Wikileaks and North Korea

I try to keep things topical at WPR, and so wrote today's column on Wikileaks and North Korea:

In the context of any discussion about negotiations, the release of the cables brings up some relevant issues of diplomatic secrecy. As Pei suggests, not thinking about a North Korean collapse would be the height of irresponsibility for policymakers in the United States, South Korea, Japan, and China. Since the final status of North Korea effects the interests of all four powers, policy coordination will be necessary. However, none of the states involved can publicly discuss contingency plans for a North Korean collapse. Evidence that South Korea and the United States were actively colluding in planning for the aftermath of such a contingency would probably quash any hopes for the Six-Party Talks. Open Japanese participation in such talks could inflame opinion in both Koreas and in Japan. Perhaps most important, evidence that China had broached the topic of a North Korean collapse with the United States and South Korea might serve to make Pyongyang even more paranoid and reckless.

I should also note that I hew much closer to the view that North Korea should be viewed as a troublesome, sometimes useful Chinese client than a herald of the PRC's impending effort to conquer the world. That China can destroy North Korea whenever it wishes through economic sanction doesn't actually mean that North Korea will do what China wants; clients often stray very, very far from the preferences of their patrons, even when those patrons enjoy overwhelming positions of power. This is not to say that North Korean intransigence can't be strategically useful for China, especially in situation of tension with either the United States or China. However, I'd go so far as to say that analyses that don't take seriously the fact of intra-party conflict in the CCP should probably be ignored.