The Chinese DF-21 Arsenal: The Finale

For previous installments, see Parts I, II, and III

Future Uncertainties

These raid-sizing thought experiments make a convincing case that, at present, the conventionally-armed DF-21 inventory is only capable of performing specific tasks within an overall combined arms first strike. At the inventory’s mid-2013 size, any margin for maintaining a campaign-waging missile reserve dissipates quickly if the missiles are less effective or U.S. BMD more effective than our thought experiments’ assumptions.

It is less clear whether the inventory is actually solely intended for the first strike role, or whether the PLA has broader long-term ambitions for these missiles. The apparent plateaus in DF-21C deployments after 2009 and DF-21D deployments after 2011 could mean that only short productions runs were needed because the PLA only needed a few tens of these missiles to meet their first strike-centric inventory requirements for 1500+ kilometer MRBMs over the near-to-intermediate term. This interpretation would be consistent with NASIC’s January 2014 assessment that the PLA’s C² capabilities are currently sufficient only for conducting “pre-planned joint fires against fixed targets in the Pacific Theater,” and that coordinated strikes against “pop-up targets of opportunity” in a dynamic combat environment would likely face “considerable difficulties, except in certain tactical situations.”[i] In other words, the PLA would presently gain little from reserving some sizable number of conventionally-armed MRBMs for campaign-waging instead of expending them within a coordinated combined arms first strike.

Alternatively, it might mean that the -21C and -21D are limited ‘test runs’ of conventionally-armed 1500+ kilometer MRBMs, and that technological as well as operational lessons-learned generated by the deployed brigades will be applied in either future DF-21 variants or new-design MRBMs. It might even mean that -21C and/or -21D production was prematurely ended due to critical performance issues or capability limitations discovered during operational testing, and that the roles one or both were intended to fill will either remain gapped until successor designs are fielded—or the roles are reallocated to other combat arms.

This leaves the question of whether the PLA has fulfilled its long-term inventory requirements for conventionally-armed 1500+ kilometer MRBMs with the -21C and -21D, meaning that it will only periodically introduce new-design missiles in this class to replace those already fielded, or whether it is undergoing a ‘build a little, test a little, learn a lot’ sequence in which a second production wave will expand the arsenal in this range-class further. If the first hypothesis is true, then it seems virtually certain the PLA only plans to use these missiles in a first strike role. If the second is true, then this would suggest an additional future campaign-waging role.

It will be extremely difficult to test these hypotheses going forward, however, if the annual DOD reports continue their post-2012 trend of not providing standalone inventory size estimates for the DF-21 series. The same will be true if they do not begin providing estimates for the DF-16 series or any future new-design MRBMs that may be deployed. As NASIC presently only reports TEL counts, the annual DOD reports serve as the only authoritative resource for missile counts. In their absence, the U.S. security studies community will be left relying solely on Chinese-language open sources of varying fidelity, which may impact analysts’ abilities to accurately inform the East Asian security debate. The PLA conventionally-armed MRBM arsenal’s size, composition, and growth trends are critical metrics for gauging Chinese doctrine, operational plans, and strategic intentions. Consequently, if non-governmental analysts are left unable to annually monitor the arsenal, it may become more difficult for U.S. and allied leaders to obtain opinion elites’ and the general public’s support for competitive strategies that hinge on popular appreciation of the dangers these and other similar PLA capabilities pose to U.S. conventional deterrence in East Asia.

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[i] Fuell, 10.