It's Cruel to be Kind...

Here's an uncharacteristically poor post from ThinkProgress Security:

The Defense Department’s budget request calls for $24 billion to be invested in Shipbuilding and Maritime Systems. Of these funds, $3.2 billion is to be invested in the construction of two new first-rate Virginia-class nuclear powered submarines. The true value in these boats lies in “deep ocean anti-submarine warfare.”

However, it’s unclear what practical value these submarines will serve. These subs probably aren’t particularly useful in combating non-existent al Qaeda and Taliban submarines on missions taking place in land-locked Afghanistan. Moreover, as CAP’s Larry Korb, Laura Conley, and Alex Rothman noted, “The U.S. Navy currently possesses more firepower than the next 20 largest navies combined — many of which are U.S. allies.” The U.S. has 11 aircraft carriers. In comparison, Italy, the second largest carrier fleet, maintains two. Morever, Yet, the Navy has shown no desire to cut the production of these vessels.

Meanwhile, in his recent address laying out his Afghanistan policy, President Obama said, “America, it is time to focus on nation building here at home.”

Okay... dude's an intern. Keep that in mind; most of this post is going to contain very little that's new for the readers of this blog. First things first, there are entirely plausible arguments that one could make against the procurement of additional Virginia class submarines. I don't think that the arguments are all that great; the Virginia class seems to me, on balance, to be a pretty good investment. But here are two arguments that are really terrible:

1. Submarines can't fight the Taliban.
2. We have lots of aircraft carriers.

Let's take these one at a time. The first one is a) irrelevant, and b) wrong. Even those who believe that the United States should concentrate on the wars it's fighting right now would normally allow that there may, in the future, be different kinds of wars that require different systems. While the war in Afghanistan continues, we probably shouldn't invest every single penny of the defense budget in Virginia class subs, but maintaining a balance between current and future needs is altogether sensible. Second, nuclear attack submarines are equipped with VLS tubes that can launch Tomahawk missiles that have been used against targets in Libya, Afghanistan, and elsewhere.

Second, aircraft carriers aren't submarines. They are different platforms with different and complementary capabilities. The problems that are solved by one can't always be solved by the other. That the United States possesses superiority in aircraft carriers tells us very little about the requirements for nuclear submarines; indeed, given that aircraft carrier battle groups normally operate with nuclear attack submarines, more carriers means that more subs are needed.

Moreover, American predominance in the aircraft carrier arena simply doesn't extend to submarine dominance. The USN currently operates fifty-four nuclear attack submarines. The PLAN currently operates sixty-one attack and diesel-electric submarines of various types, and is building subs at a faster rate than the USN. China's subs are older and less effective, but the PLAN lacks the global commitments of the USN. The United States Navy maintains superiority by having newer, more capable boats, like the Virginia class. Finally, Chinese subs aren't the only guests at the party; lotsa folks in East Asia are buying subs. The bulk of the US attack submarine force consists of Los Angeles class boats, which are 15-30 years old and retiring at the rate of roughly two per year. There are also a host of issues associated the industrial capacity to build nuclear submarines; long story short, it's not so easy to ramp production up and down.

That's a lot, but the gist is that you need to have an idea of what you're talking about before you write a post like this. There are many assumptions underlying the notion that building two new Virginia class submarines is a good idea. Maybe the United States Navy doesn't need to maintain its edge over the PLAN, maybe 688 class subs can be life-extended, maybe the Virginia class has problems, maybe the USN should rein in its global commitments, maybe the defense budget is too large and should be cut, etc. A post contesting plans to build the two submarines should deal with at least some of these assumptions in specific terms; it's not enough to justify the cutting of a specific program with the argument that "we need to do nation-building at home."