Dr. Maren Leed at CSIS is anchoring a fascinating series called The Ground Forces Dialogue. Her latest guest (today) was Major General H.R. McMaster, Commander of the Army's Maneuver Center of Excellence. As many of you know, McMaster is famous both in and out of the Army. He's a warrior King--author, scholar, fighter. Tough as nails, and smart as anyone.
But now and again, he gets things wrong. Or at least, wrong enough to be challenged.
If you have an hour, spend it with Dr. Leed and MG McMaster, and listen to one of the most articulate spokesmen for Land Power do his thing.
I invite your attention also to a couple of things that any navalist should consider:
1. MG McMaster cites core competncies in Land War as practiced by the U.S. Army--combined arms maneuver and wide area security. These are cited in the Army Operating Concept of 2010, and defined thusly: "Combined
arms maneuver is the application of the elements of combat power in a
complementary and reinforcing manner to achieve physical, temporal, or
psychological advantages over the enemy, preserve freedom of action and
exploit success. Wide
area security is the application of the elements of combat power in
coordination with other military and civilian capabilities to deny the
enemy positions of advantage; protect forces, populations,
infrastructure, and activities; and consolidate tactical and operational
gains to set conditions for achieving strategic and policy goals." McMaster's (and the Army's) view of the world seems to me to enshrine ever-war. It isn't enough to just fight and win in war (combined arms maneuver), but we must also take as a core competency in the Active Duty Army all of the functions of occupation. To me, it isn't a question of whether or not our Army needs to do both, but more a question of how it prioritizes them and where the skills sets reside. The argument to size the Active Army to do both of these things is a strikes me as worthy of criticism.
2. MG McMaster is asked to speak about lessons we may have improperly learned from 12 years of conflict. He raises in his answer, the concept of "raids" vs. "war", and his sense that many policy makers have begun to confuse the two. I may have been hearing a dog-whistle, but what I heard was a dig at the Marine Corps in particular and American Seapower in general. Put another way, a new generation of arm-chair strategists--as they view the future security environment--have come to confuse what is required to conduct "raids" with what is required to conduct "wars". And in McMaster's view, wars are what the Army is for. The problem I have with McMaster's view is that all conflict is not war, and our garrison-force Army is not as useful as other forces at our disposal to deal with the span of conflict that does not include war (and its almost by definition self-licking Army ice cream cone, wide area security). After more than a decade of land war, I believe the country is moving toward a posture of reliance on its deterrence and "raiding" forces and de-emphasizing its "war making" forces. This is natural, and it is understandable given our fiscal environment. It is not "eliminating" its war making capability--quite the contrary--it will spend billions to re-set it.
Bryan McGrath
Wednesday, March 20, 2024
Soccer, the Suez, and Irregular Sea Denial
I'm back from a little vacation in the Sahel...
Sea denial might be described as the obverse of sea control, where a weaker force is able to achieve an operational objective at sea by thwarting a superior fleet, even if only for a short duration. History is rife with examples of irregular conflicts ashore threatening freedom of navigation. Straits, channels, and other narrows are particulary lucrative targets for insurgents striving to deny the sea to conventionally-stronger opponents.
On the low end of the scale, irregular forces or angry populations have attempted to blockade or disrupt port traffic with various levels of success. These mostly unorganized efforts tend to fizzle out or be crushed by overwhelming force when maritime law enforcement or navies get involved. The Indian Coast Guard had to intervene in 2011 when local fishermen distraught over the recent destruction of their houses parked fishing trawlers at the mouth of Goa’s major port used to export iron ore. In the United States, Occupy protestors temporarily forced the closure of the port of Seattle in 2011, then the following year, longshoremen strikes closed Southern California ports for over a week, sending shockwaves through global supply chains.
Sea denial might be described as the obverse of sea control, where a weaker force is able to achieve an operational objective at sea by thwarting a superior fleet, even if only for a short duration. History is rife with examples of irregular conflicts ashore threatening freedom of navigation. Straits, channels, and other narrows are particulary lucrative targets for insurgents striving to deny the sea to conventionally-stronger opponents.
On the low end of the scale, irregular forces or angry populations have attempted to blockade or disrupt port traffic with various levels of success. These mostly unorganized efforts tend to fizzle out or be crushed by overwhelming force when maritime law enforcement or navies get involved. The Indian Coast Guard had to intervene in 2011 when local fishermen distraught over the recent destruction of their houses parked fishing trawlers at the mouth of Goa’s major port used to export iron ore. In the United States, Occupy protestors temporarily forced the closure of the port of Seattle in 2011, then the following year, longshoremen strikes closed Southern California ports for over a week, sending shockwaves through global supply chains.
| Egyptian security forces keep watch as protesters burn tires in Port Said, east of Cairo, Egypt, March 9, 2013. (MSNBC) |
The introduction of modern weapons into irregular conflicts amplifies the seriousness of these threats. Guerrilla fighters have laid mines (Tamil Tigers) and terrorists bombed oil export terminals (AQAP/AQI). During the 2006 Lebanon war, Hezbollah attacked navy and merchant shipping with advanced ground-launched anti-ship cruise missiles.
Of potentially more relevance and importance to the U.S. Navy is the ongoing low-level insurgency in the island kingdom of Bahrain. The home of COMFIFTHFLT, base to forward-deployed American and British mine-sweepers, USN/USCG patrol vessels, and USS Ponce is potentially vulnerable to disruption should this conflict spill over from attacks on exclusively on Bahraini government forces to the US Naval presence. Some observers have accused Iran of meddling in this revolution, which is largely based along Sunni/Shia fault lines. It wouldn’t be a stretch for malign Iranian actors to someday prod their proxies into disrupting allied naval operations or supply insurgents with more lethal and effective weapons as they have done in Syria, Yemen, and the Levant.
 |
| 14 March 2013- A Bahraini anti-government demonstrator was set on fire when a shot fired by riot police hit the gasoline bomb he was holding. |
The introduction of modern weapons into irregular conflicts amplifies the seriousness of these threats. Guerrilla fighters have laid mines (Tamil Tigers) and terrorists bombed oil export terminals (AQAP/AQI). During the 2006 Lebanon war, Hezbollah attacked navy and merchant shipping with advanced ground-launched anti-ship cruise missiles.
Of potentially more relevance and importance to the U.S. Navy is the ongoing low-level insurgency in the island kingdom of Bahrain. The home of COMFIFTHFLT, base to forward-deployed American and British mine-sweepers, USN/USCG patrol vessels, and USS Ponce is potentially vulnerable to disruption should this conflict spill over from attacks on exclusively on Bahraini government forces to the US Naval presence. Some observers have accused Iran of meddling in this revolution, which is largely based along Sunni/Shia fault lines. It wouldn’t be a stretch for malign Iranian actors to someday prod their proxies into disrupting allied naval operations or supply insurgents with more lethal and effective weapons as they have done in Syria, Yemen, and the Levant.
The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.
Each a Half Century of History
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| USS Midway |
Ordered in 1942 and laid down in October 1943, USS Midway was launched in March of 1945 and commissioned later that year on September 10, 1945. Originally a straight deck carrier, USS Midway served with distinction all over the world before receiving an enclosed hurricane bow, an aft deck-edge elevator, an angled flight deck, and a steam catapult beginning in June of 1955. After extensive modernization the carrier returned to service just over two years later in September of 1957.
Upon returning to service in 1957, USS Midway operated in the Pacific and conducted military operations in South Vietnam in 1965.
Following that deployment, USS Midway went back into drydock in 1966 for another massive modernization that expanded the flight deck from 2.8 acres to 4 acres and adjusted the angle of the flight deck out to 13.5 degrees. The elevators were upgraded to support larger aircraft, and everything from catapults to air conditioners were replaced. The planned $88 million modernization suffered a massive cost overrun, with the final cost coming in at $202 million. Upon returning to sea in 1970, it was discovered that the modernizations had created problems with the seakeeping of the big carrier, and the ship had to go back into dry dock for further modifications.
Once back to sea USS Midway conducted operations in Vietnam in 1971 and 1972, and in 1973 became the first US aircraft carrier forward-deployed to Japan. USS Midway returned to Vietnam conducting military operations in 1975.
From 1975 until 1990 USS Midway spent time at sea patroling the Western Pacific, Indian Ocean, and Persian Gulf regions where, in August of 1990 USS Midway found herself in the Persian Gulf after Iraq invaded Kuwait. USS Midway stayed on station and served in Gulf War I throughout the air and ground campaign before departing the region in March of 1991.
At 74,000 tons USS Midway was decommissioned on April 11, 2024 having served the nation for just over 46 years.
On the evening of February 3, 2024 I attended a banquet for members of the United States Naval Institute hosted on the USS Midway Museum in San Diego. After arriving to the party, CDR Salamander and I met up with UltimaRatioReg to form our own band of bloggers with beer for a stroll along the flight deck. Upon arriving on the flight deck, our band of brothers was joined by Norman Friedman, and the four of us spent the next hour double-fisting the prizes of our drink tickets as we strolled USS Midway discussing the history of the aircraft on the deck of the USS Midway Museum.
Our little band of brothers took our time as we enjoyed the comfortable mid 50s winter evening San Diego style and inspected the restoration of each aircraft. The aircraft we inspected both above and below deck included the EKA-3 Skywarrior, the A-4 Skyhawk, the H-34 Seabat, the H-46 Sea Knight, the T-2 Buckeye, the F9F Panther, the SBD Dauntless, the F9F-8P Cougar, the F/A-18 Hornet, the F-8 Crusader, the C-1 Trader, the E-2 Hawkeye, SNJ Texan, the A-6 Intruder, the A-1 Skyraider, the A-7 Corsair II, the S-3 Viking, the SH-2 Seasprite, the SH-3 Seaking, the F-4 Phantom II, the RA-5 Vigilante, the Huey Gunship, the F-14 Tomcat, and the TBM Avenger.
At the end of our top side tour, Norman Friedman broke ranks from our group and the three of us stood at the bow of the flight deck enjoying our perfect evening, CDR Salamander noted that every single type of aircraft we had just visited on the ship had, at one point or another, landed and taken off from USS Midway in the service of our nation.
That was when it hit me. USS Midway isn't simply a Museum, rather it is a time capsule that accurately reflects the essence of what every modern aircraft carrier in the US Navy is - a strategic investment for a half century of service to the nation. Over a period of over 46 years, USS Midway flew over two dozen aircraft off her deck, conducted operations all over the globe, fought wars in Vietnam and Iraq, served in function as a humanitarian, a diplomat, and a symbol of American power and influence during times of peace or crisis in the service of the nation.
Commissioned in late 1945 USS Midway began service at a time when aircraft carriers were unquestionably the most important seapower capability in the world. USS Midway is the only military asset of the United States that served as a relevant capability for the entirety of the Cold War, with the Iowa class Battleships being the only other platform to serve intermediately from the beginning to the end of the Cold War in a relevant function. If we suggest military anti-access and area denial capabilities that target carriers began development in the late 1990s, then we can say with a high degree of certainty that the service life of the USS Midway represents the period by which aircraft carriers were the dominant military capability at sea.
Today aircraft carriers have become extremely expensive to build, operate, and maintain. Today aircraft carrier air wings have become extremely expensive to build, operate, and maintain. Today the high end surface force and by assignment at least part of the attack submarine force serves the fleet today to protect the US nuclear powered aircraft carrier. The title of Captain Hendrix's paper asks At What Cost a Carrier, but the substance of Captain Hendrix's paper asks "What is the carriers value?"
While USS Midway may represent one of the most important national military capabilities of the second half of the 20th century, as budgets get tighter I believe it is important for the Navy to question long standing assumptions like whether aircraft carriers remain one of the most important national military capabilities for the United States heading into the 21st century. When we study aircraft carriers, either in the past, present, or future; the "value" of carriers must be thoroughly examined and explored because that "value" is bigger than budget, bigger than function, and is not easily measured through a price tag or statistical analysis. USS Midway served 46 years, but even if we use the broadest definition for sorties, USS Midway flew on average less than 40 sorties per year in wartime over the entire life of the great carrier. Statistics can tell the truth and can tell a lie, so over the next few weeks I intend to dig deeper into the questions regarding the value of aircraft carriers, and question assumptions that for too long haven't faced enough objective consideration in public.
Tuesday, March 19, 2024
What Carl Vinson Can Teach us about American Seapower
The United States has suffered from an extended period of economic distress, prompting large segments of the public to question the need for a robust American military. During this time, the U.S. Navy has been allowed to atrophy, falling below its minimum requirements in numerous classes of ships, underfunding maintenance, and allowing many ships to age past their service-life. The incumbent President has demonstrated little interest in the Navy’s role and seems content with a diminished fleet. Meanwhile, threats to American interests grow steadily, with a disarmed Europe uninterested in maintaining international security and a distracted United States easily ignored by powers intent on re-writing the international order.
While the above may sound like a description of the international environment in 2013, instead I am describing the conditions which prevailed in the early 1930s. As Germany and Japan expanded their military capabilities at rates that continually defied the predictions of Allied analysts, the Hoover Administration, absorbed by its futile efforts to restart the U.S. economy, resisted all attempts to resource a U.S. Navy capable of upholding American interests abroad. It was left to the House of Representatives’ Committee on Naval Affairs, under Chairman Carl Vinson of Georgia, to champion the cause of a modern, global fleet.
Carl Vinson, a lawyer from landlocked rural Georgia who left the Continental United States only once in his 97 years, was an unlikely advocate for American Seapower. Yet it was Vinson who, in the words of Admiral William Leahy, “contributed more to the national defense (from 1935-1945) than any other single person in the country except the president [Franklin D. Roosevelt] himself.” Vinson’s contribution was one of both advocacy and action - he was the strongest public voice in favor of naval preparedness throughout the 1930s, stressing the importance of a modern fleet to a maritime nation like the United States and calling attention to the threat of aggressive powers like Germany and Japan. But Vinson’s most lasting contribution was legislative, in the form of successive bills authorizing the size and scope of the U.S. Navy and thereby laying the foundation for the fleet which prevailed in World War II and secured the peace during half a century of Cold War.
Vinson’s principal legislative achievements were the Navy authorization bills of 1934, 1938 and 1940. In each instance, Vinson’s legislation dramatically increased the Navy’s authorized size and made important statements about the fleet’s future composition, directing resources to aviation and submarines at a time when the service was still enamored with big-gun battleships. Vinson’s handling of the Navy’s authorization bills was marked by careful attention to the international security situation, Working with the Navy’s leadership, he celebrated his authorized increases to the real-world threats of his day. As Germany and Japan continued their aggressive policies and military modernization, Vinson also successfully used the megaphone of his committee chairmanship to raise public awareness of the threat while taking substantive measures to increase fleet preparedness.
Each of Vinson’s three signature Navy authorization bills increased the fleet’s size and capabilities in ways uniquely suited to their particular moment. Beginning in 1934, Vinson authorized successively larger increases in size of the fleet, with special attention paid to the cutting-edge technologies of his day - aircraft and submarines. Working with astute Navy officers and calling upon his own sense of the changing face of modern warfare, Vinson ensured that his authorization bills invested in formidable undersea and aviation forces rather than just the Navy’s traditional surface combatants. As the 1930s advanced and the international security situation deteriorated further, Vinson’s authorization bills became steadily more ambitious. With the passage of the Two Ocean Navy Act in 1940, over a year before the Pearl Harbor attack, Vinson secured authorization for a fleet large enough to maintain American dominance in both the Atlantic and the Pacific. It was the vessels created by Vinson’s 1930s legislation that served as the nucleus of the fleet that secured victory during World War II.
As today’s policymakers grapple with a shrinking defense budget and destabilizing security environment in the Western Pacific and Middle East, we would do well to remember the legacy of Chairman Vinson. His farsighted vision in laying the groundwork for a modern, global Navy at a time of public disinterest and preoccupation with domestic concerns saved countless American lives and did much to bring about Allied victory when the Nation was forced into war. Furthermore, by insisting on investment in the “game-changing” technologies of his day, Vinson ensured that the United States would not be left behind in emerging warfare domains. His success in using the power of his chairmanship to fundamentally alter the Navy’s posture and composition is a lesson in the power of Congress to positively shape American security policy and to think holistically about the challenges our military faces.
As Chairman of the Seapower and Projection Forces Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, I am humbled to carry on the work of my able predecessor. As in Chairman Vinson’s time, we face tremendous challenges to our naval strength at home and abroad. Once again, we will rise to the occasion.
Comparing Type 056 to LCS
With the recent induction of 056, a lot of comparison has been made between 056 and LCS. The comparisons are understandable. Both are just entering services. Both are expected to be built in large numbers and are also considered to be the lower end ships of their respective navy. In many ways, their comparison stops there, because Type 054A would be more comparable to LCS just based on the size and dimensions of the ships. I want to break this down to two sections: the differences in capabilities/cost between the two classes of ships and what that tells us about the two navies.
First of all, despite both ships are designed for littoral operations, one is designed to operate in its own waters, whereas the other is designed to operate in enemy waters. 056 is supposed to replace 053 and 037 in the role of patrolling coastal waters. It's equipped with enough strike power to conduct ASuW against other regional navy. With some modification, it can also be useful in ASW operations in the littoral waters. On the other hand, LCS is suppose to be faster, stealthier, far more modular and capable of operation in other country's littoral waters. USN has no need for something like 056, since it faces no foreign naval threat within its coastal waters. For any issues like smuggling, piracy and drug trafficking, it should be up to coastal guard to protect. At the same time, China has no need for a littoral ship as large or fast as LCS, because it really has no need in the near future for a ship built specifically to fight in the littoral waters of a non-neighbouring country. While most of the mission packages for LCS have yet to finish development, LCS will be capable of ASuW, ASW, MCM and special ops once that does happen. You might see more dedicated ASW or ASuW variants of Type 056 coming out, but each ship is really not expected to be doing more than one task.
As a result of this difference in roles and size of the ship, there is also a large gap in the cost of the ship. Each LCS cost over $400 million to build and equip. That's about twice as much as the cost of a Type 054A. Type 056 is expected to be a much cheaper ship than Type 054A, since it's much smaller. My current estimate for Type 056 is around around 60 million just based on the cost of Type 022, Type 054 and equivalent sized cutters (which run for about $15 to 20 million each). The relatively low cost of this should explain why China is able to build so many units in such short time while also build numerous other classes at the same time. If this cost more, China would not be able to use it to replace all of the old Type 053 and 037 ships. Despite the recent austerity in USN and the higher cost of American shipbuilding, USN still has a far higher budget than PLAN, so it could afford more expensive ships.
The size of crews also show us interesting things about the two navies. I think the crew size for LCS is supposed to be at most 75, whereas the much smaller 056 is expected to have 60 to 70 crews (even that is a reduction to 1/3 of Type 053). Even though Type 056 is far more complex and automated than the ships it is replacing, it's probably safe to say that it still lags modern Western ships. I think a large part of that has to do with the greater number of service personnels at the disposal of PLAN. Even with the rising labour cost in China, I think it's safe to assume that the compensation for a USN sailor is far higher than that of a PLAN sailor. Another part to look at is the huge leap facing sailors who are accustomed to operating a low tech ship like type 037 (I was told no training is required to be on that ship) to type 056. It's simply unrealistic to expect someone who has operated on Type 037/053 for their entire life to be able to be competent on something like LCS. As PLAN continues modernization, this expected improvement in software is often overlooked when one looks at the new ships that are coming out. The cost of training crew members will also go up as ships become more and more complicated.
Another interesting thing is the choice that the two navies made in developing these two ships. LCS is a ship expected to be modular enough to be able to easily reconfigure for different roles by changing to different mission packages. I expect different variants of Type 056 to come with each variant built with specific role in mind. Similary to Type 037, I would expect to see a Type 056 emphasize more toward ASW and one more emphasized toward patrol and another more emphasized toward ASuW. At the same time, LCS had the requirements to be able to travel at faster than 40 knots and also be extremely stealthy. It certainly pushes the technological envelope, whereas Type 056 does not. LCS is not only a new ship design but also requires new weapon system. Whereas PLAN rarely builds a shipping class that requires leap in both the ship design and its weapon system. I think this shows the background of both navies. USN always had a lot of money to spend, so it is willing to press for that additional performance on the newest ships in the face of budget overruns and delays. In comparison, PLAN had very little money back in the days and most of its programs was canned in the 80s and 90s due to lack of funding. So as a result of this, it has always been more conservative in incorporating improvement from one shipping class to the next. Compared to USN, PLAN is more frugal in the development of new ships and the management of its existing fleet. As an example, Type 052 underwent modernization recently, but the old HH-7 SAM was kept around instead of being replaced by more advance HQ-10 SAM. PLAN has a large stock of HH-7 missiles in stock and did not want them to go to waste by removing them from the ships undergoing modernization. It will be interesting to see how the perspectives of the two navies change in the future as PLAN continues to get more funding whereas USN starts to face austerity.
First of all, despite both ships are designed for littoral operations, one is designed to operate in its own waters, whereas the other is designed to operate in enemy waters. 056 is supposed to replace 053 and 037 in the role of patrolling coastal waters. It's equipped with enough strike power to conduct ASuW against other regional navy. With some modification, it can also be useful in ASW operations in the littoral waters. On the other hand, LCS is suppose to be faster, stealthier, far more modular and capable of operation in other country's littoral waters. USN has no need for something like 056, since it faces no foreign naval threat within its coastal waters. For any issues like smuggling, piracy and drug trafficking, it should be up to coastal guard to protect. At the same time, China has no need for a littoral ship as large or fast as LCS, because it really has no need in the near future for a ship built specifically to fight in the littoral waters of a non-neighbouring country. While most of the mission packages for LCS have yet to finish development, LCS will be capable of ASuW, ASW, MCM and special ops once that does happen. You might see more dedicated ASW or ASuW variants of Type 056 coming out, but each ship is really not expected to be doing more than one task.
As a result of this difference in roles and size of the ship, there is also a large gap in the cost of the ship. Each LCS cost over $400 million to build and equip. That's about twice as much as the cost of a Type 054A. Type 056 is expected to be a much cheaper ship than Type 054A, since it's much smaller. My current estimate for Type 056 is around around 60 million just based on the cost of Type 022, Type 054 and equivalent sized cutters (which run for about $15 to 20 million each). The relatively low cost of this should explain why China is able to build so many units in such short time while also build numerous other classes at the same time. If this cost more, China would not be able to use it to replace all of the old Type 053 and 037 ships. Despite the recent austerity in USN and the higher cost of American shipbuilding, USN still has a far higher budget than PLAN, so it could afford more expensive ships.
The size of crews also show us interesting things about the two navies. I think the crew size for LCS is supposed to be at most 75, whereas the much smaller 056 is expected to have 60 to 70 crews (even that is a reduction to 1/3 of Type 053). Even though Type 056 is far more complex and automated than the ships it is replacing, it's probably safe to say that it still lags modern Western ships. I think a large part of that has to do with the greater number of service personnels at the disposal of PLAN. Even with the rising labour cost in China, I think it's safe to assume that the compensation for a USN sailor is far higher than that of a PLAN sailor. Another part to look at is the huge leap facing sailors who are accustomed to operating a low tech ship like type 037 (I was told no training is required to be on that ship) to type 056. It's simply unrealistic to expect someone who has operated on Type 037/053 for their entire life to be able to be competent on something like LCS. As PLAN continues modernization, this expected improvement in software is often overlooked when one looks at the new ships that are coming out. The cost of training crew members will also go up as ships become more and more complicated.
Another interesting thing is the choice that the two navies made in developing these two ships. LCS is a ship expected to be modular enough to be able to easily reconfigure for different roles by changing to different mission packages. I expect different variants of Type 056 to come with each variant built with specific role in mind. Similary to Type 037, I would expect to see a Type 056 emphasize more toward ASW and one more emphasized toward patrol and another more emphasized toward ASuW. At the same time, LCS had the requirements to be able to travel at faster than 40 knots and also be extremely stealthy. It certainly pushes the technological envelope, whereas Type 056 does not. LCS is not only a new ship design but also requires new weapon system. Whereas PLAN rarely builds a shipping class that requires leap in both the ship design and its weapon system. I think this shows the background of both navies. USN always had a lot of money to spend, so it is willing to press for that additional performance on the newest ships in the face of budget overruns and delays. In comparison, PLAN had very little money back in the days and most of its programs was canned in the 80s and 90s due to lack of funding. So as a result of this, it has always been more conservative in incorporating improvement from one shipping class to the next. Compared to USN, PLAN is more frugal in the development of new ships and the management of its existing fleet. As an example, Type 052 underwent modernization recently, but the old HH-7 SAM was kept around instead of being replaced by more advance HQ-10 SAM. PLAN has a large stock of HH-7 missiles in stock and did not want them to go to waste by removing them from the ships undergoing modernization. It will be interesting to see how the perspectives of the two navies change in the future as PLAN continues to get more funding whereas USN starts to face austerity.
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