I apologize for covering ground I thoroughly turned over once before, but Professor James Lacey of the Marine Corps War College has offered me a fresh opportunity to comment on rise of clinically significant levels of paranoia among some of our land power friends. In a post on National Review online, Lacey takes to the e-pages of one of my favorite journals of the vast right wing conspiracy to skewer the ruminations of the unnamed "defense intellectuals" behind AirSea battle. Putting aside for the moment the irony of a PhD in Military History on the payroll of the Department of Defense mocking "defense intellectuals" (presumably there are none of these at Quantico), Lacey recycles arguments and acts--to quote the founder and spiritual guide of National Review William F. Buckley once put it--as a "pyromaniac in a field of straw men."
Lacey--as is fashionable among like-minded land power advocates--sees ASB as little more than a naked budgetary putsch by the Navy and Air Force, presumably aided and abetted by that wildly enthusiastic booster of seapower and airpower, Robert Gates (he of sacked Secretaries/CSAF's, and speeches questioning the relevance of carriers and our dominant Navy). Apparently, news of the end of combat in Iraq and the drawdown in Afghanistan has not reached Dr. Lacey at Orthanc on the Potomac, as presumably cuts to the Marine Corps and Army strike him as somehow strategically unwise, even discounting the sneaky machinations of the Air Force and Navy (oh, and USMC, who is also part of ASB--as is the US Army, news of which has also apparently not reached the good Professor).
But lets move past the budgetary rationale offered by Dr. Lacey, and on to some of his other arguments. Lacey writes: "In truth, the Air-Sea Battle concept addresses a very real problem: How does the U.S. military operate in a world where many potential foes can afford missiles and other weapons that could deny it entry to or use of an area. Problems arose, however, when this search for a technical fix to a tactical problem began to morph into a strategy, one that was widely perceived as being aimed at containing or if necessary militarily defeating China." So, after conceding that ASB addresses a very real problem, Lacey indulges in the largest of the conspiracy theories floating around, that being the perception that ASB is or was EVER a strategy to do anything. This is simply not true, and the suggestion that ASB in some way represented a war-winning plan against China or anyone else is simply wrong. Lacey is correct in thinking that maritime and air power are rarely the instruments of victory in war. Generally speaking, a land force must threaten the strategic goals of an opponent to bring war to a close. That said, unless the Army and Marine Corps have cooked up a special access program of which I am unaware, our land power is unlikely to be transported a la "Star Trek" to battle. First, it must traverse the land and sea between its staging bases and the fight--where potential opponents wield "anti-access" capabilities. Then--in order that it might enjoy freedom of maneuver, it must operate in locales where the opponent seeks to deny them that freedom--again, largely in the air and on the sea. Put another way, in order for American land power to perform the necessary tasks it uniquely wields in victory, it must rely on the Navy and Air Force to gain SOME MEASURE of dominance in the air and on/under the sea. That ability is increasingly challenged by China, Iran and others, and no matter how magnificent our land armies may be, and no matter how few wars are won exclusively by air and seapower, it is a relatively simple idea to hold that while Navies and Air Forces do not win modern wars--modern wars are not won without them. And increasingly it appeared that there were conflicts for which DoD MUST necessarily plan, that we were in danger of NOT having a clear path to victory due to emerging anti-access and area denial (A2AD) capabilities.
Lacey goes on to say that "Of course, given today’s political concerns and current diplomatic niceties, having the Pentagon work on plans for how to defeat China was beyond the pale. So, for the past several months, the Department of Defense has been busily walking back the idea that Air-Sea Battle is a “strategy” aimed at militarily defeating China. Rather, it is once again firmly in the “concepts” corral, where it is available to assist U.S. military commanders in any region where they might encounter an enemy with substantial “anti-access” or “area-denial” capabilities." I challenge Dr. Lacey to find even a single reputable figure associated with the Navy or Air Force who has ever claimed ASB to be anything BUT a concept. Who has been doing this "walking back"? What have they said?
Lacey goes on to mock the Joint Staff's latest effort , the Joint Operational Access Concept, and in doing so, exposes himself as ill-educated as to what "Joint" actually is, and how it is the JOAC came to be. He writes, "So what is wrong with the new concept? Plenty. Although this is a “joint” concept and therefore supposed to include all the services, the Army still seems to be odd man out." Again, Lacey is an educated man, presumably with access to reputable sources--I challenge him to provide a definition of Joint that specifies ALL Services must be included. He will not, as it does not exist. Additionally, the very existence of the JOAC is a credit to the paranoia flamed in no small part from his outpost at Quantico (and from the Army's at TRADOC) which couldn't stomach the possibility that the Navy and Air Force were working on important concepts without them. That the JOAC does not rise to Lacey's definition of great doctrine is notable in view of his Service's efforts to impose it on the renegades at ASB. And again--the Army is now a part of the ASB Office, so lets hang that one up.
I could go on...but I urge you to read the post I linked to in the first paragraph for a fuller examination of land power paranoia. Dr. Lacey does neither himself, his school, nor his service credit by recycling tired arguments.
Bryan McGrath
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