Naval Supremacy Cannot be "Piggybacked" on Small Ships

Visby Class Swedish Corvette

The pages of the September 2013 issue of the United States Naval Institute Proceedings were filled with articles extolling the potential political-military influence and combat effectiveness of the 600-800 ton littoral missile corvette. The distinguished authors are well known and highly respected naval experts such as former U.S. Fleet Forces Commander Admiral John Harvey Jr., Fleet Tactics author Captain Wayne Hughes, and U.S. Naval War College Center for Naval Warfare Studies Dean Captain Robert C. Rubel. Collectively in two articles, the authors recommend the U.S. adopt flotillas of small, missile-armed surface combatants, such as the Swedish Visby class as a principle combat component of the U.S. surface fleet. The authors believe these small craft will play a crucial role in peacetime as ambassadors of political/military interest and in war as expendable patrol combatants, commerce raiders and attack platforms of choice in littoral waters.   While compelling in scope and vision, the authors’ analysis leaves out crucial aspects of history, geography, strategy and logistics. Historically the small combatant has been a persistent underachiever in the fleet structures of many navies; the geography of potential future battlefields like the Indo-Pacific region demands high-endurance, more capable platforms than the small warships the authors advocate; the strategic needs of the U.S. in “big” spaces like the Pacific are better served by larger platforms and aviation assets than by surface ship flotillas; and finally the logistics limitations of small combatants will outweigh their potential effectiveness. The combination of these factors should lead U.S. civilian and naval leaders to reject both the small combatant and the attendant operational concepts advocated by these experts.

Late 19th Century Torpedo Boat

     The small combatant armed with capital ship-killing weapons is a familiar figure from the naval history of the 120 years. The torpedo boat, the submarine, the destroyer, and the missile patrol craft were all touted from their inception as the bane of larger navies’ capital ships and possible equalizer for nations with smaller, financially-challenged navies. While British naval theorist Sir Julian Corbett was correct in that the threat from these craft upended many long-held notions of naval combat, only the submarine threat has evolved into a persistent and regular threat. The others have never met the expectations of designers and theorists. The torpedo boat was matched by changes in armament of capital ships and by the addition of the “torpedo-boat” destroyer to their escort before the First World War. While the torpedo boat was a persistent threat that concerned commanders from 1914 to 1918, it scored few operational successes. Those that did involved single units operating at night or in stealth conditions such as the successful attack on the British pre-dreadnought HMS Goliath by the Turkish Navy’s torpedo boat Muavenet-i Milliye during the 1915 Dardanelles campaign.  The torpedo-armed destroyer evolved into a general- purpose warship in its own right before World War 2. Torpedoes too evolved and became much longer ranged weapons that the Japanese Navy in particular employed from both cruisers and destroyers. These changes, including a nearly 50% increase in weight and firepower made the destroyer a much more conventional weapon. Whole flotillas of destroyers were sometimes deployed in the Second World War, but primarily as a defensive screen rather than offensive formation. They got “assist” credit in the sinking of battleships such as the German Scharnhorst and the Japanese Hiei, and a British destroyer flotilla sank the Japanese heavy cruiser Haguro in the waning days of the war, but these victories by no means constitute a strong advocacy in favor of the flotilla as a combat organization.

Cold War-era Soviet OSA II Missile Boat

      The anti-ship cruise missile-armed small combatant gained a similar feared status in the Cold War after Egyptian missile boats sank the Israeli destroyer Eilat in October 1967 and after successful Indian Navy missile boat attacks on Pakistani naval units in December 1971. While the surface-launched cruise missile is a growing and significant threat to surface warships, the “missile corvette’s” promise remains unfulfilled. Argentine missile corvettes never threatened the British Royal Navy task force that recaptured the Falkland Islands in 1982. Libyan missile corvettes were sunk by U.S. Navy aircraft before they could threaten U.S. warships executing strikes against Libya in 1986. The Iranian missile corvette Joshan was able to launch a harpoon surface to surface missile against the cruiser USS Wainwright, but the weapon either failed to arm or was decoyed by passive means. Saddam Hussein’s missile boats were destroyed by aircraft and helicopters before they launched a single missile in 1991. The only U.S. recent U.S. entries have been the 1970s-era PHM class hydrofoil missile combatants and the Cyclone class patrol coastal (PC). The PHM’s were intended to be a deployed force in the Mediterranean and perhaps the Persian Gulf, but high maintenance and fuel costs as compared with conventional combatants ensured their retirement in the post Cold War budget cuts of the 1990s. The PC’s remain today, but are lightly built and have a current armament insufficient for offensive combat operation.

         Past failings of small combatants to live up to expectations should not alone deter the U.S. from embracing flotillas. The relative casualties suffered by these ships however provide numerous examples of why not to adopt corvette-sized combatants. Twentieth century naval battles from Jutland to more recent actions in the Persian Gulf are replete with small ships suffering heavy casualties when sunk. A big ship can suffer a catastrophic sinking with heavy loss of life, but when small ships sink they inevitably take more of their crews with them. In his policy paper “Aircraft Carriers, the Real Choices” from 1978 John Lehman stated that the larger the carrier, the less vulnerable to attack it is. That law can also be applied to surface combatants and while all ships are vulnerable to loss, missile corvettes as those advocated by the authors of the Proceedings articles are more likely to be sunk if attacked than larger more capable warships. The example of the October 2000 attack on the destroyer USS Cole is a good example of the survivability of larger ships. Many experts have commented that the Navy’s new littoral combatant ships (LCS), a warship smaller and less robust than the Cole would not have survived such an attack. A corvette-sized ship even smaller than the LCS would have likely been completely destroyed with all hands. Senior civilian and naval leadership has frequently stated that people are the Navy’s most valuable resource. How does this maxim apply to corvette sized ships are more likely to be sunk and suffer higher casualties in the process than larger ships? Napoleon was reputed to have said “God is on the side of the big battalions.” History would seem to indicate that maxim is true for larger ships as well.

     Geography and logistics issues also favor larger, high endurance vessels over numerous smaller ones if the operator’s force is deployed away from home. A nation that employs numerous small warships for defense of its coastal waters has the advantage of interior lines of communication and logistics in both operating and supporting this force. Those factors have made small combatants the choice of many states from late 19^th century France to present day Iran to defend their coastal waters against the deployed forces of maritime powers such as Great Britain in the 19^th century and the United States today. The authors of the flotilla pieces have eschewed the long lines of communication necessary to support their forward-deployed flotillas from home, preferring to support them from advanced bases in friendly states. That would have made sense in the 1990’s and early 2000’s when potential U.S. opponents lacked the modern weapons necessary to effectively attack those forward bases. That is not the case now, and action by an enemy could cut off those forward bases from U.S. support or render them incapable of supporting deployed U.S. flotillas. The case of the U.S. Asiatic Fleet of 1941 is illustrative of this problem. This U.S. fleet was a forward deployed element based in the Philippines with the mission of being a deterrent or at least a “tripwire” against potential Japanese aggression. Its surface ship assets were either small or outmoded, but it possessed a substantial fleet of submarines that were expected to be very effective in attacking Japanese ships. When the Japanese destroyed or overran their bases however, the Asiatic fleet submarines were forced to withdraw to Australia and Hawaii. Professor James Holmes from the Naval War College pointed out in a 17 September piece in The Naval Diplomat that the failure of the torpedo boats of the Asiatic fleet to perform effectively negatively influenced future U.S. attempts to develop small war fighting craft. It wasn’t just the PT boats; the whole Asiatic fleet of light, forward deployed ships and submarines failed to significantly impact the Japanese Pacific advance in the early part of the Second World War. The loss of their base in the Philippines greatly hampered their ability to conduct effective combat operations. Loss of a significant forward base such as Singapore or Guam due to ballistic missile or air attack could force U.S. surface flotillas, like the Asiatic fleet in 1941, to also withdraw. Unlike even World War 2 submarines, these surface ships would be extremely vulnerable to attack, especially if completely cut off from U.S. logistics elements. A deployed tender for these ships as advocated by the authors would be even more at risk. The Asiatic submarine fleet had to abandon its tender USS Canopus after it suffered damage from Japanese air attacks. A modern tender would be an equally vulnerable, high value target for attackers. Lack of endurance outside the area supported by a vulnerable land base or tender is still a significant drawback to flotilla combatants today.

     Finally, the strategic situation of today does not support a large force of deployed corvette flotillas. These ships might have been useful in the previous two decades when the U.S. was more supportive of intervention against rouge states or in support of nations on the verge of collapse. While useful perhaps in conducting coast guard style operations that support these missions, corvette-sized ships are more vulnerable to attack in an increased threat environment. Combat in the littorals is best left to carrier or land-based aviation assets that are less vulnerable to attack, faster, re-targetable and re-useable over a longer period than a small surface ship that must depart the area to replenish its missile magazines in port. While the current carrier air wing is deficient in the long range assets necessary to that mission, it should not be replaced by a more vulnerable surface platform. As for the influence mission potential, why is smaller somehow better, especially in the Indo-Pacific basin? As demonstrated by the photo of the USS Freedom operating with a comparable Malaysian frigate used by the authors in their article, the nations of the Western Pacific have an abundance of larger warships and do not need a smaller U.S. Navy vessel executing a port call to make them feel better about military to military cooperation. While a missile corvette might be a good choice for a port visit to a West African nation, current U.S. surface combatants do not dwarf their Asian contemporaries and LCS is actually smaller and less capable than many Asian frigate designs.

     The study by LT Schwartz on small boat flotilla operations cited by the authors seems to geographically place their commerce raiding activities directly within the envelope of Chinese air and missile attack capability. If U.S. carrier or shore-based aviation assets were available to provide cover for the missile corvettes, they would remain reasonably safe from Chinese air and surface ship threats. What happens however if those U.S. assets are not available or repressed? The authors have previously stated in other works that they believe the current U.S. carrier strike group is unable to defend itself within range of Chinese air and missile attack. What also happens if the Chinese eliminate U.S. land-based aviation assets in the Western Pacific as part of an initial attack?  The concept of surface ships without aviation support as effective commerce raiders has been defunct since the Second World War. Re-introducing it without addressing these caveats does not represent an effective analysis. In any case, a distant blockade of China at a maritime choke point by local allied forces and supported by larger U.S. Navy units would play more to current fleet capabilities.

Israeli Saar 5 class Hanit after missile hit

     The current and potential proliferation of advanced cruise and even targetable ballistic missiles has made the threat environment more dangerous than the halcyon days of the 1990s. Even network-supported small combatants are at risk from attacks like the one that damaged the Israeli missile corvette Hanit in 2006. The crew of the Hanit was lucky in that the probable C-802 missile hit an aft area crane and nor the hull of the ship. A number of experts including naval analyst and war game designer Chris Carlson believe that had the Hanit taken a direct hit, there was a good chance she would have been severely damaged or sunk. At over 1200 tons full load displacement, the Saar 5 class Hanit is nearly double the size of the craft the authors propose. Such a craft would most likely been destroyed by a similar attack. In the process of designing the U.S. LCS class vessels, former Undersecretary of the Navy Robert Work noted in his January 2013 Naval War College monograph on the history of the LCS that in 2001 Navy leaders considered the 600-800 ton ship the Proceedings authors recommended in, but decided instead on the 3100 ton LCS as a more robust and capable platform than the missile corvette. Since the threat level in the form of new cruise and ballistic missiles such as the Chinese DF-21 has increased, why should the Navy now adopt a less secure platform in large numbers?

     U.S. Navy leadership was correct a decade ago in deciding that the LCS was the smallest warship concept it would accept. The vast space of the Indo-Pacific basin is very different from the relatively confined waters of the authors’ favorite Mediterranean Sea scenario. No war fleet expecting to operate in this large space can afford to be too closely tied to land-based support or even deployed tenders. The example of the first several months of the Second World War in the Pacific ought to be a strong caution against relying too much on fixed installations. Singapore fell to the Japanese long before any British analysis ever expected. The global scope of potential U.S. operations demands a fleet of larger, high endurance warships, supported by a well-defended logistics train that swiftly move to gain sea control where required. Missile corvettes that relay on forward bases and tenders for support are only the latest in a long line of small craft that have not lived up to their advertised potential. While perhaps useful in a geographically constrained space like the Mediterranean Sea or Persian Gulf, they are very vulnerable to attack by advanced cruise missiles, submarine torpedoes without coverage from land based aviation or the larger surface force units they are intended to replace. If their fixed bases are compromised or overrun, they do not have the endurance or logistics support to make a fighting retreat to the safety of other U.S. forces.

     The operational environment has changed since these craft were first proposed in the early 1990s. Bereft of significant opponents with capable naval forces since the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States in now confronted with a peer/near peer naval competitor in the form of the Chinese Navy and a growing threat from the Iranian fleets (Regular and Revolutionary Guard Corps). The North Korean Navy has demonstrated its willingness to attack without warning as the sinking of the South Korean corvette Cheonan demonstrated. This is not an environment for small corvettes. While U.S. warships may now be more vulnerable than in the last 20 years, that condition is no reason to reject capable, high endurance ships out of fear for their loss. This author has the highest respect and admiration for the authors and their many years of sterling service to the United States Navy, but he respectfully disagrees with their belief that the missile corvette should represent a large part of the future U.S. Navy surface combatant force. This concept should be rejected in favor of a balanced fleet that boasts a mix of large ships like the DDG and smaller ships like the LCS. Only a balanced fleet can really hedge all bets against future threats. A balanced fleet, rather than one of corvettes is the correct course for the future U.S. surface combatant fleet.

Whither Coastal Artillery

Readers of this blog who know me know that I travel - a lot.  If schedule permits on these trips, I try to take in a bit of the local military history - be it ships, museums, or what-not.  Over the last year or so, my travels have taken me to several locations where coastal artillery emplacements were employed, or at least emplaced for various wartime contingencies.  Some of these batteries were used to protect narrows, but others were set in prominent positions facing the open ocean.  From the early history of the United States through the late 1940s, batteries with guns up to 16” dotted the east and west coasts.  At Fort Hunt and Fort Washington along the Potomac, I saw coastal fortifications where 10 and 12-inch guns and submarine mines were used to protect the Capital from hostile fleets.  These guns were never employed and removed as obsolete in 1917.  In Hawaii, the batteries I visited around Diamond Head crater were never fired, even during the attack on Pearl Harbor.  And at Battery Point Loma in San Diego, the giant 16" unused guns were removed after World War II.

Blücher sinking in the the Drøbak Sound.

In other cases, coastal guns achieved more strategic effects.  In Oslo, I learned that during the invasion of Norway, on 9 April, 1940 two old 11” guns assisted by land-based torpedo batteries sank the German heavy cruiser Blücher.  The loss of this ship stalled Germany's advance to Oslo allowing Norway's royal family to flee to the United Kingdom, where they ran resistance forces in exile for the remainder of the war.

Several technological shifts in warfare brought about the wholesale demise of coastal artillery shortly after the Second World War.  Aerial bombardment out-ranged all guns no matter what caliber, and in the case of North American coastal fortifications, Soviet nukes simply reduced them to irrelevancy. 

But could current trends become the impetus for a resurgence in coastal "artillery" for the world's navies?  To some extent this has already happened, as relatively low cost and mobile surface to surface anti-ship missiles have proliferated to both state and non-state forces.  Lebanese Hezbollah set the precedence for their use against Israel's Hanit in 2006. China and Russia have held a monopoly on producing and selling these systems, but Western powers are starting to take notice. Kongsberg's Naval Strike Missile is ground, air, or sea launched and has been acquired by Poland for coastal defense.  Another possibility for future coastal batteries are rail guns.  The U.S. Navy has been working for years to develop this capability for surface combatants, but one of the main challenges with their implementation at sea is the significant electrical requirement.  Might a mobile ground rail gun be viable, taking advantage of more readily available power sources?

Coastal urbanization is an unstoppable demographic trend.  Future wars of both the state-on-state and irregular flavor will likely be fought near or in megacities that dot coastlines from West Africa to East Asia.  Whereas fixed coastal defenses arrayed near cities were vulnerable to air attack, the survivability of new anti-ship batteries is based on their ability to shoot and scoot.  Mobile launchers can also be camouflaged from air attack or hide in plain sight, taking advantage of placement inside population centers where counter-targeting would risk undesirable and highly visible collateral damage.  Depending on what force is employing them, modern coastal batteries can be cued by large or small combatants, UAVs, or simply friendly fishing boats with a radio and GPS. 

The shrinking U.S. Army is hunting for relevancy in a defense establishment fixated on Air Sea Battle and a bad COIN hangover.  Large-scale ground force deployments are unlikely until our collective memory fades over the next couple of decades and we unlearn painful lessons from Afghanistan and Iraq.  Perhaps the Army should examine rapidly deployable and mobile coastal missile and rail gun batteries.  The precedence for this type of system exists.  Patriot air defense batteries have been high demand assets during the past twenty years.  Their small footprint makes them discretely deployable to countries where large army formations are simply not welcome.  HIMARs is another modern mobile artillery system that has seen successful use in recent conflicts.  While providing fire support missions to special operations forces, the army has gradually succumbed to its aversion to deploying individual missile systems without bringing along the whole enchilada (brigade).
 Improved anti-surface weapons systems can play both offensive and defensive naval roles.  The tactical use of these weapons would vary between denying chokepoints, defending against amphibious raids, and harassing enemy merchant shipping.  They could be collocated with Patriot batteries to defend against enemy air attack or hidden in dense urban terrain.  Inevitably, future adversaries of western navies will employ these weapons.  The exchange ratio between a relatively low cost mobile ASCM and a multi-billion dollar combatant is just too economically favorable to ignore.  So in an environment of shrinking defense resources might we also consider going on the asymmetric offensive?

The opinions in this post are those of the author's alone, presented in his personal capacity.

AEI/Heritage Project for the Common Defense (Navy) Weekly Read

Some good reads for the committed navalist:

"Sequester Impact on Military a Disgrace," by J. Randy Forbes, Rob Wittman and Scott Rigell (Daily Press, 09/22)

"Get Real on Military Readiness," by John C. Harvey, Jr. (War on the Rocks, 09/23)

"The Lone Sailor: America's Lord Nelson?" by James R. Holmes (The Diplomat, 09/23)

"Navy's Littoral Combat Ship Challenges the Status Quo" by Dale Heinken (USNI/San Diego Union-Tribune, 09/23)

"AirSea Battle Starts to Add Substance to Concept" by Michael Hoffman & Kris Osborn (DoD Buzz, 09/23)

"Does China Have a Pacific Strategy Or Are They Bumbling Along?" by Sydney J. Freedberg, Jr. (Breaking Defense, 09/24)

"Report: LCS Manning Could Permanently Increase by 2015" by Sam LaGrone (USNI News, 09/24)

"The Danger of Neutral Warships Entering a Combat Zone," by A. Jay Cristol (USNI News, 09/25)

(VIDEO) "What Asia Pivot? Defense Budget Cuts Undermine U.S. Interests in the Pacific" (The Heritage Foundation, 09/25)

"Will Asian Drones Make Conflict More or Less Likely?" by James R. Holmes (The Diplomat, 09/26)

"Keeping LCS Running a Matter of Ship and Shore Support," by Christopher Cavas (Defense News, 09/26)

"China's Dangerous Weakness, Part 1: Beijing's Aggressive Idea of Self-Defense," by Sydney J. Freedberg, Jr. (Breaking Defense, 09/26)

"Watchdog faults U.S. Navy approach to building unmanned carrier planes" (Reuters, 09/26)

"Admiral: Navy must shrink submarine development costs" by Kris Osborn (DoD Buzz, 09/27)

Bryan McGrath

Gunboat Diplomacy Prevails in Syria

RED SEA (Sept. 13, 2013) Ensign Timothy McDaniel prepares to anchor a ladder from the guided-missile destroyer USS Mason (DDG 87) to a rigid-hull inflatable boat during a visit from leadership of the guided-missile submarine USS Georgia (SSGN 729). Mason is deployed in support of maritime security operations and theater security cooperation efforts in the U.S. 5th Fleet area of responsibility. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Rob Aylward/Released)

Some pictures are worth a thousand words. This particular picture is worth more than a few thousand. But you have to combine the picture above with this picture to understand what it means.

These two pictures combined tell us something important: The President of the United States never intended to conduct military strikes against Syria in response to the chemical weapons attack that took place on August 21st. He was bluffing. The President was never playing chess, but he was never playing checkers either; President Obama was playing poker.

In early August, well before the chemical weapons incident on August 21st in the Ghouta suburb of Damascus, USS Georgia (SSGN 729) was conducting a crew swap in Diego Garcia. When the chemical weapons attack occurred in Syria, the guided missile submarine was back to sea underway for normal training and qualifications that typically occur right after the change out between blue/gold crews. As things heated up in Syria, the prevailing assumption at the time was that USS Georgia (SSGN 729) was likely sprinting around Africa on her way to the Mediterranean Sea.

The US Navy operates four Ohio class nuclear powered guided missile submarines that are, by any definition, the most powerful arsenals of stealth conventional warfare strike capabilities on the planet. Capable of launching over 150 Tomahawk cruise missiles, these incredible weapons of war are simultaneously one of the most difficult weapons in the US military to detect and from a range of over 900 miles away can launch over 300,000 pounds of explosives in about 6 minutes and hit a fixed target with precision no larger than 2 meters in diameter. As converted nuclear powered ballistic missile submarines, these enormous submarines - the size of World War II aircraft carriers - are extremely fast and extremely stealthy. By rounding the Cape of Good Horn a SSGN could depart Diego Garcia, circumvent Africa, and arrive off Cyprus in less than two weeks, and nobody in the world today besides us is postured to see the submarine coming.

Over the past few months, the Navy has been operating two SSGNs at sea ever since USS Flordia (SSGN 728) returned to Kings Bay, Ga in early July. USS Ohio (SSGN 726) has been at sea somewhere in the Pacific, while USS Michigan (SSGN 727) has been at home port over the late summer. That basically meant the only SSGN available for Syria was USS Georgia (SSGN 729), and the prevailing assumption in open source was that the submarines has been operating off the coast of Syria.

Apparently not.

The Invisible Arsenal Ship

In the news leading up to potential US strikes against Syria, a lot of reporting focused on the assembly of three, four, or five US destroyers operating at sea west of Cyprus. It is absolutely correct that these ships would have launched Tomahawk cruise missiles into Syria had a strike been ordered by the President, but they would likely not have fired the first shots. From an operational perspective, the US Navy has been facing a physics problem in regards to strikes against Syria, a physics problem that still exists today.

You can do this on pen and paper, or perhaps even design it out using a simulator like Command: Modern Air / Naval Operations, but consider a moment the physics of a naval strike against Syria by the US Navy that would have met the politically stated goals of meaningful action as put forth by the Obama administration when they were drumming up the likelihood of a military strike against Syria.

First, there can be no casualties or attrition, so all operations conducted must be done with prejudice in favor of protecting man and material. Second, target precision is critical to political success, so excess collateral damage would be avoided at all cost. Third, not only must targets be hit accurately, but quantity of force must be evident to make a political statement. Finally, military forces must conduct the strike while minimizing the potential for counterstrike.

This combination of factors meant several things. First, military analysts knew the US destroyers near Cyprus would need to participate in the strike, because their payload of Tomahawk cruise missiles would be required to add to the quantity of force necessary to make a political statement. However, to avoid counter attack by Syrian military forces, this combination of factors also informs us that the US destroyers would need to remain relatively near Cyprus for air defense purposes, meaning the destroyers would likely be positioned more than 300 nautical miles west of Damascus somewhere south or southwest of Cyprus. That makes the flight time of Tomahawk missiles to targets in Syria around 25-35 minutes depending upon flight path - longer if the flight path avoids Lebanon - which is plenty of time for Syria to put up an organized resistance against the cruise missile strike. It is a better than an average bet the Russians would know within seconds when the US destroyers launched their Tomahawks, giving them plenty of time to tip off the Syrians.

That is why the USS Georgia (SSGN 729) is so important to a small military campaign like the one that was being discussed for Syria. By design, the submarine can approach within a few miles of the Syrian coast by stealth, completely undetectable by Syria (and likely undetectable by all but one of the Russian warships offshore), and shower multiple targets with multiple cruise missiles in minutes that would actually be measured in seconds. In the first 10 minutes, a single US Navy SSGN like USS Georgia (SSGN 729) can, by design, put every ship of the Syrian Navy at the pier out of commission, destroy every fixed military radar on the Syrian coast, and put cruise missiles on every military runway south and west of Hamah. Having a SSGN on hand for a strike against Syria is the difference between the military of Syria having 120-600 seconds to defend the nation, and between 1500-2100 seconds to defend the nation. When communications are jammed, radars are going offline for no apparent reason, and the Russians start screaming "incoming" on the radio channels heard all over the region, the chaos created by a single SSGN can send a conscripted Army into panic.

Having a SSGN off Syria is, in my mind, the prerequisite for the American way of war when applied to the proposed Syrian military strike. Everyone assumed the SSGN was there. I wouldn't be surprised if even the Russians assumed the SSGN was there. What the picture at the top of this post tells us is that since the crew swap, USS Georgia (SSGN 729) has stayed in 5th Fleet, and has not at any time since the August 21 chemical attack been in the Mediterranean Sea. That means only two things, the President of the United States was bluffing on military strikes all along, and the decline of the US Navy is so astute right now the 6th Fleet is an empty shell and was never prepared for the war it was being asked to conduct.

In hindsight, it looks to me the political play in Syria was always a bluff, and yes we should also now admit to ourselves the 6th Fleet is an empty shell unprepared for even a strike against Syria.

Russian Chess vs Obama's Poker

Nothing about US political moves made any sense or conformed to any pattern, unless we evaluate what has happened in hindsight. President Obama has launched the United States into military operations in four different countries since becoming President, and his administration only announced one of those military operations ahead of time. When the US began conducting drone strikes in Pakistan, the Obama administration didn't tell anyone. The same is true for Yemen and Somalia. During the entire first term of his Presidency, when the Obama administration wanted  the opinion of Congress on the clandestine drone wars the administration was conducting, they basically told Congress what their opinion would be. They never asked, at least publicly. Libya was a different case, it was more a matter of supporting European allies than launching a new military campaign. The President never fully committed the US military to Libya in any way other than supporting allied objectives, and the results of Benghazi on 9/11/12 make it painfully obvious how little the US military was focused on Libya once military actions against Gaddafi concluded.

If the Obama administration is committed to using military force as a policy in dealing with another nation, history tells us they will not tell anyone about it until it has already happened.

Which is what makes the rhetoric regarding a strike against Syria curious. Not only did the US make it clear we intended to use military force, but Secretary of State John Kerry - America's top diplomat - was the primary warmonger in the press regarding the use of military force before the evidence supporting the use of military force was ever actually made public. That never made any sense to me at the time, but it makes sense in hindsight if diplomacy was always the political objective. In truth, military action of any kind never made any sense, because a combined cruise missile and airstrike by the US military supported by almost no allies, except France, was never likely to achieve a meaningful outcome, either tactically or strategically.

Even more odd, the President only went to Congress on Syria after Mr. Cameron was thoroughly defeated by the UK Parliament on the issue.

So in the moments before the diplomatic breakthrough with Russia, the United States had neither an aircraft carrier nor a SSGN in the Mediterranean Sea, meaning the United States was not positioned to attack Syria and was essentially conducting very loud, very threatening gunboat diplomacy with a very small force of US destroyers in the Mediterranean Sea. The President was trying very hard to get allies, like the UK, very serious about taking military action in Syria. That does make sense, because the UK actually has an aircraft carrier in the Mediterranean Sea. The President was even approaching Congress to impress upon the world his resolve for conducting a military strike against Syria.

Checkmate and a Pair of Deuces

Assuming the draft text of the UN resolution related to Syrian chemical weapons is the final wording in the resolution, and given the facts of the situation both in theater operationally and the political situation the President found himself in, the primary conclusion from recent events is that gunboat diplomacy worked, and worked quite well in fact.

The new UN resolution will correct a mistake made by the Obama administration, it does not issue a new invisible ink red line regarding the use of military force related to Syrian chemical weapons. The Obama administration, and by extension the United States, has been soundly defeated by the gunboat diplomacy of Russia. President Obama has been allowed to save face with a meaningless UN resolution that has no teeth at all, but given the circumstances the President was never in a position to expect more than this. The President's domestic policy agenda that has, in part, manifested in the form of sequestration of the Department of Defense, ultimately prevented the United States military from ever being able to assemble the necessary military force to achieve a meaningful tactical or strategic objective through military force in Syria, so the President never held anything better than a pair of deuces, and ultimately President Obama had little choice but to play the cards the President was dealt. I have to say, I think the President is getting more than I originally expected out of a pair of deuces.

As I have noted previously on the blog, the Russian naval force off Syria creates significant tactical and operational problems for the United States for using military force effectively in Syria. A launch of cruise missiles by destroyers at 300 nautical miles will be detected within seconds by the Russian naval force, and Syria will have nearly a half hour to defend against cruise missiles which really are not advanced enough to defeat a dedicated defense. The presence of the Russian Navy offshore makes the use of a SSGN close to Syria very dangerous, because within seconds of the first launch, there is nothing preventing Russia from telling the Syrian military exactly where the SSGN is. It is unclear if Syria could effectively detect much less successfully attack the US submarine, but the risk of successful detection and attack is significantly higher with the assistance of Russia.

On multiple occasions the Russians publicly admitted that they were sharing intelligence information with the military leadership in Syria. If Putin followed through and did exactly what they said they were going to do, and gave intelligence regarding the location of a US Navy submarine to Syria, and by some chance Syria was able to successfully sink a US submarine, President Obama would be politically sunk. There is a zero percent chance that the United States would go to war with Russia over Syria, no matter how extensive and compelling the evidence was that Russia had helped Syria cause the loss of life of a US submarine crew.

The forward presence of Russian naval forces in defense of Russian national interests has served for two years as a deterrence for military operations against Syria by Western powers, and in order for those conditions to change, a very large and capable multinational alliance with intent to use military force would need to be established for purposes of shifting the political risk balance of involvement against Russia. That very large and capable multinational alliance does not exist today.

I do not know what the political fall out will be. Whether the UN resolution on Syrian chemical weapons passes or not, the US still lacks a policy for how to deal with Syria. If we assume President Obama was always bluffing, and I do make that assumption, it would not appear he ever told Mr. Cameron. My sense is President Obama does not see Mr. Cameron as the same strong ally and friend that President Bush saw in Tony Blair. It is unclear if there will be a fallout between the two men, but the President never needs to reveal he was bluffing with a pair of deuces, even if it is obvious to anyone paying attention.

The inexperience of the Obama administration has been fully exposed by President Putin, and yet, I'm not sure the Russians knew that USS Georgia (SSGN 729) was not in the Mediterranean Sea. Putin could have guessed President Obama was bluffing about military strikes, but the fact that Russia was who ultimately reached out diplomatically suggests to me Putin was never truly convinced President Obama was bluffing. That is probably the smart move, after all, President Obama takes a very liberal approach when it comes to using US military force.

Finally, it is apparent to me that at some point very early on after the August 21st incident the President realized he was going to take a hit if he didn't conduct military strikes, and yet it is clear the President recognized that conducting military strikes against Assad was counter to US interests. Whether one assumes the President was bluffing or not, what we have learned is that President Obama ultimately chose to take a course of action in foreign policy that would serve US interests, regardless of the political consequences to him personally. The recent coalition of extremist forces in Syria among the rebel groups makes clear that until the moderate rebel organization is stronger, it is counter to US National Security interests for the Assad government to fall, even if that is a desired outcome.

Gunboat diplomacy was very effective for President Obama in avoiding an outright political disaster, and gunboat diplomacy ultimately, in my opinion, allowed Russia to achieve their strategic objectives through deterrence by protecting Syria from overt military intervention by western nations.

I have no idea if the Obama administration realizes that gunboat diplomacy, and naval diplomacy in general, is an effective way to conduct foreign policy in defense of national interests in the 21st century. It is unclear to me if the President even understands how gunboat diplomacy was so influential in this specific case. I assume nothing with this President anymore because one thing is very clear in the wake of the last month of foreign policy, the President's current national security team is inexperienced, lacks skill in the planning involved with statecraft, lacks the ability to develop long term strategic plans, and is prone to make mistakes. The President's national security team is populated with reactionaries, not visionaries.

I do, however, believe that President Putin understands very well the value of gunboat diplomacy and how it has helped Russia achieve a political victory with Syria. It is no accident Russia is now sending their Pacific Fleet flagship to the Gulf of Aden. This Russian naval deployment to the Middle East isn't about fighting pirates, it is about preparing the battlespace for the next round of political chess with the United States.

Chess > Poker.

Chinese Firm wins Turkish Air Defense competition

In a surprise to many PLA followers, this news of China winning the Turkish Air Defense competition came out today. A lot of us had followed the competition, but thought Chinese and Russian bids were only sought out to bring down the price tag of Western companies. It turned out that an export version of HQ-9 has beaten out PAC-3, S-300PMU2 and Aster-30.

Clearly, this is a huge win for the Chinese military industrial complex. While this was not China's first export deal to Turkey (that would be WS-1B) or its first air defense export, Chinese firms have never won a major export deal like this in NATO countries. As shown in the dropping of price tag for $4 billion to $3 billion, the Chinese system obviously had a big advantage in price tag. Also, they are likely to be willing to share more technology and go for more local production than Raytheon and Lockmart. However, the lack of integration with NATO system along with general pressure from American government put both the Chinese and Russian bids at a disadvantage. What this result shows is that the Chinese system must have achieved at least comparable technical performance in the bidding process compared to its competition and probably won out due to cost + co-production.

On the other hand, one would think that S-300 would have similar advantages to Western systems. So, does this mean HQ-9 performed better than S-300PMU2 or was it more due to lower price? Either way, we do know that China has stopped purchase of S-300PMU2 while deploying new HQ-9 units. At the same time, there are also persistent rumours that China is looking to purchase S-400.

Going forward, I think we will only see Chinese firms doing better in international competition. SIPRI data from recent years have shown increased Chinese military export. Even if this deal does not go ahead, it really shows what PLA followers already know -> that Chinese military industrial complex is really catching up in many areas.

Book Review: 21st Century Mahan

21st Century Mahan: Sound Military Conclusions for the Modern Era is a collection of five essays by Alfred Thayer Mahan, chosen and introduced by LCDR Benjamin Armstrong, USN. The book is intended to highlight lesser-known aspects of Mahan's thought on military affairs, and breadth and some depth to Mahan's popular (?) profile. While The Influence of Sea Power Upon History 1660-1783 made Mahan famous, he continued to write prodigiously almost until his death, contributing to a variety of policy and popular venues. Included are essays on fleet positioning, education at the Naval Academy, Nelson, naval administration, and Royal Navy Admiral Edward Pellew.

The essays themselves are... uneven in readability.  I struggled through the essay on fleet positioning, although it did hold some enduring insights into the relationship between force effectiveness and distant basing. The essay on naval administration was interesting insofar as it discussed the comparative advantages of different administrative strategies, although the relevance of the argument to modern administrative problems is uncertain.

Part of the difficulty in working through these essays is Mahan's prose, which often becomes florid as he begins to discuss abstractions. Another difficulty is that Mahan resists summarizing the central points of his arguments in a way that facilitates generalization; the post on education is interesting, exceedingly detailed, and contains buried within a set of insights about the skills that a modern naval officer might need, insights which Mahan has little interest in highlighting.

Similarly, the essay on Nelson is both interesting and a bit of a struggle, as Mahan indulges in some exceedingly dull discussion of the field of biography on the way to some useful insights into Nelson's character, and the value of Nelson's leadership.  The sharpest writing in the entire book comes in the Pellew essay when Mahan describes the Battle of Valcour Island, both at the preparation stage and in the actual fight.  When discussing operations, Mahan seems to pick up speed, becoming more economical with prose in order to pack in as much relevant detail as possible. I don't actually think it's surprising that The Influence of Sea Power Upon History did well, as it plays to Mahan's best characteristic as a writer. Concentrating his attention, I daresay, seems to have the same appeal for Mahan as concentrating a battlefleet. Dispersing his attention tends to lead to disaster.

And yet, despite the difficulty of his prose, Mahan was a remarkably popular author in his time. 21st Century Mahan is an important effort. Mahan produced an enormous amount of literature in the second half of his life, and because Mahan's prose can be so difficult, and because of his unwillingness to organize and set forth his arguments with clarity, a "greatest hits" album is a must. In terms of the essays chosen I might have liked something that was a bit more reflective of how Mahan's ideas developed over time, but with only five snapshots that's difficult to do.  I would also have preferred BJ to expand a touch on the essay introductions, in order to better situate the arguments in context both of the arguments Mahan was participating in, and in his professional career. Altogether, however, it's a useful volume, especially when read alongside The Influence of Sea Power Upon History and a scholarly treatment, such as Jon Sumida's Inventing Grand Strategy and Teaching Command.

See also James Holmes and Galrahn.

Cross-posted at Lawyers, Guns and Money.

It's Game Time: Command: Modern Air / Naval Operations

I was reading last night that Grand Theft Auto V cost around $250 million to make, and has exceeded over $1 billion in sales as of the first weekend. In 2013 a video game studio that designs a great video game can expect to exceed the first weekend earnings of any movie in Hollywood, and a voice actor in a video game can make more money than the same actor can acting in a Hollywood movie. I used to think my professional background in gaming was a stigma on my resume, but now I am starting to think I was simply ahead of the curve.

One of the very first games I ever played was Harpoon. No, not the computer game, the table top game. It's true, I did play video games on my Amiga, but for the most part I wasn't much of video game guy growing up despite owning multiple computers and platforms like the old Atari 800 (where I learned to program basic) and a Nintendo that my brothers played a lot, but as a kid I never got comfortable with input devices not named a keyboard or mouse.

In November of 1994 I bought my first legitimate video game when I purchased Harpoon II. Not long after playing through all the scenarios I went online to find other Harpoon II players to help me understand the advanced features of Harpoon - including the scenario designer, and it landed me in the old Harpoon HQ community of legitimately brilliant individuals whom I have kept in touch with over the last 18+ years.

Several years ago, four members of that Harpoon HQ community; Dimitris V. Dranidis, Ragnar Emsoy, Paul A. Bridge, and Michael Mykytyn; set out to design and build a naval warfare simulation for the next generation. On Tuesday their efforts are rewarded when Command: Modern Air Naval Operations is set to release. Everything I have heard so far suggests this is exactly the game all old Harpoon players have been waiting for.

Check out the interview with the Warfare Sims development staff. Matrix Games also added a developers note worth checking out on Facebook.

The Warfare Sims website has a lot more.

I would list the names of people who have been talking to me about this game for the last year, but I feel like I would be name dropping. Needless to say the range of people involved in beta testing range from an Admiral in the US Navy to professors at the US Naval War College to some distinguished Fellows of several think tanks. It has been a long time since I have played games on my computer, but I sense that is about to change.

Boston Mike, Ragnar, Dimitris... what you guys have done is incredible, I wish all of you great success.

The Notable Empty Seat at Sea

Last week Bryan highlighted a new article on NATO he has written for AEI. NATO at sea: Trends in allied naval power focuses on the trends in the force structures of European naval powers, noting the numerical decline and the quality improvements. As Bryan notes, these trends do not balance one another.

Below is the section Bryan notes on the Royal Navy.

United Kingdom

The Royal Navy has dramatically declined in size by a third since 2000, but retains the desire and plans to remain a “balanced force” capable of naval airpower projection, limited amphibious operations, strategic nuclear deterrence, and sea control (see figure 1). This goal remains even in view of the 2010 UK Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) 8 percent defense budget reduction.[16]

A key question, however, is whether a balanced force is ultimately in the strategic interests of the United Kingdom, or whether such a force should be abandoned in favor of a “cruising” navy requiring a greater number of frigates and destroyers and providing more naval presence in a greater number of places than the current fleet plan can accomplish. The costs associated with fielding two aircraft carriers and the air assets necessary to equip them, in addition to the costs of replacing the current fleet of ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) with four new boats, will strain resources required for building surface combatants and attack submarines.[17] Considering the United Kingdom’s global economic interests and its desire to remain closely aligned with the US Navy, a force of less than 20 combatants might not suffice.

Upgrades to the Royal Navy will include fielding two new aircraft carriers carrying the F-35 Lightning II and the ongoing operation of the new, technologically advanced Type 45 destroyers.[18] Other upgrades include the continuing introduction of the five nuclear-powered, Astute Class attack submarines and the construction of the Type 26 Global Combat Ships.[19] Here as else-where in major NATO navies, numbers are being traded for capability.

When assessed against the roles articulated in the NATO Alliance Maritime Strategy of 2011—which includes deterrence and defense, crisis management, cooperative security, and maritime security—the Royal Navy presents a mixed story.[20] Continuing to move forward with both an aircraft carrier development program and a ballistic missile submarine program demonstrates national resolve to contribute to collective conventional and nuclear deterrence. However, the resources necessary to achieve these goals are to some degree harvested from savings gained from a significantly smaller escort and combatant fleet.

And while the Type 45 destroyer is more capable than the Type 42s it replaces, there will be fewer of Type 45s, as there will be fewer Type 26 frigates to replace the Type 23s. This numerical decline creates presence deficits that impact the navy’s ability to perform crucial traditional naval missions such as antisubmarine warfare (ASW) and antisurface warfare (ASUW), which underpin both conventional deterrence and cooperative and maritime security. Adding to a decline in traditional sea-control capabilities was the 2010 SDSR decision to eliminate the Nimrod maritime patrol aircraft from the inventory.

In summary, the Royal Navy continues to maintain a balanced fleet, one that looks strikingly like the US Navy, except a fraction of its size. Its contributions on the high end of the naval warfare operational spectrum (strategic deterrence, attack submarines, and antiaircraft warfare (AAW) destroyers) are notable, while a declining number of surface combatants will bedevil its ability to remain globally postured and will contribute to naval missions of a more constabulary nature.


16. Nicholas Watt “Next Generation of Nimrod ‘Spy In the Sky’ Surveillance Planes To Be Scrapped,” The Guardian, October 17, 2010, www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2010/oct/17/next-generation-nimrod-scrapped.

17. In response to questions about the costs associated with the SSBN programs, British Defense Secretary Philip Hammond insists that “The government remains 100% committed to maintaining and renewing the Trident system.” See “U.S. Defense Chief Bashes Idea of Reducing SSBN Fleet,” Global Security Newswire, July 15, 2103, www.nationaljournal.com/global-security-newswire/u-k-defense-
chief-bashes-idea-of-reducing-ssbn-fleet-20130715.

18. The Type 45 is built primarily as an anti-air warfare (AAW) combatant capable of local and area fleet defense. Capable of controlling fighter aircraft, it can coordinate fleet AAW operations and should be considered roughly comparable to a US-guided missile destroyer. It is equipped with long-range weapon systems to intercept increasingly sophisticated and maneuverable missiles. The Type 45 destroyer will be able to operate an embarked helicopter.

19. Due to begin joining the fleet in 2021, the Type 26 frigates will completely replace the Type 23 frigates. The Type 26 is planned in three variants: an ASW variant, an AAW variant, and a general purpose variant.

20. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Alliance Maritime Strategy,” March 18, 2011, www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_75615.htm.

There is no question the Type 45 is more capable of than the Type 42. The Type 26 looks promising, and should it ever be built I am sure it will be a great ship. But quantity only goes so far, and the reduction of sufficient quantity of surface combatants means a reduction in operations.

For example, the Royal Navy in 2013 does not have enough surface combatants to contribute to either of the Standing NATO Maritime Groups, and the quiet withdrawal by the Royal Navy from the Standing NATO Maritime Groups is a feature of the decisions, both military and political, regarding Royal Navy force structure that reduces surface combatants.

This comes on top of the decision in 2012 for the Royal Navy to stop contributing surface combatants to their Caribbean narcotics patrol.

If a nations Navy force structure design is completely focused on the carrier strike groups and amphibious groups, as the design of the Royal Navy of the future is, what can their naval forces do, and what do the nation give up in that process? Under such a model for naval operations, presence consists solely of the most expensive capabilities. The contingencies of both Libya and Syria have yet to demand the requirement for a US Navy aircraft carrier strike group, and yet under the future force structure of the Royal Navy, the carrier strike group is basically the minimum capability the Royal Navy can contribute to those type of naval response contingencies.

The present and future design of the Royal Navy is the ultimate test of competing theories of seapower. The prevailing theory today - even in the US Navy - is that high end capabilities are critical and therefore must be favored over lower end capabilities because warships of excess quality can meet lower end requirements. And yet, the expense of excess quality isn't simply in design and construction, but also in operations and maintenance. Will the UK choose to use the highly capable and very expensive naval vessels of the Royal Navy for naval missions that require far less capabilities, operations that can be successfully conducted at far lower cost with less capable warships the Royal Navy does not have? The Royal Navy isn't simply reducing global presence, but the high quality force design of the Royal Navy has raised the price of global presence. On one hand the future Royal Navy is built to fight in nearly any conventional war scenario, but is also designed to be excessively inefficient towards building partnerships and security cooperation in nearly all places in the world that struggle with challenges less than contested conventional war between military forces at sea.

Today there are no valid ways politically to measure the value of naval presence by a warship,and the absence of naval presence is not evaluated objectively because highlighting the absence of naval does little more than highlight the failure of politicians who ignored unmet requirements for presence.

For example, the tragedy that took place last year on 9/11/12 in Benghazi would have almost certainly unfolded differently if EUCOM had the amphibious ready group that has long been and remains today an unmet presence requirement in the Mediterranean Sea. A single amphibious ship could have potentially responded not only with helicopter gunships, but a Marine evacuation/reinforcement force, and as a warship present offshore the US would have been clued into events with the situational awareness that comes from forward deployed naval presence. The absence of that naval presence is rarely discussed in the context of Benghazi, so there has been no lesson learned, and the requirement for a Marine presence offshore goes unmet even to this day with a stop gap response force now based in Rota (a reactive contingency force vs a proactive contingency force).

What is the political value of a Navy without the ability to sustain strategic presence to places globally of national interest? What is the strategic value of a Navy designed for high end conventional and nuclear war, and little else? These and other similar questions are important questions for the US, because sequestration will require the US Navy to make difficult force structure changes of our own. Is it in our nations strategic interest to reduce capabilities in conventional and nuclear war in favor of strategic presence and operations that support irregular warfare threats to our nations interest globally? The most recent maritime strategy claimed that preventing wars is as important as winning wars. How do naval forces prevent war in the 21st century through presence, or does the 21st century geopolitical environment demand that naval power function as primarily a reaction force, rather than proactive force?

Signs of a Massive Cyber Security Incident

It started with an otherwise innocuous announcement earlier this week, which at the time looked like due diligence in the context of the Navy Yard shootings. This was posted Tuesday on the Submarine Force Reserve Component Facebook page.

All SFRC personnel,

NMCI has implemented new account policies. You must login into your NMCI email account every 30 days to remain active. This is not isolated to NMCI email accounts. Please access all Navy accounts at least once every 30 days to ensure continued connectivity.

If you do not have a CAC card reader, please contact your Navy Operational Support Center for assistance.

Refer to NMCI Information Bulletin (NIB) 3H, DTG 141753Z SEP 13 for a list of exceptions to this policy.

An update came on Wednesday.

UPDATE TO EARLIER POST ABOUT NMCI ACCOUNTS:

NROWS is now required to disable all accounts unused for 30 days. There are no waivers or exceptions allowed. This means that on some occasions, you will need to access your NROWS account between DWEs to prevent it from being deactivated. If your NROWS account has been disabled, you are required to contact the Helpdesk to reestablish your account.

The Helpdesk can be reached at 1-800-537-4617.

Also on Wednesday morning, in what I thought at the time was a very odd comment by the CNO in testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, the CNO listed Cyber second among his top priorities right now. At the time the CNO listing Cyber as a priority seemed very odd and out of place. In hindsight I am thinking he had something important on his mind.

This was sent by Commander, Navy Reserve Force Command

*   NMCI User Alert   *


~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

       *** Network Services Interruption ***

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

EVENT: *** NIPRNET Authorized Service Interruption ***

DATES/TIMES: 0400z Saturday, 21 September until 0401z Monday, 23 September 2024

(0000 ET Saturday, 21 September until 0001 ET Monday, 23 September 2024)

(2300 CT Friday, 20 September until 2301 CT Sunday, 22 September 2024)

(2200 MT Friday, 20 September until 2201 MT Sunday, 22 September 2024)

(2100 PT Friday, 20 September until 2101 PT Sunday, 22 September 2024)

(2000 AKT Friday, 20 September until 2001 AKT Sunday, 22 September 2024)

(1800 HT Friday, 20 September until 1801 HT Sunday, 22 September 2024)

SITUATION: Users may experience a NIPRNET service interruption during the time period listed above in support of a network and cyber security upgrade.

REQUIRED ACTIONS: No user actions required.

AUDIENCE: All USN NMCI Users

ASSISTANCE: Contact the NMCI Service Desk at 1-xxx-xxx-xxxx (1-xxx-xxx-xxxx) or by e-mail at ServiceDesk_Navy@xxxx-xxx.yyy. Refer to the user communication number below.

I've worked in IT at the large Enterprise level for over 20 years, and here is a tip. When users in any large organization gets an email that discusses anything related to a "cyber security upgrade" what that really means 99.9% of the time is "Incident Response."

And when a military network has an authorized network interruption of service for two days with almost no warning at all to users, that is by definition a massive response - and can only suggest a massive incident.

The information available suggests NMCI has suffered a massive security breach. Pour some coffee for your 10th Fleet shipmates, they have apparently had a busy week, and will have an even busier weekend.

It makes a lot more sense now why the CNO would suggest Cyber as one of his top priorities in a Congressional hearing over so many other more naval specific issues. When the Navy must voluntarily disrupt services to a military network for two days, clearly the Cyber issues on the CNOs mind are very serious indeed.