My post this morning on the relevance of the Maritime Strategy to the world in which we currently live elicited a superb response from fellow ID contributor Professor Farley and an excellent response (in the comments section of my post) from Benjamin Walthrop. I seek to address their insights here. I'll tackle Professor Farley's comments first.
He writes: "The first reason I'm unconvinced is that Bryan seems to be suggesting that CS 21 requires a particular force structure and shipbuilding profile, and consequently that cuts to the Navy budget will force the USN to abandon the cooperative security project."
My response to this is that although I agree that there is not a specific force structure and shipbuilding profile suitable to meet the needs of this strategy, I felt then and feel now that the force structure we currently have (and that in the 30 year shipbuilding plan) does not meet the strategy's requirements--specifically for the "globally disbursed, mission-tailored" forces. When I speak of the Strategy, I can only reveal what was in MY mind in its writing--I cannot speak for Navy leadership. And what I considered essential to this requirement was a ship that could be built in numbers--not 55, but more like 155, which we could send out around the world to the very edges of the empire to work the issues of global system protection. Essential to this vision was that we would not and could not accept a diminishing of our power projection combat punch--and the only way we could do both (protect our combat punch and create the globally disbursed force) would be for the Navy to grow. And the only way for the Navy to grow would have been to wage and win a debate for resources. Given my thesis that even the Navy's power projection combat punch will soon be on the chopping block, the globally distributed mission tailored force is difficult to imagine materializing. Oh--and don't forget--the strategy continues to place a heavy emphasis on deterrence--both strategic AND through upgraded missile defense. With the President's recent move to showcase sea-based ballistic missile defense and the staggering bill associated with the SSBN replacement--the financial pressures will likely squeeze out the low end.
The Professor continues: The entire point of the project is that the United States can rely upon allies (and even non-allied states friendly to the current structure of international trade and commerce) to carry out many of the basic tasks associated with hegemonic stability.
Well, not the entire point--but certainly a large part of it. That said--sharing the burden with allies often means being right there with them....and if we are fiscally constrained from such operations, the inducement for cooperation will diminish.
Next: Bryan's point about the shift to from cooperative maintenance to offshore balancing would be more difficult to refute, if I believed that such a move was actually afoot. I don't; while it's true enough that the Obama administration has been more responsive than either the Bush or Clinton administrations to certain "realist" voices who are themselves responsive to the intellectual community of offshore balancers, I don't see the United States retreating from global commitments, even with an overall reduction of naval forces.
This is mostly a prediction on my part, one born of the strategy gaming process at Newport during the Strategy's development. Offshore balancing approaches to both grand and naval strategy ONLY became popular when players were confronted with dramatically declining defense budgets. And that's what I see happening. I agree that there isn't a rush to the offshore balancing door right now--but give it time.
To conclude--Professor Farley writes: And so, I'd like to see some more clarity as to just why CS 21 is obsolete in an era of declining naval budgets, and I'd also like to see some more compelling evidence that the United States is on the verge of adopting an offshore balancing strategy.
I suppose I can see why Farley thinks I think CS21 is obsolete--but I did not say that--or at least only that. I wrote "I believe it may be time for the Navy to scrap "A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower", or at least begin a thorough, publicly announced review of the assumptions and conclusions it reaches. " I believed when CS21 was written that it should be thoroughly reviewed with each POM cycle and I continue to believe that today. Show me another POM cycle in the past two decades with as much built-in budgetary angst as the one we're in. I have a feeling we're looking at "peace dividend" like cuts to the budget--except there will be no peace to drive them. It will be the cold hard realities of the nation's fiscal mess.
Now, onto B. Walthrop.
He's got some valid points--but loses me at the end of his post: If you think the strategy should be re-evaluated because you think the world and projected threats have changed enough to warrant a re-write than I would support that decision. If you think that we should re-write it because we can't afford it, I think you are wrong.
I would only suggest that the financial crisis that nearly bankrupted this country, combined with a greater appetite to address domestic political and social goals--counts as the "world" changing. These factors alone MUST force the Navy to reconsider its present strategy.
Bryan McGrath
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