Directed Energy and Electric Weapon Systems (DEEWS) Serial 3: China

 This is the third in an occasional series of posts designed to discuss the future and prospects of Directed Energy and Electric Weapons Systems (DEEWS).  We have previously introduced the topic of DEEWS and differentiated among the various approaches.  In this post, I will remind some and inform others that the United States is not the only country pursuing some of these weapons.   China, Russia, India, Iran, South Korea, France, Israel, and Germany all have made commitments to and technical progress in DEEWS research and development programs.  In their 2007 unclassified report on Directed Energy Weapons, the Defense Science Board (DSB) “did not attempt to describe specific threats or ascribe threat capabilities to specific potential adversaries.”   However, they were willing to state that:

“Laser systems that could disable space-based and airborne sensors—either permanently or temporarily—are available to potential adversaries to include non-state actors.  Increased design attention to protection against these capabilities is needed.  Similarly, high-power microwave technologies that can be exploited to damage or disable electronic components of essential communications networks are available to a range of potential adversaries, including non- state actors.”

I choose to focus my post on the Chinese DEEWS due to their level of commitment (in terms of resources and longevity) and their growing importance in planning for the U.S. Department of Defense.

Numerous open sources recount China’s historically dedicated and burgeoning efforts in the field of DEEWS.  On 6 February 1964, during his meeting with Dr. Qian Xuesen (the “Father of Chinese Rocketry”), Chairman Mao Zedong expounded on earlier remarks and formulated the famous “640 Directive,” calling for the development of strategic defensive weapons, including lasers. Consequently, the Shanghai Institute of Optics and Fine Mechanics (SIOM) was founded in 1964 with the task of developing an anti-missile laser.  Since then, it has been widely recognized as the most important research center in the field of laser science and technology in China.  The 640 Program suffered during the Cultural Revolution, was then revived, but ultimately was cancelled in March 1980 by Deng Xiaoping as Head of the Chinese General Staff Department.  None­theless, SIOM continued conducting indige­nous research and publishing findings internationally.^[1]  In 1970, the Anhui Institute of Optics and Fine Mechanics (AIOFM), arguably the second most important laser research center in China, was established.  Concomitantly, throughout the 1980s, China received significant Israeli assistance in the fields of targeting laser and high-energy laser research.^{[2], [3]}

Chinese research has consistently progressed as documented by Mark Stokes’ 1999 detailed report, “China’s Strategic Modernization: Implications for the United States.”  In it, he utilized Chinese sources to research the Chinese laser research base, finding that “…an estimated 10,000 people, including approximately 3,000 engineers, in 300 organizations are involved in China’s laser program. Almost 40 percent of China’s laser R&D is for military purposes.”^[4]  More importantly, he categorized Chinese research in crucial laser fields such as adaptive optics as third best in the world behind the United States and Germany.  Lasers are part of a larger class of weapons known to the Chinese as “new concept weapons” (xin gainian wuqi), including high-power lasers, high-power microwaves, rail­guns, coil guns, particle beam weapons, etc. (essentially DEEWS).

More than a decade later, public information on Chinese DEEWS remains scarce.  However, the wealth of Chinese scientific publications and the fact that a significant portion of DEEWS components are produced in China confirms it is now a world leader in the field.  The 2006 DoD annual “China Military Power” report to Congress detailed a major effort in laser and radio frequency directed energy weapons.  Later that year, China reportedly fired a ground-based high-power laser at and blinded U.S. surveillance satellites in orbit over China.  Although debate ensued as to whether China was laser ranging to determine satellite orbits or actually intended to dazzle or blind the satellites, China’s test demonstrated a significant new capability.  Satellite imagery analysis by Sean O’Connor, an internationally renowned analyst and author of the IMINT & Analysis blog, has since identified the potential sliding hangar locations of space-oriented Free Electron Lasers at the AIOFM center in Hefei, the Chinese Academy of Engineering Physics (CAEP) center in Mianyang, and the laser Anti-Satellite (ASAT) site in Xinjiang province.

As of now, there are at least three types of Chinese laser weapons confirmed: the banned, blinding ZM-87 Portable Laser Disturber; the JD-3 integrated laser rangefinder/warning/self-defense device mounted on Type 98 main battle tanks; and the laser responsible for the 2006 satellite blinding.[5]  The scope and amount of Chinese research, however, strongly suggests Chinese DEEWS research proceeds briskly and will likely achieve fieldable DEEWS in the near future.  Additionally, China may be able to leverage its sizable technical labor pool and domestic DEEWS component production sector to reach or surpass the achievements of adversaries.

So, what should the average American reader take away from this blog post and its several links?  First, it would be incorrect and potentially arrogant for the U.S. to believe it is in the driver’s seat when it comes to the fielding of DEEWS weapons in operationally relevant forms.  In fact, I had a conversation just last week with a former high-ranking official of the U.S. military science and technology establishment who told me that no one “…should be surprised…” if the Chinese are first to field a laser for use in the maritime environment.  Second, it occurs to me that the United States should be considering methods of countering DEEWS, which appears to be ongoing.  Third, there appears to be a clear sense from other nations—both allied and otherwise—that warfare is moving increasingly in the direction of DEEWS.  Given the tensions between the desire of many Americans to remain the world’s premier military power and the resources we are willing to devote to it, increased emphasis must be given to systems and capabilities that offer the possibility of engagement for dollars per shot rather than hundreds of thousands to tens of millions of dollars per shot.

Finally, it seems to me that the race to the best technology is only part of the issue here.  Of equal importance is getting the technologies quickly into the hands of the warfighters, where they can innovate in ways not considered by the weapons designers, while devising appropriate tactics, techniques and procedures for the employment of these weapons.  We used to be pretty good at getting things out into the fleet quickly, but it seems we’ve slowed down somewhat in the past couple of decades—and certainly, DEEWS is taking longer than it ought.  I doubt the PLA(N) will move with our deliberation. 

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[1] “One of the eight scientific fields receiving special emphasis in the People's Republic of China these days is lasers. At the International Quantum Electronics Conference in 1980, 7 of the 150 papers accepted were from China.”

Gloria B. Lubkin. “China Emphasizes Laser Research,” Physics Today, Volume 33, Issue 5, May 1980. 

[2] In the 1980s, China had obtained from Israel a copper vapor laser gun sight for use on T-54 tanks. John W. Garver. China and Iran: Ancient Partners in a Post-Imperial World, University of Washington Press, 15 February 2007, 150.

[3] Washington Times staff writer Bill Gertz cited a DIA report accusing Israel of selling U.S. Tactical High Energy Laser (THEL) laser technology to China and pressuring American defense contractors to make restricted software codes related to classified laser research available to Israeli defense companies. Bill Gertz. “Israel Suspected of Transferring U.S. Laser Weapon Data to China,” The Washington Times, 27 January 1999.

[4] “Situation, Development of Laser Industry in China,” Yingyong Jiguang (Applied Laser Technology), June 1990, JPRS-CST-90-028.

[5] “Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, 2009”, Annual Report to Congress, Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense, 2009, p. 27.  

Bryan McGrath

Cyber Warfare...Brought To You By J.C. Wylie

Future thinking about cyber operations is often analogized to early airpower doctrine. Like the early airpower theorists, Gregory Rattray also points out that cyberwar theorists also make the mistake of assuming that cyber operations capabilities will be standalone strategic weapons. The cyber weapon, in other words, is not always going to get through. More likely is cyber warfare operations and tactics augmenting regular operations and tactics. In other words, the difference is between an unrealistic vision of cyberwar and a very much plausible conception of cyberwarfare.

Naval warfare and special operations theory may present a better prism for viewing how cyber operations will play out. In his seapower classic Military Strategy: A Theory of Power Control, Rear Admiral J.C. Wylie argued that the aim of strategy was to gain some measure of control over the adversary. There were essentially two styles of strategy: sequential and cumulative. Sequential strategy utilizes force in discrete, linear packages. An land army on campaign sweeping through a territory destroys an enemy state layer by layer, division by division. Cumulative forms of strategy, on the other hand, build gradual and nonlinear pressure on an opponent.

The classic example is the relationship between the land war in the European Theater of Operations and the Combined Bomber Offensive. By tying down precious German resources, the Bomber Offensive amplified the strategic effect of the land campaigns. Airpower advocates were, of course, wrong that a strategic airpower offensive would on its own negate the need for a land campaign. But the Bomber Offensive cannot simply dismissed as a failure merely because it did not live up to its planners' strategic expectations.  In naval warfare, the Pacific Theater of operations paired a sequential strategy of advance through fortified island networks with the cumulative destruction of the Japanese merchant fleet by submarines. To go even farther back in military history, Winfield Scott's Anaconda Plan, which exploited Union strength on the rivers and the oceans, amplified the strategic effect of land operations in the Western and Eastern theaters of operation.

So how does Wylie fit into cyber operations? Well, first let's take a look at what Kings' College professor Thomas Rid has written about the characteristics of cyber weapons:

Cyber-weapons span a wide spectrum. That spectrum, we argue, reaches from generic but low-potential tools to specific but high-potential weaponry. To illustrate this polarity, we use a didactically helpful comparison. Low-potential 'cyber-weapons' resemble paintball guns: they may be mistaken for real weapons, are easily and commercially available, used by many to 'play,' and getting hit is highly visible -- but at closer inspection these 'weapons' will lose some of their threatening character. High-potential cyber-weapons could be compared with sophisticated fire-and-forget weapon systems such as modern anti-radiation missiles: they require specific target intelligence that is programmed into the weapon system itself, major investments for R&D, significant lead-time, and they open up entirely new tactics but also novel limitations. This distinction brings into relief a two-pronged hypothesis that stands in stark contrast to some of the debate's received wisdoms. Maximising the destructive potential of a cyber-weapon is likely to come with a double effect: it will significantly increase the resources, intelligence and time required to build and to deploy such weapons -- and more destructive potential will significantly decrease the number of targets, the risk of collateral damage and the coercive utility of cyber-weapons.

We also know that certain weapons are modular and customizable for multiple roles, the development and acquisition cycle (at least compared to certain air superiority platforms) is very agile, weapons utilize the target system itself as a means of inflicting coercive damage, and they are heavily customized to the target and difficult to utilize in a salvo capacity. Because of this, it is unlikely they can be utilized as a standalone strategic weapon.

DoD seems to realize this too. Take a look at this graf from an article on DARPA's Plan X: 

Cyberwarfare conjures images of smoking servers, downed electrical systems and exploding industrial plants, but military officials say cyberweapons are unlikely to be used on their own. Instead, they would support conventional attacks, by blinding an enemy to an impending airstrike, for example, or disabling a foe’s communications system during battle.

Yup, sounds cumulative. DoD's vision of cyber capabilities is explicitly based on the presumption that they amplify the capabilities of conventional attacks.

One vision of how cumulative strategy might be realized in a cyber context can be found in a distillation of cumulative strategy in the special operations community. James D. Kiras has argued in his work on special operations that the relationship between special operations forces and general purpose forces also demonstrates the intersection of cumulative and sequential strategy. Special operations forces use psychological and material attrition to raise cumulative costs of operating, enhancing the striking power of conventional forces. A group of commandos raising havoc in the enemy rear area disrupts the target's logistics and forces tactical dispersion, weakening the ability to win the fight in the forward edge of the battle area. Unlike the stereotype of attrition encountered in maneuver warfare literature, attrition can have nonlinear cumulative effects. The kind of damage inflicted by cumulative capabilities, be it naval forces, airpower, or special operations units, snowballs into a fearsome weapon.

Lukas Milevski has made the analogy that cyber operations have many of the same characteristics as special operations forces. High-risk special operations depend on significant amounts of target intelligence, surprise (the zero-day exploit), and are utilized against targets in which tailored and customizable means trump general purpose conventional power. Moreover, Milevski observes that utilizing an exploit against an important system also simultaneously ensures that the same vulnerability cannot be exploited readily again through exposure.  While Milevski is right to observe how the specialized nature of cyber operations generates a particular kind of cumulative pressure that augments sequential strategy, there is more to the Wyliean metaphor than simply special operations theory.

The routine conflation of intelligence exploitation systems with weapons is but one symptom of what NDU professor Sam Liles argues is a common confusion of information security (the protection of systems) and the optimization of networks with offensive warfare. Network-centric enhancement to make war or the ability to manage and provision a network, Liles observes, is not the same thing as waging war.  Liles also argues in another post that the real ream of cyberspace is the zone of command, control, coordination, data and cognition---a "seam" between the respective domains that US military doctrine (at times artificially) defines. Such a conception broadens not only our conception of cyberspace but also our idea of what our means of cyber operations may be. We aim to use the seam to achieve a measure of control over the adversary. Moreover, just as the purpose of operations on the sea is to effect events on land, cyber operations ultimately are a means of exploiting the seam cumulatively to amplify the conventional (sequential) campaign.

Finally, this paragraph also demonstrates once again that some of the better ideas about this subject were written fifteen years ago:

Another goal is the creation of a new, robust operating system capable of launching attacks and surviving counterattacks. Officials say this would be the cyberspace equivalent of an armored tank; they compare existing computer operating systems to sport-utility vehicles — well suited to peaceful highways but too vulnerable to work on battlefields. The architects of Plan X also hope to develop systems that could give commanders the ability to carry out speed-of-light attacks and counterattacks using preplanned scenarios that do not involve human operators manually typing in code — a process considered much too slow. Officials compare this to flying an airplane on autopilot along predetermined routes.

John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt originally conceived the role of cyber war not as a standalone strategic weapon but the integration of cyber tactics and operations into warfare as a whole. Hardened systems capable of surviving hits and giving back, at speeds faster than tactical operators can contemplate, as a means of amplifying conventional effects are well within the idea of warfare they predicted in their early works.

J.C. Wylie's works are, of course, an highly imperfect means of thinking about information power. But they offer a starting point as doctrine development, operational tests, and perhaps wartime employment further determine the American approach.

USS Freedom - "Fit and Ready for Service"

SAN DIEGO (May 2, 2024) The littoral combat ship USS Freedom (LCS 1) operates in the waters off Southern California. The littoral combat ship is a fast, agile, networked surface combatant designed to operate in the near-shore environment, while capable of open-ocean tasking, and win against 21st-century coastal threats such as submarines, mines, and swarming small craft. (U.S. Navy photo by Lt. Jan Shultis/Released)

The Board of Inspection and Survey has taken a little Pacific cruise on USS Freedom (LCS 1), and issued a grade.

“My assessment is the ship is sound, the engineering plant is good, combat systems are good,” said Vice Adm. Richard Hunt. “The ship rides very well.”

That verdict came after a three-day “special trial” conducted May 22-24 at San Diego by the Navy’s Board of Inspection and Survey, or INSURV. Nearly 200 people rode the ship — normally crewed by 40 sailors — to test the Freedom’s combat, communications and engineering systems; minutely examine the ship’s physical condition; and put the vessel through a series of ship-handling evolutions.

“There were some hiccups in the demonstration in some of the areas,” Hunt admitted, “and there are things that ought to be fixed on three, five and seven” — follow-on ships built to the Freedom (LCS 1) design. “But the things we identified [as problems] are fixable.”

The first thing that needs to be highlighted, I think, is that the TMI worked exactly as designed. I knew as soon as I posted the TMI results there was about a snowballs chance in hell that Freedom would fail INSURV, in fact, I don't think any ship that had their TMI results posted publicly would fail INSURV - which is one more reason I strongly believe the US Navy should be more transparent with TYCOM Material Inspection results since they are moving ahead with the policy of keeping INSURV reports classified.

You have to read all of Chris Cavas's article to get the full picture, which is basically the new baseline for keeping track of issues on USS Freedom going forward.

For me the hawse pipe design problem and the stern door problem stood out as the biggest issues. The design problem related to the hawse pipe forward appears to still be the problem without a solution on Freedom, because it also appears to be a problem on Fort Worth. That problem was on the ship in 2008 - when I rode the ship. That problem is not the Navy, that's the shipbuilder.

So water is still coming in on the stern doors? Again, that was an issue in 2008, and is obviously a design issue because the doors aren't the same on Fort Worth (but no word if the new doors on that ship are working). I note that Independence, Bertholf, and San Antonio (basically the three latest new classes of medium and large ships other than Freedom) have had major stern door problems. I don't think the issue is a show stopper for the deployment, because as I understand it the water seeps in only when the ship is at high speed, but that corrosion in the stern door area is only going to get worse until the stern door has an actual solution vs a mitigation process. 3+ years later though? Come on.

The propulsion plant issue that had one of the diesel engines down isn't that big of a deal to me, and was something that I had heard about previously. From what I understand of that issue, that's basically a 'crew needs more time at sea on the engines' problem because the hot bearing is related to an issue related to a yet to be determined setting for oil pressure. That is a new ship problem that gets fixed when time allows you to tinker with it at sea, something Freedom hasn't been able to do.

The misfire is an analogy just waiting to be defined in the comments, but that doesn't strike me as an issue if the ship has fired 840 rounds and only suffered 2 misfires to date. That's actually pretty good. With that said, in the article Hunt attributed the combat system problem to the crew being unable to load the combat system's software properly. OK... that sounds like a procedural issue, which happens, but I do wonder to what degree that process is done on simulators. I get it that the ship has been down for a long time and that process hasn't been performed much in over a year, but isn't that something that can be done in a simulator? Human error, got it; but a training simulator double check might be worth a look as well, just to be sure.

There were some positives covered in the article, and for the record Chris Cavas and I have both been on USS Freedom when it performs a crash back - and I remember Chris looked at me and whispered wow when it happened - which is probably why he notes Hunts reaction in the article. If you have ever been on a ship moving really fast that comes to full stop quickly, you'll know it can be bumpy. You know, that speed thing bugs me too, but I think for USS Freedom (LCS 1) we can at least say it appears speed has been designed into the ship well. The article ended with one last thing I want to cover.

Hunt said he had seen a great improvement in the Freedom over the past 18 months or so.

“I’m not sure I was a believer a year and a half ago, but I’m there now,” he declared.

Obviously it is noteworthy that the President of INSURV Rear Adm. Robert Wray and Commander, Naval Surface Forces Vice Admiral Richard W. Hunt were both apparently on the bridge during some portion of the 3 day INSURV. The reason I think it is interesting is because I have spoken to Vice Admiral Hunt before, and I know a little about him. For example, he was on USS Underwood (FFG 36) during that ships first deployment, which I think is interesting because USS Underwood (FFG 36) was the first of the FFG-7 class to field the 3 promised capabilities of the OHP - RAST, Link 11, and LAMPS III. In many ways, that gives him a lot of insight into what it means when USS Freedom (LCS 1) is being deployed without some promised capability - like the original modules, because he lived that story with the FFG-7 class as many did. Ten years after his tour on Underwood, Hunt was CO of USS Crommelin (FFG 37), which if you ever talk to a SWO who did a LT tour on a ship class then returned to do a XO or CO tour on the same ship class, you'll know those guys really know that ship class very well. Hunt is basically a 35 year active duty SWO who really knows frigates while also really knowing CRUDES, and he's also the Type Commander - so lets not ignore the irony that the TYCOM Material Inspection (TMI) of LCS 1 a few weeks ago was performed by his people.

I note these little informative details because from my point of view, the story of USS Freedom (LCS 1) is at minimum - always remarkable and interesting. I don't know about you guys, but I can't wait for USS Freedom (LCS 1) to deploy to Singapore, because it's an absolute certainty that the deployment will be remarkable and interesting - the same as it always is with this ship.

Congrats to both crews of USS Freedom (LCS 1). With the constant circus surrounding the ship, you folks are fantastic and have stayed professional through it all. I hope someone is keeping a good journal, because the book on this ships development would likely sell pretty well, and we are only on something like chapter 5 with many more chapters yet to be written.

Foreign Entanglements: SOF in DPRK?

Two days ago, David Axe posted a short piece on the Diplomat blog reporting that a US general had indicated that US and ROK special forces could be operating in North Korea. All hell proceeded to break loose. US Force Korea essentially called Axe a liar, several other reporters spoke up in his defense, and the situation eventually settled around the explanation that the US general had been speaking hypothetically. Fortunately, I had previously scheduled an episode of Foreign Entanglements with David for Tuesday evening, which proved to be the eye of the hurricane. Enjoy!

Some Thoughts on the Coastal Riverine Force

Even the smallest economy-of-force programs aren’t immune to Navy budget cuts and accordingly, numerous reductions to NECC force structure were submitted for POM 13. The Navy’s Riverine and Maritime Expeditionary Security Force (MESF) units make up a significant and important part of this community, and comprise the majority of the Navy’s combatant craft outside of Naval Special Warfare. Following the decommissioning of six MSRONs over the next few years, the resulting force structure will consolidate to seven combined Coastal/Riverine Squadrons (CRF) Squadrons for a total of about 4,400 active and reserve Sailors. “The primary mission of CRF is to conduct maritime security operations across all phases of military operations by defending high value assets, critical maritime infrastructure, ports and harbors both inland and on coastal waterways against enemies and when commanded conduct offensive combat operations.” As these changes are enacted, it’s worthwhile to look at where this leaner expeditionary force has come from and where it might go in the future.

A Bit of History

Fighting in inland and coastal waters has been a regular occurrence throughout the U.S. Navy’s history, with notable campaigns in North America, China, and of course, Vietnam. Following the Vietnam War, the navy’s riverine force was largely disestablished and by the 1990s, the sole capability remained in one NSW unit.  The 21st Century riverine force, assembled a few years after the Navy Staff realized that Operation Iraqi Freedom wasn’t just a ground war, now consists of three squadrons of highly trained Sailors with boats and kit sufficient to conduct their missions globally. During OIF, the RIVRONs protected the Haditha Dam and performed hundreds of combat patrols in support of ground forces along Iraqi rivers. The RIVRONs also were equipped with the RCB, a very capable troop carrying boat based on the Swedish CB-90. These boats have been recently used for coastal missions, but are not optimized for extended operations in heavier seas.



 RPBs and RCB in USS Oak Hill (LSD 51) U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication
Specialist 2nd Class Michael R. Hinchcliffe

The arguably less well known Maritime Expeditionary Security Force originated out of the Inshore Undersea Warfare units that defended harbors and other inshore areas against Viet Cong sappers. In the 1970s, the IUW community reverted to the reserve force, added new equipment and missions such as electronic and acoustic surveillance. MIUWs and IBUs performed landward and seaward security roles for amphibious and JLOTs operations, with some units mobilized for Operation Desert Storm. Following the October 2000 attack on USS COLE, the then-called Naval Coastal Warfare community gradually shifted to a boat-centric force, added active force structure, and changed its name to MESF, to reflect the increased emphasis on anti-terrorism/force protection. Throughout the last decade,  thousands of MSRON Sailors have deployed globally to austere locations and successfully deterred new terrorist attacks on critical maritime infrastructure. They have escorted thousands of naval and civilian ships, defended dozens of different ports, and lived for months at a time on Iraq’s rusty OPLATS - all thankless, but vitally important missions.  Interestingly, the new CRF is not the first time that the Navy has combined coastal and riverine units.

On boats

The MK VI will be the newest addition to NECC’s fleet (see Chuck Hill’s post here) and provide a much needed augmentation to the smaller MESF and RIVRON craft. There is room to debate whether the MK VI will be the right vessel for coastal NECC missions. Certainly, the ability to embark a boarding team and better sea-keeping and endurance will make the MK VI a tremendously more capable platform than the MESF’s current 34’ PBs. But one the thing to keep in mind is that combatant craft are small, inexpensive relative to every other surface (and air) platform, and designed to have a short life span. Therefore, if the initial buy of six vessels doesn’t prove ideal for CRF, then OPNAV shouldn’t dwell on what amounts to rounding errors in the larger acquisition budget and move quickly to another design.

That said, it should be understood that the MK VI does not meet the requirement for a green water Cyclone PC replacement which would be more properly classified as an offshore patrol vessel or offshore support craft. The MK VI just doesn’t have the legs and payload for that mission set and requires either a near-by land base or sea-basing as seen in the above photo of well deck testing last year. Ostensibly, LCS was going to take on the offshore patrol role, along with the missions for apparently every other ship class smaller than a DDG. Time will tell how that idea works out.

Some Future Opportunities

Along with continuing to conduct NECC’s mainstay riverine, force protection, and security force assistance missions, the CRF has the opportunity to expand into new mission sets. As the combined CRF stands up next week, it’s heartening to hear one of the MESG Commodores recognize the offensive potential of these units. “Although Coastal Riverine Force will predominantly perform force protection type missions, when required it will be capable of conducting offensive operations which will enhance mission effectiveness throughout the force.”  These operations will require new equipment, training, and tactics.

Although the MK VI is not heavily armed or armored, it does appear to have a remotely operated MK 38 Mod 2 (25mm) on the bow. The Israelis have similar mounts on their fast attack craft that include coaxial Spike ER laser guided missiles (8 km range). One hopes that NAVSEA CCD is planning on installing at least an equivalent capability on the MK VI to add to CRF’s offensive punch. I recently was aboard a similar sized vessel capable of carrying 16 griffin missiles in a VLS-type launcher, so this sort of firepower not out of the question for 20-30 meter fast attack craft. Furthermore, by becoming targeting nodes in a distributed naval fires network, these small vessels could fight above their weight class.


MIUWU 114 Mobile Operations Center on Khawr Abd Allah River
Iraq, April 2003 (author’s photo)

 Similarly, the MESF’s land-based sensor detachments have the potential to improve targeting in the littorals. A primarily defensive force since COLE, MESF’s 90s-era equipment is in need of a radical facelift, with the addition of lighter and more numerous fixed, mobile, and disposable sensors. In the IUW era, the MIUWUs routinely deployed and listened to sonobuoys in support of coastal ASW.  Today, a myriad of air and sea droppable sensor packages with various combinations of EO, signals, acoustic, and METOC collection capabilities are readily available. These smaller, smarter, and cheaper sensors can rapidly disseminate their data globally via a number of means, and along with small tactical UAVs, should become a staple of the CRF.

The Navy must sustain traditional brown and green water MSO missions, but new technology will also make it possible for NECC units to become an integral component of distributed maritime operations in higher intensity warfare.

******
Thanks to Lee Wahler, a frequent commenter on ID, and other hard core boat guys for helping with ideas and research on this article.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.

Have a Safe Memorial Day Weekend

Have a great weekend, and stay safe. If you read one thing this holiday weekend, I hope it is this.

Pictures of the Day

From here.

STRAIT OF HORMUZ (May 19, 2024) The guided-missile destroyer USS Nitze (DDG 94) transits the Strait of Hormuz with Military Sealift Command missile range instrumentation ship USNS Invincible (T-AGM 24) and British Royal Navy ships HMS Ramsey (M110), HMS Pembroke (M107) and RFA Lyme Bay (L3007). Nitze is deployed as part of the Enterprise Carrier Strike Group to the U.S. 5th Fleet area of responsibility conducting maritime security operations, theater security cooperation efforts and support missions as part of Operation Enduring Freedom. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Jeff Atherton/Released)

It is very interesting that while the US negotiates the future of the Iranian nuclear program in Baghdad, USNS Invincible (T-AGM-24) enters the Persian Gulf.

USS Devastator (MCM 6), USS Sentry (MCM 3), USS Pioneer (MCM 9) and USS Warrior (MCM 10)

You can learn more about the Dockwise ship TERN here, and there are more pictures here. These ships should arrive in Bahrain sometime in the 3rd week in June.

Joining Information Dissemination

I'm Adam Elkus, and I'm very excited to begin posting at Information Dissemination. I'm a PhD student in International Relations at American University and a recent MA graduate of Georgetown's Security Studies Program.

A little more about me: I blog at Rethinking Security, my eponymous blog, although I also am involved with CTOVision, Small Wars Journal's El Centro, and Asia Security Watch. I've also recently started posting at Abu Muqawama. My primary interest is in military theory and strategic studies, with specific interests in new operating concepts, information security, campaign design, law enforcement, and related subjects. I'm on Twitter as well.

I live in DC, and do a lot of my blogging at Baked and Wired and Snap in Adams-Morgan. My favorite books on strategic subjects are Special Operations and Strategy, The Structure of Strategic Revolution, and The Scientific Way of Warfare. Lastly, because my friend H. Lucien Gauthier will inevitably mention it, I also really, really like giant robots and the Wu-Tang Clan. Once a blue moon they intersect.

I've followed (and admired) Information Dissemination for a while, and I'm very thankful to Galrahn for bringing me on board. This site sets the standard for discussion of naval matters and strategy, and I'm looking forward to diving into what has already been an impressive and stimulating ongoing conversation.

CNAS Touts Sustainable Pre-eminence

DC based national security think-tank the Center for a New American Security has released another in its series of reports centered on how the national security establishment ought to organize/re-organize itself to be more effective and efficient in an era of declining military budgets.  Entitled "Sustainable Pre-eminence: Reforming the US Military at a Time of Strategic Change", CNAS's crack team of David Barno, Travis Sharp, Nora Bensahel, and Matthew Irvine have put forward a rational, adult blueprint for change to the American military establishment, one that takes as a given our current economic malaise and assumes another $150B in cuts over the next ten years on top of those already apportioned to DoD in the Budget Control Act of 2011.  This is a thoughtful, readable approach written at the broad policy level, rather than a treatise on budgets.  It is worth reading in its entirety, for it is a useful and potentially prescient tonic to be taken to alleviate the pain of American military decline.

George Bernard Shaw

I say this because while CNAS has delivered up a nifty plan for us to run out the clock, it does not have to be so.  We can--and should--spend roughly 4% of our GDP on national defense--making it the first bill we pay--while other "discretionary" accounts line up behind it. Additionally, the whole use of terms "discretionary and non-discretionary" amounts to a giant thumb on the scale of government spending, rhetorically walling off great stashes of national resources promised as entitlements generations ago by Congresses long since dead and buried.  CNAS (wisely) walks away from a discussion of military pay and benefits in this report, saying that others have covered the subjects well and that reform therein is a matter of political will.  Such could be safely said too (a matter of will) about the cowardice of leaving an increasing percentage of government spending unmolested, while we whittle down our military might so that we might fund other "investments". 

One might think someone with my body of work would be pleased to see a think-tank so thoroughly embrace American Seapower.  And truth be told, this report does just that--clearly in words, and by dealing the Navy fewer cuts than any of the other services, it prioritizes the Navy by reducing it less than the others.  Additionally, it re-deploys that which the Navy retains in a more persistent and powerful presence, largely in the Asia Pacific.  And if a gun were held to my head and I was made to say "the way it is, is the way it will ever be", then I would probably line up behind CNAS and proclaim this approach to be about as rational a way forward as we are going to see.  The Navy retains most of its force structure, and it sets itself up as the strategic blocking force in the Pacific.  But there are devils in the details.  Much is made of the importance of SSN's in this report, but I seem only to find one addition to the current plan.  A CVN and an Airwing are cut--seemingly sacrificed on the altar of "the Navy has to suffer some pain" as little else is offered to justify the cuts.  Brookings scholar Michael O'Hanlon's embrace of multiple crews for surface ships is embraced by the CNAS authors, with little regard to the loss of force structure sure to follow, which results in a force that may be more present, but has less aggregated combat power.  Put another way, CNAS trades presence for warfighting capacity--not an unreasonable trade--but it has to be recognized for what it is. 

CNAS seems to buy the 2007 Navy Strategy's two hub model (IO/Arabian Gulf and East Asia) and shifts more naval power to the Far East.  Where does this come from?  A declining number of ships, to include 10% fewer Amphibs than are in today's substandard long range plan that does not meet either the COCOM or the USMC requirements, half the LCS's, and an undetermined number of CRUDES ships--already stretched thinly.  All of this while the Mediterranean once again shows itself to be a place of interest to us and our NATO partners, whose approach to military power puts both their interests and ours in question.  

I'm a huge fan of their suggestions for carrier aviation (cut the JSF buy, keep the Super Hornet line open, diminish/end the USMC tacair presence on CVN's and double down on unmanned), I'm dubious of USAF's ability to take up the unmanned ISR load in the maritime domain, and I'm generally well-disposed to their thoughts on the Marine Corps (which also does well, by comparison). 

But in order to LOVE this report, one has to be a good bit more reasonable than I am, and I take my cue on reasonableness from George Bernard Shaw: "The reasonable man adapts himself to the world; the unreasonable one persists in trying to adapt the world to himself. Therefore all progress depends on the unreasonable man."

Bryan McGrath

CATO: The Future of the US Navy Surface Fleet

SAN DIEGO (May 2, 2024) The first of class littoral combat ships USS Freedom (LCS 1), rear, and USS Independence (LCS 2) maneuver together during an exercise off the coast of Southern California. The littoral combat ship is a fast, agile, networked surface combatant designed to operate in the near-shore environment, while capable of open-ocean tasking, and win against 21st-century coastal threats such as submarines, mines, and swarming small craft. (U.S. Navy photo by Lt. Jan Shultis/Released)

The Policy Forum on the US Navy Surface Fleet at CATO has turned out to be a hugely successful event. It was informative and stayed interesting from start to end. In fact, I can only find one problem with the event - they used some crappy Java movie app that is terrible on mobile devices and several browsers instead of YouTube for the video of the event. Thus - I won't be embedding the video, so you'll have to go here and download it. 

The panel included Robert O. Work, Under Secretary of the Navy; Eric J. Labs, Senior Analyst for Naval Forces and Weapons, Congressional Budget Office; Ben Freeman, National Security Fellow, Project on Government Oversight; Christopher Preble, Vice President for Defense and Foreign Policy Studies, Cato Institute; moderated by Benjamin Friedman, Senior Fellow in Defense and Homeland Security Studies, Cato Institute. I am a big fan of the work of Bob Work, Eric Labs, and Christopher Preble. I do not know much about either Ben, but I do appreciate what POGO does for taxpayers.

This is a great discussion start to finish, and while it is supposed to cover all of surface warfare, it really focuses on LCS because LCS really is the most interesting thing about the Navy right now - for all the right and wrong reasons simultaneously. Whether it is when Christopher Preble quoted CDR Salamander or when the Undersecretary discusses fleet design or when Eric Labs points out every other alternative to LCS costs more... this is solid gold information. Panels like this discredit the bullshit people read on LCS every day on the internet, and are hugely valuable towards informing the public on this very interesting ship the Navy is fielding to the fleet.

A Few Stories... 

Did you know that I am unable to find a single expert on shipbuilding in North America or Europe who believes the US Navy can build any frigate design greater than 4000 tons - any design world wide btw - for less than LCS, but people run around the internet claiming otherwise all the time. I can't find a single expert on shipbuilding in North America or Europe who believes the Absalon class is anywhere near less expensive than LCS, but that is frequently touted on the internet all the time. I hear people say the FFG-7s are oh-so-much-better-than-LCS if we would only upgrade them like the Australians did. Well, I have talked to the Australians extensively about this, and the upgrade of the Adelaide class was such a fantastic dumpster fire the Australians had to retire 2 of their 6 ships just to afford to finish the upgrades, were ultimately only unable to upgrade 4 ships, and spent so much money on the project they could have purchased brand new ships for about the same cost. It was such a mess of a project for the Australians that it became a political scandal. Why?

Well, it turns out it was a dumpster fire for the same reasons the US Navy chose not to upgrade the FFG-7s - the compartmentalization of the ship is so intense for survivability purposes it basically rendered the ship obsolete because the cost of modernization far exceeded the benefits of doing so. Now with that said, the compartmentalization was for survivability purposes, and that meant a Perry could hit a 750lb mine and survive, and a Perry could get hit by 2 Exocet missiles and survive. There are trades, and those trades are not trivial, but the same extensive compartmentalization that saved the ships in combat prevented the entire class from ever upgrading due to the extensive costs of doing so. If you read an easy solution to naval issues on the internet, do your homework, because nothing in naval affairs is ever simple.

For the US Navy to upgrade the FFG-7s exactly how the Australians did to upgrade the Adelaide class, the estimated cost today is $300 million per - and that assumes it would be $50 million cheaper for us than it would be for them, simply because I'm being stupidly patriotic suggesting we are somehow better at this kind of stuff than they are without any supporting data (yes, stupidly). So people advocating for SLEPing the frigates, they basically would prefer to get 10-15 years out of 30 year old ships for 2/3 the price of a brand new LCS. I think that would be a bad idea, and yet - people on the internet claim it to be BRILLIANT!

In 2008 - before the Navy had brought Freedom out to salt water, I rode Freedom for 3 days from Buffalo to Montreal. During a high speed run across Lake Ontario, I walked down to the mission bays to see what it was like down there while the ship was at high speed. The first thing I learned is that in bay 3, the smallest mission zone where the Navy has apparently been putting modules for people; it is one of the loudest places on the ship when the turbines are running - so the idea the Navy can simply plug in habitat modules down there as a solution doesn't sound credible to me. Maybe Independence is different, but on Freedom it was so incredibly loud down in that mission zone I put my earphones on and turned on music. Another thing I noticed was water coming in the back door of the ship while the ship was at high speed.

Since before the ship was even commissioned, the back door of LCS-1 has been a known problem and water has been coming through that door. A natural conclusion of that would be rust in that area. But here is what bugs me - the USCGC Bertholf had a problem with her stern door, the USS San Antonio had a problem with her stern door, and the USS Independence has a problem with her stern door. Why does the US shipbuilding sector have such a big problem building stern doors for each new class of ship? I don't know, but I see a pattern that NAVSEA clearly doesn't have a good oversight program in place to address.

I don't know Michael Fabey, but I got a real kick out of his article because it really sounded like his source had an axe to grind with LCS - and apparently Michael Fabey didn't think he was being used. Michael Fabey had never been on LCS-1 before he got onboard for that article, and one of the really silly things in my opinion is that he apparently needed to sneak on the ship at all - because I have to tell you, I have never had to sneak onto a Navy ship before so that alone sounds really silly to me.

One of the first things you'll notice about LCS-1 is that it doesn't get painted very often, and as of last year some of the places had never been painted. It's a weight thing, driven by the stupid speed thing. Well, if you don't paint the ship, you will see rust, uhm - because it is a ship and without paint, you can't really hide rust.

During my last tour on Freedom I observed rust and cracks as described by the article (keep in mind, this was in Jan 2011), and I asked the CO and XO about them. They were known problems they were going to eventually deal with during maintenance availabilities, but the priority of the ship was to test as many things as possible to insure every problem had a solution that could be incorporated into the new ships under construction. The whole idea that Michael Fabey had to ninja aboard USS Freedom to discover problems is ridiculous, because neither the ship nor the crew hides problems - the ships purpose has been to identify problems for the class and I have several personal experiences where all you have to do is ask about the problems to get an interesting answer that, btw, tells you a lot more about LCS than the story Michael Fabey was trying to tell.

I found that Aviation Week article to be supremely insulting to the professionalism of the sailors and officers that I have encountered each visit to Freedom, and remarkably uninformed. Ben Freeman gets a pass by me, and while maybe he should have done better research, he isn't a ship guy and doesn't really know this stuff. Fabey writes about ships every day as his day job, he doesn't really have an excuse for not figuring out what he was looking at. I remember once standing on a Perry class in Mobile, AL several years ago asking about cracks on the ship, and the DH giving the tour told me to move my foot, because I was standing on a crack. It was a known problem, and they intended to fix it. What Michael Fabey sold as a "holy shit moment" on LCS is pretty much an every day issue the Navy deals with throughout the fleet, so pardon me if I think reporting old news being sold as new news that triggers a GAO investigation into old problems is an example of poor journalism rather than solid journalism. No, I'm not impressed, the lack of context and the inability to answer basic questions like 'why' is not impressive journalism to me. I guess my standards are too high.

I thought of these things while watching the CATO panel as Christopher Preble discussed how when he served on USS Ticonderoga 9 years after that ship was commissioned, he was still dealing with first in class problems on that ship. People keep saying LCS has a big problem, but it's basically the same as the old problem, and the absence of context blows every problem out of proportion. Apparently LCS is the only ship class in the world where a problem doesn't get fixed, because the media never reports it fixed. Really? There are some legitimate problems with the LCS hull (and I would argue the design), but they aren't always the problems you think they are, and certainly not the ones POGO discussed from documentation dated last year prior to the ships maintenance availability - particularly the problems that were fixed last year during that availability. Good thing the GAO is going to investigate those old problems that apparently never get fixed even though most already have been fixed, because it couldn't possibly be useful to focus on a real issue facing LCS that matters like the modules.

MARINETTE, Wis. (May 3, 2024) The future littoral combat ship USS Forth Worth (LCS 3) is underway for acceptance trials on Lake Michigan. Fort Worth successfully completed the trials, testing the ship's major systems and equipment in port and underway. Acceptance trials are the last significant milestone before delivery of the ship to the Navy. The ship was presented to the Navy's Board of Inspection and Survey with high levels of completion. (U.S. Navy photo by Mike Rote/Released)

Looking Ahead

So if you watch the panel at CATO, towards the end of the Q&A Robbie Harris asks a question about the LCS looking to the future, and Bob Work discusses the 6 things the Navy has to do with the LCS going forward. His 6 points are in bold below, the rest is my comment on those points.

1) Address the issues brought up by POGO/Aviation Week. There are 62 issues they listed, but 25 of the 62 problems do not actually exist and most of the issues raised are old - which means when Congress asks the GAO to do an investigation they are basically telling everyone Congress is badly out of touch and uninformed (shocking, not really, and I do think the Navy is at fault on this). There will be more problems with LCS in the future. These problems with the LCS hull to date are part of the challenge with the hulls, and the fixes must be put into the production run so the R&D ships serve the purpose they are being touted to be serving today. Based on my conversations with LCS folks over the last few years, a lot of people have been working hard on every aspect of this issue (it's basically been what the LCS has been doing). I do not see this issue as being a difficult one to overcome, indeed it is the issue that is mostly behind the Navy and only new issues with LCS-3 and LCS-4 (and later ships) will matter from this point forward in my opinion.

2) Get the core crew size right. The Navy knows they are too low on manning LCS, and they need to figure out the right number for each ship. The ships were designed to have technology replace the need for so many sailors. Some of those technology substitutions worked, and clearly some did not and never will. IMO, the solution is almost certainly going to be a mix of manpower and technology, and I suspect we will see around 10 sailors added as part of the core crew of LCS-1 resulting in a core crew of 50, roughly a 25% increase. I've been on the ship and no redesign will be necessary for this change, they will simply bunk 3 deep like on other surface combatants instead of 2 deep like they do today, and the head/shower areas may need a bit of redesign. Easy fixes I think. Expanding the stores for the galley might be another issue. My personal impression engaging with folks who know LCS is that they almost have this manpower issue figured out for LCS-1, and are still trying to figure it out for LCS-2. Because manpower is the top cost driver for the US Navy today, figuring out how to keep crew sizes low is critical to having a well sized fleet. Not figuring this issue out means the Navy can only afford about 200 ships, or less, because of the high cost of manpower that would be invested in the ships. Anyone who doesn't understand how big the manpower issue is, why it is important to reduce crew sizes for Navy ships, and how this issue is a major strategic issue for the US Navy is wildly uninformed. More than any other factor, crew sizes are limiting the size of the US Navy and is the constraint that makes 300 ships the high number for the size of the US Navy fleet. I suspect we will see a similar process play out with DDG-1000 as they work to get manpower on that ship right as well. Hopefully, all these lessons will be folded into the next large surface combatant scheduled to get funded in FY18.

3) Single up the combat systems and C4I systems to make sure the ships are interoperable inside the fleet. This will solve several problems that one runs into with disparity in a network designed to fight. For me, this is a much bigger problem with the LCS hulls than what most people moan about, like speed. It is the single biggest barrier to getting the combat side of the LCS training pipeline right, and insures that modular systems are truly interchangeable regardless of hull design. I do not know which combat system is better, and I don't care - singling up to one combat system for both hulls is the single most important part of the LCS hull going forward. Speed is something the Navy can (and has) experimented with on the tactical side. It may or may not be useful. The Navy has not accounted for the issues related to how populated seas in the information age will impact naval warfare in the future, and very smart officers on LCS have been developing tactics using ship speed that have specific value towards that challenge. Maybe speed will be useful, maybe not. Regardless, two combat systems are a big problem going forward, because unlike often discussed issues like speed; 2 combat systems represent a legitimate tactical liability for LCS long term.

4) Make sure the mission modules work. Until I see a missile that is better than the Griffin, which is a short ranged interim solution, I am not going to buy the ASuW module as viable. Until the LCS is capable of deploying multiple sensors simultaneously and capable of processing that data for useful submarine tracks as part of a battle force network, the ASW module is an exercise in PowerPoint. Until I see Mine Men praise the MIW module as better than their dedicated minesweepers, I'm not a believer. Prove the first three modules if they are the threat driving the requirements for the LCS platform as designed. More information would be useful, but that's a problem with LCS across the board.

5) Prove the Maintenance and Manning schemes for LCS will work. I know enough to say too much on this, but I believe this is going to be a huge challenge for LCS over time. I think the Navy can work through the contractor maintenance issues that most people think is the big problem, but I see that as the easy problem to solve as roles and procedures are better defined. However, the manning issues with the surface fleet are bigger than just the Littoral Combat Ship, so LCS is not only bringing a new way to man the ship, it is adding a new manning scheme on top of a manning system that works well enough to convince Congress everything is OK, but requires heavy use of statistical analysis that apparently gets manipulated to give the appearance of functional. Two examples include the TYCOM crossdecking and the way operational squadrons (the carrier squadrons) raid people from the other squadrons (non-carrier squadrons) in RW, but those are only two of many ways the Navy is basically robbing Peter to pay Paul on manpower shortfalls while claiming the manning requirement is met. How long before Gold crew raids Blue crew for people, and we end up with 2 crews per LCS where both are manned at 90% on paper, but neither is fully manned for operations in reality? 10% of a crew of 50 people in 5 people - which is a lot and may represent 50% of the total number of people the Navy needed to add to the LCS just to fix the current manning problems.

If final core LCS crews are 50 people, but Blue crew reports fully manned at 90% and Gold crew reports fully manned at 90% under USFF 90% FIT requirements, what happens when Blue crew has to raid Gold crew for a deployment? Blue crew drops from 90% (45 people) to 80% (40 people). Meanwhile USFF reports 2 fully manned LCS crews (because they average 90%), but the reality is the core crew of 40 people that is considered too small today will be what Gold crew works with, because they had to send 5 sailors over to Blue crew to man the ship to100% for deployment. This USFF 90% FIT requirement in surface warfare today is a bullshit exercise in statistics rather than a functional plan for operational fitness thanks to workarounds like TYCOM crossdecking, and the LCS manning concept will not be compatible with traditional Navy smoke and mirror manning schemes.

Sorry, but if you want to fully man a LCS, the manning requirements need to be 110%, not 90%, because losing even one body on a ship that is optimally manned is going to be a big problem with cascading impacts. Maybe if USFF would raid shore commands to meet ship manning instead of forcing crossdecking in the TYCOMs - and starts these shore raids for manpower by taking from the staffs of 4 star Flag officers - this problem would get fixed quicker.

6) Evolve new modules. Flexibility with modularity is clearly awesome, and I do see how Marine Corps modules, SOF modules, and MSO modules can and probably will be useful in the future. If we assume the Navy gets to this point in the LCS program, and I believe they will starting sometime between 2015-2017 as Littoral Combat Ships start operating in numbers with functional modules together, this is where the Littoral Combat Ship becomes something very few today understand will unfold with LCS over time.

For the surface warfare community, I believe the Littoral Combat Ship represents a "once in a generation opportunity" to innovate the new technologies and the new capabilities that will have significant impact on how naval forces fight in the future, and the reason I am confident in my belief is because the Navy has decided the LCS will be the ship that will evolve what is represented as "mothership capabilities" to the surface force. Motherships are the future of surface warfare in the 21st century, and LCS will have significant impact on virtually every surface ship design across the world. I have enormous confidence that the Littoral Combat Ship will be successful, because it has the right ingredients - top level support and well trained sailors. The promotions of the last two years highlight the top level support exists throughout the chain of leadership, and the innovation is the aspect of LCS that gets almost no time in the press (and it IS there) because the press sells train wrecks, and the LCS has a history full of them.

The surface combatants of the future will look more like LCS than they will DDG-51, and it is the same reason future submarines will look more like the converted Ohio SSGNs than they will the traditional submarine designs of most attack submarines today. The capability of motherships to deploy distributed systems -  systems that distribute ISR networks and lethal payloads as a function of the platform - is going to have a significant tactical impact to tomorrows naval battlefield. Under today's model of naval warfare, if two ships face off against each other, at most the only other tactical threat deployed by the opposing ship one must worry about is the helicopter. In tomorrows model of naval warfare, when two ships face off against each other, the ship capable of distributing payloads and sensors to offboard systems under, on, and over the water at range will be able to attack their adversary from multiple angles simultaneously, thereby stressing defensive systems and creating an attrition effect on the adversary before they are able to achieve firing position against the platform. In many cases, systems are much more difficult to target - particularly small, quiet underwater systems, so they will provide huge tactical advantages for the mothership that don't exist today.  When platforms begin fielding distributable systems that can deploy payloads at range, and multiple platforms are deploying multiple systems, the emerging networks of overlapping ISR and payload platforms and systems will build resiliency into the defense of the battleforce while enabling the lethality of the most capable platforms to fire effectively first at range against adversaries.

Nobody really knows how all of this is going to work, and the Navy isn't even sure they really know what all is needed to make it work, but the US Navy has decided the Littoral Combat Ship will be the low cost entry level investment towards the mothership capabilities that will expose the challenges of large battle networks and allow the Navy to work through the problems and evolve towards this new way of naval warfare. Because of that - it is the LCS sailors through their innovations (which will both succeed and fail along the way, because that is what happens when you innovate) who will usher in the truly distributed network way of war at sea. If you are wondering who the innovators are in the surface warfare community over the next decade, they are in the LCS program.

So for better or worse, I share Bob Work's optimism and excitement for LCS, and I am starting to see the change of attitude in SWOs as mentioned by the CATO panel regarding LCS. LCS looks like doom and gloom in Washington, but the further one gets from DC and the closer one gets to Norfolk and San Diego, the more obvious it is that many of the young SWOs and sailors see LCS as an opportunity and a challenge, rather than the problem and a failure reflected in media narratives.

Two good reads worth checking out regarding the CATO panel. First, Christopher Preble's After Action Report, and this VERY interesting discussion by Kurt Albaugh who has slides I would love to get a copy of, and is a topic I want to research before discussing myself.