 69)
USS Bainbridge (DDG 96) (CTF-151)
USS Stout (DDG 55)
USNS Big Horn (T-AO 198)
USNS Sacagawea (T-AKE 2)


Boxer Expeditionary Strike Group

USS Boxer (LHD 4) (CTF-151)
USS New Orleans (LPD 18)
USS Comstock (LSD 45)
USS Lake Champlain (CG 57)
USS Chung-Hoon (DDG 93) (7th Fleet)
USCGC Boutwell (WHEC 719)


Taurus 2009

HMS Bulwark (L15) (Heading to Bangladesh)
HMS Ocean (L12)
HMS Somerset (F82)
HMS Talent (S92)
HMS Echo (H87)
USS Mitscher (DDG 57)
RFA Wave Ruler (A390)
RFA Fort Austin (A386)


EU NAVFOR

SPS Numancia (F83) (Flagship)
HS Psara (F454)
FGS Rheinland-Pfalz (F 209)
FS Nivose (F 732)
FGS Emden (F210) (SNMG1)
ITS Maestrale (F570)
FGS Spessart (A1442)


Standing NATO Maritime Group 1

NRP Corte Real (F334)
USS Halyburton (FFG 40)
SPS Blas de Lezo (F103)
HNLMS De Zeven Provinciën (F802)
HMCS Winnipeg (FFH 338)


Combined Task Force 150

FGS Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (F 218)
FS Aconit (F713)
PNS Khaibar (F183)
HMS Cumberland (F85)
FS Commandant Ducuing (F795)
RFA Wave Knight (A389)


Combined Task Force 151

See USS Boxer (LHD 4) above
See USS Bainbridge (DDG 96) above
See USS Gettysburg (CG 64) above
USNS Lewis and Clark (T-AKE 1)
ROKS Munmu the Great (DDH 976)
TCG Giresun (F 491)
HMS Portland (F79)
RSS Persistence (209)


In Theater

Ocean 6
RFS Admiral Panteleyev (DDG 548)
FS La Boudeuse (P683)
FS Var (A608)
FS Marne (A 630)
FS Saphir (S602)
HMS Richmond (F239)
HMAS Warramunga (FFH 152)
KD Sri Indera Sakti (A1503)
INS Tabar (F44)
INS Beas (F24)
HMS Makkah (814) (RSNF)
HMS Al Dammal (816) (RSNF)
RBNS Sabha (FFG 90)
PLAN Shenzhen (DD 167)
PLAN Huangshan (FFG 570)
PLAN Weishanhu (A887)
USS Milius (DDG 69)
USS Paul Hamilton (DDG 60)
USS Scout (MCM 8)
USS Gladiator (MCM 11)
USS Ardent (MCM 12)
USS Dexterous (MCM 13)
USS Typhoon (PC 5)
USS Sirocco (PC 6)
USS Chinook (PC 9)
USS Firebolt (PC 10)
USS Whirlwind (PC 11)
USCGC Baranof (WPB 1318)
USCGC Maui (WPB 1304)
USCGC Adak (WPB 1333)
USCGC Aquidneck (WPB 1309)
USCGC Wrangell (WPB 1332)
USCGC Monomoy (WPB 1326)
HMS Atherstone (M38)
HMS Chiddingfold (M37)
HMS Grimsby (M108)
HMS Pembroke (M107)
USNS Tippecanoe (T-AO 199)
USNS Catawba (T-ATF 168)
RFA Diligence (A132)
RFA Cardigan Bay (L3009)
JS Sazanami (DD-113)
JS Samidare (DD 106)
JS Akebono (DD 108)
JS Tokiwa (AOE 423)

The following three ships are also supporting Russian Naval activity in the region near Yemen:

Irkut - tanker
Izhora - tanker
MB-37 - fleet tugboat

Friday, April 24, 2024

Russia Does Soft Power, Too

The Telegraph reports some of the efforts of Russia to reassert its influence in its former republics:
The Kremlin quickly recognized the importance of [Moldovan President] Voronin’s regime to Russia’s interests and worked hard to deny support to those who might challenge him from the West. In Georgia, Moscow is provid-ing nonintrusive, soft-power support such as extensive media coverage to the array of opposition groups that seek to dethrone Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili.

With the Ukraine presidential election due in six months, Moscow has no preferred candidate among the two most likely to reach the sec-ond round - Yulia Tymoshenko and Viktor Yanukovych.

It will not repeat the mistakes of its 2004 embrace of Yanukovych. The message from the Kremlin is: “We support pro-Russian positions, not candidates, and we will judge by deeds, not campaign promises.”
And arguably, they're doing it better than we are. Watch for an uptick in Russian efforts in Ukraine as elections get closer, and a spike if the results don't go Moscow's way.

PLAN P0rN Ph0to ParaDe

Looking for pictures from the PLA Navy parade?

See here, here, and here.

Among the pictures check out the Russian slave class Varyag fresh out of dry dock last year. Also, that is a Type 091 and in the line with a Type 092 behind it, the more modern nuke subs stayed away. Since those links above don't have a good close up of the Type 092, you can see one here.

Be aware, the links are all bandwidth extensive.

BZ to the USS Fitzgerald (DDG 62) for representing the US. This was an important week for the PLA Navy, and in the uncertainty of the current Chinese strategic environment looking to the future, that means it was an important week for us too.

Tactical Options for Fighting Somali Pirates

There have been a number of ideas floated regarding options for dealing with the pirate activity around the coast of Somalia. Ultimately, it has been noted that none of the options are really good, and absent a commitment on the ground to change conditions in a society that really hasn't known true domestic governance since the 17th century Ajuuraan Sultanate, the world is picking from a list of difficult choices.

Solving the issue of Somalia is going to take awhile, and likely be a feature of the Obama administration whether he likes it or not. The question facing the Obama administration is what level of effort the military is going to be asked to make to coincide with a comparative effort of the State Department. Ideally the Transitional Federal Government, currently in Djibouti after being run out of their country by Islamists, will be stood up with a legitimate government military force and be able to establish some law and order. This won't be easy, the opposition is consolidating their position. Even if that is to happen, the diplomatic activity to create a solution, find funding, and take over meaningful governance is going to take awhile (some say it may not even be possible).

This analysis assumes that if the policy regarding the use of military power stays at the current level, which is in essence ineffective despite current record levels of international naval assistance (which will dwindle in the weeks ahead), the problem will get worse as the weather improves over the next few months and the Obama administration will see its leadership credibility globally erode. This is a potentially debatable position, but history does not suggest ineffective action in the face of serious security problems that are only getting worse leads to good things.

This raises the question, if we know the diplomatic efforts are going to take a long time to develop, what tactical actions should the Obama administration approve for the military to buy time for the long term Somalia policy to form? This analysis looks at three possibilities: engage from the air, engage on land, and engage at sea.

Action from the Air

Using air power to bomb or the Navy to cruise missile the bad guy was American small wars policy from the end of the cold war until the Iraqi surge. This limited financial cost approach (comparatively) also came with limited success, and the implementation of air power centric solutions have largely been discredited as a strategic approach to fighting small wars. The entire decade of the 90s was essentially an Air Force campaign in Iraq following Operation Desert Storm, and the fact Iraq was invaded a second time 12 years later suggests that any air power centric approach to fighting piracy on land will almost certainly be ineffective.

Due to the competition found in the Somali clan system, the Transitional Federal Government is unlikely to complain too much about US attacks on pirate clans, but even active approval of a clearly flawed strategy does not lead towards a security solution, and may indeed produce larger security problems. From regional air bases or from an aircraft carrier, CIA and special forces operating on the ground can certainly paint targets to bomb, but to what end?

Obviously, the air power centric approach to fighting piracy on land is not only the least likely solution, it is the least likely solution to produce any meaningful results towards a strategic end that eliminates piracy. In my opinion, there are no air power centric solutions for Somali piracy.

Engage on Land

The US military, if working in cooperation with international partners, does have a few limited options for engaging pirates on land. This would not happen immediately, but is certainly possible. Major naval powers globally are currently undergoing a major buildup of naval power centered around the amphibious ship. Nations that have either recently built or in the process of developing new amphibious ship platforms include South Korea, Japan, China, Australia, Singapore, India, South Africa, Turkey, Italy, Spain, France, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Denmark, the United States, Brazil, and Russia.

In the 90s, several strategic discussions that led to Marine Corps concepts like From the Sea, and Forward... From the Sea discussed the possibility that in the 21st century, rather than large invasions of other state powers the Marine Corps would be asked to do what some call amphibious raiding operations. These raids, usually conducted at a level consisting of 2 battalions, are rapid insertion of Marines to destroy an enemy capability, capture some bad guys, and essentially rapidly retreat back to sea without leaving a sustained footprint on land.

The strategic intent of these raids is similar to military activities the US Marines have conducted in Iraq, including in Fallujah and Baghdad. The way this would work against the pirate cities is for Marines to land forces at key points to cut off supply and prevent retreat from the city, setting up checkpoints and establishing a hold on the high ground. Heavy units would be moved from ship to shore away from the city before moving into the cities, clean out as many weapons as possible, and retreat back to sea. The primary purpose of the sweeps is to raid (and burn down) the property of pirate leaders, gain intelligence, destroy as many weapons as possible, destroy as many drugs as possible, and generally create chaos by targeting illegal goods and targeting pirate leaders.

When Marines are pulled back to sea, special forces would establish ambush points for targetting resupply of weapons and leverage intelligence gained to create more problems for pirate leaders. The point is to create enough chaos, confusion, and fear on land in these pirate cities that nobody has time to be a pirate. All American $100 bills would be confiscated for being money stolen through piracy, and high value pirate leaders could be extradited to countries willing to hold major pirate leaders accountable for their crimes.

These would obviously be expensive operations, particularly if conducted against the various different cities where individual pirate clans are active. The US commitment would probably be 2 MEUs, and would probably require additional international forces to help secure the ground. Amphibious raiding however, is a way to conduct operations without establishing a footprint, and would almost certainly heavily reduce piracy from these areas to buy time for long term solutions.

Engage at Sea

There are two ways to escalate military activity at sea that can produce measurable improvements over the status quo: convoys and security detachments on commercial shipping. This strategy is unlikely to actually reduce the dangerous security conditions at sea, but would decrease the number of hijackings. This would also be an expensive solution.

First, it should be noted that convoys are already established from the Red Sea to northeast of the Horn of Africa, and this has produced some positive results. Convoys do work, and by reducing the area that needs to be protected by multinational forces the naval power available becomes more effective fighting off pirate attacks. The problem is, a similar such traffic lane is needed along the length of the eastern Somali coast from the Horn of Africa to Kenya.

One way to address this is to strategically place amphibious ships and use soldiers under a UN flag for force protection on ships. On the heels of the activities of private consulting companies in Iraq, government troops is just about the only way to do this, and given the multinational nature of the challenge, multinational forces under a UN flag is about the only way to get past several legal problems.

By putting an amphibious ship near Djibouti, helicopters can be used to place squads on ships that are entering the Gulf of Aden while retrieving squads from ships entering the Red Sea. The idea would be to use the amphibious ship as a platform for shuffling squads to and from commercial traffic that transits the area, and add force protection to every ship in the region.

An US LHD would be stationed somewhere near the Yemen island of Socotra. The LHD would not only add and remove UN squads coming to and from the Red Sea, but also add security teams to ships transiting the east African coast along an established transit lane. Another amphibious ship would then be placed a couple hundred miles off the coast of Kenya, and would be used to add/remove squads from ships heading north and south.

There are several issues. First, there is a need to increase the number of ships off the east coast of Somalia to patrol any transit lane, but this is hard to do because it pulls from the number of ships protecting the Gulf of Aden region where pirate activity has been very high. One option would be to use Sea Fighter as a rapid response platform off the east coast supporting UAVs, and surge a handful of Perry frigates to patrol the eastern coast line of Africa. The Perry class was built to protect commercial shipping, why in the world is it not being used in this role when it is commercial shipping that is being targeted?

Because there is a possibility that squads could be unbalanced with ships potentially moving in greater numbers in certain directions, there will be a necessity to move squads back to the LHD from the other amphibious ships. This role can be uniquely filled by using the MV-22, which has the range to act as an air shuttle for the squads. By flying the transit lanes used by commercial ships, the MV-22 also becomes an early responder should a ship under attack need an additional squad or two to reinforce a ship being assaulted (a very unlikely scenario btw). If the damn thing had a gun, the MV-22 would be a very nice force multiplier in this situation.

Ideally, only the LHD would be a US ship, while the role of the other two amphibious ships in this model being supported by from other nations. The addition to CTF-151 of Singapores LST RSS Persistence (209), for example, would allow the role of the amphibious ship off the coast of Djibouti to be filled by a coalition partner. The Netherlands, Great Britain, France, South Korea, China, Japan, Spain, Italy, or India could potentially be another partner in this model.

Under a UN flag, this model would allow any nation to use UN squads for protecting merchant vessels in the threatened area. The squads would ideally be from multiple countries, allowing for several countries who may not be willing or able to send a warship to send soldiers, sailors, or Marines for force protection instead.

The addition of security teams to commercial shipping reduces the probability a ship will be taken, thus reducing the necessity for convoy escorts and allows dispersal tactics to be leveraged for the reduced number of warships.

Ultimately, these are expensive solutions, but they do buy time for the diplomatic efforts to develop long term solutions on land. For example, the sea solution that leverages UN squads could be a mitigating tactic leveraged while a Somali coast guard solution is developed as a way to be proactive against pirates.

I don't advocate for any specific idea, although I am against an air power solution. I am a believer that the current policy is not only bad policy, but dangerous long term as better weather approaches in June. The size of the international naval force gathered to fight piracy will get smaller in the future, so a tactical adjustment must be made. This is a small problem, but allowing it to continue should be seen as an unacceptable option for the Obama administration, because if piracy increases as it continues to do, a perception will develop that suggests the US is either incapable or unwilling to deal with the problem. That comes with a political cost, and more importantly, if a perception develops that the US is not putting out effort, any major disaster will be blamed on the US.

The Obama administration foreign policy appears to be designed to create a sense of international partnership for dealing with international challenges. There are huge political gains to be made in US foreign policy by capitalizing on the international partnership opportunities surrounding the Somali piracy activities today, but the policy has to produce a perception of positive results to validate the desired cooperative approach of the administration, otherwise the policy loses credibility both with partners, and at home.

Advertising

I intend to add ads to the blog over the weekend. Going to use the blog to test some things for the next few weeks so if something looks different, you know why.

The process will be slow as I test various options. I am not taking direct advertising at this time.

Thursday, April 23, 2024

Pentagon 1:00pm Friday

Tomorrow Lindy Lyzer is giving a tour in the Pentagon at 1:00pm for the panel guests of the 2009 Milblogger conference. Lindy is an Army PA, so for a 30 minute tour the odds are very low she will be guiding the tour towards the Navy folks.

The tour is supposedly for the panel speakers, which according to the Milblogger website would be some mix of David Stanford, JD Johannes, Lily Burana, Craig Stewart, Genevieve Chase, airforcewife, Alex Horton, Solomon, Paul Rieckhoff, Greyhawk, Rebekah Sanderlin, Pete Hegseth, Dave Dilegge, Andrew Exum, Matt Burden, Bill Roggio, Uncle J, McQ, TSO, and Maggie.

Look, I love Dave and Andrew, they are the first blogs I read every day too. Greyhawk and ArmyofDude are really cool, no question. Matt Burden and Bill Roggio are the power class of milblogging. I would put money down that Soloman probably tells the best stories. I am also sure the young men throughout the Pentagon will be distracted by Lily Burana's femine charms.

But if you are in the Navy and work at the Pentagon, and you think the Navy blogosphere is even somewhat interesting, I would encourage you to walk right past all that other service star power and find Boston Maggie.

There is a 'behind the scenes' to the naval blogosphere, and it is two women: Mary Ripley and Boston Maggie. Like Mary, Boston Maggie is one of those leaders you never see and who never gets the credit she deserves, but for me is an inspiration, confidant, mentor, and worker who acts as a glue to the naval blogosphere community.

If you get a chance I encourage you to find Maggie, shake her hand, and wish her good health.