Jeff Record's latest book traces the road to war between Japan and the Western Allies in 1940 and 1941. Record's recent work, much of which has been very critical of modes of thinking prevalent in US foreign policy, has probed the analogies and misperceptions that dominate US security thinking. In this case, Record wants to challenge the idea that Japan was somehow "crazy" to launch a war in 1941 that it thought it would quite likely lose. Part of Record's account has to do with Japan's pursuit of "glory" and domination over Southeast Asia. However, Record also takes account of the role that miscommunication played in forming misconceptions in both the American and Japanese governments.
Japan's decision to go to war in December 1941 remains a puzzle for political scientists. Deterrence theory suggests that states don't go to war when they have a negative expected utility for the decision; in other words, when the likelihood of defeat and the cost of defeat exceed the likelihood and fruits of victory. War is also unlikely when states agree about the probabilities for victory and defeat; if the presumed loser understands that it is likely to lose, it will come to some accomodation rather than fight. The Japan case is puzzling because there is ample evidence that both the Japanese and the Americans judged Japanese victory as unlikely. The most common solution, such that it is, to this problem has been that Japan regarded its international position in late 1941 as untenable, and believed that its capabilities would swiftly decline relative to the US, the USSR, and the UK. A low likelihood of success in war in 1941 was better than no chance of victory in 1943, so the Japanese leaped into the void.
Record doesn't exactly dissent from this conclusion, but he does give us a more process oriented account of the dynamics of the decision for war in Washington and Tokyo. Neither Japan nor the United State really wanted war with the other. Japan would have preferred to seize British, Dutch, and French positions without interference, and in any case regarded both China and the USSR as greater long term threats. The United States remained focused on Europe, and would have preferred to maintain a tolerable trade relationship with Japan until issues with Germany were settled. Both states tried, in clumsy and not-so-clumsy ways, to indicate their preferences to the other. Record suggests that Japan's adherence to the Tripartite Pact was intended to deter the United States, and that the Japanese leadership was surprised by the hostile American reaction. On the other side, the graduated escalation of trade pressure on Japan was supposed to deter further Japanese aggression. Neither move had the intended effect, of course.
There's nothing radically new in Record's account of the path to war. Most of what we get is nuanced reinterpretation of information that was already available. Nevertheless, there are some productive insights, including most notably Record's account of the extent to which American demands increased over the course of 1941. Following the occupation of French Indochina, the United States effectively demanded a Japanese evacuation not only of FIC, but also of China. Record suggests that this move probably wasn't well thought out in US policymaking circles, but that it did accord with the general US perspective towards East Asian politics.
The question of what might have happened if Japan had limited itself to attacking UK/DEI, or even just DEI and French possessions, remains interesting. The Roosevelt administration viewed this prospect as a critical threat to US national interests, but in the absence of a direct attack on the United States it would have been difficult to mobilize support. If the Japanese had refrained from attacking British possessions, it would have been difficult indeed for Roosevelt to argue for war. On the other hand, seizure of just French and DEI possessions would have left the Japanese in an exceedingly precarious military position, as the British and the Americans would have plenty of time to fortify bases along critical Japanese supply routes. With the Allies in possession of Singapore and the Philippines, the Japanese would effectively have been at the mercy of a Western threat of war. Japanese awareness of this strategic problem, combined with their belief that war was inevitable, made a limited attack less attractive.
What lessons for today? As always, the message we send is not necessarily the message that the other side receives. The enemy is free to draw his own conclusions about whatever we do; there is no message that is so clear that it cannot be willfully misunderstood. Both the Americans and the Japanese felt that they were communicating clearly and forcefully with the other, yet it turned out that neither actually appreciated the other's perspective. To be sure, clear communication might not have prevented war, especially given Japanese belief in the inevitability of such conflict. The Pacific War wasn't "accidental" in any meaningful sense. Nevertheless, we shouldn't expect too much communication, either in its military sense ("they only understand the language of force") or in its diplomatic sense ("we need to create a common understanding"). Foreign policy actors have powerful reasons to misunderstand even the clearest of messages.
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