Different Perspective on the Somali Navy

David Axe suggests that pessimism regarding the development of a Somali Navy may be misplaced:

In near-shore waters — the only zone a local navy has any chance of patrolling — pirates are indistinguishable from legitimate fishermen. Trying to counter pirates in these waters is pointless. Farther out to sea, where few fishermen would dare venture, it’s easier to distinguish bad guys from good, so pirate patrols can actually work. But deep waters are the purview of the international naval coalition, numbering some 20 large warships, that protects commercial shipping in East African waters. The Somali navy doesn’t need to compete with this naval coalition. Instead, the Somali navy must operate on land, sniffing out and eradicating pirate enclaves. For that reason, it would be more accurate to call Somali sailors “naval infantry” or even “marines.” Omar himself has used the latter term from time to time.

Indeed; this description of the nascent Somali naval organization challenges conventional notions of what we think of as a Navy, but it's not necessarily dispositive. Several countries (Bolivia, for example) maintain the organizational structure for naval forces despite not having any coastline. Most such organizations, however, do possess boats, and operate on rivers and lakes; what Axe is talking about here really seems, as he suggests, more like marines sans the amphibious component. Another term for this would be "army," but whatever.

As it happens, I'm about halfway through Flotilla, Donald Shomette's history of the Patuxent naval campaign in the War of 1812. The book is loaded with useful information, and provides some insight into the dynamics of founding organizations (Commodore Joshua Barney essentially created an adjunct naval organization to fight a Royal Navy squadron in the Chesapeake Bay), and into the nature of naval asymmetric warfare (fighting big ships with small boats isn't new). More thoughts when I finish the book.