JHSVs Are Not Coastal Patrol Vessels

Yesterday I highlighted that over the last 4 years, the operational tempo for FFGs, LSDs, and PCs are all very, very high. The reason is not difficult to explain, these are the platforms the Navy is using to execute maritime strategy globally at the low end of the spectrum of national threats and naval responsibilities.

I fully support the Navy wanting to retire the Perry class FFs. They are a money sink of maintenance costs, other operational costs, and crew costs that includes training on very old technology. Had the Navy upgraded the frigates instead of remove the 'one-arm-bandit' capability 10 years ago, my opinion would be different. Hindsight is 20/20, as long as we live and learn I think it is OK to let these ships retire as they reach end of life.

The LSDs are great ships, but what impresses me more are the officers who command LPDs and LSDs. I am a huge supporter of Amphib COs, because I realize that the very high operational tempo globally over the last two decades translates into them being in a unique position to be at sea more than other COs; and usually in all the places where the rest of the Navy eventually finds itself only during bad times. Amphib COs are the ambassadors of the country to many places globally and represent the best tradition of what naval power means to a superpower building cooperative relationships. While it is unpopular to say in the Navy, Amphib COs make due at high operational tempos despite usually being underfunded to match the high OPTEMPO, and btw, usually with the sailors who wanted to be a on major surface combatant but didn't score high enough to make it. In other words, Amphib COs typically get the short, thin straw in today's Navy right before they get asked to drink from the biggest cup.

It is why among SWOs, I often find officers who served on Amphibs to be the most creative. One persons opinion, but adaptation takes practice and Amphib COs get plenty of practice adapting to tough situations - more so in my opinion than SWOs on surface combatants who go into almost every situation over the last decade with capabilities and support well beyond what is necessary to execute the required mission. I'm sure Navy leaders will disregard what I'm saying, but there is a very real bias against SWOs who are Amphib sailors today by Navy leaders, and I think it is a more serious problem for the Navy than people want to admit.

How many surface warfare officers currently ranked Vice Admiral or higher served on an amphibious ship during their entire career? According to their biographies... none. Why is it the only major flag officers who have served on an amphibious ship were from special warfare or aviation? Ponder that thought as you observe who gets Major Command and promotions this year.

I am a strong believer in Coastal Patrol vessels, but not because I favor PCs - because I don't actually think the Navy should actually build traditional PCs. I like PCs though, because I like that they allow Lt Cmdr's the experience of command at sea. Any officer who has effectively commanded one of the forward deployed PCs off KAOOT and ABOT at any point over the last 5 years is probably one of our best young officers. That job has probably been the hardest SWO job in the Navy over the past decade, as it is the true front line at sea in the wars we are in.

I think the Navy understands very well the value of that experience, but rightfully refuses to invest in ships that don't meet a minimum standard requirement for endurance. I made the point that the Navy intends to alleviate the pressure on these ships at sea by replacing their mission sets with Littoral Combat Ships and Joint High Speed Vessels. In a recent interview of Bob Work by Chris Cavas, that is basically the point Bob makes.

The theme for the Navy is balancing all of these different missions. We think we were able to come up with a pretty good plan in aviation and shipbuilding, which reflected these budget priorities. You'll see, for example, improvements at the low end because we've stabilized the LCS program and increased the Joint High Speed Vessel program quite significantly, to 23 vessels.

There was a big debate within the department on patrol craft, PCs. People said these are very good for irregular warfare. But when we looked at it we said we wanted to have self-deployable platforms that have a lot of payload space that you can take to the fight whatever you need - SEALs, Marines, [a] Riverine squadron. So we decided to increase the Joint High Speed Vessel program, at the same time SLEPing [service life extension program] the 13 PCs we have, so they're going to be with us well into the 2020s. But the Joint High Speed Vessels will take over for them, because we like their self-deployability aspects - they can be a sea base, they can be an Africa Partnership Station, they're extremely flexible.

I disagree with Bob Work in many ways in this quote. The Littoral Combat Ship program has yet to be stabilized. The Navy has two ships at sea and two ships under construction. We have seen 2 ships canceled while under construction, 1 ship deleted from a budget, and something like 4-6 ships removed from budgets since this program started? Even after the new plan was announced last year, the FY 2011 shipbuilding plan released Feb 1, 2024 added 2 more Littoral Combat Ships on top of this most recent plan - meaning the Littoral Combat Ship is so "stable" the current plan is officially - only 12 days old. That is not stability!

The budget situation has me conceding that self-deploying vessels are the only way to go. I say this because there is not enough money to buy the kind of logistics ships needed to support ships that don't emphasize endurance. I also have my eye on the Pacific, and we need ships with endurance out that direction. I think 4,000 nm should be the threshold, which is about what the Littoral Combat Ships can do.

I also think Bob Work has the vision right regarding the value of payload space. That is a concept I've been calling for on the blog from the beginning - motherships will be in the 21st century what aircraft carriers were in the 20th century. Manned and unmanned systems as payloads is the way ahead, and by unmanned systems I mean vehicles and/or/with weapon systems.

There is nothing more important to enforcing peace at sea than a qualified, well trained sailor. The necessity to put manpower to sea when necessary, or go unmanned with ISR or combat power as needed is the kind of flexibility the future Navy needs. I do not believe these needs are only at the low end, but I do think the Navy will find that they get more punch value from low end vessels with this approach as the systems architecture for payloads mature.

I have serious concerns with the idea that a JHSV can replace a PC. These are two very different platforms that perform two very different roles. I do not have confidence that a JHSV is the right platform to meet the vital sea control requirement against irregular warfare threats, and the Littoral Combat Ship is touted with the promise that it is on par with frigates, not PCs (insert joke here?)

I believe the Navy is missing a key piece in their vision for global maritime maintenance for coastal patrol and sea control against irregular surface threats, a piece neither the LCS nor the JHSV fits because of cost and capability - respectively. What is needed is a platform with the endurance to self-deploy, the speed to be a warfighter against irregular maritime challenges, the space to be flexible enough to conform to the needs of the warfighter in the ugly littorals, and manned capable to put peacemakers in a position to execute their mission. With flexible space, the degree to which the ship needs to be armed can be customized as necessary, and developed over time as technologies evolve for the LCS. Most importantly, the ship must be low cost. In the 21st century, the Navy has already built this ship.

SeaFighter (FSF-1)

No ship is more mythical, thus less understood, than Sea Fighter (FSF-1). Ask someone in the Navy what they know about Sea Fighter and unless they have actually been part of the crew, it is a good bet they will get some details wrong or claim ignorance. Ask a reporter or take my word for it, finding accurate information about Sea Fighter today is not easy at all.

Sea Fighter was the first Navy ship certified under NVR, in fact the same NVR that impacted both General Dynamics and Lockheed Martin when developing the Littoral Combat Ship came as a result of designing and building Sea Fighter. Sea Fighter has a 10,000 cubic ft bay, hit 54 knots in sea trials, can sustain 40 knots for over 2000nm in sea state 3, and sustain 50 knots if necessary. Sea Fighter has endurance of at least 4400 nm. Sea Fighter can sustain 20 knots on diesels. Sea Fighter is the only first in class ship designed and built by the Navy in the 21st century that met every construction requirement and cost requirement.

Sea Fighter has plenty of room for growth. Not only is the mission bay on Sea Fighter larger than that of USS Freedom (LCS-1), but the design allows for weight growth utilizing the bay that can hold twelve 20-ft ISO containers.

Most people in the Navy have no idea what an amazing piece of technology they have in Sea Fighter (FSF-1), because ONR never delivered the ship. ONR's only job is to develop new technologies and deliver them to the fleet. Why have they not delivered Sea Fighter (FSF-1)? Sea Fighter is currently being managed by PMR-51, which is ONR's Low-Observable/Counter Low-Observable Program Office. If you examine the most recent pictures of Sea Fighter more closely (you can use the two pictures on Sea Fighter in this post), you will notice the stealthy modifications to the hull including moving the exhaust from the side of the ship to the top of the ship on each side of the helicopter landing area. There are actually several modifications that can be observed, and the potential for further modifications for low observability and reducing radar cross section exists.

The taxpayer investment into Sea Fighter is probably around $200 million so far, although because PMR-51s budget is classified, the true dollar amount is unknown. $200 million for a first in class ship? There is no way this ship with necessary electronics and comms couldn't be mass produced at $150 million, and I'd bet the actual cost would be lower.

Sea Fighter is classified as a High Speed Naval Craft, same as the JHSV. Sea Fighter is classified for trans-oceanic operation with no weather routing required below Sea State 6. This is just about the same as the requirements for JHSV.

Obviously the JHSV is a larger vessel, and I am in complete agreement they are different ships for different purposes - JHSV is a fast payload transport vessel while Sea Fighter is a fast coastal patrol vessel. The Navy is estimating the cost of the JHSV, which is not NVR compliant, to be an estimated $195 million each. In my opinion, the JHSV does not represent a good PC replacement vessel, and the Navy should look at Sea Fighter as the future replacement for the PCs. To make JHSV NVR compliant would cost money, and it isn't necessary - Sea Fighter already is NVR compliant.

Sea Fighter is perfect as a self-deploying coastal patrol and sea control vessel and it fits the desired flexible capability wanted for future naval vessels. It would make a lot of sense for the Navy to look into the possibility of teaming with the Coast Guard for their OPC program, which the Sea Fighter is also well designed for (did you know the Sea Fighter folks have looked into a Coast Guard version of the design).

I see a future fleet that has to be dynamic with space on the low end and designed for open architecture flexibility on the high end. All of these ships must be capable of self deploying. As this fleet is developed, we should not try fitting round pegs into square holes, which is what the Navy would be doing by trying to turn a JHSV into a PC. There are excellent alternatives, and Sea Fighter is one of the best kept secrets hiding in plain sight that should be evaluated.