Russia Dreams of a Nuclear Navy

What are the odds of this actually happening.

Russian officials on Thursday said that the country will be completing the construction of a new class nuclear-powered destroyer by 2016.

Russian Navy Admiral Vladimir Vysotsky told RIA Novosti that the prototype of the new class destroyer, which is designed to be used at sea, would be finished in around five years, adding that the warship had a 90 percent chance of being powered by nuclear energy.


Vysotsky spoke at the 5th International Maritime Defense Show, IMDS-2011, in St. Petersburg, Russia, after Roman Trotsenko, President of United Shipbuilding Corporation, had previously stated that the company was beginning the design for a new nuclear-powered destroyer.

Trotesenko said the design phase alone, which is expected to begin this fall, would last around two years, and that it would be constructed for the Russian Navy.

I expect to see nuclear powered destroyers being built in Russia right after those aircraft carriers expected to start construction in 2015 get going. Unlikely. Russia does have the infrastructure to build nuclear powered ships, but those ships are icebreakers, not destroyers.

I guess I am just very skeptical. I don't see this as mission impossible for Russia, rather mission "highly unlikely."

USFF Hosts Bold Alligator 2012 Main Planning Conference

From Expeditionary Strike Group 2 Public Affairs

Commander, United States Fleet Forces hosted the first of two Main Planning Conferences June 24, for Exercise Bold Alligator 2012, scheduled to take during January and February 2012.

Bold Alligator 2012 represents the Navy and Marine Corps' revitalization of the fundamentals of amphibious operations, strengthening their traditional role as fighters from the sea.

The focus of this event is based on the common goal of Navy and Marine Corps leadership to revitalize, refine and strengthen core amphibious competencies, which are critical to maritime power projection and are a cost effective option for a wide range of military operations.

The capabilities that allow the amphibious force to conduct a forced entry landing against an opposing military force are the same capabilities that make it the force of choice for crisis response and building partnerships.

"As recent world events show, amphibious forces are a critical part of a wide range of military operations," said Rear Adm. Kevin Scott, commander, ESG-2. "We need to always be ready to successfully conduct prompt and sustained amphibious expeditionary operations from the sea in support of the nation's maritime strategy."

More than 330 Navy and Marine Corps personnel from more than 50 ships and commands met at Expeditionary Warfare Training Group Atlantic (EWTGLANT) aboard Joint Expeditionary Base Little Creek-Fort Story, Va., to incorporate recent guidance from senior leaders and continue the planning process for the large-scale amphibious exercise. The primary training audiences for the exercise are Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) 2, 2d Marine Expeditionary Brigade (2d MEB) and the Enterprise Carrier Strike Group.

Bold Alligator 2012 will be a large-scale multinational naval amphibious exercise conducted by United States Fleet Forces (USFF) and Marine Forces Command (MFC) that will focus upon the planning and execution of a brigade-sized amphibious assault from a seabase in a medium threat environment. The underlying scenario of this exercise is designed to emphasize the Navy/Marine Corps capabilities in undeveloped and immature theaters of operations.

Expected to participate in the exercise are: an amphibious task force (led by ESG-2) consisting of 10 amphibious ships and four to six combatants; a Marine expeditionary brigade-sized landing force (2d MEB); a carrier strike group (aircraft carrier, embarked air wing and four combatant ships); mine counter measure forces, Navy expeditionary combat command forces, Military Sealift Command ships; coalition force elements from several allies, and other commands in the support of amphibious operations.

I really think Bold Alligator 2012 is a very big deal. Grand plans and schemes are great on paper, but the Navy and Marine Corps are both going to learn a lot from actually doing an exercise this large.

Have you been reading the recommendations by Admiral Harvey in preparing for this exercise? I have, indeed I probably never would have read One Hundred Days: THe Memoirs of the Falklands Battle Group Commander had it not been recommended by Admiral Harvey. In case you are wondering, that book was really good.

If your one of those 'on-the-go' types like me, you can also check out a podcast discussing Chinese Amphibious Operations: 1949-1958 recorded May 8, 2024 hosted at the New York Military Affairs Symposium website.

I wonder if there is any way I can find a way to get embarked for this exercise.

Drones, Not Helicopters Over Somalia

I was wrong and deserve to be criticized for not trusting my instincts, and also for relying on questionably sourced media reports. Helicopters over Somalia? Washington Post says it was drones.

The strike last week against senior members of al-Shabab comes amid growing concern within the U.S. government that some leaders of the Islamist group are collaborating more closely with al-Qaeda to strike targets beyond Somalia, the military official said.

The airstrike makes Somalia at least the sixth country where the United States is reportedly using drone aircraft to conduct lethal attacks, joining Afghanistan, Pakistan, Libya, Iraq and Yemen. And it comes as the CIA is expected to begin flying armed drones over Yemen in its hunt for al-Qaeda operatives.

Nice to see a major newspaper note we are now engaged in combat operations in six countries. The United States is now fighting two wars on the ground, Iraq and Afghanistan, and noteworthy the other four countries the United States is fighting drone wars in (Yemen, Libya, Pakistan, and Somalia) all have very long coastlines.

It is my hope that when Admiral Greenert becomes CNO, he sets goals that inspire innovation. For example, set goals like launching a Reaper off the future USS America (LHA 6). It isn't hard to predict that airpower alone in the form of drones won't solve serious problems, meaning the serious problems will only fester until some point when a nation hosting CIA drones will kick you off their property.

If the drones fly from the sea, particularly if they fly off platforms where airpower isn't the only option like a LHA/LHD, we don't have to worry about those kind of problems.

China Exporting Submarines For Pakistans Nuclear Triad

From the June 2011 issue of FORCE magazine, an Indian National Security and Defense magazine, comes this remarkable article.

Pakistan’s efforts to have a sea-based minimum credible nuclear deterrent vis-a-vis India took a significant step forward last month when the state-owned, Wuhan-based China State Shipbuilding Industrial Corp (CSIC) ferried the first Qing-class conventional attack submarine (SSK) to Shanghai to begin a year-long series of sea trials, which is likely to include the test-firing of three CJ-10K submarine-launched, 1,500km-range land attack cruise missiles (LACM) capable of being armed with unitary tactical nuclear warheads. Called the Qing-class SSK, it is a variant of the Type 041A Improved Yuan-class SSK, which is also due to begin its sea trials later this month.

It is now believed that the contract inked between CSIC and Pakistan early last April (see FORCE April 2011, pages 16-17) calls for the CSIC’s Wuhan-based Wuchang Shipyard to supply six Qing-class SSKs, all of which will be equipped with a Stirling-cycle AIP system and will be able to carry up to three nuclear warhead-carrying CJ-10K LACMs each. The double-hulled Qing-class SSK, with a submerged displacement close to 3,600 tonnes, bears a close resemblance to the Russian Type 636M SSK, and features hull-retractable foreplanes and hydrodynamically streamlined sail. The first such SSK was launched in Wuhan on September 9 last year, and a total of three such SSKs are on order from China’s PLA Navy as well. The AIP system for the Qing-class SSK was developed by the 711th Research Institute of CSIC. R&D work began in June 1996, with a 100-strong team of scientists and engineers led by Dr Jin Donghan being involved in developing the Stirling-cycle engine, while another team led Professor Ma Weiming of China’s Naval Engineering University began developing the all-electric AIP system. The two projects entered the production engineering stage in 2007, with the Shanghai Qiyao Propulsion Technology Ltd, a wholly owned subsidiary of the 711th Institute, becoming the principal industrial entity charged with producing the AIP system. Incidentally, the Qing-class SSK’s all-electric propulsion system is a derivative of a similar system that was developed about a decade ago for the PLA Navy’s six Type 093 Shang-class SSGNs and three Type 094 Jin-class SSBNs.

For those who got lost in the trade speak, basically China is exporting submarines specifically designed to deliver nuclear weapons. The submarines will be armed with cruise missiles designed, built, and delivered by China to Pakistan intended to launch Pakistan nuclear warheads.

The most troubling part of this article is that it is very probably accurate. The article is worth reading in full, as it also claims China is giving the Pakistan Navy two Jiangkai I-class Type 054 frigates.

Technology and Executive Power

My column this week is on the technological implications of the Obama administration's excuse for avoiding the WPR:

In the future, however, presidents may resort to airpower in order to avoid congressional limitations on their executive power. A longer-range concern is that as the United States continues to develop technologies that increase the distance between "shooter" and target, such as advanced drones and Prompt Global Strike, power over decisions of military and security policy would shift even more radically away from Congress and toward the executive... In the short term, members of Congress concerned about executive control over war-making powers might be best advised to pay closer attention to procurement decisions. If the president continues to claim the right to use certain weapons of war without Congressional oversight, then Congress is clearly within its powers to deny those weapons to the president, or at least to demand accountability.

Footage Of Dutch Freeing Pirated Vessel

On April 2 the Dutch rescued an Iranian vessel from Somali pirates.

The MoD has now released footage of that rescue, during which 2 pirates were killed after they opened fire on the Dutch sailors.

AFRICOM's Air War in Somalia

For the second time in four days, and for the third time since April, the United States has conducted an airstrike in Somalia.

The key point here is that all of these attacks are apparently being conducted by helicopter, all of them are being done at night, and all of them appear to be well planned surgical strikes against Al Shabab targets in southern Somalia.

The first attack came on April 6, 2024 near Kismayo where it was reported over 35 members of Al Shabab was killed. The second attack came on June 24, 2024, also near Kismayo, where helicopters reportedly attacked a military convoy clustering at a Al Shabab base. The third attack came last night when three helicopters attacked a training camp in Taabta village in the Afmadow District of Lower Juba. Noteworthy, the news report notes that the locals had been hearing airplanes the last few days, suggesting they were under aerial surveillance.

It has been very difficult to track down confirmation that the 'unidentified' helicopters are that of the United States, but CNN's Barbara Starr broke the story on Tuesday.

CNN has learned that U.S. military aircraft conducted a strike near Kismayo in southern Somalia last week as part of new secret joint Pentagon and CIA war against a terrorist group the U.S. believes is targeting Europe and the United States.

The U.S. hit a stronghold of al Shabaab, a Somali-based al Qaeda affiliate now in the U.S. crosshairs.

U.S. military and CIA personnel have gone to Somalia in recent months, gathering intelligence and meeting key Somali contacts, according to two U.S. officials. The White House believes that al Shabaab and al Qaeda are now hand in glove.

The video report found at the link is much more informative, and describes a new JSOC/CIA Somalia operation that is intended to go after high value targets in Al Shabab. Whether or not this is "new" or simply a better funded operation is subject to interpretation, but it does indicate a shift towards more US covert operations in Somalia and it also provides some much needed airpower for AMISOM, even if it isn't in direct support of their operations.

After tonight's attack in Lower Juba, which is the southern most region of Somalia along the Kenyan border, there simply wasn't a way the US would be able to deny responsibility anymore so any revelations by Barbara Starr today are of no consequence. There are only a few outfits in the world that can pull off two precision helicopter attacks conducted in the middle of the night in a failed state over a four day period, and only one nation in the world has both the capability and the political capacity to make those strikes happen.

It will never be confirmed, but US Army 160 SOAR - the same outfit that flew helicopters in the raid to kill Osama Bin Laden, and the same outfit that flew helicopters over Mogadishu of Black Hawk Down fame - is the most likely unit conducting these operations. Apparently they have returned to Somalia to kill Al Shabab big boys, and because they are the very best - it is a good bet that they will find a lot of success and the life expectancy of whoever is unlucky enough to be labeled the "#3 Al Qaeda guy" in Somalia has suddenly become very short. There is no danger in speculating US Army 160 SOAR is involved here, because there just aren't very many units the US has that can do this mission, and that isn't a secret.

And to be blunt, it is the height of parochial thinking within the fighter jock driven naval aviation community that after nearly 10 years after 9/11, the US Navy has still not stood up a naval aviation unit to do missions like the US Army 160 SOAR. Hopefully that will change soon.

America Just Isn't That Into You Admiral

Regular readers should know by now, National Policy and the Transoceanic Navy published in Proceedings in May 1954 by Samuel P. Huntington is one of my favorite articles of all time. The article is so well written and timeless that I can quote it for dozens of very different discussions and it will be remarkably relevant.

As we begin the 2nd decade of the 21st century where the Army has been engaged in 2 wars while the Navy has quietly been doing its duty over the horizon, I am reminded the US Navy has been in a similar position before.

The Navy’s subordinate role during this Continental Phase of policy is well indicated by the miscellaneous nature of its military functions. These were basically threefold. First, there were the Navy’s responsibilities for coastal defense. From the time of Jefferson’s administration down through the 1880s this resulted in the construction of a whole series of gunboats and monitors designed solely for this purpose. Secondly, the Navy was responsible for protecting American commerce overseas and, in the event of war, raiding the commerce of the enemy. For this purpose the Navy was deployed in half a dozen squadrons scattered about the world from the Mediterranean to the East Indies and was largely equipped with fast frigate-cruiser type vessels. Thirdly, during the Mexican War and the Civil War, when the United States was fighting two nations powerless at sea, the Navy performed valuable functions in blockading the enemy and assisting in amphibious operations. These miscellaneous military functions did not, however, exhaust the activities of the Navy during this period. Since these military functions were of a general secondary nature, the Navy tended to acquire a wide variety of essentially civilian functions and directly related to any security threat. These included the support of general scientific research, the organization of a number of exploring expeditions, the frequent performance by the naval officers of diplomatic functions, and the utilizations of members of the naval service to administer civilian department of government. In general, during this period the Navy had no clearly essential role to play in meeting any major security threats and consequently tended to dissipate its energies over this wide variety of civilian and military functions.

The subordinate role of the Navy in implementing national policy was reflected in the weak public support which it received during this period. The continuous expansion of the nation westward tended steadily to decrease the political power of those sections most sympathetic to the Navy, and after the Federalists were swept out of office in 1800 it is not inaccurate to say that the government was generally dominated by political groups either indifferent to or actively hostile towards the Navy. The farmers of the interior tended to view the naval establishment as an unnecessary if not dangerous burden on the national economy. Consequently the Navy was frequently allowed to fall into fairly serious states of disrepair, reaching its lowest point the post Civil War years.

Since the Navy had no definite role to play in implementing national policy, it was unnecessary for it to have a type of organization which emphasized a distinction between its military and civilian functions. Consequently, although there was a major change in naval organization in 1842, when the bureau system was introduced, nonetheless the basic pattern of naval organization remained the same throughout the entire period. Neither under the Board of Naval Commissioners nor under the bureaus was there any clear differentiation between the military and the civilian functions of the naval department under the supervision of the Secretary. When during the Civil War the Navy was called upon to perform a significant military function, a special officer had to be designated to direct the military activities of the fleet. With this exception, however, naval organization reflected the inability of the Navy to develop a strategic concept relating it to the goals of national security policy.

I thought of what Samuel Huntington wrote when I saw these interesting poll numbers taken by Gallop. I want folks to carefully consider what we are learning here. The first question:

The Navy spends more money on aircraft than the Air Force does, but come fleet week the Navy finds average American people that don't even realize the Navy has aircraft. Unfortunately, that is when someone is forced to mention the movie Top Gun and memory kicks in, but without Top Gun as a reference point it really is remarkable how little attention naval aviation gets. I honestly blame the Navy for that, and the naval aviation community is the worst. Too much focus on the fighter jocks and not enough focus on everything else that makes the entire community great. Next time someone is putting bat wings on the MH-60s for an exercise, get some pictures and do an interview. Talk about the P-3 community more - these folks have incredibly interesting stories that always involve a handful of personalities that make up a single planes crew. The same is true of Hawkeye's. When was the last time Navy News published an interesting article on Top Gun? Ironic those pictures were intended to showcase the MH-60R, but all the focus went on the ship. Maybe it's because nobody outside the smallest possible audience understands the difference between Romeo's and Sierra's.

The second issue is submarines. Since the cold war the Navy has been completely unable to articulate the value of submarines, and now that the Navy is finally moving to build 2 per year - the American people really don't understand why we spend so much every year building two per year. We live in an age where technology is integrated into the lives of almost every American, and yet no one in the Navy can articulate all the amazing things a submarine can do? You're not even trying. Most of the amazing things submarines can do are not even secret, they simply aren't openly discussed. The Navy needs to learn how to talk in detail without giving details, and start telling a story without revealing any secrets.

The third issue is that the surface fleet refuses to take on the difficult challenges of this era (stuff like piracy and narcotics submersibles) and is instead focused on meeting some enormous threat that may or may not materialize in the decades ahead. The surface fleet is the most distributed, thus visible force in the Navy, and the refusal by leadership to use the surface fleet today in the actual protection of commerce (see piracy) or in coastline defense (see narcotics smuggling) puts the Navy visibly out of step with what they say when explaining their strategic concept - 21st Century Seapower.

I've said it many times since I first read the phrase, and it is absolutely right. It isn't that the Navy doesn't have a compelling story to tell, it is that the Navy doesn't know how to tell a compelling story for itself.

Eleven Percent?!?!?

No amount of PR is going to change that number. If the US Navy doesn't start addressing the little things, then the US Navy is going to find themselves being a little navy again only able to handle the little problems. Think otherwise? See the Royal Navy for a historical example. The rise of China alone is not going to help the Navy, because negative arguments on behalf of the Navy that focus on fearing the Dragon represent intellectually bankrupt arguments that aren't going to win in serious budget debates. The story must discuss the positive benefits of the US Navy, and by extension actions must align with words. The mismatch of budget, actions, and words by the US Navy is the single most obvious discrepancy the US Navy must overcome if they wish to be seen as more relevant by the American people.

There are serious problems at sea today, and the US Navy has been ineffective in even curbing those problems. Americans aren't as dumb as US Navy leadership thinks they are, and that 11% relevance is well earned when the US Navy is widely known to give little more than token efforts to well publicized problems on the oceans today. To the average American, inability to prevent piracy in the 21st century doesn't give Americans confidence in the US Navy towards hedging China.

Cold war generation naval experts will cry foul at my suggestion that piracy is a problem for the US Navy today, but that is because most cold war era folks I know are looking to fight the big war scenario with China in the future, and they put their focus there instead of admitting the Navy must address the problems of this era today first to have any credibility in the future.

The Navy could learn a lot from the Marines, who themselves had no desire to be a second land army in Asia, but accepted their role in this era even though it has obviously cost them in areas like the EFV. I honestly believe the Marine Corps benefits greatly from addressing the challenges they are needed for rather than the ones they would prefer to do, and this specific metric measured suggests the payoff exists when a service sacrifices desires for the needs.

Prestige is pure perception. Yeah, the USMC silent drill platoon looks like money on TV, so the other services can concede some points there, but there is more to it than that. There are signs everywhere, for example, the US Marine Corps Facebook page has 1,677,000+ people following the page, where the US Navy Facebook page has 333,600+ people following. Twitter is no different, with the US Marine Corps primary account listing 47,000+ followers while the US Navy News account has just over 26,000 followers while the official US Navy account has over 22,000 followers. I cannot explain the enormous disparity, rather only observe it's existence might have something to do with the Marines constantly being in the news for doing what must be done - even if they are in reality doing the job of the US Army.

One of the things I try to do is watch what military related articles go viral in social media, and recently this blog post at the Wall Street Journal went viral in a big way. Read it all, but tell me this quoted portion doesn't inspire respect and prestige among average Americans regardless of the issue being discussed.

Sgt. Maj. Barrett also tackled questions on the repeal of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” the military’s ban on gays serving openly in uniform. The Department of Defense is preparing to implement repeal, and Sgt. Maj. Barrett addressed that issue directly.

“Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution is pretty simple,” he told a group of Marines at a base in South Korea. “It says, ‘Raise an army.’ It says absolutely nothing about race, color, creed, sexual orientation.

“You all joined for a reason: to serve,” he continued. “To protect our nation, right?”

“Yes, sergeant major,” Marines replied.

“How dare we, then, exclude a group of people who want to do the same thing you do right now, something that is honorable and noble?” Sgt. Maj. Barrett continued, raising his voice just a notch. “Right?”

Sgt. Maj. Barrett then described conversations with U.K. troops, who saw a similar ban lifted a decade ago, with little disruption. And to drive the point home, he produced a pocket copy of the Constitution.

“Get over it,” he said. “We’re magnificent, we’re going to continue to be. … Let’s just move on, treat everybody with firmness, fairness, dignity, compassion and respect. Let’s be Marines.”

When you're out with the Navy, who do you talk to? I really like to talk to NCOs, when allowed, but the face and voice of the Navy I end up spending most of my time with is almost all of the time is Officers. In the Marines, the face and voice of the Marine Corps on the battlefield and on the home front is mostly the NCOs, who say more in fewer words than officers ever do in public.

In January when I was out looking at the EFV at Camp Pendleton, the tour was led by a NCO with 20+ years in the AAAVs - and the tour was fantastic. Would an officer told us the history of problems, and how those challenges led to one of the greatest, most unaffordable amphibious vehicles in history? Probably not, we would have heard a similar story without all the raw details that made the Gunny's story so interesting. NCOs simply tell better stories when they are on duty...

The Navy in particular could learn a lot, and gain a lot, from letting NCOs loose in public. Yeah, the ugly side of stuff might be shown, as it was with the PBS special, but the Navy must accept that the public today responds positively to the bad when it is in context with the good, and the NCOs are the only folks who seem to handle the bad and the good (both, together) well in public. Officers, as they have been trained to do, too often hide the bad in public even though it is usually their focus in private. As one SWO once put it:

We're SWOs...we've been brought through a culture of "only brief the problems" and that begins to pervade everything so that we no longer see the bright shiny pony...just the one small speck of poop that got dropped 2 seconds ago.

And then we look for someone to work up a POAM on getting the poop cleaned up, someone else to put together the safety brief, and a third to figure out the ORM.

And in the end, it is a NCO who follows each step to job completion, and understands the details of the story better than the SWO ever could. When telling a story, the details matter more than the summary when your trying to connect with people, and that is why the Marines lead with NCOs out front.

These are just a few of my thoughts. The reasons for these numbers are many, but have a lot to do with the Navy ignoring the problems of this era. The Marine Corps talks about their big, ugly problems openly and describes the challenges they face, but the Navy conceals problems on the most visible issues like shipbuilding. Which method works better? Gallop appears to have data that suggests Navy leadership is getting it wrong. Pushing this poll off as a PR problem would be a mistake. These poll numbers don't reflect public relations, rather they reflect the absence of a viable strategic concept being aligned with direct, transparent communications.

You know what frustrates me the most? Once upon a time Bob Work knew this better than anyone - and even wrote about it. Interesting he got to the Navy and is now in position to effect the culture there towards alignment of effort, money, and action..., but apparently no one in the Navy is ready for such a dramatic step.

Photo of the Day Part II

I think my moms new 'friend' is a retired Marine, because I am starting to get pictures like this in my inbox.


Supposedly this is caricature of SEAL TEAM 6 when it was heading off to kill Bin Laden. I like the masks, but really do not have the details on the back story of this image.

If this picture is legitimate caricature of SEAL TEAM 6, then can someone explain to me the footwear. Personally I think once the US Navy gets the trademark, I think the Navy should ask Lego to make a set where proceeds go to families of fallen SEAL members. I'd put a link on the blog, not to mention buy a few sets for myself. I'd also bet it would be a best seller at US Lego stores nationwide.

Shi Lang Ain't Varyag

Dan Goure, via Phil Ewing:

It appears that the PLA did not just buy an ex-Soviet era aircraft carrier but, more significantly, it has bought into a Soviet era vision of a rising world power requiring a blue water Navy. In the process, the Soviet Union wasted enormous resources creating naval forces that were virtually irrelevant both politically and militarily. China, like the Soviet Union/Russia is a continental power. Even with a growing economy Beijing will not have the resources to build both effective land and air force and a blue water navy.

Moreover, deploying an aircraft carrier even with a complement of strike aircraft is not the same thing as having an operationally effective carrier strike group. The PLA Navy will have to develop the capability to provide 360 degree air and missile defense, fleet ASW, underway replenishment and air/sea coordination. Where is the Chinese navy’s equivalent of the Aegis air/missile defense system, E-2D airborne surveillance and C2 or the Los Angeles class SSN?

The reality is that the U.S. Navy should welcome the Chinese effort to create its own blue water navy. The U.S. Navy has a seventy year history of being able to engage and destroy hostile surface fleets. The name Shi Lang could also be translated as “big fat target.”

Not all continental powers are the same. The People's Republic of China is now, and for the foreseeable future will remain, deeply dependent on maritime trade. Exports accounted for 27% of the PRC's GDP in 2009, even as global exports were severely depressed by the financial crisis. 28% of Russia's GDP was accounted for by exports, but a very large percentage of this was energy delivered through land and sea pipelines. China is also far more dependent on seaborne energy imports than Russia. China's container port traffic amounts to roughly 10 times that of Russia.

Long story short, China is dependent on the sea in a way that the Russia is not, and the Soviet Union never was. This is something we have to take account of when interpreting Chinese naval development. The economic growth of modern China, and consequently the legitimacy of the CCP, is largely (although not entirely; see Yasheng Huang's Capitalism with Chinese Characteristics) built on a foundation of maritime security provided by the United States Navy. Whether the USN continues to provide this security or not, China's continued economic development requires maritime engagement.

China's geographic position is also, obviously, far more amenable to maritime projection than either Russia or the Soviet Union (or Germany, for that matter). China possesses warm water ports that lie astride major global trade routes. Because of the difficult geography of SE Asia, China's neighbors are difficult to intimidate through the use of land power. They are, however, susceptible to naval influence. At the same time, in the absence of a powerful, expansionist Russia the PRC faces no meaningful threats along its land borders. Its littoral is very vulnerable, however, to superior naval force.

What this means is that while there's probably some logic to the argument that the Russian aircraft carrier program should be thought of largely in symbolic terms, the same argument does not apply to China. China has a strong interest in developing a powerful, effective blue water navy. Shi Lang should be interpreted along these lines. With due respect to our host, "How to kill Shi Lang" is a fun question to ask, but it's one of the least illuminating possible approaches to thinking about the growth of Chinese naval aviation.

The Afghanistan Focus on Fear and Consequences

I will admit it. When the Lexington Institute blog first started, I wasn't a fan, but I am now willing to admit that I read it every day. Daniel Goure and Loren Thompson have an uncanny ability of getting me to think about something in most of their posts - sometimes about something mentioned on the margins rather than the main idea they are discussing. Either way, sparking an idea should be the point of writing at all - and in that effort I find them successful.

That blog really deserves more credit than it gets, and has come a long way in demonstrating how a think tank can contribute to the daily narrative of ideas floating around the National Security discussion.

Naturally, I am giving the Early Warning Blog credit in the same post I am going to disagree with something said, because you know - that's how bloggers roll sometimes. A recent piece by Daniel Goure is beneath the quality I have come to enjoy from him. This blog post comes from June 22nd, before the announcement by the President regarding the troop drawdown, is what has been tumbling around in my head.

The President is expected to propose a time-phased withdrawal of the troops sent as part of the surge, possibly modified by the situation on the ground at the time. But what about the other 70,000 U.S. personnel and those from allied countries? If he does not make the case for a longer-term U.S. presence in Afghanistan he places the entire enterprise at risk. Without a compelling rationale for our presence in that country, in Southwest Asia and globally, any future economic shocks could see the collapse of the Afghan experiment, the defense budget and America’s global military position.

When Britain pulled out of Asia and the Middle East the United States was prepared and able to take its place. So the power vacuum in the world was temporary in duration and limited in scope. If the United States withdraws from either the Middle East or Asia, the world will be left with a yawning security chasm.

My problem with this argument, and many other articles written since the announcement by the President that it is time to draw down troops in Afghanistan is that there appears to be some link made between Afghanistan and the United States global commitment in Asia and the Middle East - as if pulling out of Afghanistan means retreating back to the Texas border with Mexico. Where does this presumed cause and effect rationale come from?

The US pulled out of Vietnam and the US didn't pull out of Asia, so why does pulling out of Afghanistan mean the US will retreat out of Asia or the Middle East?

Why is maintaining the "Afghan experiment" associated with "the defense budget and America’s global military position?" A set back in the "Afghan experiment" does not even necessarily mean a setback for US interests in the Middle East in the fight against radical extremism, and it is a real stretch to make the argument that withdrawing from a land war in Asia is somehow going to set back Americas global military position.

Look, I don't believe we need to pull out of Afghanistan 100%. I do believe we could scale down to a very small force and achieve the strategic objective of keeping America safe from attacks that originate from Afghanistan. Keeping America safe is only a subset of the much broader strategic objective we have embarked on in Afghanistan though, and I think the broad objective is part of the problem - not the solution.

Another example - enter Bob Kagan with this nonsense that I do not believe at all, because it would represent one of the most disturbing truths I have heard in years.

Make no mistake, however. The entire military leadership believes the president’s decision is a mistake, and especially the decision to withdraw the remainder of the surge forces by September 2012. They will soldier on and do their best, but as the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm. Mike Mullen, put it, in characteristic understatement, they believe the decision will increase the risk to the troops and increase the chance that the mission will not succeed. It bears repeating that the deadline imposed by the president has nothing to do with military or strategic calculation. It has everything to do with an electoral calculation. President Obama wants those troops out two months before Americans go to the voting booth.

The entire military leadership? If Bob Kagan is to be believed, the entire military leadership of the United States believes that only 1 strategy and 1 tactical application of that strategy exists in addressing strategic objectives in Afghanistan. If that is true, that would be the most disturbing thing I have ever read about the military in the 21st century - that the entire military leadership of the United States is fixated on only one way for the US to prevail strategically and tactically in Afghanistan.

Seriously? If what Bob Kagan is saying is true, then American decline is past the point of no return. We are left with two choices when considering what Bob Kagan is saying, either Bob Kagan is 1) completely full of crap or 2) we need to a wholesale clearance in military leadership to get rid of the group think. I'm thinking the correct answer is #1, and we are living in a national nightmare if I am wrong.

Fear Consequences

I have grown very weary of the fear approach towards Afghanistan policy. Why is it that for very smart and credible people to make a case for Afghanistan, the argument must be first and foremost the certainty that bad consequences will happen with any change in direction, whether tactically or strategically. Is there any more obvious sign the United States is currently following bad policy when fear and uncertainly of possible consequences is the only convincing argument offered in support of existing policy.

Whenever a policy cannot be articulated in the context of positives, and is reliant on the context that focuses on negatives; the policy is the problem. Read Daniel Goure's piece again and read Bob Kagan's piece again; and find for me what is gained - not lost - in Afghanistan under the policy we have been following under the surge. Both of their arguments suffer the same problem most arguments in favor of staying the course in Afghanistan suffer - there is nothing noteworthy to be gained even if we ever do reach the end of the COIN rainbow.

Picture of the Day

This is HMAS Sydney (FFG 03) firing a SM2 on June 18th test off Hawaii.


This weapon system appears to be perfectly capable today. The United States Navy still operates many frigates that could, yet cannot, use this weapon system. I believe we may have been right to retire the missile when we did, but we have also been lucky we have not needed it.

USS Halyburton (FFG 40) and now USS Carr (FFG 52) have been operating in the Mediterranean Sea near Libya, and Libya may indeed one day find a way to shoot ASMs at ships offshore if this war continues much longer. If they do, having a functional SM2 sure would be handy for protecting the ship...

Just saying.

What to Watch For This Week

There are six big issues this week I will be watching closely.

South Korea will be conducting military exercises all week near the city of Paju near the DMZ. While South Korea conducts exercises along the DMZ all the time, I keep thinking we are going to see another North Korean action in the very near future. The reports of the Army struggling with malnutrition is particularly troubling, and on Tuesday the US women's soccer team is going to kick the snot out of the North Korean women's soccer team at the Women's World Cup in Germany. If you get a chance, look for photo's of the two teams side by side before the game. It is going to look like a competition between the women and the girls, and the North Korean soccer team isn't malnourished like the rest of that nation.

Russia will continue testing the Bulava missile on June 28th. One of the really interesting aspects of this launch is that Russia intends to stream the launch live on the Russian Defense Ministries website. That is either a sign of confidence in the missile program after very difficult development pains or political desperation given how much money has been spent. I am less concerned than apparently most of you regarding the conventional military power of Russia, but I am concerned about Russia's nuclear inventory. Nuclear weapons remain Russia's most influential and most leveraged political weapon.

There is diplomatic movement in the territorial dispute between China and Vietnam. The Wall Street Journal is reporting that there is a resolution, while the New York Times is reporting that both sides have agreed to sit down and discuss the issue. I tend to think the Wall Street Journal mistook the announcement for talks about the issue as an actual resolution to the territorial dispute, and the New York Times reporting is more accurate. Regardless, the possibility the US could get diplomatically involved is one of the factors driving a diplomatic solution from China. I would suggest Hillary Clinton has once again positively influenced the region with her speech last year regarding US policy of South China Sea territorial disputes in ways that most people do not truly appreciate.

It is unclear what will happen with the "peace" flotilla that sailed to run the Gaza blockade. Egypt is playing a positive role, and other nations have also played positive roles in preventing a confrontation. Much of the international will ignore how running a naval blockade is an act of war, but Israel's naval blockade of Gaza is an act of war, which makes whining about rockets into Israel nothing more than a complaint by Israel that the enemy is fighting back. The big difference here is that the war is between Israel and Gaza, not those of the blockade who make themselves enemy combatants in a war zone intentionally. Israel isn't only within their right to stop the flotilla, but also within their legal rights under international law to sink the ships outright. Yeah that would be the height of political stupidity, but Israel will stop the flotilla at any cost.

The TFG in Somalia is making things harder for everyone on the piracy issue. On May 24 six private security personnel were arrested and $3.6 million intended for paying a pirate ransom was seized by the TFG in the name of anti-piracy efforts. While the six people have been released due to Presidential pardon (read external political pressure), the bottom line is ransom money will now have to be delivered in ways that get around the TFG. This comes as it is reported that London insurance companies now pull in more than $120 million a year from Somali piracy, while the United Nations reports ransoms last year totaled just over $110 million. The areas where piracy insurance is required in the Indian Ocean have expanded, so expect a much higher figure than $120 million for insurance companies this year. Bottom line, governments everywhere are part of the problem because none of them are willing to commit to a real solution, and the shipping industry is caught trying to manage their own interests against an assault of some kind from all sides.

Finally, ex-Varyag goes to sea trials on Friday. No need to discuss this one, I'm pretty sure everyone will be watching and there will be plenty of things said. The aspect of this event I am watching for is what China says about it.

A bonus thought:

People have long asked where Somali pirates are getting all of their good intelligence from. They seem to know where the easy to hit ships will be, by name and all. There is ample evidence that Somali pirates are not working with Iran and they also do not appear to work in coordination with any Al Qaeda affiliated groups. One of the biggest questions that has popped up as a result of several different events over the last several months is how much influence and apparent connectivity ISI Chief Ahmed Shuja Pasha has with Somali pirate leaders. My sense is the relationship between Somali pirates and the ISI is the next big pirate story on the verge of busting into the media.

(Picture at the top caught my attention. Some will get it, some won't. Click for more information.)

Is J-15 a game changer?

I often see articles on the web warning of the impending Chinese naval power and the impact on American's naval dominance. I find most of them to be badly written and low on facts. However, there are some authors how have followed PLAN for a long time and write some really good stuff. Andrew Erickson is one of the few PLA followers that I truly respect. His latest article with Gabe Collins on the J-15 program is another quality piece of work. I would recommend all PLAN followers to read it.

The authors did a good job of going over all of the potential problems associated with operating J-15 on a STOBAR carrier like Varyag. They brought up the reduced maximum take-off weight of J-15 vs land based flankers. They brought up how US carrier groups can make use of USAF tankers from forward base points to extend the range of USN air wing, but this option is not available to PLAN in the foreseeable future. Another limitation to Chinese air wing is the lack of fixed-wing ISR assets and ASW assets like E-2, S-2 and S-3. I think the following lines sums up the entire article perfectly.

The J-15’s emergence offers potential capabilities that are noteworthy because China is starting from such a low baseline in naval aviation that virtually any progress could make a big difference.

For these reasons, Chinese ski jump carriers simply cannot be used in any of the combat roles that U.S. Navy carriers have performed.

I think most of us would agree with the assessment that J-15 on Varyag does not represent any kind of game changing capability, but rather the most obvious option for PLAN to start off. Varyag was not designed for the same kind of missions that PLAN has in mind for future carrier groups. From much of what I read on Chinese sources, it’s seems that PLAN wants to follow USN’s direction in carrier operation. However, it clearly does not have the same aircraft, carrier producing capability and general weapon system available to achieve that in the near future. As a result, it would have to develop carrier operation doctrine based on what it has at disposal. I do think that Varyag will see more time in service than just as a training carrier based on all of the new sensors and CIWS they have installed on it, but the first domestic carriers will give us much better idea of the direction of PLAN. It’s with this that I disagree with some of the points made in the article.

The article completely dismissed most of the missions that J-15 could have based on the assumption that it will always be flying off a STOBAR carrier. Based on what I have seen (including the recent photos of fixed wing AEW), I would say that the first domestic carrier will probably be a CATOBAR carrier. In fact, I’ve read that PLAN picked the J-11 platform over J-10 platform for naval aviation due to its potentials in performing different types of missions. China does not have the same fleet of SSGNs or cruisers that Soviet Union had to launch long range supersonic missiles. The shipwreck missile launch module has also been removed from Varyag. China’s current helo fleet is also likely to be restricted to AEW and ASW missions. So, I don’t think China will be relying on helicopters or deck-launched ASCMs (as mentioned in this article) to attack opposing naval forces. Maritime strike and anti-ship missions will be carried out by J-15 regardless of whether it is operating off a STOBAR carrier or a CATOBAR carrier.

I also think the authors really missed the point when they speculated that China would need longer ranged AAM and AShM to compensate for the shortened range of J-15. Russian missiles like R-37 and Brahmos are extremely bulky and would significantly cut down the range of a naval aircraft. J-15 would be able to carry at most one AShM of Brahmos size or two missiles of R-37 size. The original Su-33 could not perform any mission outside of Combat Air Patrol, because Su-27 was purely an air superiority fighter at the time. Even if Su-27 had multi-role capability, the limited takeoff weight from STOBAR carrier would’ve drastically reduced the usefulness of most of the current Russian anti-ship missiles and ground attack weaponry. Most of the recent Chinese weapons development has aimed at creating smaller weapons (PGMs, ground attack missiles, AAM and AShMs) that can be carried by smaller fighters (like J-10 and JF-17) and UCAVs. J-15 could possibly take off with a couple of YJ-83s (about 700 kg each) or a couple of KD-88s (also about 700 kg each) and still have useful combat range. It would also be able to carry a number of PGMs similar to JDAM and SDB and attack land based targets. If China does build a CATOBAR carrier, J-15 will theoretically be able to carry as much weapon as F-18E/F, while having comparable range and CAP time. So, I think the combat potential of J-15 should not be limited to the so called “missile-centric” approach.

In conclusion, I think this article did a very good job at pointing out the problems facing PLAN as it is about to launch its first carrier and operate its first naval aircraft. The appearance of J-15 is not a game-changer in anyway, but it will be a tremendous learning process for PLAN. They have a long way to go before becoming competent at carrier operations. At the same time, I think it is also worthy to explore the potential of J-15 on CATOBAR carriers, because I believe PLAN is moving in that direction. J-15 really has the potential to perform all of the roles that F-18 E/F performs for USN. It’d be interesting to see whether or not they will develop EW version of J-15 like Growler or buddy-to-buddy refueling version of J-15. They have already done this with the JH-7 platform, so it should not be too difficult to also do this on J-15. It will also be interesting to see what else they plan to join J-15 in the air wing. We’ve already seen a naval trainer in JT-9 and naval AEW helicopter in Ka-31 and Z-8. I would think that other variants of Z-8 and possibly Z-15 will also become part of the air wing. And with all of the resources that China has put into UAVs and UCAVs, I think we will see them on there too. The possibilities increase even more if China does build CATOBAR carriers. The naval AEW project currently in development (and possibly other projects) would be able to take-off. As with everything else in PLAN, I’m just waiting patiently for all those developments.

Gaza Flotilla - Round II and Navy IW

The US Department of State has condemned Hamas and friends’ upcoming attempt to provoke the Israelis into a confrontation. If the flotilla happens, and I see no reason why it won’t, look for evolved tactics, both operational and informational, on both sides. The Israelis will not let their naval commandos be surprised or overwhelmed this time.

State versus non-state clashes at sea have become more prevalent in recent years. In addition to the Flotilla, Greenpeacers have tussled with the Danish Navy, the pirate saga in the Indian Ocean continues, and the USN routinely faces numerous interactions with various sorts of refugees and detainees. Although not as glamorous as preparing for war at sea, irregular population-centric encounters should be a routine part of unit and advanced level training for USN surface and air forces. The Navy should consider utilizing culturally appropriate role players in these scenarios, much as the Army and NECC have done in their training. The first time Sailors deal with some of the human dynamics in these situations should not be in an environment where the wrong move could create an international incident. There are a lot of unemployed Somalis in the US diaspora - let's put some of these young men who are vulnerable to radicalization to work for Team America, provide some stellar role models for them, and give the Navy's front line forces some realistic training.


The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.

On the War Powers Act

Charles Krauthammer had an interesting column yesterday on the ongoing kerfuffle between some in Congress and the Administration over whether the President is "breaking the law" in not assiduously adhering to the tenets of the War Powers Act.  It is must read, as it contains a proposal for a modern, useful "division of labor" in the war-making function.

A couple of thoughts to consider as you read Dr. K's article.

1.  The War Powers Act is unconstitutional, and I fully support President Obama ignoring it.  He is however, ridiculous in asserting that what is going on is not covered by the WPA.  He should acknowledge that it is, and challenge the Congress to do something about it.  If it drives a constitutional question, so be it.
2.  The Libyan intervention is unwise and we should have nothing to do with it.  President Obama was wrong for exercising his legitimate, Constitutional authority as CINC in this case.  This is an error of judgment, not a "high crime or misdemeanor".
3.  Those in Congress who point to the unconstitutional WPA as cover for their legitimate objections to the wisdom of the actions the President is taking are mostly playing politics with their base (anti-war liberal, finger in your eye conservative, or libertarian) ; they should rely on that power over which they hold EXCLUSIVE authority--the purse.  De-fund the war if you don't like it.
4.  Dr. Krauthammer has come up with a very interesting proposal.


Bryan McGrath

Rules of Engagement in the South China Sea

Over the past 2 weeks I have been closely following the activities taking place in the South China Sea. It is worth noting that the tensions between China and the Philippines have advanced far enough that political leadership in the Philippines wants clarification regarding rules of engagement.

Lawmakers on Thursday urged the House of Representatives leadership to summon officials of the Department of National Defense (DND) so that they can brief Congress on the ongoing security situation in the West Philippine Sea.

The House also wants to find out the specific mission orders and rules of engagement issued to BRP Rajah Humabon and other maritime assets which are conducting sovereignty patrols in the disputed Spratly Group of Islands.

Davao City Rep. Karlo Alexei Nograles said the Chamber headed by Speaker Feliciano Belmonte Jr. can ask the DND and representatives of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), particularly the Philippine Navy (PN), to brief the House on the parameters of the country's assertion of its sovereignty over its territories in the West Philippine Sea.

This is very important, Nograles said, because while the Philippines is committed to protecting its sovereignty and its right to defend itself from foreign intrusion, "Congress needs to be apprised on what to expect under different possible scenarios."

"We should know how we are going to respond, especially in a worst case scenario because while it is true that although we have to protect our territories even if we are a small nation with a very ill-equipped Armed Forces, this act of sending BRP Rajah Humabon to conduct sovereignty patrols could be viewed as an act of brinkmanship," he said.

"A single act of hostility from either side could spark a shooting war and we definitely do not want that to happen," he added.

This comes after the topic of the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty between the US and Philippines was raised earlier this week when Hillary Clinton promised the United States stands with the Philippines, although I do believe there are still some questions as to what exactly that means.

The US is also looking to arm up the Philippines, which is obviously necessary given the near absence of any legitimate naval capability by the Philippines. China responded to Hillary Clinton's remarks unfavorably, as one would expect.

China has recently completed 2 naval exercises in the South China Sea - one large exercise involving forces of the South Sea Fleet and a smaller naval exercise with Vietnam. Tensions between China and Vietnam are just as strained as they are between China and the Philippines due to similar incursions in the South China Sea. Vietnam has a stronger military and coastal security force than the Philippines does though, so the dynamic between those nations is very different.

As schedules would have it, it is time for our annual naval exercise with Vietnam while CARAT moves to the Philippines. The presence of the US Navy in the region is likely to add more political rhetoric to the tensions. The US is always forward deployed in the Pacific though, so there really isn't anything new here to note. For those who are curious, the Essex and George Washington will be at sea more over the next few months, but again that isn't new either - the calendar just changed to summer meaning it is time for the summer patrols.

It is hard to imagine an all out shooting war breaking out in the context of all this tension, indeed there is no public evidence anyone involved wants to see that happen based on political comments. With that said, there is also no evidence anyone is ready to back down, and we are at the stage where rules of engagement for the possibility of a military engagement is being discussed at the highest levels of government. That suggests to me some kind of incident may be looming large over the horizon.

As I have watched this unfold, my guess is this is intentionally leading to an incident. As unlikely as it may sound to some, the United States is in a terrible political position with these events and our credibility in the Pacific may be heading for a serious challenge. China is dead serious about these territories. As I have been watching all of this unfold, I am starting to think China may be looking to test the strength of our mutual defense treaty with the Philippines by inciting a major, but isolated incident. China knows a one time incident will not be responded to in any meaningful way by the United States, and also knows they can leverage our inaction in support of the Philippines as part of their political influence throughout the rest of the region.

If you are looking for a quick review of events unfolding in the South China Sea, I recommend this recap by Sen. James Inhofe (R-Okla.) over at The Hill. The map above can be used to reference where most of these activities are taking place relative to the Philippines. As you can see, these islands are nowhere near China, all of them 400-500+ miles away from China while being within the Philippines EEZ.

The Fire Scout Downed in Libya

Amy Butler of AviationWeek has the scoop on the Fire Scout downed in Libya. Basically, one of the 2 Fire Scouts operating from USS Halyburton (FFG 40) in support of NATOs military campaign against Libya was shot down while doing some targeting work. I only have a few thoughts.

First, while I can't say I like losing any aircraft, I am very pleased to see that field testing the Fire Scout included putting the system in a position where it could be shot down. Yes it sucks to lose a drone, but it is part of the evaluation process in determining the vulnerability, reliability, and contribution of these type of systems in combat zones.

Second, from the outside looking in, there are several things we don't know - like where USS Halyburton (FFG 40) was in relation to the drone when it went down. Is this how naval vessels will extend ranges in littoral operations, and is it possible that a better weapon systems on the LCS could leverage the Fire Scout with fires from the sea? USS Halyburton (FFG 40) has had a rather remarkable deployment to date, including quite a bit of excellent largely unreported work off Somalia before being deployed to Libya. It really is too bad for the Navy that NATO has done such a poor job allowing PAOs to contribute the stratcom side of that ships deployment - because the tech makes it more interesting than what much of the rest of the fleet is doing (unfortunate, but true).

Finally, there is a cost-value relationship at work with unmanned systems, and ultimately the Navy can make some value judgments regarding the loss of the Fire Scout vs the loss of an alternative platform performing a similar mission. I note the reaction to losing the drone was curiosity rather than outrage. I think it is important, because drones appear to give Navy commanding officers more flexibility in taking risks that might otherwise not be taken with a manned platform. I don't know about you, but I think it is a healthy thing that COs have the option of taking greater risks in combat - as long as that option is exercised wisely.

MARAD Is Selling the Superferrys

This makes no sense at all to me, except that when it comes to team players in government - MARAD is a bad teammate. MARAD is selling the Hawaii Superferrys, Alakai and Huakai, to the highest bidder. Here is how this is most likely to go down...

Some operator is likely to purchase the vessels, and sometime in the very near future the Navy will charter both vessels. The Navy will then pay $10-15 million more to company that operates those vessels than the Navy would pay if MARAD simply transferred the vessels to the Navy today. That is insane, but that is how all of this will almost certainly end up.

The US Navy is not big enough to turn down 2 high speed vessels they are only going to charter in the future anyway. The government owns these ships, what valid reason is there to give up ownership when the US Navy is currently buying similar ships new?

What should happen is the House Appropriations Committee should add language to the FY12 budget bill directing MARAD to transfer the two SuperFerries from Title XI holdings (bankrupcy) to the National Defense Reserve Fleet in a Retention Status with a militarily useful classification. That way the Navy can hold on to the two vessels until they can figure out where to get the money for upgrades and operations. There are all kinds of options really, simply forcing MARAD to reclassify the ships to recognize the fact that they are something useful to the military would be enough to salvage the situation, because if the vessels are in the NDSF fleet and militarily useful, then MARAD can not fire sale them like they are trying to do right now.

Congress is often highly critical of the military for lacking the flexibility to rapidly adapt to acquisition and procurement opportunities. In my opinion, the two Hawaii Superferry's present an opportunity for Congress to lead by example.

The link above is from the sales announcement listed in the Federal Register, and lists the details of both Superferry's. I don't know about you, but I can think of dozens of ways those two vessels could be better than an 85% solution for a great number of operational needs today.

Presidents Speech on Afghanistan

The President of the United States gave an important speech Wednesday night on the way forward in Afghanistan. If you wish to review or read the speech, a transcript is available on the White House website. As has become common with this President, the speech was well written, but the delivery didn't seem to connect with the audience as authentic. If you viewed the speech, I would be curious the impression you had - because my impression sitting in a room with several friends was this President is perhaps one of the first US Presidents in American history who could not independently articulate the strategic objective of the war in Afghanistan he has committed the military to fight on behalf of the nation.

I find myself in 100% support of the direction President Obama has chosen for Afghanistan, and see the drawdown of 33,000 US forces in that country as a positive first step. The death of Osama bin Laden; regardless of whether it was symbolic or substantive, achieved the last important strategic objective a large, prolonged military presence in Afghanistan needed to achieve. The future of Afghanistan will be largely decided by the government of Afghanistan, and American strategic interests in any future of Afghanistan at this point can be achieved through sustained, persistent engagement - an engagement that does not require a large land Army in Asia. As Libya has reminded us, persistent use of limited military power cannot defeat weak or failed states, but it can contain them while preventing bad guys from gaining power.

What disappointed me most about the announcement of drawdown of US military forces from Afghanistan was not the Presidents speech, rather much of the incoherent political reaction by various political leaders and pundits. Strategic thinking appears dead in defense policy today, and tactical thinking prevails in the political dialog. Below are a few notes to consider when contemplating what tonight's first step towards drawdown in Afghanistan actually means.

Obama's War

Barack Obama's bold move was to draw down 33,000 US military forces by summer of 2012, which will still leave about ~70,000 US military forces in Afghanistan. By comparison, the Bush administration high mark for total US military forces in Afghanistan was ~35,000, meaning even after this drawdown the United States will still have around twice as many military forces in Afghanistan than at any point during the Bush administration.

Strategic Victory

The political arguments crying foul because President Obama failed to discuss what victory looks like in Afghanistan is perhaps the most incoherent political argument of them all. Not only is it impossible for a single pundit discussing victory to articulate strategic victory in the context of strategic national interests, but they would be all alone even trying to articulate what victory in Afghanistan is because nobody can articulate it coherently. 70% of the defense think tank community is retired US Army, and across the entire right to left spectrum of credible Afghanistan analysis and discussion - every single one of those folks articulate or public articles and papers discussing strategic victory in Afghanistan in the context of avoiding strategic defeat.

The US Army shouldn't have to articulate in public what strategic victory is, and to prove it - they don't, but they do often discuss the danger of strategic defeat. The President of the United States didn't mention strategic victory in his speech and I don't believe for a second he could define it - much less articulate it in a speech. Political pundits who complain about the lack of a discussion regarding victory in Afghanistan cannot themselves articulate what victory is in Afghanistan, so why exactly is this considered a strong political criticism?

Credibility

There is concern that if the United States pulls out of Afghanistan, American credibility is diminished and it suggests somehow that America is in decline. In my opinion, any super power that fights a land war in Asia without a coherent strategic objective that can be articulated to the nations population is the mother of all signs that a nation is on a course of diminished credibility and declining power, and is certainly a bigger sign of serious trouble than a tactical adjustment like troop numbers on any military battlefield could ever be. When you believe that America cannot afford to "lose" a war in Afghanistan of all places, then you are the declinist who lacks confidence in America's position in the world today. Credibility for Afghanistan is primarily a domestic concern by politicians and pundits who believe it is retreating if you walk away from any fight, including fights where victory has limited strategic value. Credibility is not a legitimate battlefield concern.

Taliban Victory

The political argument that suggests the Taliban wins because they outlast us in Afghanistan unless we kill absolutely all of them doesn't make much sense to me. We overthrew the Taliban as the government of Afghanistan with less than a battalion of US forces in 2001, and somehow we now require a dozen brigades to prevent them from taking power? There is no evidence that suggests a small military presence couldn't keep the Taliban out of power, because there is already evidence that suggests it only takes a small military presence to remove the Taliban from power. No matter what the United States does from now until 2012, 2014, or even 2020 - tribal power will still be the dominating political power in Afghanistan. Whether the United States politically exploits unified tribal power or divided tribal power against the Taliban, the Taliban will have serious trouble consolidating power in Afghanistan as long as the US remains engaged. Even if the size of that engagement is far less than a dozen brigades, as long as it is bigger than a single battalion - I like our chances in preventing the enemy from achieving victory.

Let's Talk Strategy For a Change

There will be political criticism that President Obama broke ranks with certain Generals in regards to policy for Afghanistan. This audience is smarter than that, because we all know there are always Generals and Admirals on both sides of every debate. After 9+ years of following the advice of certain prominent Generals, the nation is still at war in Afghanistan. The suggestion that breaking the trend indicates a political mistake by the President is unsupported unless one believes it was always the plan to fight the longest US war in history in Afghanistan.

There are strategic arguments related to the use of military power in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Yemen, Pakistan, and even Somalia that have not been articulated as US political policy, and I believe that issue as part of a broader discussion of defense policy is just waiting to jump into the public debate as election season approaches. I strongly believe that many US military leaders would welcome a public defense policy debate, indeed would feel more empowered if they were unleashed in advocating strategic justification arguments on behalf of their service instead of defense budget arguments focused on winning their portion of the administrations budget pie.

For 16 of the last 22 years the United States has been fighting wars on the ground around the world, but over that same period since the cold war the world has changed considerably. The President has a real opportunity to turn the defense budget debate into a public policy and strategy debate that guides difficult spending choices in defense. As we move into election season, I think there would be enormous value to the President to move the defense discussion away from budget and towards policy, because I think he will find his policies are more congruent with the likely direction of a strategic discussion than they will be in a political defense debate framed in the context of government spending priorities.

This analysis doesn't focus in on the fine print of the Presidents speech, rather my take on some of the finer points I witnessed discussed as a result of the speech. Feel free to add your thoughts on the speech or my commentary in the comments below.

Site Stuff

I tried out the mobile viewing settings for the site, and wasn't very pleased. Part of it has to do with problems regarding the comments in the mobile settings, which I can probably fix if I make an effort to go through the code. The other part is I like accessing the links I have on my own site from my own phone. I use a Droid phone, and for the most part it looked OK but needs some tweaks.

For those of you who tried it, I would appreciate feedback here. I am getting a lot of traffic these days and a lot of interest in terms of advertising. I'm giving serious consideration to exploring my options there, and would appreciate feedback on that subject if you have any thoughts. This blog site not have a revenue problem because comment is free around here, but I am always open to audience input on these issues (as long as you respect the fact I am simply farming for ideas and advice rather than seeking instructions).

If there are any specific annoyances related to the site, please leave comments in this thread. I am going to actually try to make an effort to clean stuff up.

NATO and Means-End Reasoning

My thoughts on Gates’ NATO speech:

It is worth noting, however, that protection of Libyan civilians through airstrikes sits so far outside NATO’s founding purpose that the framers of the 1949 treaty that brought the alliance into existence would hardly recognize the mission. NATO is a tool that has been effectively repurposed since the end of the Cold War, but tools are not infinitely malleable. So while the alliance may not be the ideal tool for managing military intervention in Europe’s “near abroad,” that does not mean that the organization is — or risks becoming — useless. Instead of disparaging allies, it would make more sense for critics to consider what NATO can and cannot do, and adapt their expectations accordingly

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Austal's LCS Corrosion Problem

It started when Bloomberg reported the Navy had discovered “aggressive” corrosion on the USS Independence (LCS 2). There weren't many details in the original report, so I initially chalked this up to part of the learning curve both the Navy and Austal will suffer through with a new ship type built completely of aluminum. The story became more interesting to me as an observer when I saw the way Austal Chief executive Andrew Bellamy responded to the news.

Chief executive Andrew Bellamy said any corrosion on the vessel, known as a ''littoral combat ship'' for its ability to hug the shore, would be the fault of the operator or maintainer.

''We have built 230 vessels of this type that have not suffered from this type of problem … where the operator and the maintainer of the ship have followed the procedures in a thorough way,'' Mr Bellamy said. ''I suspect there is a problem in the area of operational maintenance if there is a galvanic corrosion issue.''

The rust claim comes weeks after the Perth-based Austal said it would sharpen its focus on the defence sector amid weakening demand for commercial boats.

Blame the Navy for poor maintenance because Austals first big warship runs into a problem none of their simple commercial ferry designs ever had? That seems like a really poor way to respond to problems encountered. My impression at the time this article was released is that the Navy was dealing with a rust problem, so to me this article was nothing more than a good laugh at the hubris of Austal.

But it turns out this isn't a simple rust problem, which was my mistake in following this story. Check out this remarkable press statement sales pitch by Austal.

Galvanic corrosion is an issue that has challenged U.S. warships since 1844, when the USS Michigan, the first iron-hulled Navy ship, entered service. Today, two common and robust solutions, impressed current cathodic protection systems and the use of strategically-placed sacrificial anodes, are in wide use throughout the world, particularly in ships where two different metals such as steel and aluminum are utilised in the one vessel.

As a specialist in aluminum shipbuilding, having built over 220 aluminum vessels for defence forces and commercial clients around the world since its formation in 1988, Austal is intimately familiar with the management of galvanic corrosion. An electrochemical process, galvanic corrosion occurs when two dissimilar metals, after being in electrical contact with one another, corrode at different rates.

According to company records, galvanic corrosion has not been a factor on any Austal built and fully maintained vessel, and our technical experts are eager to support any request to identify root causes of any corrosion issue in any aluminum naval vessel in service today. The Westpac Express, an Austal-built and fully maintained high-speed catamaran, has shuttled U.S. Marines throughout the Pacific Basin continuously for ten years, with a 99.7% availability over that period.

As Prime Contractor for Jackson, the third Independence-variant Littoral Combat Ship (LCS-6), Austal has a well-developed methodology for the management of galvanic corrosion, which it has deployed globally on behalf of its defense and commercial clients. If selected to provide post-delivery support for the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Class Services program, it is a straight forward process for Austal engineers to regularly conduct systematic reviews of the electrical grounding throughout each Austal-built vessel to detect and eliminate stray currents that might cause electrolysis between the stainless steel impeller housing and of the adjacent aluminum structure.

An integral part of any post-delivery support program for a high-performance, high-speed vessel such as the Independence-variant LCS is to provide a cadre of qualified maintainers who can help our Navy partners to deploy temporary sacrificial anodes every time the vessel is moored, and ensure that high-voltage maintenance equipment is properly grounded before use aboard ship. These are services that Austal’s skilled aluminum specialists, operating from six maintenance hubs in the Asia-Pacific, North America, South America, Europe and the Middle East, offer Austal customers every day.

With almost 2,200 current employees at Austal’s USA shipyard, with a future workforce planned of over 4,000, each and every Austal employee is committed to making the Littoral Combat Ship a success. Awarded a ten-ship contract in December 2010, Austal has eagerly assumed the role of Prime Contractor for the Independence-variant Littoral Combat Ships awarded under the 10 ship block buy contract, and, as a Prime Contractor for those 10 ships, Austal will always stand by its products and our Navy partners.

It turns out this is not rust, rather an electrolysis issue between the stainless steel waterjet parts and the aluminum hulls, and when the Navy calls an electrolysis problem “aggressive corrosion" that suggests to me the metal is completely gone - not rusted. In the case of LCS-2, the problem was apparently accelerated by stray currents in the hull from the electrical distribution system problems the ship has been having since it was turned over to the Navy. Normally an electrolysis problem would be prevented by the use of a Cathodic Protection System (CPS), but wouldn't you know it - USS Independence (LCS 2) doesn't have a CPS.

LCS-4 doesn't have one either, but apparently CPS is part of the lessons learned process and was included in the fixed-price contracts for Austal versions of the LCS beginning with LCS-6. LCS-2 will have the CPS installed at the next drydock period, while Austal has said a CPS will be added to LCS-4 before the ship is turned over to the Navy.

The question everyone seems to be asking is whether the JHSV could suffer the same issue. With all due respect to the Austal press statement, vessels built for Navy purposes have a great deal more technology potentially running electrical currents through the ships than commercial ferry's do, and Austal isn't exactly a world wide expert on building frigate sized navy ships. The stray currents in USS Independence (LCS 2) could easily reoccur in the JHSV creating similar problems if prevention isn't built into the design. The Westpac Express is a commercial design and the charter did not significantly add technology nor were changes made to Westpac Express that runs electrical power throughout the ferry, so Austal is making an apples to oranges comparison suggesting their immune from criticism because their simple commercial vessels don't have this problem.

I've heard from a few unofficial but relatively informed folks the JHSV does not have a cathodic protection system, and if that turns out to be true we could see the Navy move to address that issue before JHSV-1 conducts sea trials later this year. I'd be curious to know if Westpac Express has a CPS installed, or some other form of prevention is used at all.

I tend to think of this problem as the first public problem that is part of a steep learning curve process both the Navy and Austal were bound to run into with the Austal version of the Littoral Combat Ships, indeed I suspect there will be other public problems revealed over time that will require relatively simple, albeit costly, solutions. Is this a big deal? Hard to tell, but given both the problem and solution is well understood, in the context of unknowns yet to be discovered with LCS - to me this isn't really that big of a deal as long as the long term solutions effectively work as intended.

Mistrals Represent Politics and Industry, Not Military Power

By now everyone has likely heard that Russia and France have finalized the deal for the Mistral class amphibious ships. If you want to know more, I highly recommend this remarkably thorough article at Defense Industry Daily that covers just about every angle possible from the industry perspective.

As I have mentioned in the past, this deal is not a threat to US interests and the only threat that might exist to US allies is the possibility the ships could be used in a territorial dispute with Japan. With all due respect to Russia, in a territorial dispute involving conventional military power between Russia and Japan, the spirit of Admiral Togo Heihachiro will prevail in that fight every single time. The Mistrals won't be used in that way, or they will not survive. I suspect when the Mistrals are finally making a deployment, they will be used in much the same way everyone else uses large amphibious ships these days - acting as a command node for conducting soft power diplomacy missions and helping address 3rd world problems from offshore.

The deal between Russia and France is about politics and industry, and really isn't so much about military power like some politicians would like you to believe. I find myself in strong agreement with this Stratfor analysis.

Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov and Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov are visiting Paris to meet with French President Nicolas Sarkozy and other French government officials on June 20-21. The visit quickly follows the conclusion of an agreement between Russia and France for two French Mistral-class amphibious assault ships, worth $1.7 billion, that France has agreed to sell to Russia with the full technology transfer Moscow demanded. The ships would be built in France and delivered in 2014 and 2015, with the potential for another two to be built in Russian shipyards under French supervision.

The Russian officials’ visit is a chance to very publicly emphasize the Mistral deal, a boon for the Kremlin which wants to signal to the rest of Europe that it has a strong security relationship with France (part of its ongoing campaign to unsettle the Central Europeans and make them doubt the commitment of their West European NATO allies). It is also an opportunity to discuss several other deals the two countries are working on, covering energy, military and space technology cooperation. For France, building close ties with Russia is about ensuring that the evolving Berlin-Moscow relationship does not leave Paris unable to affect security issues on the continent.

The issue I intend to watch closely is how much Russian shipbuilder OSK will ultimately contribute and learn from the French in construction of these ships, and whether it is even possible to get a base of subcontractors stable enough to support construction of large navy vessels in Russia. All indications are if any new Mistrals are built in Russia, they would be built by the recently announced new STX shipyard being built in St. Petersburg.

The Russian shipbuilding industry can really only build two types of naval vessels - submarines and small frigates/corvettes. Exports of these types of ships to various nations sustained the industry through the really bad years following the cold war, but export orders for Russian naval vessels are drying up as most of the world is expanding domestic shipbuilding markets. Is the Mistral a program that can truly kickstart the Russian shipbuilding industry towards better quality and production techniques in the 21st century, or is this a gamble unlikely to pay off? I tend to believe it will ultimately be a small step in the right direction, and not the leap Russian political leaders hope.