Book Review: China's Search for Security

I reviewed Andrew Nathan and Andrew Scobell's China's Search for Security for H-Net:

Nevertheless, Nathan and Scobell argue that, despite its growing power, China’s international position remains almost uniquely precarious. China borders more countries that any nation on earth, and continues to have border disputes with several of the most powerful. Other strong states, such as the United States and Japan, threaten China’s littoral. Internally, political discontent threatens Beijing’s control of outlying areas, including Tibet and Xinjiang. Concerns about political discontent and the maintenance of economic growth continue to draw the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) focus inward.

On a related point see here, although I suspect that there are some translation issues regarding the terms "invasion" and "occupation."

On the FY 14 Shipbuilding Plan

AEI's Mackenzie Eaglen and I have an Op-Ed at RealClearDefense this morning.  Here's a key point: "The latest interim plan will cause aggregate combat power to decline along with numbers, leaving the fleet less capable of dealing with open ocean submarine threats, enemy surface fleets, and the majority of threat aircraft and missiles. Additionally, the Navy continues to under-resource its amphibious ships, meeting neither the Marine Corps’ combat requirement of 38 ships nor the worldwide combatant commanders’ requirement for a similar number."

We can talk all we want about re-balancing and relying more heavily on American Seapower, but in the end, what we buy is a reflection of what we value. 

The plan relies on over-optimistic budget assumptions (which is not surprising, but is rather the norm in the kabuki played out between the Navy and Congress when it comes to the shipbuilding account) and ignores the impact of sequestration.  It does not appear to reflect any real shift in emphasis to Seapower derived of the strategic guidance issued by the President last year.  It retires ships long before the end of their service lives not because they aren't useful, but because we cannot afford to both operate them and build the future force given the current resource allocation.

We cannot afford the Navy we have nor the Navy we need.  We must either strategically re-prioritize to obtain the resources necessary to buy and operate that Navy (progress toward which I see little evidence of), or we need to change the Navy we have to one we can afford.  Jerry Hendrix wants to de-emphasize carriers.  I want to shed the SSBN nuclear deterrence mission.  Wayne Hughes wants to alter the fleet design.  Simply shrinking the same fleet we have now to one 2/3 of its size over the next 15 years (the actual glide-slope we are on)  is not the answer, unless what you desire is the ability to do what we do now a little less well, in fewer places with diminished simultaneity. 

Bryan McGrath

Africa Maritime Updates

With so much in the news this month, it's been easy to overlook the interesting events occurring in and around the water of today's most dynamic continent.

Somali Piracy remains practically non-existent this year, thanks to the continued presence of armed security detachments on commercial vessels.  While commercial shipping in the Gulf of Aden is relatively safe, hundreds of smaller private sailing vessels and motor yachts remain unable to transit the area because they simply can’t afford armed security.

Two years ago this month, U.S. and NATO forces were pounding away at Libya's armed forces and pretty much totaled Gadhafi's Navy.  Earlier this month, Royal Navy frigate HMS Kent made an unprecedented good will visit to the port of Tripoli.  Other countries such as France and Malta have been helping Libya to rebuild its naval forces, which are critical for patrolling the country's 2,000 kilometer coast line, interdicting smugglers and migrants trying to reach Europe, and securing the export of more than 1.3 million barrels per day of petroleum.

The MEND is at it again.

On the west side of the continent, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) group killed 10 police in a boat and renewed attacks on maritime oil infrastructure.  More troubling though, are reports that MEND, historically a group with secular aims, may be entering the sectarian conflict started by Boko Haram terrorists in the North.  Threatening attacks on Muslims in the Niger Delta, the group's spokesman recently issued a statement: "On behalf of the hapless Christian population in Nigeria, The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta will from Friday, May 31, 2013, embark on a crusade to save Christianity in Nigeria from annihilation." Nigerian security forces are already overwhelmed fighting terrorist in the North (with very heavy handed tactics it must be noted) and a renewed insurgency in the South could threat stability in this important economic anchor for West Africa.

Also in the Gulf of Guinea, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration recently conducted a rather audacious under-cover operation at sea to detain Guinea-Bissau's former Chief of Naval Operations and drug kingpin Bubo Na Tchuto.  The impact of narcotics proceeds on the ledgers of terror groups in Africa has been overstated by DEA (at least in my opinion), but this operation was worthwhile if only to remove one of the most corrupt officials in West Africa.

 

In Northern Mali, French Forces have begun a gradual withdrawal from fighting al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. AQIM and its associated militant groups made use of the Niger River during the French intervention.  France is hoping for a U.N. force to replace African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) troops and that force will certainly need some sort of riverine capability to keep the waterways leading up to Timbuktu and Gao clear of extremist activity.

Malian military patrols the Niger River.

 The last update isn’t really maritime-related, but does involve the USN participating on a unique foreign internal defense mission in the Sahara.  Last month, four U.S. naval officers deployed with special operations forces (SOF) from all over the globe to West Africa to train African special operators for counter-terrorism missions in the region.   SEAL LCDR Kaj Larsen explains more here about FLINTLOCK 13.

 

Instability around the continent and the recent attacks on U.S. embassies last September have driven the military to examine various options for both future crisis response and steady state capacity-building operations.  The Army is regionally aligning some forces, with a dedicated Brigade Combat Team to support training missions and be prepared to intervene on the continent should the need arise.  Africa has been described as an "economy of force" operation for DOD and generally the introduction of any element other than culturally-attuned, small footprint forces (read SOF) raises the eyebrows of State Department diplomats.  I find it hard to believe that the Army could get a brigade-sized element - or even pieces of it - nimble enough to deploy rapidly, with a minimal number of "boots on the ground" and adequate logistics train to satisfy these requirements.  Along similar lines, the Marine Corps has instituted a company-sized crisis response element for this mission which leverages the speed and long-range mobility of the MV-22.   Expeditionary crisis-response is in the Marine Corps DNA, but without adequate amphibious shipping, the Corps' unique capabilities can't be exploited.  That said, it will be interesting to see which force the COCOM and Ambassador calls on next time there is a crisis in Africa.

 The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.

Learning from the Doolittle Raiders

The following contribution is written by Congressman J. Randy Forbes from Virginia's fourth district, Congressman Forbes is chairman of the House Armed Services Seapower and Projection Forces Subcommittee and founder and co-chairman of the Congressional China Caucus.

71 years ago today, 16 U.S. Army Air Force B-25 Mitchell bombers took off from the aircraft carrier USS Hornet on the way to bomb Tokyo. Coming only months after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the Doolittle Raid (named for the mission’s commander, Lt. Col. Jimmy Doolittle) constituted the first American offensive operation of World War II and helped shatter the illusion of our adversary’s invincibility.

Despite occurring over seven decades ago, the Doolittle Raid offers lessons intensely relevant for our time. The personal heroism of the Doolittle Raiders, seven of whom died during the raid or in captivity, is a timeless tribute to the bravery and sacrifice of our men and women in uniform. The operation’s brazenness - placing bulky bombers on an aircraft carrier in the Pacific Ocean in order to reach and hit the very heart of the Japanese Empire - reminds us that effective military operations require leaders of vision and daring to achieve our national security objectives. And the Raid’s effective use of Army Air Force personnel and aircraft, launched from a Navy carrier and defended by Navy surface vessels and submarines, illustrates how the demands of modern warfare refuse to neatly delineate between services- cooperation between our Navy, Marines and Air Force is an enduring necessity.

Most importantly, the Doolittle Raid reminds us that the ability to project military power from the sea in times of crisis is the essential mission and defining feature of the U.S. Navy. As in 1942, the aircraft carrier remains the most effective instrument of projecting American power onto hostile shores, deterring potential adversaries and, if necessary, delivering overwhelming force to defeat the enemy. No other platform possesses the striking power of the carrier. This power is packaged into a system that has both global reach and almost unimpeded growth potential. The carrier can sail through the world’s oceans, free from the political complexities associated with overseas bases. At the same time, this floating airfield can also be “modernized” with new naval aircraft that can bring a mix of capabilities demanded to operate in future security environments.

Today’s Navy carriers have advanced beyond anything the sailors onboard the Hornet could have imagined; a modern Ford-class carrier is roughly 80,000 tons larger than the Yorktown-class ship which launched the Doolittle Raiders and can house over 75 advanced aircraft. Despite the technological advances of the last seven decades, the aircraft carrier’s status as the fulcrum of the Navy’s Fleet remains unchallenged.

As the Navy prepares for the challenges of the coming decade, the question will not be whether our carriers remain vital; rather, the key determination will be the appropriate mix of aircraft comprising the Carrier Air Wing (CVW). It is this flexibility that is the true utility of a carrier. In an anti-access/area-denial environment (A2/AD), where nations from Iran to China are investing in missile technology designed to restrict our carrier operations, it is imperative that the Navy’s CVWs contain aircraft with the right mix of of range, persistence, stealth, payload, and electronic attack to successfully execute its missions. The Navy’s investments in shorter range aircraft have left it dependent on the carrier’s ability to get relatively close to hostile shores. As the Doolittle Raid proved, there is great strategic and military advantage in maintaining a long-range strike capability. As I have written here before, the UCLASS, if done right, is poised to offer the CVW an option for long-range ISR and strike that will help anchor the carrier’s power projection mission for decades to come.

The world we face in 2013 is very different from the one the Doolittle Raiders knew as their B-25s hurtled down the Hornet’s flight deck in April 1942. But while the technologies and competitors may have changed, the utility of the aircraft carrier to American defense policy remains constant. We honor the legacy of the Doolittle Raiders today while being mindful that the success they achieved in projecting American power far from home against a determined and resilient enemy is an achievement we must jealously protect in our own time. It is incumbent upon all of us to never stop working, and to never stop asking the difficult questions, to ensure that those who follow in the footsteps of the Doolittle Raiders have the tools they need to deter, prevent and, if absolutely necessary, win America’s wars.

Navy’s Continued Commitment to Europe

The following contribution comes from Rear Admiral Michael Smith. Rear Admiral Michael E. Smith is Director, Strategy and Policy Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations

Last Tuesday, at the Sea-Air-Space Expo, I had the opportunity to sit on a well-attended panel with USMC Major General (sel) Rocco and USCG Rear Admiral Lee to discuss a range of issues for the three Sea Services relating to the Asia Pacific rebalance. In the exchange with audience members following our remarks, we fielded a number of very pointed questions that were really variations on the same concern: will the rebalance negatively impact our commitments to Europe?  

From my perspective, the answer to these questions is a resounding no - as long as we approach the future with a new way of thinking. NATO is without question the most powerful military alliance in the world and will continue to be a centerpiece of security in an unpredictable world, and the Navy's relationship with the maritime forces of our European allies and partners remains a cornerstone of cooperative activities across the globe as we confront numerous, collective challenges together. In fact, the Navy continues to pursue greater integrated and cooperative activities with our European counterparts. Examples of continued and enhanced U.S. commitments to Europe include the forward deployment of four of our most advanced Aegis ships to Rota, Spain, where they will support a broad range of missions in addition to their focus on NATO ballistic missile defense, and our ongoing feasibility study of deploying new Littoral Combat Ships and Joint High Speed Vessels to the region. Further, Navy’s contribution to Ballistic Missile Defense of Europe includes not only the maritime BMD piece but also Aegis ashore with the first site planned for Romania in 2015.

Especially in light of fiscal challenges felt across the NATO alliance, we should approach this era of fiscal austerity with significantly greater focus on the potential we all can gain from a more advanced approach to cooperation and engagement between allies and partners - this issue was the focus of an article I recently wrote for Proceedings, Strategic Cooperation: Everybody Wins.

In short, if we take an approach that more fully leverages allied and partner contributions then not only will we maintain our commitments in Europe; we will more efficiently manage resources globally. Now is the time to grasp this opportunity and approach allied and partner contributions in a new light. While the Asia Pacific rebalance is a current area of focus, our commitments to Europe and the Mediterranean are not wavering and can in fact be strengthened if we are willing to challenge our previous planning assumptions and embrace the full capabilities our partners can bring.

Strength in Numbers: The Remarkable Potential of (really) Small Combatants

The following contribution is from LT Jimmy Drennan. LT Jimmy Drennan is a Surface Warfare Officer. He is the prospective Weapons Officer aboard USS Gettysburg and a Distinguished Graduate of the Naval Postgraduate School's Systems Engineering Analysis program.

You are a tactical commander tasked with a mission to seek out and destroy one of the enemy’s premier capital ships in his home waters. You have two potential striking forces at your disposal: a world class surface combatant of your own with a 99% probability of mission success (Ps = 0.99) or a squadron of eight independently operating, missile carrying small combatants - each with a chance of successfully completing the mission no better than a coin flip (Ps = 0.5). Do you go with the almost sure thing and choose to send in your large combatant? As it turns out, the squadron of small combatants has an even higher overall Ps. But let’s assume now that you’ve advanced to operational commander. You might have more concerns than just overall Ps. What are the defensive and logistical requirements for each option? How much fleet investment am I risking with each option? What will it cost to replace the asset(s) if it is lost? What capability does the striking force have after successful enemy action (i.e. resilience)? An analysis of these factors, intentionally designed to disadvantage the small combatants, actually comes out overwhelmingly in their favor over the large combatant. The results verify what naval strategists and tacticians have long known: for certain offensive missions, an independently operating group of even marginally capable platforms can outperform a single large combatant at lower cost and less risk to the mission.

The War at Sea Flotilla: A Test Case

In the Autumn 2012 edition of the Naval War College Review, Captains (U.S. Navy, Retired) Jeff Kline and Wayne Hughes introduce “A War at Sea Strategy” in which they describe a flotilla of small, missile-carrying surface combatants designed to challenge Chinese aggression in East Asian waters. The flotilla ships would utilize largely independent tactics, relying little on networked command and control, to produce a powerful cumulative combat capability.

“What would the flotilla look like? In rough terms, we envision individual small combatants of about six hundred tons carrying six or eight surface-to-surface missiles and depending on soft kill and point defense for survival, aided by offboard manned or unmanned aerial vehicles for surveillance and tactical scouting. To paint a picture of possible structures, we contemplate as the smallest element a mutually supporting pair, a squadron to comprise eight vessels, and the entire force to be eight squadrons, of which half would be in East Asian waters. The units costing less than $100 million each, the entire force would require a very small part of the shipbuilding budget (Hughes and Kline, 2012).”

This flotilla concept provides an ideal test case to compare against a world class surface combatant but first we must establish a few key assumptions on which this analysis is based.

Statistical Independence. The math behind this analysis hinges on the idea that the outcome of one small combatant’s engagement has no effect on the others in the squadron. While true statistical independence is nearly impossible to achieve in real world naval operations, the War at Sea Flotilla concept models it closely with independently operating units, the potential for various ship classes, and the inclusion of allied navies which may use different tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). This concept of operations is a major departure from today’s heavily networked forces which generate combat power through the integrated actions of several units. In those forces, the actions of one unit can have profound impact on the effectiveness of another.

Defensive and Logistical Requirements. For the purposes of this analysis, we will assume that the defensive and logistical requirements are roughly equivalent for both the small combatant squadron and the large combatant. Both would require defensive support in warfare areas not directly related to the current mission. Even a multi-mission, blue water combatant would employ inorganic support, such as maritime patrol aircraft or early warning assets, to watch its back while it conducted a focused offensive mission. As for logistics, any surface asset would need an oiler nearby to conduct sustained operations in enemy waters. A nuclear powered aircraft carrier would still require periodic support to replenish its stores of jet fuel. The logistics tail would be shorter for a large combatant than a flotilla, since it carries much of its own maintenance and supply support, but that can be a detriment in a mission involving an exchange of missile salvos. While the structure of defensive and logistical support may differ greatly between the flotilla and the large combatant, one can assume the drain on resources would be about the same for both options. 

Unit Cost. Captains Hughes and Kline estimate the unit cost of the flotilla small combatants at $80 million (Hughes and Kline, 2012). Therefore, a squadron of eight combatants would cost $640 million. The unit cost of the large combatant is assumed to be $1 billion, which is an underestimate for relevant US Navy platforms. The cost estimates in this analysis are intentionally set up to work against the flotilla concept in order to emphasize its potential for savings.

Enemy Capabilities. To further disadvantage the flotilla concept, let’s assume the small combatants are significantly overmatched by the enemy combatant. In a first strike, the enemy combatant is capable of simultaneously targeting six of the eight squadron combatants. Against the large combatant, it is capable of conducting a devastating mission kill in which the ship may not be sunk but the cost to repair it to fully mission capable would be comparable to the unit cost. As a starting argument, let’s assume in either case the enemy can achieve a mission kill with 10% probability (Pmk =0.10) since both striking forces have similar levels of defensive support. You might argue that Pmk should be lower for the large combatant because it possesses superior self defense capabilities; however, you could also argue that the mobile, distributed nature of the small combatant squadron compensates for each ship’s lack of self defense by complicating the enemy’s targeting process. It may be relatively easy for the enemy to target one or two of the small combatants, but it remains a challenge to simultaneously eliminate the entire squadron.

Selecting the Right Striking Force: Analysis Results

Using the generic introductory scenario, we can compare the small combatant squadron to the large combatant in terms of performance, cost, and risk. 

Overall Effectiveness. We are given the overall effectiveness of the large combatant as Ps = 0.99 and the individual effectiveness of the small combatants as Ps,ship = 0.5. To determine the overall effectiveness of the squadron, it is easiest to first estimate the probability that none of the small combatants successfully accomplish their mission. The probability that any one small combatant will not accomplish the mission is,

Since the outcomes of each engagement are estimated as independent of one another, the probability that none of the eight small combatants accomplish the mission is,

The probability that at least one of the small combatants accomplish the mission is the converse of the previous result, or

In other words, the squadron has a 99.6% probability of success vice 99% for the large combatant. This may not seem like much of an improvement, but it is more remarkable when considering the unit cost of each option.

Cost Effectiveness. The unit costs are given as $1 billion for the large combatant and $80 million for the small combatant, so we know that the squadron of eight small combatants is the more affordable option at $640 million. In addition, we have established that the squadron can outperform the large combatant for this particular offensive mission in which the individual squadron ships are actually overmatched by the enemy. The squadron is not only more cost effective than the large combatant; it actually delivers better performance at lower cost. As a commander, would you rather invest $1 billion in striking force that fails 10 times in 1000 attempts, or save $360 million with a striking force that fails only 4 times in 1000 attempts? To put it another way, if you were to invest the same $1 billion in 12 small combatants, you could deliver a striking force that failed only 2 times in 10,000 attempts (Ps = 0.9998).

Resilience after Enemy Action. One way to consider risk is to look at the impact to the mission if the enemy is able to successfully consummate a first attack. We have assumed the enemy is equally capable of attacking the large combatant and the squadron of small combatants. If the enemy combatant achieves a simultaneous mission kill against six of the small combatants, then only two will remain to continue the mission. These two small combatants have a combined 75% probability of successfully completing the mission.  On the other hand, if the enemy successfully conducts a mission kill against the large combatant, the probability of successfully completing the mission is 0% and you lose the other warfare area capabilities that the large combatant could bring to bear in other missions. The additional investment required to provide onboard logistics support is also lost.

Another way to look at this risk is to calculate the expected damage cost of each option in the long run. Assuming the enemy is able to conduct devastating mission kills (in which the repair costs are comparable to the unit cost) a conservative 10% of the time (Pmk = 0.1) for both the large and small combatants, then the expected damage cost for the large combatant is,

Likewise, the expected damage cost for the squadron of small combatants is,

In the long run, the enemy is expected to cause $52M less damage per mission in the case of the small combatants. Even if the enemy were more likely to successfully target six small combatants simultaneously, how much would you as a commander be willing to pay for 75% follow-on capability vice 0%?

Less Communications, Less Cost, More Combat Power: Analysis Insights

The results of this analysis seem to indicate that the squadron of small combatants is an obvious choice for naval missions involving direct action against the enemy fleet. Yet the scenario described is quite generic and says nothing about the actual TTPs and systems the squadron will utilize in prosecuting the enemy. How can such a generic scenario really prove anything about the effectiveness of small combatants? The key is that two fundamental principles underlie this analysis and can be applied in much broader terms.
   
First, independently operating, redundant, and at least marginally capable units will greatly increase any system’s overall effectiveness, primarily because unit faults and errors are not permitted to propagate through the system as they would in net centric warfare (e.g. flawed group tactics or a false link track). For surface combatants, an individual effectiveness of 50% is sufficient to affordably produce a formidable striking force. For less expensive systems, that number may be even less. Ultimately, this kind of system is so effective because it is highly unlikely that none of the individual units will successfully complete the mission.

The second principle that contributes to the appeal of the small combatant squadron is that the price of military systems increases exponentially as you attempt to improve individual unit performance closer and closer to perfection. Most of our warships today are designed well past the “knee” in the cost curve. Small combatants can be built with marginal capability at (relatively) very low cost. One new concept illustrates how less capable ships can affordably produce equivalent performance as more capable ones in certain situations. In his 2009 essay, “Buy Fords, Not Ferraris” Captain (U.S. Navy) Henry Hendrix proposes Influence Squadrons, composed of light amphibious ships, large combatants, littoral combat ships (LCS), and small combatants, to alleviate the need for some Carrier Strike Groups - with a smaller price tag (Hendrix, 2009). The purpose of the War at Sea Flotilla, however, is not to replace current fleet assets but to fill a vital niche not now covered to fight a war at sea in littoral waters. Therefore the cost must be small. Captains Hughes and Kline suggest the cost of maintaining a fleet of 64 flotilla ships, steady state, should be less than 3 or 4% of the shipbuilding budget (Hughes and Kline, 2012).

Think Small: Analysis Conclusion and Recommendations

One look at the writings of Sir Julian Corbett or Captain Hughes’ Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat will show the reader that the benefits of small combatants in certain aspects of naval warfare are not a new discovery. In fact, this analysis may seem like the kind of thinking that led to the development of LCS, which was, after all, born out of wargaming and analysis that advocated for small combatants (Johnson and Long, 2007). The LCS program is not, however, a realization of the principles discussed in this analysis. Both Freedom and Independence class LCS are large multi-mission warships (albeit one at a time) in which mission packages cost a premium to achieve very high probabilities of success. The War at Sea Flotilla, if constructed as Captains Hughes and Kline recommend, would exemplify the advantages of independently operating small combatants.

None of this is meant to condemn LCS or any other ship class for that matter. Every ship in the US fleet, along with the distributed networks that multiply its combat power, has an important role in the mission of winning the nation’s wars, deterring aggression and maintaining freedom of the seas. The purpose here is to provide an analytical basis for including independently operating squadrons of small combatants in the discussion for future force structure. For targeted offensive missions at sea, concepts such as the War at Sea Flotilla can provide higher performance than large combatants at lower cost and with greater resilience to enemy action. In today’s fiscal reality and tomorrow’s projected operational environment, that is a combination Navy leaders should not ignore.

A Global Navy for a Global Mission

My boss, Rep. J. Randy Forbes, published two pieces last week on Seapower issues. While I think many came across the one he co-authored on attack submarines with Rep. Courtney (AOL Defense), I also wanted to highlight the second piece he did for the new RealClearDefense website. American Seapower: A Global Navy  for A Global Mission is written as a foundational piece that Rep. Forbes hopes will be part of a broader thesis he continues to expand on for why the Nation should prioritize a larger Navy. You can find it here.

Why does the United States maintain such a robust Navy? It's a fundamental question we should be asking because the answer has both major economic and national security implications. Many assume we have a strong Navy simply because others states that may do us harm also have strong Navies or because the U.S. is flanked by the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, waterways potential enemies may use to bring war to our shores. But if we maintained a Navy just to defend our coasts than our current battle force fleet of 285 ships would be more than sufficient for the task. 

A better question, then, might be to ask what the Nation expects its Navy to provide. A number of enduring American interests present themselves.... 

2014 Navy Budget Share Predictable, Not Newsworthy

Searching for any real evidence for a rebalance to the Pacific and a concomitant shift in national military strategy as reflected how the budget is allocated among the Services continues to be unsatisfying.  

Here is a table I put together of how the base defense budget has been allocated in the recent past (actual budgets 2010-1013) and projections for how the pie would be split up from 2014-2017.  The figures in this table for future years are from the 2013 budget.  All figures were rounded up or down to the nearest whole number, which is why some years do not equal 100:

	Army	Navy	Air Force	DoD
2017	24%	29%	28%	19%
2016	24%	29%	27%	19%
2015	24%	29%	27%	19%
2014	25%	29%	27%	19%
2013	25%	29%	26%	19%
2012	26%	29%	27%	18%
2011	26%	29%	27%	17%
2010	26%	29%	27%	17%

Next, I took figures from the 2014 Budget Submission as reported by DoD Buzz in an article trumpeting that fact that the “Navy” hauled in the largest budget share.  Putting aside the fact that the “Navy” has two Armed Services in its budget, the Navy has been receiving the largest slice of the pie for several years and the size of it has been fairly consistent.  Here is the table above with the 2014 line showing both the pre-FY 14 budget line and post FY 14 budget line, using the figures from the DoD Buzz story:

	Army	Navy	Air Force	DoD
2017	24%	29%	28%	19%
2016	24%	29%	27%	19%
2015	24%	29%	27%	19%
2014	25%/24%	29%/29%	27%/27%	19%/19%
2013	25%	29%	26%	19%
2012	26%	29%	27%	18%
2011	26%	29%	27%	17%
2010	26%	29%	27%	17%

Again, in the second table, the 2015-17 budgets have not been updated with figures from the 2014 budget input.  It is entirely possible that the 2014 line is just the beginning of more important shifts of money among the Services and DoD.  But don’t let anyone fool you; the 2014 budget—from the perspective of how budget shares reflect priorities—is business as usual.