Project Valour-IT 2007 Fund Drive

Donations arranged through the link to the top right.

The Future of Underwater Warfare

As I noted the other day, there is currently only one submarine design project underway to support future submarines in the United States, and it involves reducing the cost of the Virginia class. While it is very successful, that it is the only design project currently being funded by Congress should concern citizens, and more specifically the Navy more than it appears to. Putting aside the workforce factors, which is no small thing, current events internationally point to underwater warfare playing a larger portion of the attention of the US Navy at sea.

Submarine exports are up, and not just in Asia, but also in Europe, Africa, and South America. It is noteworthy both China and Russia are spending enormous sums of money fielding not only new attack submarines, but ballistic missile submarines as well, while India is about to field its first nuclear submarines.

Innovation is up. While AIP is a favorite topic, it isn't the only area where underwater technology is improving. The US Navy has achieved the promise of modularity in its submarine force in the very near future, and there are also major advancements in new sonar systems, communication technologies, and fielding unmanned platforms from submarines. While there is no question the SSGN and Virginia class represent a great deal of innovation in submarine technology, when it comes to new ideas and future designs, Europe is moving at a faster pace.

Submarine technologies in the future appear to be heading in three directions, the large submarine, the small submarine, and the combination of both.

Future Large Submarines are currently in development Brazil, China, France, Great Britain, Russia, India, and the United States are all in some stage of designing or producing a new nuclear submarine, either attack or ballistic, and in some cases both. While it appears India and China are working off of older designs, the leaked plans to the internet of the future Russian submarines show there is still a great deal of design ingenuity left in the Russian industry. Universally, new designs are not simply power plants, electronics, and a combination of torpedo tubes as we saw at the end of the cold war, rather underwater payload delivery systems designed to move deployable cargo in the form of manned and unmanned specialized mission packages. It is noteworthy that while India is looking into a design based on the Akula II, it is also seeking smaller deployable manned midget submarine designs for special operations, as well as endurance based UUV systems that can deploy from their new Akula II style nuclear submarines.

On the other end of the spectrum, the HDW Type 210mod and Fincantieri/Rubin S1000 both represent small (between 1000-1300 tons submerged) submarines designed specifically for littoral anti-submarine warfare. Both countries are seeing a growing market. Low cost, low manning requirements, decent weapon loads, and AIP technology combine to offer nations an alternative sea control capability along coast lines in defense against enemy surface and subsurface platforms.

The most interesting future submarine design outside the United States is the SMX designs coming out of DCN. In the spirit of the BAE high/low alternative future concept submarine designs recently unveiled at DSEi 2007, DCN is working on modular capabilities alternatives to its new "three-in-one" base model. For those not familiar, the "three-in-one" SMX design includes a larger base submarine as a combat command platform with 2 smaller combat lethal operation submarines that can attach/detach from the base submarine mothership. Additionally the SMX design is focused on building interchanging modular systems that can be loaded/unloaded from the mothership organically, or transferred to the smaller operation submarines.

The question is, what is driving innovation?

There is a prevailing theory in some corners that just like the last half of the 20th century was devoted to land warfare, specifically in Europe and the Middle East, the next half century will be devoted to securing national interests by sea. While Imperials and Colonization may be dead in the west, there are always lingering issues that lead to desire for stronger military capability. While military conquest by China over Taiwan is a popular theory among those who think war drives decisions, lets assume for a minute a few alternatives that are not driven by all out war.

Should the Wall between North Korea and South Korea come down in 2009 just like the Wall came down dividing Germany in 1989, how will the Korean peninsula then look in 2029? Is there any reason not to assume it wouldn't look similar to Germany in 2009? By the same token, what then would we make of regional island dispute between Japan and a unified Korea?

What about the very near future? Next year Saudi Arabia is going to tender bids for a new submarine, and there are going to be several potential sellers from Russia, to China, to Europe, and perhaps beyond. If Saudi Arabia decides to buy 3 advanced submarines, it is likely other regional players like the UAE and Iran might decide to buy some of its own. That in turn could lead to interest by smaller players for the smaller, cheaper submarine designs being introduced.

With submarines on the market at costs of $250 million or less, and the importance of transportation at sea increasing for emerging economies, new designs are creating new challenges for traditional submarine powers in the west, particularly the United States. If a nation like Venezuela is fielding 6 or more smaller AIP submarines for the same cost we are fielding one Virginia class, the balance of power over a small body of water like the Caribbean Sea can shift quickly. The ability of the US to rapidly produce a counterweight to a regional buildup requires investment in designs today so they are mature tomorrow if needed, something Congress and the Navy don't seem too concerned with right now.

This discussion focused specifically on the manned platforms being designed, but the reality is, no Navy is yet to field on any large scale unmanned systems. We know unmanned systems will impact future warfare, or do we? If we believe unmanned underwater weapons are the future, then the question needs to be asked, where is the funding for design efforts and what is the US Navy waiting for?

Yet Another Pirate Tale Off Somalia - Updated

It was reported yesterday that yet another ship was hijacked off the coast of Somalia, the North Korean ship MV Dia Honga Dan. Boarded by 8 gunmen, the crew of 22 was overpowered, until they decided to fight back...

The crew of a ship hijacked from Somalia overpowered their attackers Tuesday and regained control of the vessel, officials said.

About two dozen crew members of the North Korea-flagged vessel were able to fight off the eight gunmen who had seized the vessel late Monday, and the crew was piloting the ship back to the war-battered city's port in Mogadishu, said Andrew Mwangura, program coordinator of the Seafarers Assistance Program, which independently monitors piracy in the region.

He said first reports that the vessel was from South Korea were incorrect, and that the crew numbered about 22, instead of nearly twice that number as earlier reported.

An international watchdog reported this month that pirate attacks worldwide jumped 14 percent in the first nine months of 2007, with the biggest increases off the poorly policed waters of Somalia and Nigeria.

Keep an eye on Eagle1's place, he will no doubt have all the details from his seemingly unlimited sources of that regions security as yet another saga of piracy off Somalia unfolds.

Update1: CDR Salamader has the rest of the story involving the USS James E Williams (DDG 95). It is noteworthy that now there are forces from SNMG1 and SNMG2 in the Indian Ocean.

Project Valour-IT 2007 Fund Drive

Not a blogger? Looking to support Valour-IT? Copy the text below, customize as desired, and send as many emails as you can, print newsletters, and spread the word. The following is my latest alert to my Masonic brothers. Yes, there are still Masons under the age of 35...



Brothers,

The Project Valour-IT 2007 Veteran's Day Fund Drive Begins Monday October 29th and goes through Veterans Day, November 11th. The Navy goal this year is $60,000 (my blog is supporting the Navy). The fund drive goal is $240,000 total. For those unaware, Project Valour-IT is an ongoing effort by Soldiers' Angels to provide voice-controlled and adaptive laptop computers to wounded Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Marines recovering from hand wounds and other severe injuries at major military medical centers. Operating laptops by speaking into a microphone or using other adaptive technologies, our wounded heroes are able to send and receive messages from friends and loved ones, surf the 'Net, and communicate with buddies still in the field.

Valour-IT is an IRS-certified non-profit (donations are tax-deductible) and is non-political. Regardless of ideas about how/why war is being waged, the fact is that people are wounded and need our help. Valour-IT is about supplying that help, not about endorsing or opposing the reasons why it's needed.

Last year Valour-IT raised over $230,000 dollars. This year, need among the wounded hasn't changed, with as many as 100 laptops going out each month.

Brothers, we need help getting the word out. Email all your friends and family, call your radio station, email the local talk host, write your local newspaper, inform the local TV personality, and when possible connect with local business and organizations that would be willing to get involved and help raise money for this worthy cause. If that is beyond your desire or capability, and you would prefer to give $1 or more instead, that is ok too!

Information will be updated each day of the fund drive at my blog, where you can donate via the image provided in the top right hand corner:
http://informationdissemination.blogspot.com/

Official Links:

Official Site: history and background on Valour-IT, official donation info
http://soldiersangels.org/index.php?page=project-valour-it

Bulletin Board: general competition info, tech help, team planning, announcements, etc.
http://www.chaoticsynapticactivity.com/valouritphpBB/posting.php

Auction Site: donated items for sale
http://sablogs.com/cgi-bin/valourITauctions/eAuction.pl

Project Blog: background, interesting links, daily donation tracking, public relations
http://www.valour-it.blogspot.com/

If you would prefer to support another service in this drive, official links to the Team Leaders is provided below, and donations can be arranged through the links made available on those sites.

Army:
http://www.blackfive.net/

Navy:
http://chaoticsynapticactivity.com/

Air Force:
http://www.mudvillegazette.com/

Marines:
http://www.sablogs.com/

Thank you for your support.

5th Fleet Focus: Addressing the Pirate Menace

I was going to wait until next week before pointing out the increased naval activity off the east coast of Africa in regards to pirates, but events have drawn my attention to the region sooner. On Monday, Eagle1 posted an article about a Japanese Tanker hijacked at sea on Sunday off the coast of Somalia. Later on Monday we learned that the USS Porter (DDG 78) engaged the pirates while they were in international waters, sinking to skiffs ties to the hijacked vessel hull.

It appears that fog of war played into the incident, as it is reported the USS Porter (DDG 78) was unaware of the nature of the cargo on the hijacked Japanese-owned, Panamanian-flagged ship the Golden Mori. I'm not going to bother with much of the details of the incident beyond what Eagle1 is reporting, because the DoD is working to schedule a press conference with the Captain of the USS Porter (DDG 78) on Tuesday, where the fog of war will clear on the incident.

However, new details are being reported that the hijacking took place off the Socotra Islands, and the USS Arleigh Burke (DDG 51) is shadowing the vessel. More interesting is news that the Somalian government has given permission to the USS Arleigh Burke (DDG 51) to enter Somalian waters to pursue the hijacked vessel. As far as I am aware, this is the first time the government of Somalia has given the international coalition permission to hunt pirates.

Last week France dispatched the frigate FS Guépratte to Somalia to escort UN chartered ships supporting the World Food Program in Somalia. The USS Whidbey Island (LSD 41) is also in the region, however I do not believe the LSD has any Marines onboard. However, on October 16th, the 22nd MEU completed 2 weeks of training in Kuwait and reconstituted aboard the Kearsarge Strike Group amphibious ships. This would free up the ships to offer Marines for any operations against the pirates and the hijacked ship. USS Porter (DDG 78) is part of the Kearsarge Strike Group.

Although the Enterprise Strike Group is in the theater, and while the USS Arleigh Burke is part of the Enterprise Strike Group, it is unlikely the USS Enterprise would move away from Iraq to deal with pirates. However, the USS Forrest Sherman, also part of the Enterprise ESG, has been operating off the east coast of Africa in support of AFRICOM and is available.

Finally, the USS Wasp (LHD 1) is in theater as well. The USS Wasp (LHD 1) is also not carrying Marines, but does offer an alternative for moving aircraft around the region in MAG elements that would be supporting either Iraq, or operations off Somalia.

The US Navy has a number of assets available regionally that can support virtually any operation against pirates. I'm not going to go into detail, but there are at least 4 US and allied nuke subs in the region, and they bring a number of SOF options into play. If I was the pirates onboard the Golden Mori, I don't think I would be sleeping well tonight.

Here Comes the Analysis of Alternatives for the CG(X)

InsidetheNavy (subscription) has the story.

A study refining the definition of the future CG(X) cruiser was recently completed and will be vetted by Navy officials in the near future, a top shipbuilding official said here last week.

Rear Adm. Bernard McCullough, the Navy’s director of warfare integration (N8F), told Inside the Navy on Oct. 24 that the analysis of alternatives (AOA) for the new cruiser recommends “about four” variants.

One of those options calls for splitting the ship program and building two different size hulls for the surface combatant, one based on the DDG-1000 destroyer and one that is larger, he confirmed.

“There’s about four options and that’s one of the options,” McCullough told ITN at an expeditionary warfare conference in Panama City, FL.

The analysis -- conducted by researchers at the Center for Naval Analyses -- will be “briefed out to Navy leadership, starting in about another two weeks,” McCullough said.

Following the Navy discussions regarding the Analysis of Alternatives *AOA), the Defense Acquisition Board will meet to define milestone A. The Defense Acquisition Board was originally scheduled to meet October 10th, but that meeting was canceled and no future meetings are scheduled.

Too bad the Analysis of Alternatives is limited to the CG(X). I'd like to see a study on littoral warfare as a result of the new maritime strategy and its increased focus on missions other than war and small wars from the sea.

Bringing Back the APD

In the November 5th edition of Navy Times, there is an article called "Marine Delivery May Be Part Of LCS’ Future" where for the first time, the Navy is talking about the LCS as a APD.

For those unaware, APD is officially described as a "High Speed Transport" by the Navy, although many of us prefer the term "Auxiliary Personnel Destroyer" or "Destroyer Transport."

In years to come, the Navy could develop littoral combat ship modules to carry Marines to the fight, perform special operations missions and deliver humanitarian aid and disaster relief, said Rear Adm. Victor Guillory, the Navy's director of surface warfare requirements.

"I don't want to rule anything out," Guillory said in an Oct. 24 interview.

Robert Work of hte Center for Strategic and Budgetary Studies discussed this option for the LCS a few years go. In his discussions with both General Dynamics and Lockheed Martin, at the time he made the argument that if you had one of each ship you could fully support the deployment and sustainment of a single reinforced mechanized rifle company.

I think it is interesting how the LCS is discussed like it can fit every role. The program of record is for 3 mission modules supporting MIW, ASuW, and ASW. The 2005 QDR specifically cites another mission module that has gone ignored, the SOF module. That doesn't include the export versions, and now we have the Marines looking for a APD module.

For a ship that 7 total were planned to be built by now, 4 of which have been funded, and could ultimately be nothing more than two 1-class vessels after 6 years if Congress decides to get nasty in the next few weeks, this program gets an amazing amount of hype.

Big Decisions for Big Programs in FY08 Budget

On October 22nd, InsidetheNavy (subscription) ran an article called "Taylor Urging Senators to Agree to Nuclear Power, Larger Fleet" in which he had a few choice comments for the Navy and the industry.

“I think it’s time for Congress to step in and say this is what the Navy needs to do.”

The congressman commended Navy Secretary Donald Winter for accepting responsibility for the design of ships and the oversight of shipbuilding, but noted that “he’s one man -- he going to need some help.” Winter needs an acquisition executive that will help him convince the major shipyards that their major responsibility is to the fleet, Taylor said.

“He’s going to need some very capable help and quite frankly he’s going to need a head-knocker because the major shipbuilders -- they think their major responsibility is to their shareholders,” Taylor said. “I think their responsibility is to the fleet.”

These comments come among the backdrop of two very different spending bills for the Navy included in the FY08 Defense Budget. The House and Senate bills do a lot of things differently, and there are going to be some tough decisions hammered out in committee when they get together over the next few days. Below is a summery of the issues facing Congress.

Virginia Class Submarine

The House and the Senate both added additional funding to the FY08 budget for advanced procurement of a new Virginia class submarine. The House added $588 million which includes around $400 million to begin construction of the reactor, the item requiring the longest lead time in a new submarine. The Senate approved $470 million. Starting advance procurement in FY08 will allow an additional submarine to be added to the FY09 budget next year, perhaps starting a construction run of 2 Virginia class submarines per year 2 years earlier than intended in the 313-ship plan.

Lewis and Clark Class Dry Cargo Ships

Both the Senate and the House added 1 T-AKE to this years budget and authorized one more T-AKE for next year. The House went further though, adding an additional $1.4 billion to the National Sealift Defense Fund to buy two more T-AKE dry cargo ships on top of the 2 already mentioned above.

San Antonio Class Amphibious Ship

The House added around $1.7 billion for a 10th San Antonio class amphibious ship. The Senate did not include any provision for the 10th LPD-17. The Marines are eager for the ship and are lobbying for its inclusion.

UH-1Y/AH-1Z Marine Corps Helicopter Program

Both the House and the Senate recommended reductions to the program The House dropped $104 million from the $518 million request while the Senate killed dropped $78 million and eight aircraft. Since both bills were passed, the Navy has informed Bell Helicopter Textron to plan for the program to increase to acquiring around 123 UH-1Y utility helicopters and 226 AH-1Z attack helicopters as part of an initiative to grow the Marine Corps to 202,000 Marines. This is up from the original request of 100 UH-1Ys and 180 AH-1Zs. Currently, the average UH-1Y costs around $18 million, and the average AH-1Z costs around $21 million. It will be interesting to see if the Navy is able to influence either the Senate or the House regarding the program reductions given the program is expected to get larger to reflect other Congressional changes in the FY08 Defense Budget.

Littoral Combat Ship

The biggest debate is the LCS, and the entire program could hang in the balance of the decisions made in committee. All four versions of the appropriations and authorization bills are different in their recommendations regarding cuts to the LCS program. The LCS request is complicated by the Navy's April decision to drop one of the three ships it asked for in its original February budget submission to Congress, but it is further complicated by the ongoing contract negotiations with General Dynamics regarding the 2nd General Dynamics ship funded in FY07. The Navy hopes to have the GD contract negotiations concluded before the Senate and House bang out the final LCS program for FY08 in committee.

The House has recommended reducing the Navy's request for two ships to one, authorizing $339.5 million to buy one new LCS hull. The Senate has recommended no new ships and pulls funding for the GD LCS currently under contract negotiation, and moving up the timetable to pick one of two competing designs by the end of 2008 instead of 2010.

Of the original $910 million request in the Presidents original budget, the House cut $571 million and two ships, while the Senate dropped the entire $910 million request.

The Navy doesn't really like any of the options in either the House or the Senate, and is lobbying hard for $460 million to fund a single LCS in FY08 while hoping to keep funding for the 2nd General Dynamics LCS funded in FY07. According to those in Panama last week, Rear Adm. Charles Goddard said that if 1 LCS is funded in FY08, the Navy would hold a competition for the ship between General Dynamics and Lockheed Martin.

The contract renegotiation with GD over LCS3 is only part of the story though, unless the contract impresses the Senate, those negotiations may end up being a lot of effort for not. In asking around, I can't find anyone, and I mean nobody in the Navy, Industry, Congress... willing to predict what will happen with the LCS. That in itself says a lot.

2 more items of note. First, both the Senate and the House cut LCS mission module funding as well, citing LCS ship cuts as the primary reason. Second, the FY08 Budget has language in it that changes the name "Department of the Navy" to "The Department of the Navy and the Marine Corps." I'm thinking CDR needs to hold a new logo design contest.

5th Fleet Focus: US Navy Engages Pirates Off Somalia - Updated

The USS Porter (DDG 78) engaged some pirates off Somalia, CNN has the details.

A U.S. Navy warship fired on and sank two skiffs used by pirates Sunday to hijack a merchant vessel off the coast of Somalia, U.S. officials said Monday.

The USS Porter responded to a distress call from the merchant vessel carrying benzene, the officials said. Sunday's shooting took place in international waters, they said.

At the request of Somalia's government, a second U.S. warship, the destroyer USS Arleigh Burke, is now shadowing the merchant ship inside Somali waters, the officials said.

In recent years, warships have stayed outside the 12-mile limit when chasing pirates.

The officials said that when the Porter fired on the skiffs tied up to the merchant vessel, it was not known the ship was filled with highly flammable benzene.

Additional details of the hijacking can be found at Eagle1's place.


Update1: Somalia has authorized the international coalition for hot pursuit into Somalian waters, details coming in a few hours.

Update2: Latest Details here.

Project Valour-IT 2007 Fund Drive

The Project Valour-IT 2007 Veteran's Day Fund Drive Begins Monday October 29th and goes through Veterans Day, November 11th. The Navy goal this year is $60,000. For those unaware, Project Valour-IT is an ongoing effort by Soldiers' Angels to make available voice-activated laptop computers to wounded military personnel who need them to maintain contact with family and friends, to access the Internet or perform other tasks.

Valour-IT is an IRS-certified non-profit (donations are tax-deductible) and is non-political. Regardless of ideas about how/why war is being waged, the fact is that people are wounded and need our help. Valour-IT is about supplying that help, not about endorsing or opposing the reasons why it's needed. Need evidence? Moveon.org is signed up under Navy in supporting the fund drive. Update: Since removed, hoax maybe?

I have personally been involved in the adopt a soldier program through Soldiers Angels since 2005, and I highly recommend it. For both my wife and I it has been a rewarding experience, and I recommend it to anyone here at home looking to make a personal effort in support of those in service to our country.

I am admittedly very new to Project Valour-IT, introduced to it recently by Xformed. Being that I own an IT Corporation myself, I find the project a natural fit for donations of both my business, my personal, and as a natural fit to be supported by this blog.

Official Blog for Project Valour-IT

How You Can Get Involved.

Straight Cash Homey. You can always donate through the Fund Drive widget to the top right of this blog.

Join Up. Are you a blogger? Spread the word.

The V-IT bulletin board has posts of lots of general and specific info, plus it’s a place to connect with other teams/bloggers for advice on how to get involved.

Get the word out. Email all your friends, call your radio station, email the local talk host, inform the local TV guy/gal, and connect with local business and organizations that would be willing to get involved. In my experience in fund raising, time dedicated in these activities is often as if not more valuable than a personal contribution.

The Dutch Deny Blocking Israeli Satellite TV Signal

A few weeks ago I discussed the mystery of the Israeli satellite TV network YES disruption in northern Israel.

Electronic disturbances that have played havoc with the YES satellite television company's broadcasts in the past month were caused by powerful radar equipment deployed onboard a Dutch Navy vessel off the Lebanese coast, The Jerusalem Post has established. The disturbances took the form of time delays on soundtracks as well as distorted and fragmented pictures during broadcasts.

Sources close to YES say that the disturbances, which have caused the company significant financial harm, were caused by an extremely powerful radar system, exponentially stronger than the signal beamed to subscribers' home dishes.

The radar was deployed by a UNIFIL vessel, possibly the Dutch vessel HNLMS De Ruyter, an air defense frigate, off the coast of Lebanon. Observers and subscribers are calling on YES to return the monthly fees for YES subscription over the time of the disturbances. Should YES return one month's fee to every subscriber affected, the damages could potentially add up to NIS 100 million.

Springboard has the latest article, the Dutch claim they didn't do it. If they didn't do it, then who did?

Turf War: Business as Usual

Another turf war reported inside the DoN (soon to be DoN&MC, but no one is talking about that yet)...

Marine Corps officials for some time have grumbled about the Navy not buying enough amphibious transport ships. These vessels are essential for Marine deployments, officials contend.

Marines argue that they need more amphibious ships to respond to crises around the world and for humanitarian operations. Other ships in the Navy’s budget, such as attack submarines, are less urgently needed because they only are useful in major wars against naval powers.

“We need to think how we spend our money,” said Lt. Gen. James F. Amos, deputy Marine commandant for combat development and integration. Maybe the Navy ought to consider buying fewer submarines, he suggested. “You can probably contain the Chinese fleet and wreak havoc with just five or six attack subs.”

If the Marines want more amphibious ships, then why have they accepted the proposed Sea Base? These turf battles are starting to look silly. The Marines are not wrong, but if they want more amphibious ships, maybe they should use the 18 billion planned for the Sea Base that isn't joint and can't support a full MAG before calling for fewer submarines.

Insert phrase about having your own house straight before calling out someone else's.

And btw, based on the new maritime strategy, I have a suggestion for the Marines coming later this week. I think the Marine Corps officials cited above have a good case based on the new strategy, but it needs to be developed if it is going to meet the requirements as laid out in the strategy. Business as usual, including the current Sea Base plan, doesn't fit well into the strategy as is, (despite what Winter said last week) at least the way I read it. If you read between the lines (like we are asked to do) of the new Maritime Strategy, it doesn't look like a call for a single Sea Base, rather distributed FOBs at sea.

More on that later.

Anyone looking for change in business as usual should avoid reading any comments made last week at the 12th annual Expeditionary Warfare Conference, because you will be disappointed. I do think reconsideration is coming despite so many comments otherwise last week though. Lessons from both wars are yet to make their way into the planning guidance documentation in full force yet, but they will.

Sustaining the US Submarine Industry

In another of those excellent articles in the November issue of National Defense Magazine, Grace Jean gives us one of the most comprehensive updates you can find on the state and sustainment of the US domestic submarine industry. Titled Shipbuilders Forecast Exodus of Submarine Designers, the article highlights both the recent successes and future challenges of the industry to sustain itself. The submarine industry has been warning for years that trouble lies ahead, and that the Navy need to increase submarine production and begin to design the next generation boats soon, or the shipyards will lose irreplaceable skilled workers.

The problem comes down to simple economics. As submarines have become more expensive and time consuming to build, the Navy has been able to afford fewer of them. The upshot has been growing costs for the shipyards, mostly attributed to having to keep a skilled workforce in place even in the absence of contracts, industry experts say.

The debate has now resurfaced in the context of the Virginia-class fast attack submarine. As the design work winds down and the boats continue in production, shipbuilders are warning the Navy that without a new submarine on the drawing board within the next several years, experienced scientists and designers will retire or leave the industry.

The result would be higher costs and delays in production once a new program is launched, shipbuilders caution.

Though the next submarine program is not slated to start until 2019, design efforts typically commence several years in advance because the entire process often takes 15 to 17 years.

Historically, as one submarine class is completed and put into the water, designers and engineers on the program will roll right into the design process for its successor. But there is no new design underway for the first time since the Nautilus, the Navy’s first nuclear submarine, was commissioned in 1954.

The article is long and detailed, and an excellent read. It highlights the value of the submarine design skills the industry is advocating for in pointing out the recent successes I discussed the other day with the Virginia class submarine, but also points out that General Dynamics Electric Boat dispatched Engineering teams to help bail the British out on their Astute program when the British lost critical design and industrial skill between that program and the Vanguard program.

To prevent that from happening, the next design should be launched as soon as possible, he said. “There’s very little liability in starting a design early and getting it done.”

The Rand study found that starting the design early in 2009 would lead to savings over time.

“One of the advantages of starting early is that it allows you to approach it in a more controlled manner,” said Butler. “It allows you to perhaps develop your prototypes so that they’ll be a little more mature, so you enter an acquisition program with a little less risk. And this seems to be in line with the current thinking of the Navy, to control cost overruns on future programs.”

Electric Boat officials advocated the design start in 2009 to take advantage of the learning that engineers acquired during the Virginia redesign program. The company believes that the best way to design a ship is by pairing a new engineer with an experienced one. A later start date means there may be fewer experienced designers on the team available to mentor younger workers.

When you consider where the situation of the submarine force 10 years ago, and follow the roller-coaster to this point today, it really is an interesting study with many current lessons of value. For example, the USS Seawolf (SSN 21) was commissioned in 1997, and at the time it was already known there was no way the Navy was going to build more than 3 of them. The USS Virginia (SSN 774) was awarded in 1998 under a dark cloud that questioned the seriousness of the sub service regarding cost controls.

Since then the Navy has redesigned the first 4 SSBNs into SSGNs, already returning 3 to sea with the USS Ohio (SSGN 726) already on its first deployment. That program is widely touted as the most innovative and perhaps one of the most important "transformations" in the entire DoD. The design of the Virginia has been in flux, with 2 designs already being fielded, and a third set to begin in 2012 which is now being highlighted as yet another example of innovation. Submarines have somehow achieved in design exactly what the surface fleet has tried to do, modularity, and by leveraging interchangeable Multiple All-Up-Round Canisters (MAC) and support for off board systems, it is the undersea branch leading the way as the surface fleet struggles in costs and designs.

All of these advancements are taking place with no one is really discussing the MIW advancements of the underwater service (the SSGN is now assumed the most capable MIW platform in the Navy should it ever be assigned that role), or the already funded R&D for anti-aircraft missiles capable of being deployed in MACs to take on enemy aircraft and helicopters supporting ASW missions against US submarines.

Not sure why..., DID covers the contracts, the larger budgetary and strategic research documents discuss these topics, but these topics are next to impossible to find any dedicated media articles covering the topics.

In 1997 many in the Navy, not to mention outside observers, saw the cost problems of submarines and overruns of the Seawolf class (followed by similar cost problems with the Virginia class) as a valid reason to stick the sub service in the back of the pack. Noteworthy as the entire force transitions to UUVs, modularity concepts, and cost cutting measures the sub service has somehow found themselves worthy of being front of the line by embracing all three concepts and integrating them into business. The designers, the industry, and the Admirals that have accepted every challenge and helped turn them into results deserve a lot of credit.

Hopefully there will be reward for the efforts, and Congress will find a way to sustain the irreplaceable skilled workers facing an uncertain future. IMO it isn't just wise from a strategic perspective, or smart from a political perspective, but Congress can finally put some leverage into the rest of the maritime industry by rewarding success for a change, instead of accepting failure without recourse.

One final thought. Molten Eagle is ready to take on more of the dirty work for the DoD in the form of the MOP, and the more I think about it, I see no reason why not. More on the MOP here.

"Lack in Strategic Direction" for DoD R&D; Funding

The November edition of National Security Magazine is out, and it has a number of excellent articles. One of the more interesting, and timely IMO, article is the aptly named "Defense Department Should Refocus Technology Spending, Experts Warn" by Sandra I. Erwin.

The Pentagon’s research and development budget has never been bigger. Despite such largesse, investments in technology tend to miss the mark and do little to enhance the United States’ competitive standing as a high-tech powerhouse, said Pentagon advisors and outside analysts.

Defense research and development budgets will exceed $80 billion in fiscal year 2008, of which about $12 billion will be allocated to long-term science and technology projects. Most of the funds pay for so-called “applied research” for near-term needs — including modifications of existing weapon systems and war-related projects such as technologies to help troops detect and disarm roadside bombs.

But despite a steady rise in R&D spending, the Defense Department has not been able to replicate the technological success witnessed during the Cold War, when the Pentagon delivered a string of breakthrough technologies that, to this day, continue to provide military forces major advantages, such as unmanned aircraft, cruise missiles, stealth and Global Positioning System satellites.

The problem today appears to be a “lack of strategic direction,” said an April 2007 report by the Defense Science Board, a senior-level advisory panel.

“The Defense Department science and technology programs are not well positioned to meet the nation’s strategic challenges,” the panel wrote. Further, the Pentagon “needs to understand the technological possibilities available to the United States and the options available to adversaries.”

A lack of strategic direction? The new Maritime Strategy, intended to provide vision for the strategic direction of the Navy doesn't help, as it directs the Navy to do everything.

Eighty billion dollars driven by no strategic direction at a time when all services are struggling to fund platforms that are either aging or in disrepair due to the war. To reinforce the point, the article goes on to cite Navy Secretary Donald C. Winter in a recent speech at the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency’s technology symposium.

But Winter also cautioned that a techno-centric view of the world is not helpful in the context of current wars.

“America’s technological superiority has thus far not proven decisive in this war,” Winter said. “Because of the stark differences in literacy rates, in economic development, and in technological advances between those seen in the West and the rest, we have a tendency to underestimate the ability of the enemy — whether a country or a non-state actor — to use technology.”

The 9/11 attacks and the roadside bombs that target U.S. troops in Iraq, for example, were not technology surprises, he said. “Rather, they were unanticipated tactics and uses of technology, not unlike the use of kamikaze pilots in World War II.”

In the near term, Winter said, “We need to defeat this enemy’s ability to make tactical use of technology to strategic effect.”

The U.S. military also must consider that future adversaries will have access to militarily useful technology as readily as Americans do, he added. The harsh reality, said Winter, “is that the most technologically advanced country in the world is finding that its technological edge is not always a decisive advantage.”

This speaks directly to what I was talking about on Friday with the new Maritime Strategy. I see the MS as designed to treat the symptoms in the maritime strategic environment. It addresses everything from dealing with and preventing major power war to irregular challenges that can disrupt global economics in the maritime environment, but it does not focus on the core problems that create the symptoms, in fact it glosses over them and implies them without tackling them directly. America faces four challenges to our maritime superiority; the emergence of competition and/or cooperation with China, the diminishing domestic maritime industrial capacity, the irregular challenges to the global commons related to the rise of Islamic Extremists, and other non-state actors, and our increasing reliance on foreign sources of energy.

I believe that the Navy should have designed a strategy to specifically address the core problems facing the Navy, specifically building upon the traditional strengths of our nation and focusing them on the problems.

To address the rise of China the US needs to leap ahead of current capabilities, so when China arrives to the point we are today, we will be yet another generation --- or two ahead. This is done through R&D and innovation into the future of naval warfare: Unmanned air systems, underwater superiority strategies, and dedicated focus for space superiority. If a Navy has control over the sea and under the sea, a Navy has control of the entire sea. The purpose is to support a fleet to address major war situations.

To address the diminishing domestic maritime industrial capacity, the Navy can refocus its R&D budget to address new technologies, and build a combination of prototypes low cost vessels. The Navy built 8 single class nuclear submarines during the cold war, and built a number of other single class vessels, some of which still serve to this day (USS Enterprise (CVN 65)). The way I see it, the Navy is building prototypes today: LCS-1, LCS-2, DDG-1000, and DDG-1001 represent four different hulls and a variety of brand new technology. Not a single one of those ships currently has a long production run on order, nor will they for at least another year or two.
A shipbuilding strategy that builds single vessel classes insures maturity of design when production starts. It forces competing innovations that ultimately reduce cost. RAND has said as much in several studies of shipbuilding, specifically pointing out that the next submarine design needs to start in 2009 even though the SSBN(X) doesn't need to be fielded until 2024. Noteworthy, RAND pointed out that extra time in design always saves money. See the British recent trouble fielding their new nuclear subs for further evidence, which explains why the UK MoD is committed to keeping R&S funded as a top priority, even if the nation has to give up some of its industrial capacity due to costs. R&D is critical to keeping shipbuilding costs down, which is critical to keeping the domestic maritime industrial capacity healthy.

To address the irregular challenges to the global commons related to the rise of Islamic extremists, the Navy can build many lower cost platforms designed for the soft power mission that accept reduced capability at lower costs. This has been done before, the last time the Navy needed to fill a specialized gap was during the cold war, when the Navy built a reduced capability frigate for convoy escort. The Navy was able to mass produce the ship because of its intentional reduced capabilities, and the vessel is widely considered successful. The purpose is to support a fleet to address irregular warfare situations, and the healthy side effect is plenty of work for the domestic maritime industrial capacity.

Finally, R&D is critical to reducing our nations increasing reliance on foreign sources of energy, and the Navy has a role here. The USS Nautilus (SSN 571), the USS Enterprise (CVN 65), the USS Long Beach (CGN 9), and the USS Bainbridge (CGN 25) all represented a break from traditional power sources for naval vessels in the late 50s and early 60s. All 4 were single class vessels. Where is a similar strategy today? Nuclear technology isn't the only option, Hydrogen power technologies are coming online but suffering from a lack of research funding in fuel cells.

But proactive in new forms of energy isn't the only approach one can take with R&D, nuclear disposal is an alternative. Congress and the nation would be more open to nuclear technology if there was innovative techniques that reduced the cost of dealing with nuclear waste. Funding for that is minimal, but it is a concern soon to directly effect the Navy with the retirements of so many nuclear submarines. Where is the Navy on addressing our nations energy concerns? Out defending oil rigs...

In case you were wondering, other than the JSF, the majority of Navy R&D is dedicated to the development of the surface fleet, including faster, lighter, and stealthy among other things. Tango Bravo, UCAS-N development, and alternative energy funding by the Navy is less than a billion dollars total even if you combine all three.

R&D in the DoD is chaotic suffering from a lack of direction according to the Defense Science Board. Their complaints aren't in a vacuum though, it represents the yearning for a larger strategy based in American innovation for solutions to the problems creating the crisis's that ultimately require the bulk of our military attention in foreign policy. It has been said there is no evidence to support a larger DoD focus to leverage R&D as a strategy, and no pressure on the Navy. From what I can tell, there is plenty of evidence to say that yearning for a grand strategy indeed exists, in fact everyone is looking for one of the services to step up in the role of leadership, but it appears no one is listening, and no one is willing to articulate the vision required for such a strategy.

5th Fleet Focus: Order of Battle

Order of Battle in the 5th Fleet Area of Responsibility.

The Enterprise Carrier Strike Group

USS Enterprise (CVN 65)
USS Gettysburg (CG 64)
USS Arleigh Burke (DDG 51)
USS Stout (DDG 55)
USS Forrest Sherman (DDG 98)
USS James E. Williams (DDG 95)
USS Philadelphia (SSN 690)


Kearsarge Expeditionary Strike Group

USS Kearsarge (LHD 3)
USS Ponce (LPD 15)
USS Gunston Hall (LSD 44)
USS Vicksburg (CG 69)
USS Porter (DDG 78)
USS Carr (FFG 52)
USS Miami (SSN 755)


Task Force 150

FGS Augsburg (F 213)
FS Commandant Ducuing (F795)
FS La Motte Picquet (D645)
PNS Tippu Sultan (D 185)
USS Whidbey Island (LSD 41)

In Theater

Ocean 6
USS Wasp (LHD 1)
RSS Persistence (L 209)
HMS Richmond (F 239)
HMAS Anzac (F 150)
USS Scout (MCM 8)
USS Gladiator (MCM 11)
USS Ardent (MCM 12)
USS Dexterous (MCM 13)
HMS Ramsay (M 110)
HMS Blyth (M 111)


Standing NATO Maritime Group 2 (SNMG2)

TCG Orucreis (F245)
HMS Northumberland (F238)
NMM Aliseo (F574)
HS Aegeon (F460)
SPS Canarias (F86)
FGS Rhoen (A1443)
USS Laboon (DDG 58)

Maritime Strategy: Desires for Mahan and Realities of Corbett

The object of naval warfare must always be directly or indirectly either to secure the command of the sea or to prevent the enemy from securing it.

The second part of the proposition should be noted with special care in order to exclude a habit of thought, which is one of the commonest sources of error in naval speculation. That error is the very general assumption that if one belligerent loses the command of the sea it passes at once to the other belligerent. The most cursory study of naval history is enough to reveal the falseness of such an assumption. It tells us that the most common situation in naval war is that neither side has the command; that the normal position is not a commanded sea, but an uncommanded sea. The mere assertion, which no one denies, that the object of naval warfare is to get command of the sea actually connotes the proposition that the command is normally in dispute. It is this state of dispute with which naval strategy is most nearly concerned, for when the command is lost or won pure naval strategy comes to an end.

This truth is so obvious that it would scarcely be worth mentioning were it not for the constant recurrence of such phrases as: "If England were to lose command of the sea, it would be all over with her." The fallacy of the idea is that it ignores the power of the strategical defensive. It assumes that if in the face of some extraordinary hostile coalition or through some extraordinary mischance we found ourselves without sufficient strength to keep the command, we should therefore be too weak to prevent the enemy getting it--a negation of the whole theory of war, which at least requires further support than it ever receives.

-Some Principles of Maritime Strategy by Julian S. Corbett

Leading up to the release of the new Maritime Strategy, the warning Kaplan gave us earlier this month did not sit well with me. Kaplan foretold of a shift in naval thinking, a departure from Mahan and an embrace of Corbett as the guidance we should expect in the new strategy. Kaplan was right.

He was also right when he discussed his impressions earlier this week in his column.

In essence, this new maritime strategy represents a restrained, nuanced yearning for a bigger Navy, albeit one whose mission will be cooperation with other navies. That requires more than just new ships. “A key to fostering such relationships is development of sufficient cultural, historical, and linguistic expertise among our Sailors, Marines and Coast Guardsmen to nurture effective interaction with diverse international partners.” Such training costs money and creates bureaucratic challenges, but it helps lay the groundwork for an exceedingly gradual, elegant decline of the Navy’s capabilities—a future in which it has fewer platforms but gets more out of the ones it does have by working more closely with others.

Kaplan captures the tone precisely, what I have previously labeled confusing language before I realized why I was so confused. Apparently, Strategy1 is getting feedback from some saying that this new MS is not a strategy. I disagree, I find the strategy to be a well constructed, well thought out, well meaning document that does create a strategic vision for the Navy. It is a safe bet, low risk strategy that, as Kaplan noted, is intended to guide the Navy through uncertainty while manging the Navy's decline.

My problem isn't necessarily with the content of the strategy, on its own it is well done, but if the process of taking strategy to focus is the transition from vision to strategy, from strategy to tactical approach (medium-term) and from tactical approach to operational tasks and actions, my problem with the new MS starts with the vision and trickles its way down.

It is noteworthy that Kaplan sets the tone of decline as an accepted inevitability, because I think you have to approach the MS with the same tone in order to buy into it. The new MS is not a strategy for maintaining or extending superiority, rather a strategy to maintain superiority while also conceding it. The strategy vision expressed in the MS (that both Kaplan and I see) stipulates that the United States is in decline of Maritime Superiority, and that the US Navy can manage the decline through cooperation with other nations. By stipulating the vision of US decline, the strategy accepts that the United States will not be able to achieve solutions to prevent the decline, and outlines a strategy for the Navy to manage the symptoms of the decline in a manner to at best maintain Command of the Sea, and at least maintain Uncommand of the Sea in the spirit of Corbett.

When the vision behind the strategy accepts decline, implementation of the strategy will almost certainly insure decline.

It is not difficult to see why such a well outlined, well meaning strategy is so widely rejected. The strategy does not reflect the spirit of Americans, nor the characteristics that best represent the nature of our people. The strategy does however, reflect the Institutional thinking we see coming from the Navy.

Americans are bold, aggressive, and ambitious. It is why Europeans often call us rude, intruding, and meddlesome. We are a people who embrace entrepreneurship, innovation, and confront challenges. We desire to be the best, cheer for winners and do not accept second best as good enough.

I see the MS as designed to treat the symptoms in the maritime strategic environment. It addresses everything from dealing with and preventing major power war to irregular challenges that can disrupt global economics in the maritime environment, but it does not focus on the core problems that create the symptoms, in fact it glosses over them and implies them without tackling them directly. America faces four challenges to our maritime superiority; the emergence of competition and/or cooperation with China, the diminishing domestic maritime industrial capacity, the irregular challenges to the global commons related to the rise of Islamic Extremists, and other non-state actors, and our increasing reliance on foreign sources of energy.

It is said the strategy implies dealing with these issues, but mentioning these issues as part of the environment is not the same as designing a strategy in dealing with them. It is difficult to say the Navy is taking a strategic approach to expand superiority over China. China may not be building a modern fleet today, but everyone knows they soon will be. Where in the strategic vision to invalidate the AIP submarine as a strategic threat? Don't tell me it is "We will continue to hone the tactics, training and technologies needed to neutralize this threat." Is that strategic vision, or sales material?

The protection of foreign sources of energy is why the MS requires "Globally Distributed, Mission-Tailored Maritime Forces." It seems to me that if the Navy was serious about a strategic approach to securing our nations energy resources, they would invest in technologies like fuel cells, alternative hydrogen energies, etc.. and build an AIP submarine. That is more strategic in solving the nations problems than deploying 60 ships in 20 locations to protect offshore drilling, or competing over polar regions which will require forces to protect territory claims for drilling rights.

I see the MS as a reflection of the same Institutional thinking we have seen coming from the Navy this decade. A Navy that believes in 40 knot minesweepers but has been weak in investing in underwater superiority or alternative fuel technologies. A Navy in pursuit of incredibly expensive, large surface combatants at the expense of more ships, while at the same time complaining about the lack of ships. A Navy that shifts aircraft carriers and submarines to the Pacific because of China, but is reluctant to name China directly in its own maritime strategy.

The strategy itself isn't the problem, it is a reflection of the problem in my opinion. The Navy vision accepts decline, avoids confronting challenges, and emits a tone of pessimism. It doesn't inspire, it doesn't live up to the modern ideals expected from our nations services, because it doesn't reflect the spirit of the American people. I am confident that the new MS will be effective in managing decline under the leadership of the Navy, but in general I am disappointed in the new MS and the Navy for conceding decline by designing a strategy to manage it in the first place.

I don't like strategies based on a vision of pessimism, and I am not surprised others don't either.

Coercive Diplomacy and the Threat to Use Force

While this might be new to some, these sales were discussed in the Senate back in August of 2006. Most people probably didn't notice, because we were watching the Israel - Lebanon war at the time. Isn't it interesting how this all of sudden becomes a priority?

The Foreign Affairs Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives has approved a bill to grant to Turkey three decommissioned U.S. military ships and to sell a fourth to the allied nation at a large discount. The panel passed the bill on a voice vote.

Under the arrangement, the U.S. should transfer to Turkey two Oliver Hazard Perry-class guided-missile frigates and an Osprey-class coastal minehunter. Another coastal minehunter was offered to Turkey at the sale price of nearly $28 million.

The two frigates, recently decommissioned by the U.S. Navy, are valued at about $125 million each, and the Osprey-class minehunters are worth about $130 million each, U.S. and Turkish military officials said.

The bill now must be approved in a House floor vote and by the Senate before being signed by President George W. Bush.

Under the same bill, the U.S. also is planning to grant two other Osprey-class minehunters to Lithuania and to sell another two to Taiwan.

We all know why this has suddenly risen to the top of the list. Everyone thank Nancy Pelosi for her incredible foresight; true leadership indeed.

All is not lost if the US House and Senate actually learn the lesson here. Apparently, as Turkey is proving once again, despite what we are often told in regard to Iran, coercive diplomacy backed by legitimate threat to use force is still the best way to avoid having to apply actual force.

We are two to three weeks away from the time we can expect the heavy drum beats from the US regarding Iran to pick up again. That drum beat is going to be emphasized as the Navy deploys a large number of ships on scheduled deployments within a few weeks time frame. If you thought Bush and Chaney have been rattling the sabers with talk of WWIII and promises of a no nuclear Iran, get ready for a thrill ride.

Bush is soon going to push Iran on their nuclear program very hard with his own coercive diplomacy backed by legitimate threat to use force. He will push past the point where western liberals begin to panic, because he needs that effect to amplify his message. The question is, when Iran believes the US is coming, will they push back or approach the table. If they approach the table realistically, Bush will talk this time. Otherwise, start expecting the unexpected.

Will Congress learn from Turkey's example? Yet to be seen, but remember, it was Turkey's elected body that voted to use force that ultimately forced our hand. In other words, I concur with Stratfor's analysis that the only peaceful solution leads to Democrats eventually empowering Bush to use force and trust he doesn't. I imagine that doesn't sit well with the far left kooks who desire peace, and may ironically prove to be the biggest roadblock in preventing war.

6th Fleet Focus: Noteworthy from Nigeria

Last week, the day after the USS McHenry (LSD 43) deployed on its African Partnership Station Initiative, Nigeria signed on. Nigeria's participation is a big deal, a huge opportunity for AFRICOM and the Navy and is an excellent example of the soft power discussed in the recently released Maritime Strategy.

The United States imports more oil from Nigeria than we do from Saudi Arabia. This puts the security situation in Nigeria very high on the interests of the United States. AllAfrica.com provides interesting insight into what the African Partnership Station Initiative is up against in Nigeria.

Chief of Defence Staff, Lt. General Andrew Owoye Azazi yesterday allayed the fears of Nigerians on the continued presence of United States military in the Gulf of Guinea.

Speaking at a forum in Abuja on Tuesday, the Defence chief said that Nigerians should not get unnecessarily worried over the matter as the troops are there just to give peace in the area. General Azazi said that US likes to have relative peace anywhere they have business interest.

"US wants relative peace to be able to undertake their business" he said pointing out that there is no other motive behind their troops presence to worry anybody.

The Nigerian public sees the US mission of "projecting stability" to the region as "exporting subversion." It is one of many stigma's the US Navy brings to the region, and it is going to take time to change perceptions. The article goes into detail regarding other challenges as well, problems ranging from corruption to HIV to security issues in the Niger Delta, including where "the Defence chief said that military have lost sizeable number of personnel in the troubled region but refused to give the exact figure of casualties." He acknowledges there isn't a military solution, there will have to be a political solution to stop the violence.

In the maritime domain, the security issues are evident.

MEN of the Nigeria Navy, NNS, Delta in Warri, Delta State have seized three vessels, including a Cotonou boat filled with condensate opposite the Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) Refinery jetty in Warri.

Vanguard learnt that the three ships were intercepted, last Thursday, by a Naval Patrol team very early in the morning but the oil bunkerers on sighting the military men, abandoned their pumping machines, their boats and the stolen condensate.

Navy Information Officer in Warri, Lieutenant Sikiru Adigun confirmed to Vanguard, yesterday that the seized boats were with the possession of the Navy.

He said the authorities of the NNS, Delta has contacted the Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) to come and dispose off the condensate.

As at yesterday when Vanguard visited the Naval Base, the three ships were seen with the anchored at the waterside while the condensate in the Contonou boat was leaking into the water with a heavy stench around the area. A source said the Navy was waiting for the SPDC to come and take the condensate away.

Crime which has led to environmental problems which is compounded by military engagements... the cycle continues. This is a small peek into the challenges facing the African Partnership Station Initiative.

This is also why the strategic thinkers who developed the new Maritime Strategy wisely emphasize a soft power approach throughout the strategy.

Strategic "Defense in Depth" vs "Safety and Security"

The Maritime Strategy discussion continues over at CDR Salamanders place, but also at SteelJaw Scribe's place, with remarkable access to the writer available to anyone interested in asking questions. Remarkable, because there are few people actually taking advantage of the access being provided to bloggers and blog readers. To me that says a lot, the Navy made every effort to include interested citizens in the development process of the Maritime Strategy, and again is making an effort to explain it and answer questions, but in the end, no one cares.

Either way, credit the Navy, who attends the service even if the church is empty.

It has been said in policy discussions that strategic thinking is missing in the United States. I think we are seeing evidence of this. There is a tendency for a lot of people to move away from the strategic context and move directly to the CONOP. I'm not ready to make that move yet, there will be plenty of time for shipbuilding, procurement, and operational concepts but for me, I'm still stuck trying to make sense of the strategic vision this strategy sets going forward.

The new Maritime Strategy is intended to be the bridge that connects Seapower with policy. The following statements represent to me the executive summery in that regard.

This strategy stresses an approach that integrates seapower with other elements of national power, as well as those of our friends and allies. It describes how seapower will be applied around the world to protect our way of life, as we join with other like-minded nations to protect and sustain the global, inter-connected system through which we prosper. Our commitment to protecting the homeland and winning our Nation’s wars is matched by a corresponding commitment to preventing war.

The United States Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard will act across the full range of military operations to secure the United States from direct attack; secure strategic access and retain global freedom of action; strengthen existing and emerging alliances and partnerships and establish favorable security conditions.

I have observed that most of the frustration regarding the new MS revolves around 2 fundamental issues; the language in defining the strategic environment and the conceptional approach to strategic vision.

The language used to define the strategic environment is distracting, unclear, and doesn't even attempt to establish the intellectual basis for a new direction for the Navy.

The new MS takes the Navy into a revolution of security affairs. The term "safety and security" or just "security" is used many times as a substitute for the word defense. The language of the strategy puts the security of the global maritime environment in a brighter light than the defense of the nation. The language used to emphasize security blurs the distinctions between hard and soft power, civil affairs and military affairs, which then contributes to conceptional confusion for readers. This adds complexity to a document intended for a broader audience, which I think contributes directly to the lack of interest.

The language implies emphasis of collective security and stabilization instead of emphasis on collective defense. The strategy specifically mentions NATO and informal relationships like the Global Maritime Partnership initiative as a foundation for collective security agreements. This represents a grand strategy for global governance of the maritime domain with regional security as the mutual interest for engagement. However, by blurring the distinction between security and defense, and emphasizing the promotion of international partnerships built for regional security purposes, the strategy gives the impression the Navy desires to have its cake (collective defense) and eat it too (collective security). One doesn't equal the other, but the language used implies otherwise to a reader of the new MS.

There are very few cases where long term international partnerships for stabilization and security have been effective, and most have not been effective over the long term. Afghanistan is an example where it has been ineffective due to disproportional support, and in many cases UN peacekeeping missions apply as ineffective as well. The only thing going for the Navy is that failure in security and stability operations do not translate into failures of alliance, at least historically, meaning there is capital here for the Navy to spend without risking NATO or other formal and informal defense relationships. In the end, partnerships and alliances only lose credibility when they fail in their defense agreements, not when they fail in their security agreements.

The conceptional approach to the MS strategic vision has left many, including me, wanting more, but that doesn't mean the strategy is bad. The strategy lays out a broad outline in guidance, but the lack of specifics doesn't offer the details promoting changes many were hoping for. The conceptional approach was apparently intentional, which is a striking contrast to the 86 MS which was very detailed in outlining its strategic vision.

I think this was the right approach. Policy in the current political environment is a moving target, particularly for a nation already engaged in two wars that is also trying to prevent engagement in other theaters. In the US the target could potentially shift every 4 years with a new administration. The bridge between a shifting policy and Seapower needs flexibility, and for that, conceptional vision is the right approach.

The conceptional approach does provide some specificity in strategic vision, which leaves a lot of room to build tactical CONOP for those looking for change. "Regionally Concentrated, Credible Combat Power" and "Globally Distributed, Mission-Tailored Maritime Forces" sounds buzzworthy, but the tasks behind those descriptions are actionable and accurately articulates a 'Defense in Depth' strategic vision. The conceptional vision begins from a foundation of 6 core capabilities; Forward Presence, Deterrence, Sea Control, Power Projection, Maritime Security, and Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response.

The conceptional approach established on a core set of capabilities intended to perform a number of specific tasks explains why some in the industry won't care much for the new strategy. The outlined Defense in Depth with a strong emphasis on security implies the need for new metrics in procurement, because no matter how you look at it, the Navy has embraced security cooperation as a major part of the Defense in Depth conceptional strategic vision. For starters, the conventional military configuration is less relevant when the threats are of the asymmetric variety, meaning several big budget item crowds are going to need new PPTs in justification of their gold plated capability.

I think there is a lot of strategical depth worth exploring in the new strategy, but I think the reason why the conversation has stalled over the last few days is in a large part due to the confusing language which missed the mark with the broader audience the MS was intended to reach. Some of this is due to a lack of strategic literacy in the US, citizens have had government substituting policy for strategy and this has contributed to the problem. Either way, credit the Navy, by being available for questions, people have no reason to claim ignorance, they can only claim citizen inaction in understanding the new Navy Maritime Strategy.

Littoral Combat Ship for Israel Update

Defense News has an article on all the benchmarks LCS-1 is passing as it tries to get to sea. Yawn. When it actually gets to sea, call me. If the price goes up, call me. Otherwise, I'm not interested in LCS-1. I'm tired of talking about LCS-1 getting ready, I want to see it ready already.

But I was interested in the second half of the Defense News article.

Meanwhile, Lockheed also is continuing work on an international version of the LCS for Israel. Last month, NAVSEA awarded an additional $2.5 million to the company to study the combat system configuration.

“This is an effort to look at the combat system performance with the systems the Israelis specify,” said Gary Feldman, Lockheed’s business development director for the international LCS.

Earlier this year, the company completed work under a 2006 $5.2 million NAVSEA contract to study hull, mechanical and engineering systems for the Israeli LCS.

“We validated the hull could accommodate the systems,” Feldman said. “The goal was to maintain as much commonality with the U.S. versions as possible. We were very successful. The hull is very much the same hull. The topside modifications were necessary for the combat system. We validated it with the multifunction radar, Mk 41 vertical launch system and other systems.”

In contrast with the U.S. LCS, Israel is eschewing the mission module concept in favor of a more heavily armed ship carrying permanently emplaced systems.

The new nine-month study will study integration of the Lockheed Aegis SPY-1F radar and the Israeli Elta EL/M-2248 Adir radar with the Combatss-21 system, Feldman said.

The Israelis already have specified use of a Rafael Typhoon gun, he said. The missile system is to be capable of launching a U.S. Raytheon Standard SM-2 surface-to-air missile, but the study will also look at incorporating the Israel Aerospace Industries Barak 1 and 8 missile systems.

“When the study is completed, we’ll expect the Israelis will move forward with contract design,” he said.

If the Israelis gain approval to buy the LCS, Feldman added, detail design could begin in 2009 with construction starting in 2010.

I keep wondering what a LCS with teeth will cost, but I also wonder what the LCS without teeth will ultimately cost...

Virginia Class Submarine Approaches Cost Benchmarks

Defense News has an update regarding the cost of the Virginia class submarines.

Designers, managers and builders of the U.S. Navy's SSN 774 Virginia-class nuclear attack submarines say they have finally cut the program's cost to about $2 billion per sub.

"As of September, we are about $50 million away from the $2 billion submarine," Capt. Dave Johnson, the Navy's Virginia-class program manager, said Oct. 19. As of now, he said, "we are at about $2.05 billion."

The figure has been key to the Navy's hope to begin building two subs per year starting in 2012. Submarine proponents in Congress are hoping to jump-start that effort in the current defense bills, now in House-Senate conference. If they succeed, an additional sub could appear as soon as 2009.

The new Navy cost estimates are for the 2012 submarine, and assume that two subs would be ordered in that year.

Managers for General Dynamics Electric Boat, the chief design shipyard for the submarines, are optimistic they can get the cost even closer to the $2 billion goal.
With a redesigned bow and at least 150 more improvements on the way, the program is "within about $15 million," John Holmander, Electric Boat's Virginia-class program manager, said Oct. 19. "And we have actual plans that should get us to the balance."

What I find interesting is that it appears the Block III changes will both enhance capability and interoperability while reducing costs. The ASDS lockout chamber was retained despite earlier warnings it would be removed. Also interesting are the changes to the sonar and VLS.

The new LAB sonar array will substitute the sonar sphere's active/passive transducers for a listening-only hydrophone system. Replacement of the water-backed LAB array for the air-backed sonar sphere will save about $11 million per sub, wrote Johnson.

Much of those savings will come from eliminating hundreds of penetrations associated with the sphere. Electric Boat also will no longer need to shape the spheres using a very expensive and sophisticated five-axis cutting machine.

The new LAB array will feature two primary components: the passive array - using hydrophone technology from the Seawolf SSN 21-class submarines - and a medium-frequency active array.
The new hydrophones will last the planned 33-year life of the submarine, while the transducers will need replacement at about 17 years.

Another advantage, said Kurt Hesche, EB's design and engineering director for the submarines: While the sphere needed more than a thousand transducers costing more than $5,000 apiece, the LAB's 1,800 hydrophones cost only $600.

The Defense News article goes on to describe a number of changes to the VLS. The 12 Tomahawk vertical launch tubes are out, replaced by two larger tubes. The missile tubes are slightly wider modifications of the 7-foot diameter D-5 Trident ballistic missile tubes with changes similar to those done in the Ohio-class SSGN conversions.

The tubes will be newly manufactured and somewhat shorter than the Ohio tubes because of the smaller Virginia hull. Each will be able to carry a Multiple All-Up-Round Canister (MAC) fitted with six Tomahawks removing the center one for an access tube.

The missile canister will be removable from the new Virginia Payload Tubes leaving room for larger weapons or underwater vehicles. The connectors and width dimensions are the same as the tubes fitted on the Ohio SSGNs which will allow interoperability between the two submarine classes for new payloads. The new tubes will nearly double the amount of payload space of the existing tubes, going from 1,200 cubic feet to 2,300. The new missile tubes are expected to save an estimated $8 million per ship beginning with the 2012 ship.

While the article is behind the firewall at Defense News, you can find the entire Defense News article in the Monday October 22nd Office of Information News Clips.

5th Fleet Focus: The Enemy Exploits the Gaps

The Discussion of Maritime Strategy is on, and it is over at CDRs place and at SJS's place. I intend to be focused on it at least once every day this week, and probably more than that for awhile. We are told the new Maritime Strategy is the "strategic concept which clearly formulates its relationship to the national security." This was on my mind as I read this today.

Eagle1 picked up two reports of events taking place off Somalia. The first one.

The UN World Food Programme on Monday renewed pleas for deployment of foreign naval vessels to protect food aid in Somali waters, a day after its chartered freighter escaped a piracy attack.

On Sunday, WFP-chartered, Comoran-flagged MV Jaikur II came under attack 60 nautical miles off the Somali port of Brava, south of Mogadishu, where it had had just unloaded 7,275 metric tons of WFP food and was sailing back to Mombasa.

The pirates fired, but the ship managed to escape.

And this one.

Somali pirates have seized a cargo ship off the east African coast, the head of a local seafarer's association said on Monday.

Gunmen attacked the vessel on Wednesday, said Andrew Mwangura, the program co-ordinator of the East Africa Seafarers Assistance Programme, but due to chaotic communications with war-ravaged Somalia the incident had taken several days to confirm.

He did not have details on the number or nationality of the crew members aboard the Almarjan, a cargo ship of over 2 500 tons that was flying under a flag from the Comoros Islands and operated by Dubai-based Biyat International.

...

Somali pirates attacked four ships over two days last week, hijacking a Dubai-based vessel that is still in their possession, the head of a local seafarers group said Monday.

Pirates chased after three of the boats and shot at one of them on October 17 and 18, but the ships were able to escape a hijacking. The other, seized last Wednesday, was not as fortunate.

How timely. As I noted yesterday, the USS Carter Hall (LSD 50) exited the region while the USS Whidbey Island (LSD 41) entered the AOR, both crossing the Suez Canal on Saturday. Somehow I missed that also crossing the Suez the same day was FS Commandant Blaison (F793), replaced by the FS Commandant Ducuing (F795) which entered the AOR. As I noted also entering the Red Sea was SNMG2, although SNMG2's destination is yet unknown.

Is strikes me as more than coincidence that the two ships most reported to be working off the coast of Somalia, specifically USS Carter Hall (LSD 50) and FS Commandant Blaison (F793) just happened to be returning home during these pirate attacks.

It is very clear the pirates of Somalia have excellent intelligence of coalition naval operations taking place in TF150. It also seems to me that somebody over at CENTCOM dropped the ball here. Either the forces covering for the two ships were unequal to the task, or CENTCOM made a conscience choice to not protect the coast due to some other reasons (force limitations perhaps) while rotations were taking place at the Suez. Either way, this has all the appearances of a blunder in dealing with piracy off the African West Coast.

The new Maritime Strategy, "A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower," offers specific guidance for the Navy through 6 Tasks, 6 Capabilities, and 3 Priorities. They are

Six Tasks:
1. Limit regional conflict with forward deployed, decisive maritime power.
2. Deter major power war.
3. Win our Nation's wars.
4. Contribute to homeland defense in depth.
5. Foster and sustain cooperative relationships with more international partners.
6. Prevent or contain local disruptions before they impact the global system.

Six Capabilities
1. Forward Presence.
2. Deterrence.
3. Sea Control.
4. Power Projection.
5. Maritime Security.
6. Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response.

Three Priorities
1. Improve Integration and Interoperability.
2. Enhance Awareness.
3. Prepare our People.

I want to focus on the Task "Prevent or contain local disruptions before they impact the global system." The strategy defines it as such:

Maritime forces will work with others to ensure an adequate level of security and awareness in the maritime domain. In doing so, transnational threats—terrorists and extremists; proliferators of weapons of mass destruction; pirates; traffickers in persons, drugs, and conventional weapons; and other criminals—will be constrained.

By being there, forward deployed and engaged in mutually beneficial relationships with regional and global partners, maritime forces will promote frameworks that enhance security. When natural or manmade disasters strike, our maritime forces can provide humanitarian assistance and relief, joining with interagency and non-governmental partners. By participating routinely and predictably in cooperative activities, maritime forces will be postured to support other joint or combined forces to mitigate and localize disruptions.

I don't know the specific reasons this came to prominence in the new Maritime Strategy, but for us laymen looking for a reason why these types of maritime security issues matter to the larger regional maritime safety, I encourage you to check here and follow the links.

The new Strategy is designed to reach the interested citizens of the nation, what I call the Boston Maggie's of the US, although that might be setting the mark way too high cause she knows her stuff. Basically, interested citizen John's and Jane's who give a shit. So this is my citizen John and Jane test. If NATO, including the US Navy pulls off the coast of Somalia, and several ships get attacked by pirates including a ship chartered for the UN World Food Programme, did the Navy properly execute the strategic guidance as described above? I'd be willing to bet Maggie would say no.

I think it was the 'routine' and 'predictable' nature of rotations that allowed the pirates to disrupt the maritime domain off Somalia. I am pretty sure when the UN World Food Programme chartered vessel is attacked, it falls under the category of either pirate or 'other criminals' as described in the new Maritime Strategy.

In other words, allowing the enemy (pirates, criminals, whatever) exploit the gaps in our "forward presence," these incidents represent a failure in "preventing and containing local disruptions before they impact the global system."

Yes, I am borrowing a bunch of language from the new Maritime Strategy to highlight events. It is what it is, I didn't write it. I point out that the task "Prevent or contain local disruptions before they impact the global system" is on an equal level as the task "Win our Nation's wars." The Navy has said as much, because the Navy has made a big deal about the task "Deter major power war" being on the same level as the task "Win our Nation's wars." So answer me this...

Is failure in "Prevent or contain local disruptions before they impact the global system" equal to failure to "Win our Nation's wars?" Somehow, I seriously doubt it, nor would I advocate it to be, but if the Navy is serious about their own strategy they need to take very seriously the failure within the 5th Fleet regarding the recent activity off Somalia, because not to do so cheapens the content of the new Maritime Strategy.

I'll be watching Standing NATO Maritime Group 2, it could be we are seeing the very early implementation of new Maritime Strategy. I hope so, I also doubt it.