Observing the Resistance to the Paradigm Shift in the DoD

On Wednesday we highlighted an article in the Washington Quarterly by Michael J. Mazarr, a professor of national security strategy at the U.S. National War College. Aptly named The Folly of 'Asymmetric War' we believe this article is very important to the national defense strategy discussion regarding the Paradigm Shift in the DoD towards asymmetrical warfare. The article represents a well articulated position for the resistance movement to that shift that is sure to be cited in future research.

The article well represents the pre-9/11 position favored by Donald Rumsfeld that the US military should altogether avoid peacekeeping operations. The article forwards a perspective that idealogical factors override other conditions that limit the capability of military power to influence an outcome, thus advocates the "use of social, economic, political, informational, and psychological tools of statecraft" as the means to address asymmetrical threats driven by ideology. We have a lot of respect for Professor Mazarr, and we don't disagree with his statement, however we do disagree with his entire premise. We disagree with Professor Mazarr not based on what he saying, rather more for what he completely omitted. Ideology is not the overriding factor controlling conditions, economics is. We observe Professor Mazarr's only nod to the importance of economics was the mention of Thomas Barnett in paragraph four, and we believe economics plays a more dominant role in the Paradigm Shift in the DoD than Professor Mazarr is allowing for.

The resistance movement in the DoD is represented very well in this piece, advocating for a refocus towards hard military power for hedging for war against peer competitors as was required during the cold war. The Paradigm Shift in the DoD is advertised by the resistance movement as the reduction of hard military power capabilities of the US military towards the ways in strategy that produce a less effective fighting force. Citing Clausewitz, Professor Mazarr suggests the US cannot afford to shift towards a posture that contends with limited war, because enemies of the United States will exploit us by waging unlimited war against us in those conditions. Professor Mazarr adds numerous compelling arguments of this nature, all of which we believe will find popularity within those resistant to the DoDs shift, however we observe that the arguments work only absent the attachment of economics as a primary driver towards national defense strategy realignment.

We believe the compelling reason to balance military power towards a force capable of warfighting and peacemaking is rooted in the alignment of national defense strategy and national economic interest. If we do characterize asymmetric warfare as an obscure term that describes military forces engaged in missions from delivering humanitarian relief, conducting special forces operations against terrorists, peacekeeping and peacemaking, counterinsurgency, post conflict reconstruction, and/or nation building; then we must also recognize the Paradigm Shift in the DoD represents a shift in the strategic means to shape forces towards doctrines like COIN (strategic ways) towards the strategic ends of establishing the security environment to promote economic connectivity in a globalized world (strategic context). Ends, Ways, Means, Context.

As a counter to Clausewitz's vision of limited war, we suggest Corbett is more applicable to current conditions the DoD is facing. Today military strategy cannot afford to be solely focused on war, rather must also account for the conditions of what is described as peace today. Using a naval analogy, the struggle during peacetime for a super power like the United States is to recognize that while we enjoy Command of the Sea, Uncommand of the Sea is the natural condition. The impression we get from reading Professor Mazarr's article is that should Paradigm Shift in the DoD occur, the United States would find itself in unable to manage threats by state competitors that take an absolute war approach to our defeat.

We disagree with this position, because we believe such suggestions ignores the truism that the natural order of peacetime is the eventual uncommand of the land, sea, air, and space the United States dominates today. While it is commonplace to hear the difficulties of war, we often ignore the difficulties of peace that creates conditions of prosperity for competitors. Accepting peace and prosperity globally comes with an obligation to also accept the prosperity that creates Uncommand of the land, sea, air, and space (or the perception of contested Command of the land, sea, air, and space by nations) is the natural state of progress. The unique factor of prosperity in todays environment is the interconnected nature of that economic prosperity, and that factor promotes the best possible dissuasion strategy to counter unlimited war, which in the 21st century likely means nuclear war.

We outright reject that if in the face of some extraordinary hostile condition or through some extraordinary mischance the United States will find ourselves without sufficient military strength to contend for command of the land, sea, air and space to a competitor or stronger competitor, and that our nation would therefore be too weak to prevent the enemy gaining such command themselves. We believe these arguments require a negation of the whole theory of war to reach such a conclusion, a conclusion of which at least requires more supporting facts than is given.

We note that if we are using historical examples of ideological struggles, the lessons of the cold war reminds us that in the end, economics triumphs over ideology. Using Islamic terrorism as the ideological example, we note that the nations thriving under economic prosperity through globalization are not the nations where one contemplates future military operations, rather the nations absent economic prosperity through globalization, and we believe Iran is a great example, is where we see the plausable use of military force. This condition suggests investment of military forces towards the ends of establishing conditions that promote global economic connectivity is a wise investment for military power, as it promotes conditions that don't lead to unlimited war as described by Clausewitz.

We believe the United States can evolve the capabilities and metrics for warfighting to maintain sufficient dissuasion and escalation control to prevent absolute war between major powers, while also evolving the capabilities and metrics to expand the peacetime environment through economic connectivity thus reducing the number of state competitors where absolute war would be necessary. Should an aggressive state competitor arise prompting reconsideration to the balanced national defense strategy, we believe that as long as the DoD has not ignored the evolution process towards new warfighting capabilities, the nation will be positioned to retool and adapt to new conditions in that environment.