Rule # 1 and the Cost Cult of Invulnerability

The following contribution comes from Captain Henry (Jerry) Hendrix, Captain (ret.). Jerry Hendrix is a Senior Fellow and the Director of the Defense Strategies and Assessments Program at the Center for a New American Security.

On the morning of December 7, 1941, the USS Arizona, with 13.5 inches of armor at her waterline, 18 inches of armor on her turrets, and watertight compartments throughout her hull, was one of the most survivable ships in the world, that today continues to rest upon the bottom of Pearl Harbor with over a thousand honored dead still onboard. The USS Cole, equipped with the Aegis defense system, represented a $1.3 billion dollar investment in survivability in today’s dollars. She was designed to defend herself and other ships around her against the latest in air, surface and subsurface threats. Yet on October 12, 2000, a small motorboat filled with explosives nearly sank the ship as she refueled in Yemen.

There is no such thing as invulnerability. Many defense investments are misplaced, but near the top of the list are the billions spent chasing the illusion that ships can take a hit in a modern, hypersonic warfare environment and keep fighting. DOD must face the unpleasant reality that we will never build an indestructible ship.

This drama is playing out with the Navy’s overdue decision on the Small Surface Combatant (SSC) that will follow the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). The decision will have a significant impact on the next Navy budget submission. One of the prime contenders for the SSC design will be a modified LCS with more armament. Another should be the Coast Guard’s National Security Cutter (NSC). Both will fly in the face of critiques who carp about reliability and survivability. Issues with reliability for both ships are being addressed and are in line with other previous “first in class” ships ranging from the Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7) to the San Antonio (LPD-17), all of which experienced significant mechanical challenges. However, it is the issues of survivability (LCS and NSC were built to the basic Level 1+ standard) that has triggered the most concerning debate.

To be sure, we try. It is incumbent upon Defense officials, naval officers, and the nation to attempt to preserve the lives of our fighting men and women, and no one wants to take a position where they could be accused of supporting the idea that service members are “expendable.” Rules and requirements are written into procurement documents in an attempt to create platforms that can take a hit and preserve the lives of the crew inside. Much of this protection comes with a downside, generally complexity and weight, which in turn results in decreased range (as weight goes up, fuel mileage comes down) and ultimately in cost, which also has the net effect of lowering the overall number of platforms purchased.

Both of these ships illuminate persistent questions regarding survivability and the proper level of investment in it. History reveals war as a science that ebbs and flows between the offense and the defense. Offense had the upper hand when the first rock made contact with a forehead, but armor granted wearers an ability to shrug off blows and strike the unarmored with their swords, at least until the longbow showed up. One hundred and fifty years ago advances in metallurgy granted the advantage briefly to the defense, giving rise to ironclads, but soon the offense regained its advantage with the advent of the large rifled projectile and the high-speed missile.

Today’s military research and development attempts to defend by shooting down the projectile rather than building armor because physics dictates that there is nothing that can shield you from a hypersonic missile when it has you in its sights. We cannot make any platform invulnerable to attack.

The point here is not whether platforms can be made survivable or not. The Arizona and Cole tell us that on day one of the next conflict, given our form of government, we are going to take the first blow. No one likes the sad simple truth that in war that men and women will die. This is also not to say that we shouldn’t invest in survivability or that we should stop buying high-end platforms. We should, but in a balanced high-low, manned and unmanned mix with an eye to the realistic return on investment in a wartime environment and its impact on the number of platforms we can ultimately purchase to comprise our frontline force.

On day two of the next war, after we have been struck first, we will adjust to the new reality and redeploy our remaining forces to deal with the threat. Given this fact, existing platforms like LCS and the NSC should be in the mix for the Small Surface Combatant selection. They are basic designs, relatively cheap, rapidly maturing, and here. We cannot afford a pause in shipbuilding. We need numbers. Quantity has taken on a quality all its own. Over emphasis on survivability in the face of a hypersonic reality represents hubris and an attempt to ignore the reality of modern war. We chase pleasant illusions over unpleasant realities at our own peril.