Building a True 21st Century Fleet

The modularity and concept of space designed into the Littoral Combat Ship is exactly the right direction that the Navy needs to go. The 21st century fleet needs to be flexible with large payload space. Whether or not this space should be interchangeable is still a question to be answered in the future, but the ability to utilize space as an interconnected capability is absolutely the future of surface warfare.

One can make all kinds of comments regarding how many DDG-1000s the Navy should be building. In my opinion - 4 ships is a capability (NSFS w/ 4 BBs for example), 2 ships is a technology demonstration (USS Long Beach (CGN 9) and USS Bainbridge (DLGN 25)), and 3 ships represents a sign that no one in the Navy or Congress has the vision or leadership necessary to make a decision absent the influence of parochial self interest when it comes to Navy shipbuilding.

The DDG-1000 has consumed the greatest piece of Navy R&D for the last 7-10 years, but the ten key technologies are going to be game changers in the way we think about and design ships. I have said it on Midrats at least twice, and will say it again here...

The DDG-1000 program will represent a resounding success for the Navy even if the ships do not last their full service life or never make a substantial contribution in the service of the country as a warship. The intellectual capital that has been and will be gained from DDG-1000 is going to facilitate the Navy's effort to shift from a largely platform centric perspective - to a perspective of exploiting a network of combat and non-combat systems centric capabilities. This is a doctrinal change that will almost certainly emerge as part of the Air-Sea Battle doctrine development process mentioned in the 2010 QDR.

We are entering an age of energy. The most important technology on the DDG-1000 is the Integrated Electric Drive (IPS). Taking a comprehensive HM&E approach, the Navy has positioning itself to realize the incredible flexibility that comes with trade space for both the weapons system acquisition folks as well as the operators when these ships go into the fight.

This gives the Navy the opportunity to design and build platforms that are nothing more than the "boxes" of flexible payload space Bob Work discusses, utilizing integrated power and open architecture integration to enable the Navy to maintain pace with technology developments. This approach capitalizes on a common network interface systems for ESM, Missiles, Radars, Comms, C4ISR, Manpower, Guns, Lasers, Hospitals, etc. to give the Navy the flexibility for rapidly upgrading systems to insure a platform designed in the 21st century remains relevant through the life of the ship.

With a properly managed HM&E design that leverages IPS and open architecture, the Navy is poised to treat a 21st century warship like a smart phone - with network interface modules representing the apps. As the apps get old, the open architecture approach allows them to be rapidly upgraded as new technologies are fielded.

The challenge for the Navy is streamlining this process. We only hear pieces of this description from naval leaders, but no vision statement as articulated here - even as this represents the future as even they see it in the future fleet. The challenge is to invest in design to produce HM&E maturity for a future surface combatant with Integrated Electric Drive so that we can then take advantage of the systems - like AMDR.

So far in FY2011 budget discussions, Navy leaders have identified the Burke for HM&E and specific findings in an AMDR study as specific desired systems. The problem with this approach is that it wastes the decade by spending money on ships without Integrated Electric Drive. That matters, because any ship built without Integrated Electric Drive after 2015 will be obsolete before they retire. Can the nation really afford to spend so much money on high end fleet capabilities that will almost certainly not be viable in 20-30 years?

Last year Gene Taylor mentioned money may need to be spent getting the Burke design into a modern design software tool. It was a good suggestion, because that will be the only way the Navy can get the Burke aligned to the HM&E -> IPS -> Systems approach in the right order. Until the Navy gets to that point with a major surface combatant, the Navy will remain stuck in the 20th century at the high end of naval warfare.

Expect our challengers and adversaries to continue moving towards the approach discussed in this post by the end of the decade. Considering our nations economic problems, we should make it a strategic objective to get there first.