Showing posts with label Naval Special Warfare. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Naval Special Warfare. Show all posts

Saturday, August 13, 2024

The Thirty

The following sailors assigned to an East Coast-based Naval Special Warfare unit were killed in the Aug. 6 helicopter crash in Wardak province:
Lt. Cmdr. (SEAL) Jonas B. Kelsall, 32, of Shreveport, La.

Special Warfare Operator Master Chief Petty Officer (SEAL) Louis J. Langlais, 44, of Santa Barbara, Calif.

Special Warfare Operator Senior Chief Petty Officer (SEAL) Thomas A. Ratzlaff, 34, of Green Forest, Ark.

Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technician Senior Chief Petty Officer (Expeditionary Warfare Specialist/Freefall Parachutist) Kraig M. Vickers 36, of Kokomo, Hawaii

Special Warfare Operator Chief Petty Officer (SEAL) Brian R. Bill, 31, of Stamford, Conn.

Special Warfare Operator Chief Petty Officer (SEAL) John W. Faas, 31, of Minneapolis, Minn.

Special Warfare Operator Chief Petty Officer (SEAL) Kevin A. Houston, 35, of West Hyannisport, Mass.

Special Warfare Operator Chief Petty Officer (SEAL) Matthew D. Mason, 37, of Kansas City, Mo.

Special Warfare Operator Chief Petty Officer (SEAL) Stephen M. Mills, 35, of Fort Worth, Texas

Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technician Chief Petty Officer (Expeditionary Warfare Specialist/Freefall Parachutist/Diver) Nicholas H. Null, 30, of Washington, W.Va.

Special Warfare Operator Chief Petty Officer (SEAL) Robert J. Reeves, 32, of Shreveport, La.

Special Warfare Operator Chief Petty Officer (SEAL) Heath M. Robinson, 34, of Detroit, Mich.

Special Warfare Operator Petty Officer 1st Class (SEAL) Darrik C. Benson, 28, of Angwin, Calif.

Special Warfare Operator Petty Officer 1st Class (SEAL/Parachutist) Christopher G. Campbell, 36, of Jacksonville, N.C.

Information Systems Technician Petty Officer 1st Class (Expeditionary Warfare Specialist/Freefall Parachutist) Jared W. Day, 28, of Taylorsville, Utah

Master-at-Arms Petty Officer 1st Class (Expeditionary Warfare Specialist) John Douangdara, 26, of South Sioux City, Neb.

Cryptologist Technician (Collection) Petty Officer 1st Class (Expeditionary Warfare Specialist) Michael J. Strange, 25, of Philadelphia, Pa.,

Special Warfare Operator Petty Officer 1st Class (SEAL/Enlisted Surface Warfare Specialist) Jon T. Tumilson, 35, of Rockford, Iowa

Special Warfare Operator Petty Officer 1st Class (SEAL) Aaron C. Vaughn, 30, of Stuart, Fla.

Special Warfare Operator Petty Officer 1st Class (SEAL) Jason R. Workman, 32, of Blanding, Utah.
The following sailors assigned to a West Coast-based Naval Special Warfare unit were killed:
Special Warfare Operator Petty Officer 1st Class (SEAL) Jesse D. Pittman, 27, of Ukiah, Calif.

Special Warfare Operator Petty Officer 2nd Class (SEAL) Nicholas P. Spehar, 24, ofSaint Paul, Minn.
The soldiers killed were:
Chief Warrant Officer David R. Carter, 47, of Centennial, Colo. He was assigned to the 2nd Battalion, 135th Aviation Regiment (General Support Aviation Battalion), Aurora, Colo.

Chief Warrant Officer Bryan J. Nichols, 31, of Hays, Kan. He was assigned to the 7th Battalion, 158th Aviation Regiment (General Support Aviation Battalion), New Century, Kan.

Staff Sgt. Patrick D. Hamburger, 30, of Lincoln, Neb. He was assigned to the 2nd Battalion, 135th Aviation Regiment (General Support Aviation Battalion), Grand Island, Neb.

Sgt. Alexander J. Bennett, 24, of Tacoma, Wash. He was assigned to the 7th Battalion, 158th Aviation Regiment (General Support Aviation Battalion), New Century, Kan.

Spc. Spencer C. Duncan, 21, of Olathe, Kan. He was assigned to the 7th Battalion, 158th Aviation Regiment (General Support Aviation Battalion), New Century, Kan.
The airmen killed were:
Tech. Sgt. John W. Brown, 33, of Tallahassee, Fla.

Staff Sgt. Andrew W. Harvell, 26, of Long Beach, Calif.

Tech. Sgt. Daniel L. Zerbe, 28, of York, Pa.
The AP has a story here on each person named above. It's well done. It reminds us this isn't just a story about 30 brave and honorable men, but there are a lot of families - and children - in this story as well.

Tuesday, June 28, 2024

Photo of the Day Part II

I think my moms new 'friend' is a retired Marine, because I am starting to get pictures like this in my inbox.


Supposedly this is caricature of SEAL TEAM 6 when it was heading off to kill Bin Laden. I like the masks, but really do not have the details on the back story of this image.

If this picture is legitimate caricature of SEAL TEAM 6, then can someone explain to me the footwear. Personally I think once the US Navy gets the trademark, I think the Navy should ask Lego to make a set where proceeds go to families of fallen SEAL members. I'd put a link on the blog, not to mention buy a few sets for myself. I'd also bet it would be a best seller at US Lego stores nationwide.

Thursday, June 2, 2024

NECC Tests With Amphibious Ship

Building on the post yesterday, the Navy is starting to test the concept of integrating Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) with Amphibious ships, in this case Riverine.
Tuesday, the Navy tested the ability to dock and secure the RCB and the smaller riverine patrol boat in the well deck of the anchored dock landing ship Oak Hill during a proof-of-concept test held at the mouth of the Chesapeake Bay.

Riverine force leaders gave the demonstration a thumbs-up. If senior Navy leaders agree, the riverine force could find itself with a new post-Iraq war mission set outside the green-water arena for which it is designed, and the Navy with yet another capability for the flexible and heavily deployed amphibious force.

“I think we had a successful test today,” said Capt. Chris Halton, commander of Riverine Group 1, during a high-speed ride on an RCB from Oak Hill back to Joint Expeditionary Base Little Creek-Fort Story, where the ship and Halton’s parent command, Naval Expeditionary Combat Command, are based. “We showed that one, we can do it, and two, we’ve got some stuff to work on. But the bottom line is, I think our concept is sound.”
I highly recommend reading the entire article as it covers the challenges. This was a first step in testing, and there will be lessons to learn as the article makes clear.

There are several reasons why this type of integration is important. First, once integrated it will become part of the capability requirement for future Riverine equipment. That's important, because right now Riverine mostly uses some very old equipment. Second, once the offload and onload procedures are worked out, a culture of innovations that comes from actually using these forces from an amphibious ship will begin.

I suspect we will see creativity not only from the NECC side, but also from the Amphib side with the amphibious ship COs. One thing I've noticed being around the Navy for the past several years is that amphibious ship COs tend to take more risk than their cruiser and destroyer cousins, but that's probably a product of the promotion system that tends to trend heavily towards cruiser and destroyer captains vs SWOs of amphibious ships.

It may also have to do with some amphibious ship COs being aviators instead of SWOs, and looking for ways to stand out against the backdrop of Carrier officers in the aviator community. This isn't scientific by any means, just an impression I get based on observation.

I think the Navy will find tremendous value in the integration of NECC and amphibious ships, and I actually prefer this approach to building specialized ships for NECC. However, I also think there is an opportunity for the JHSV to be used in support of Naval Special Warfare assets.

Those of you familiar with leesea in the comments may know he has quite a background in both NECC and amphibious ships, and he has been pointing out for years how the JHSV, while not perfect, has the utility to provide the NECC with an afloat offshore staging base capable of fast response and logistical support. I think leesea will ultimately be proven correct on this once the JHSV and NECC get teamed up.

The key distinction between the JHSV and the MLP or amphibious ships (or LCS for that matter) is that the JSHV is designed with capacity in mind, where these other platforms considered in the context of modularity are designed with capability in mind. Capability minded design approaches end up leading to trade offs and sacrifices that ultimately reduce flexibility and add cost, but I will agree there are positives in the capabilities built into the design spec (sea state operational parameters and survivability are often cited examples). As the Navy ventures further down the road into modular vessels, I believe it is going to be important for NAVSEA to think about modular platforms in the context of capacity during initial design rather than capability, a subtle but important change early in new vessel concept design and development.

After all, the CVN is a great example where the Navy has long designed the platform with capacity in mind, instead of capability. That approach has been a winning design methodology, and if you look at the evolution of aircraft carriers you will note that the evolutions comes from systems capabilities added to improve upon the base large capacity platform which over time, gives the Navy the best of both capacity and capability on a Navy ship.

I am very excited to see the Navy testing Navy Expeditionary Combat Command integration with the surface fleet, and I truly believe good things will come from this. We will all know the Navy is really making progress with these concepts when we start seeing Marines involved and integrating into this mix of capabilities, although I also believe there is a real opportunity to get a Navy SOF RW unit up and running in support of these integrated capabilities as something like a Navy version of the Army's 160 SOAR (A), or put in a Navy context - the Top Gun of the RW side of aviation.

(this post was updated because the author screwed it up)

Wednesday, June 1, 2024

A Naval Special Warfare Ship

Proceedings subscribers (USNI members) have won again. The rest of you need to become a USNI member so you stop missing out on excellent content like the June issue of Proceedings Nobody Asked Me But... section by Rear Admiral George Worthington, U.S. Navy (Retired).
Naval Special Warfare (NSW) forces need to operate from the sea. For long-range open-water transits they depend on the Navy. But they rarely practice with blue-water ships, which are not outfitted to support U.S. special operations forces (SOF) with space for staff planning; troops; stowage for ammunition, small arms, and demolitions; a diving-recompression chamber; or dedicated communications terminals. Worst of all, amphibious ships are earmarked full time for Marine embarkation and not available to SEALs, especially with the 2006 establishment of Marine Corps Special Operations Command. SEALs and Special Warfare Combatant-craft Crewmen (SWCC) need dedicated open-ocean ships.

NSW comprises several SEAL teams, a single SEAL delivery vehicle (SDV) team, and special boat teams. These commands are blended together for deployments as a squadron, and all report to the commander, U.S. Special Operations Command through the NSW Command headquartered in Coronado, California. Overseas, they report to the geographical combatant commanders.

The teams—supported by various units and U.S.-based groups—catch rides in whatever surface ships or submarines are allotted for a given operation. But, as noted previously, the surface ships are not oriented to special operations forces that could be Army Special Forces, Marine Special Operations, or (most usually) Navy SEAL and SDV teams.

NSW craft include the 82-foot MK V special-operations craft, now approaching 20 years’ service. This has an aluminum hull, water-jet drive, some crew-served weapons, and is capable of 50-plus knots and a 600 nautical-mile range. Next down, the 36-foot rigid-hull inflatable boat, a workhorse capable of 40 knots, has a crew of three SWCC and can transport eight SEALs. At the bottom of the list is the 15-foot combat rubber raiding craft, made by Zodiac of North America. This carries nine passengers at 30 knots for 60 nautical miles. SDVs are specialized, free-flooding underwater insertion vehicles.

So why do SEALs need a dedicated blue-water support craft?
Rear Admiral Worthington goes on to answer the question in quality detail. I thought it was particularly interesting that he rejects the LCS and suggests the old Newport class is closer to the mark. I'm not sure I either agree or disagree with his points, but I think it goes to the heart of a serious limitation of LCS in that the platform lacks the endurance to be a credible afloat forward staging base.

The MLP might actually a good fit, but with only 3 planned there will never be enough MLPs to meet the demand.

By the way, last week at GenNext Rear Admiral Worthington discussed this topic among others, and below is listed the key takeaways from his presentation:
  • The SEALs have come a long way since their formation in the 60’s. Vietnam was the trigger—they became an instrumental part of the armed forces for covert action. After Vietnam funding dried up until the 80’s and the SEALs had a revamp
  • In Rear Admiral Worthington’s opinion, too much has been leaked already regarding the killing of Osama Bin Laden. Identifying the SEALs at the Special Forces team responsible for the raid only puts them in more danger. The SEALs are responsible for the most elusive and dangerous jobs in the world, their privacy and ability to execute can potentially be affected by too much exposure.
  • The OBL operation was a complicated one but something the SEALs could “do in their sleep”. Rear Admiral Worthington noted, “I bet their heart rate didn’t go above 92 when they stepped in that compound. “
  • Mobility issues for the SEALs remain. They need dedicated helicopter squadrons for special operations and dedicated surface ships. He also touched on the shortfalls of the current Newport Class LST/Littoral Combat Ship (LCS).
That last key point is covered broadly in generic detail in the Proceedings article, but I admit to liking the idea of comparing the Newport Class LST/Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) in the context of a dedicated special operations surface ship design starting place.