Bob Work Defines Sea Bases and Seabasing

We quote from this excellent Bob Work report. Nothing quite captures the definition of Sea Basing, as defined today, than this bit.

Although the definition found in the Seabasing JIC was subsequently approved by the services and the Joint Staff, the constantly changing (or evolving) definitions of seabasing (note: henceforth, this report will adopt the spelling convention found the DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms) and seabase (analogous to airbase)—and the concepts that underlie them—helps to explain why current discussions about seabasing so often resemble two simultaneous monologues rather than true dialogues. As implied above, some proponents see seabasing as a naval concept that “enables” joint operations,” while some see seabasing as a maritime concept that is an integral part of emerging forms of joint littoral warfare. Some see seabasing as more about building bases at sea to replace land bases, while other see seabasing more about using the sea as a base of operations to overcome a temporary lack of land bases. Some see seabasing more in terms of the static support of joint forces operating ashore, while others are attracted to the more dynamic aspects of seabased maneuver. Meanwhile, the DSB views it as a way to conduct seabased forcible entry operations more rapidly, supplanting traditional “amphibious assaults.” Without a common understanding and acceptance of seabasing that simultaneously embraces all of these things or resolves their conceptual differences, it will be difficult, if not impossible, to initiate a fair and informed debate about current seabasing plans and programs.

Lingering confusion about the concept is especially evident among those analysts and planners outside the relatively small group of officers and planners familiar with the evolution of joint and naval seabasing efforts. As the Naval Studies Board of the National Research Council of the National Academies wrote in 2005:

Planning for the sea base (sic) is still in its infancy. Coordination across the Services is just beginning, with discussions between the Navy, the Army, and the Marine Corps, and in response to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) initiatives. As a consequence, the details have yet to emerge, especially with respect to joint operations and with respect to the availability and needed development of technology to perform the tasks that are envisioned for the sea base.

These thoughts were echoed in January 2006, five months after the new definition for seabasing was agreed to in the JIC. That month, the Vice President of Naval Systems at Boeing commented that the seabasing concept is going to require a partnership between government and industry to help everyone clearly understand what end capability or outcome the Pentagon is looking for. “It’s a very complex problem,” he said. “It takes a partnership to come close to defining the level of clarity for industry to start to build components.” He went on to say that Boeing was investing to expand its knowledge of the seabasing concept so that it can better understand some of its capabilities and limitations, “To help both ourselves, and to share with our customer, things they should consider as they try to add more definition to what seabasing means to them” (emphasis added).

These thoughts were seconded soon thereafter by a former head of the Navy’s Warfare Development Command who now works with General Dynamics. While on active duty, Rear Admiral Robert Sprigg, now GD’s Director of Advanced Warfighting Concepts, was right in the middle of the rapid evolution of seabasing that occurred in the first years of the 21st century. He rightly observed that the “seabase discussion has been a discussion that has developed in segments, not in one coherent manner.” While he believes that the picture of a “seabase’s desired operational capabilities” are getting more coherent, he stated “It’s not there yet to start building too many things.” He recommended an open dialogue begin between the operating forces, acquisition community, and industry to help better define the concept and to understand better the required capabilities.

Juxtaposed against this lingering confusion about what seabasing is or should be are the associated material solutions being so aggressively developed and pursued by the Department of the Navy. While these plans now have a joint stamp of approval, this paper will argue that the programs are being conceived of and pursued long before the full range of desired and possible joint seabasing capabilities have been adequately explored and debated. The end result: current seabasing plans are rather narrowly focused on two key capabilities—landing a single brigade on a hostile shore in 11 to 17 days, and thereafter providing seabased logistical support for two early entry brigades until follow-on joint forces arrive. It is true that these two key capabilities do indeed reflect the “top level requirements” identified in the Seabasing JIC. Nevertheless, it is hard not to get the sense that DoN plans are first about recapitalizing the Department’s amphibious and expeditionary maneuver fleets, and only second about developing an inclusive maritime concept of seabasing more attuned to the evolving strategic environment and the likely security challenges of the 21st century.

Sea Basing, or seabasing, lacks definition today and Bob Work captures that reality perfectly with his report from 2006. It could be argued in fact that the definition has actually expanded since this report, as it doesn't even address Global Fleet Stations.

A number of professional magazines are producing articles on Sea Bases and Expeditionary Warfare in general, and while the Marines are trying to distinguish the two, it is getting increasingly difficult to see how the decisions of one doesn't directly effect the other. I wanted to get this on the blog though, because as I continue to discuss Sea Basing it will help explain why my definition may not be a definition you have formulated in your own mind. Thus is the way with undefined programs.