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The United States Naval Institute News service was the first to report that President Trump would appoint financier Philip Bilden to be nominated for Secretary of the Navy. USNI News was among the last to report Philip Bilden would drop out.

Financier Philip Bilden has withdrawn himself from consideration to be the next Secretary of the Navy, he said in a Sunday statement.

In the statement, Bilden said he would be unable to meet the requirements of the Office of Government Ethics requirements for the position without “materially adverse divestment” of his family’s financial interests.

“I fully support the President’s agenda and the [Secretary of Defense James Mattis’] leadership to modernize and rebuild our Navy and Marine Corps, and I will continue to support their efforts outside of the Department of the Navy,” he said in the statement.
“However, after an extensive review process, I have determined that I will not be able to satisfy the Office of Government Ethics requirements without undue disruption and materially adverse divestment of my family’s private financial interests.”

In a Sunday statement, Mattis said the withdrawal “was a personal decision driven by privacy concerns and significant challenges he faced in separating himself from his business interests. While I am disappointed, I understand and his respect his decision, and know that he will continue to support our nation in other ways.”

Mattis also said, “in the coming days I will make a recommendation to President Trump for a leader who can guide our Navy and Marine Corps team as we execute the president’s vision to rebuild our military.”

Thanks to Major Garrett's twitter account, this wasn't exactly unexpected news. Basically, that was the moment the financial conflict of interest was discovered and it was only a matter of time before he withdrew his name from the nomination. Political activists, both on social media and the media, may try to make this into something it isn't, but the bottom line is that it was going to be very difficult for Mr. Bilden to divest himself from the wealth the gentleman had accumulated over his career in International Finance in order to meet the government ethics requirements related to financial conflict of interest.

Having personally run into similar ethical requirements related to financial interests and working for government, it's very hard for me to see this as a big deal. Someone like me who had a few thousand dollars invested in activities that created an ethical financial conflict has nothing in common with someone like Philip Bilden who likely had millions of dollars to deal with. Most people who comment on this stuff have never actually dealt with the issue.

In the end Philip Bilden's nomination and subsequent withdrawal has everything to do with the process working as designed. Philip Bilden's nomination came from the well attuned voices in both the Naval War College Foundation and the United States Naval Institute, both of which have very influential naval insiders who know the man as someone actively engaged and interested in naval affairs, and willing to put his money where those interests are. In that context though, it was unlikely Philip Bilden's supporters saw any potential private financial conflicts of interest as ever being an issue that would prevent his appointmnet, so when credible people recommended him to the President, it isn't hard to see President Trump appreciating the recommendation of an outsider with big name endorsements who General Mattis was also endorsing.

The Navy undoubtedly needs more people like Philip Bilden in their corner, but that can't override how the government undoubtedly needs people who can get through the financial ethics requirements related to offshore investments, and that goes double for this administration. From everything I have seen and heard, Philip Bilden is a great American, but the government financial ethics requirements are not really flexible when it comes to people with global investments. This would be true for most of the wealthy stars super of Hollywood, like George Clooney or Angelina Jolie, who have extensive  foreign investments likely disqualifying them from ever being Secretary of State, for example, just as it is true for Philip Bilden. Bottom line, in American government you are considered far more qualified if you blow trillions of dollars of taxpayer money on government garbage than if you have effectively earned and invested your own wealth resulting in a portfolio showing foreign holdings. Amusing how that requirement for government service is both logical and remarkably pathetic.

I look forward to seeing who General Mattis recommends for the new Secretary of the Navy. While Randy Forbes would have to be the top safe pick on everyone's mind, I'm still hoping the President's team throws the 102 mph fastball right over the strike zone and picks from among the top folks in the next generation who didn't sign that War on the Rocks memo... folks like Mackenzie Eaglen, Jerry Hendrix, or Bryan Clark.

Question of the Week February 13 - February 17, 2024

Each week Information Dissemination will present a Question of the Week for professional consideration and discussion. The question will remain at the top of the blog from Monday at 12:00am until Friday 5:00pm. Please scroll down for new contributions. This weeks question:

CSBA's new report Restoring American Seapower: A New Fleet Architecture for the United States Navy calls for smaller conventionally powered CVLs of 40,000 to 60,000 tons that would provide power projection and sea control capabilities at the scale needed for day-to-day operations and for SUW, strike, and CAS as part of initial combat, freeing CVNs to focus on high-end integrated multi-carrier operations. How much money would be too much money for a 40,000 to 60,000 ton CVL? Why?

"The Trump Navy: Getting to 350 Ships" Event at Hudson Center for American Seapower 1 March

Former Navy Under Secretary The Honorable Dr.  Janine Davidson, and CSBA Senior Fellow Bryan Clark will join Hudson Center for American Seapower Director Seth Cropsey and me for a conversation about the Trump Navy midday on March 1.

Details can be found on the Hudson Center for American Seapower webpage.

The Biggest Issues Facing Our Navy And Military Strategy Across The Seas

I did an interview with The Federalist Radio Hour recently that may be of interest to readers.

Rep. Conaway Introduces the "12 Carrier Act"

Representative Michael K. Conaway (R--TX11) has introduced the "12 Carrier Act" in the House. The bill can be found here.

The best bit is here;

SEC. 4. INCREASE IN NUMBER OF OPERATIONAL AIRCRAFT CARRIERS OF THE NAVY.

(a) Increase.—Section 5062(b) of title 10, United States Code, is amended by striking “11 operational aircraft carriers” and inserting “12 operational aircraft carriers”.

(b) Effective Date.—The amendment made by subsection (a) shall take effect on September 30, 2023.

I am of course, very supportive of this measure. Both the Navy's recent Force Structure Assessment and the CSBA Fleet Architecture I assisted on call for 12 carriers.

Question of the Week February 6 - February 10, 2024

Each week Information Dissemination will present a Question of the Week for professional consideration and discussion. The question will remain at the top of the blog from Monday at 12:00am until Friday 5:00pm. Please scroll down for new contributions. This weeks question:

The Navy awarded Newport News Shipbuilding $25.5 million to begin advanced fabrication of of the aircraft carrier USS Enterprise CVN-80 this week. Should CVN-80, the third Ford-class aircraft carrier, be the last big deck aircraft carrier the US Navy builds?

Why? Why not?

CSBA Fleet Architecture Talking Paper--Why the Current Force Structure Assessment Process is Flawed

During the work last summer on the CSBA Fleet Architecture Study, I would occasionally write short summaries of things we were thinking about for the team lead, Bryan Clark. The one below is a condnesed version of some thinking on why the way FSA's are done today is flawed.

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There is a fundamental weakness in the manner in which the Navy conducts fleet architecture and force structure inquiries. That weakness derives from the tension between the near-term nature of the “demand signal” as represented in the numbered war plans, the GFMAP, and security cooperation force requirements, and the far-term nature of the 30 year shipbuilding and aviation plans that are required of it by the Congress. These 30 year plans are a manifestation of the fleet architecture in place and planned, such as it is. Because the main inputs to it are 1) the near-term demand signal extrapolated forward into the future and 2) the perceived need to “replace” force structure that reaches the end of its service life, a classic “self-licking ice cream cone” situation is created. An explanation follows.

There is a force structure in place at any given time that reflects the extant fleet architecture. Combatant Commanders (COCOM) request forces (or sometimes capabilities) to service their requirements from the forces that are available. To the extent that there are either unavailable forces or capabilities to service these unmet needs, the COCOM generates need statements—urgent operational requirements or inputs to their integrated priority lists. Generally speaking, these needs are reflective of in-situ/near term needs. The Navy then—within its capability to do so—attempts to meet these needs with (again, generally speaking)—short term or nearly immediately available solutions.

Put another way, the COCOMs ask for what is available, and the Navy builds its fleet around what the COCOM’s ask for. What the COCOMs ask for is conditioned by a set of pre-existing expectations of what can and will be provided. Our fleet looks like it does because of an aggregated response over time to what is asked of it by the competing requirements of COCOMs obsessed (by design) with the near term.

In our approach to this assessment, we take as our main idea the conventional deterrence of great power war. We assess the current fleet architecture (to include its posture and basing) to be at best, sub-optimized to meet this mandate and at worst, a slow, methodical undercutting of such deterrence. This is due to the fact that our forces providing everyday peacetime presence are the same forces that would be relied upon for war-fighting—just a smaller subset thereof. The demands of great power warfighting create a requirement for a level of response that cannot be adequately prepared for given the needs of maintaining point-station deterrence day in and day out from among the same forces. This Alternate Fleet Architecture is based upon a radically altered “demand signal” that is closely aligned with the needs of a regionally aggregated approach to great power deterrence focused through the instrumentalities of a number of emerging naval operational concepts.

CSBA Alternative Fleet Architecture Study

In the 2016 National Defense Authorization Act, DoD was directed to conduct a group of studies on Alternative Fleet Architectures. The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) was selected to perform one of the studies, and its fearless leader Bryan Clark asked me to pitch in.  The study has finally been released to the public, and it can be found here.

The Fleet in Being Strategy

PACIFIC OCEAN (Jan. 20, 2017) Aircraft from Carrier Air Wing (CVW) 17 conduct flight operations aboard the aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71). The carrier is currently off the coast of Southern California conducting carrier qualifications. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist Seaman Bill M. Sanders/Released)

The US Navy has dealt with the fiscal controls of sequestration put in place by Congress and the Obama Administration over the last few years by making a strategic choice that favored new shipbuilding activities over the maintenance of ships and aircraft - among other things. Budgets are zero sum, and Defense News is reporting the consequences of that strategic choice.

The U.S. Navy’s F/A-18 Hornet and Super Hornet strike fighters are the tip of the spear, embodying most of the fierce striking power of the aircraft carrier strike group. But nearly two-thirds of the fleet’s strike fighters can’t fly — grounded because they’re either undergoing maintenance or simply waiting for parts or their turn in line on the aviation depot backlog.

Overall, more than half the Navy’s aircraft are grounded, most because there isn’t enough money to fix them.

Additionally, there isn’t enough money to fix the fleet’s ships, and the backlog of ships needing work continues to grow. Overhauls — “availabilities” in Navy parlance — are being canceled or deferred, and when ships do come in they need longer to refit. Every carrier overall for at least three years has run long, and some submarines are out of service for prolonged periods, as much as four years or more. One submarine, the Boise, has lost its diving certification and can’t operate pending shipyard work.

Leaders claim that if more money doesn’t become available, five more submarines will be in the same state by the end of this year. 

The article has plenty of details, but the eye popping quote comes after the article cites "$6-8 billion" in immediate needs. There is only one way to describe what this means.

The dire situation of naval aviation is sobering. According to the Navy, 53 percent of all Navy aircraft can’t fly — about 1,700 combat aircraft, patrol, and transport planes and helicopters. Not all are due to budget problems — at any given time, about one-fourth to one-third of aircraft are out of service for regular maintenance. But the 53 percent figure represents about twice the historic norm.

It doesn't matter how many ships are in the US Navy's shipbuilding plan, the unequivocal truth of the situation is - the US Navy today is a hollow force. When the fleet cannot leave port and has been degraded to the point it cannot maintain it's own resources, it is a fleet in being. It was an intentional choice, by both Navy leaders and Congress - they all own the situation as it is today. This has been the strategy of the last several years to insure new construction and new ships. No one, whether a civilian in either political party or an Admiral in the Navy today, can claim they are not accountable. Priorities get funded, and a lot of priorities that have nothing to do with the maintenance of naval power have been funded over the last many years.

Consider for a moment that it is very likely the training squadrons are probably among the squadrons actually getting maintenance funding, which means it is very likely the US Navy couldn't field more than 4, and probably not even 5 aircraft carriers with functioning combat aircraft today in response to a national emergency. I don't know what percent of the F-18s force is grounded, but I bet the percentage of helicopters grounded is much higher, because if there is one thing we can make a safe bet on - it is that naval aviation leaders will have prioritized the F-18s and done only the minimum everywhere else.

Last week the Question of the Week asked whether the US Navy was prepared for combat at sea. My answer to this question would be, "Yes the US Navy is prepared to fight, at least initially, and while the tip of the spear is very sharp - it's the shortest spear the US Navy has represented since the 19th century."

In 2010 I remember listening to fleet leaders who were very concerned that the US Navy was on the verge of being a hollow force, and today in 2017 the US Navy is absolutely hollow. There are entire squadrons of aircraft that cannot fly today, and ships that not only can't get underway - but it is unclear when they next could get underway. When I read articles discussing the size of the US Navy in 2017 I roll my eyes wondering if they have any idea how meaningless the numbers they use actually are. Numbers on paper have nothing in common with reality. The CNO telling any and all who will listen that the state of maintenance in the force has already passed critical levels - that's the reality.

Question of the Week January 30 - February 3, 2024

Each week Information Dissemination will present a Question of the Week for professional consideration and discussion. The question will remain at the top of the blog from Monday at 12:00am until Friday 5:00pm. Please scroll down for new contributions. This weeks question:

Is the US Navy prepared for combat at sea? Why or why not?

Q and A: On Technology and the Defense Acquisition System (Segment 10)

Q and A: Recent Events of Iranian Harrassment of US Navy (Segment 9)

Q and A: On Allies and Burden Sharing (Segment 8)