The AEGIS Standard Towards Strategic Balance

Many years ago, and specifically the year I turned 21 years old, that uncle flew me out to his place in Los Angeles to show me a bit about his profession as a global businessman. That uncle was often referred to as the rich uncle, but that's not exactly true. He was remarkably smart and successful pulling in money like it grew on the lawn, but he equally blew through money like his wallet was on fire. In those 5 days he spent the equivalent of my annual salary at the time each day. It was obscene yet exciting, but it also explained why he never got married and never started saving a penny until he reached his late 60s.

I had recently started a new company at the time, and he wanted to show me what he did. His plan was simple: I was going to sit beside him for several days as he met with some of the world’s top bankers. Keep in mind this was in 1997; the US economy was booming, and the biggest concern in terms of global shock came from unknowns like Y2K. Y2K was the topic of these meetings, and in every meeting I was introduced as his Y2K expert (which was true).

I learned a lot, no question, and many things I learned that week have stuck with me through the years, but there was one 3 hour meeting I attended where those gathered discussed the shift in the late 70s away from the gold standard towards the global economy today, and over time I have come to accept their argument as a quiet truth understood by those on the global side of big money: The Gold Standard was replaced by the proverbial F-16 Standard in 1979 to save the world during a global energy crisis. It was at that time America's debt economy was born.

Because of overwhelming US military power and because the US was willing to use force when necessary to protect interests, it was believed that no competitor to the US dollar would ever emerge until a competitor to the proverbial F-16 emerged first. Keep in mind, these are bankers and strategy consists mostly of risk management in their world. The only safe bet in the emerging global economic order that included many new players participating as resource contributors was the raw power of the United States to back the US currency by force.

After watching the banking crisis of the last few years and the war of the last decade, I frequently wonder if the proverbial F-16 standard even exists in the minds of global bankers anymore.

I thought about this as I read Robert Kaplan this morning in the Financial Times.

The financial world is obsessed with stock market gyrations and bond yields. But the numbers that matter in the long run are those of U.S. warships. Asia has been at the centre of the world economy for decades because security there can be taken for granted, and that is only because of the dominance of the U.S. navy and air force in the western Pacific.

Because 90 per cent of all commercial goods traded between continents travel by sea, the U.S. navy, which does more than any other entity to protect these lines of communication, is responsible for globalisation as we know it.

There is no guarantee that this situation will last, however. In the 1980s era of high Reaganism, the U.S. Navy boasted close to 600 warships. In the 1990s, following the collapse of the Berlin Wall, that number fell to about 350. The U.S. Navy’s current strength is 284 warships. In the short term that number may rise to 313 because of the introduction of littoral combat ships. Over time, however, it may fall to about 250, owing to cost overruns, the need to address domestic debt and the decommissioning of ageing warships in the 2020s. Meanwhile, the bipartisan quadrennial defence review last year recommended that the U.S. move toward a 346-ship navy to fulfil its global responsibilities.

There is a big difference between a 346-ship U.S.navy and a 250-ship navy - the difference between one kind of world order and another.

The very next statement Kaplan writes in this article is important. Kaplan says "Armies respond to unexpected contingencies, but it is navies and air forces that project power." This is similar to something I believe to be a constant of 21st century national security policy; which is that armies project force, but it is navies and air forces that project power.

In my opinion, this is where Malcolm Turnbull and Hugh White lack detail in their arguments for strategic balance in East Asia. Both suggest the best and most realistic strategic outcome for East Asia is one in which the major powers are in balance, but the term balance is used in generic terms and without context. Balance does not mean equal, and it is where things aren't equal that matter the most in the strategic balancing equation.

Does a world where China becomes the worlds largest economy strike me as a strategic concern? Honestly, by itself; nope. China is the most important trading partner to the United States today, and I see that achievement for China in alignment with US economic advancement in the 21st century, and economic advancement by the US has historically also driven social and technological advancement for the United States as well. With that said, the brilliant and creative Stan Lee was right - with great power comes great responsibility.

What concerns me much more is if China fails to mature within the liberal global order over the next few decades and simultaneously attempts to achieve primacy of the global oceans through naval power. If indeed the best and most realistic strategic outcome for East Asia is one in which the major powers are in balance, then it must also be stated that the strategic balance Turnbull believes is best cannot be achieved should China achieve primacy over US Naval power, and I would go further to suggest US naval primacy is today the single condition that allows strategic balance between the major powers if/when China achieves primacy in other areas of national power like economy.

As the global economic trade winds shift from the Middle East to Asia, other shifts are taking place as well. With the emergence of alternative energy, the proverbial F-16 standard - once the replacement for the Gold Standard that placed the US dollar at the center of the global energy currency market - is itself slowly being replaced by the proverbial AEGIS Standard that protects the global trade lines-of-communication towards insuring global currencies can exchange in the spirit of commerce in the 21st century market.

To use a simplistic and imperfect historical analogy as bloggers tend to do, I would suggest strategic balance in East Asia is achieved as long as the US emerges as Athens and China emerges as Sparta, and the global security environment and global economy is managed better than it was by the ancient and modern Greeks respectively. If that happens, the 21st century has an opportunity for a prosperous and promising future. However, if China strives to become Athens and US policy continues to be driven by the Spartans in the DoD; Australia, everyone else in the Pacific, and Washington, DC should not only be preparing for, but expecting war.

US Primacy in Asia: Not Inevitable

With a hat tip to the Lowy Institute Blog, these are some interesting comments by Malcolm Turnbull, the Australian Shadow Minister for Communications and Broadband, and a very high ranking leader within Australia's Liberal Party.

This is not the typical party line one often sees in the US or Australia, which from a political view, more frequently looks into the future of Asia in the context of US retaining superiority even when nodding to US relative decline. In this speech, Turnbull repeats a new tone on the subject, first noted by Sam Roggeveen last month, and again yesterday by calling for the pursuit of a future regional balance in Asia.

As Henry Kissinger recently reminded us, history is far from bunk in China “No other country can claim so long a continuous civilisation, or such an intimate link to its ancient past and classical principles of strategy and statesmanship.”

That is why when Deng Xiao Ping opened China up to the world in 1979 he invoked the example of the 15th century Admiral Zheng He who led great voyages across the Indian Ocean. In those days, an open and confident China was the world’s strongest nation. When later emperors closed China off to the world, Deng reminded the hardliners, China became weak and began a decline that ended with 150 years of humiliating invasion, colonisation and exploitation by stronger nations.

A humiliation that in the 20th century included the brutality of the Japanese occupation and rape of Nanjing, and in the 19th, the Opium Wars which were the equivalent of the Medellin Cartel sending a nuclear submarine up the Potomac and threatening, successfully, to destroy the Capitol and White House unless the US disbanded the Drug Enforcement Agency.

China drank deep and long from the well of bitterness and defeat. And so when Mao Ze Dong announced his triumph from atop Tien An Men in 1949 his first words were Zhong Guo ren min zanqilai le - the Chinese people have stood up.

So it is no surprise that as China becomes richer it seeks to strengthen its military capacity. Those who interpret this as necessarily meaning a stronger China is a more aggressive one should reflect on that history and recent events.

China lost in the 19th century vast tracts of land in what is now Siberian Russia - the Amurskaya region for example. These thefts were ratified in unequal treaties in 1858 and 1860. Recognising that depopulating yet resource rich Siberia may constitute an opportunity in the future, China could have decided to leave those treaties as illegitimate artifacts of its century of humiliation, to be redressed when times were propitious.

Instead it has chosen to renegotiate and settle the Sino-Russian borders with minor adjustments. Hardly evidence for imminent territorial expansion.

And as Kissinger has also pointed out, unlike the USSR or even the US, China does not seek to persuade other countries to adopt its values, let alone its system of Government.

The central role of trade in China’s prosperity also argues for its rise to remain peaceful. In 2010 China’s trade was 55 per cent of its GDP - the same as for Britain in the 1870s, the era of the Pax Britannica, and five times larger than trade in the US economy of the 1950s and 1960s when American economic dominance was greatest. Given the importance of a stable economy in the regime’s legitimacy, China’s rulers themselves have more to lose than almost anyone from conflict that disrupts global economic flows.

The best and most realistic strategic outcome for East Asia must be one in which the powers are in balance, with each side effectively able to deny the domination of the other - a scenario which Hugh White has written about extensively in the recent past.

With its energy and resource security depending on long global sea lanes, it is hardly surprising that China would seek to enhance its naval capacity. Suggestions that China’s recent launch of one aircraft carrier and plans to build another are signs of a new belligerence are wide of the mark.

In that regard, I disagree with the underlying premise of the 2009 Australian White Paper that we should base our defence planning and procurement on the contingency of a naval war with China in the South China Sea. Prejudice or wishful thinking is not a substitute for coolly rational analysis.

As I said in London, this is no time for another “long telegram” or talk of containment. It makes no sense for America, or Australia, to base long-term strategic policy on the proposition that we are on an inevitable collision course with a militarily aggressive China.

Yet remarkably, while all of us galahs in the political petshop are talking about the rise of Asia, many are apparently laboring under the misapprehension that while everything can change in the economic balance in our region, nothing will change in strategic terms.

In other words, even though China is about to become the world’s largest economy and is actually in the centre of East Asia, nonetheless the United States will remain the dominant power in the region, in the same way it has been since 1945 and even more so since the collapse of the USSR in 1991.

Au contraire.

Plus ça change, plus c’est la meme chose is not a sound basis on which to build Australia’s foreign policy.

Rather, our strategic response to the rise of China therefore should be to continue to deepen our engagement with that nation and with our other neighbours, as friends even if not as allies, and at the same time hedge against improbable but adverse future contingencies, as opposed to seeking to contain (futilely in all likelihood) a rising power.

Of course cool heads are required on all sides. China needs to be more transparent about its goals in the region and on the basis of that build confidence with its neighbours so that misunderstandings can be avoided.

In that light, the decision to host up to 2500 marines at an Australian army base in Darwin could hardly be regarded as a threat to China (just as Australian naval ships exercising with the PLA navy was presumably not regarded by the US as a threat). After all there are over 60,000 American service personnel including 17,000 marines in Japan and Korea - on China’s doorstep in comparison to Darwin.

China’s prickly reaction reflected not the foreshadowed deployment itself, but the context briefed out by the White House - that that this was part of a strategy to stand up to growing Chinese economic and strategic power, a spin reflected in most media commentary despite being contrary to common sense (not to speak of geographic reality).

It suits President Obama’s domestic agenda to be seen to muscle up to China, even if the additional muscling does not bear too much analysis. But an Australian Government needs to be careful not to allow a doe-eyed fascination with the leader of the free world to distract from the reality that our national interest requires us truly (and not just rhetorically) to maintain both an ally in Washington and a good friend in Beijing - which is, after all, our most important trading partner and a principal reason why our unemployment rate is half that of North America or Europe.

If extravagant professions of loyalty and devotion to the United States strike a somewhat awkward note for many Australian ears, how do we imagine they sound in the capitals of our neighbours? And the same may be said in respect of equally extravagant compliments paid to Beijing. Australian leaders should never forget that great powers regard deference as no more than their due.

I have less interest in Australian politics than I do US politics, at least on this topic, because for the most part it is infrequent to see political leaders make bold statements with purpose and wisdom. Some of the issues raised in this speech represent a rare exception.

From a strategic perspective, I note that - finally - we see a legitimate political leader (and as expected, outside the US) at least attempting to raise the topic of policy options should US primacy not be maintained in the Pacific.

Hugh White has been raising the topic for some time, and as he articulated very well in his recent Obama Doctrine article in the Wall Street Journal, President Obama has made clear it is the policy of the United States to resist China's challenge to US primacy in Asia, using all the instruments of its power to strengthen and perpetuate the preeminent leadership the US has exercised in the region for decades. In a news conference in Canberra, Australia, on Nov. 16, President Obama described it as a mistake to suggest the U.S. fears China or is seeking to isolate the world’s most populous nation. He said, “The main message that I’ve said not only publicly but also privately to the Chinese is that with their rise comes increased responsibilities.” He went on to say, “It’s important for them to play by the rules of the road.”

Which is accurate, except it is also accurate to note that US policy is intended to insure they are US sanctioned rules and a road the US maintains some control over.

From Hugh White's recent contribution in the New York Times.

Everything now depends on how China responds. Optimists hope that Beijing will back off in the face of American resolve. Pessimists fear they will push back, escalating strategic rivalry between the world’s two strongest states and threatening the future peace and stability of Asia. Even if the optimists are right in the short term, the longer-term trends favor the pessimists. Historians may well look back at this as the moment that U.S.-China rivalry became overt and unstoppable. The consequences could be disastrous for everyone, including America. China’s economic scale makes it the most formidable strategic adversary America has ever confronted.

Many believe that America has no choice because the only alternative to U.S. primacy is Chinese hegemony. But is that right? Does America need to dominate Asia in order to stop China dominating it? Or could America balance and limit China’s power, while still allowing a rising China more space? Might there be a way to prevent Chinese hegemony and still avoid outright rivalry? We should start asking these questions now, because we are running out of time to answer them.

The Diplomat recently described Hugh White as the Australian Canary. Maybe, but I'm more interested in who will be the US canary. The Republican candidates, one of which is likely to replace Barack Obama unless the President can learn economics in the next 12 months, are almost certain to adopt the Obama doctrine for Asia that centers on US primacy. All evidence suggests that US political leaders cannot take any political stand except one that focuses on US primacy in Asia now and forever. This is a fools gold, but no one ever said politics wasn't foolish.

So we are left to search for other leaders, whether civilian or military, who are ready to promote visions of Americas future foreign policy in Asia and around the world that is congruent with the very real possibility that China may indeed have the largest economy in the world by 2025 - just 15 years from now. If China becomes the worlds largest economy, would that disrupt American primacy in Asia? President Obama's policy record isn't very good, indeed he isn't running a reelection campaign based on his record in case you haven't noticed, so there is certainly no evidence this new Obama Doctrine for Asia will be successful. There is also little evidence that anyone is thinking about a Plan B.

As China builds up military resources and capabilities commensurable with their economic growth, how should the US respond? Whose strategic vision of the future includes US prosperity and security regardless of whether China is the largest economy in the world or not?

Where Was the Sea Base?

Military Times has a six-part series of articles up on what they call The Secret War in Africa. It is a provocatively named series, and technically accurate as what the series has done to date is reveal the unknown details of previously reported but never detailed military activities in Africa - mostly Somalia. The 6th article is expected next week.

This is the 5th article in the series, and it involves a topic worth discussing here.

The U.S. operators were in trouble. Deep trouble. Along with some Ethiopian troops, a “really small” number of U.S. personnel were hunting a high-value target near the town of Bargal in Somalia’s autonomous Puntland region when they came under heavy fire that not only prevented them from killing or capturing the target but also pinned them down, according to several sources.

Running out of options on June 1, 2007, the operators called the destroyer Chafee sailing off the coast. In response, Chafee fired more than a dozen rounds from its 5-inch gun, a senior Pentagon official told Stars and Stripes (without mentioning that the mission was a desperate bid to rescue U.S. troops in Somalia). That naval gunfire — a rarity in the modern age — enabled the United States and Ethiopian troops “to break contact” and get away, a senior intelligence official said.

When I read this, I remembered this incident was reported and that I had discussed back in June of 2007; in fact I distinctly remember Jeff Schogol describing the Navy using gunfire support as "Old School."

I remember that incident because I recall thinking about how the US Navy had the USS Carter Hall (LSD 50) somewhere near that region and yet was using a destroyer to support forces ashore. Now maybe in that case it was smart to use a destroyer for a little naval fire support, because as the article notes - it solved the problem.

But hindsight being what it is, I do have serious questions if the US Navy leverages the flexibility of the amphibious ships well in modern irregular warfare situations like offshore of Somalia. Does anyone honestly think it is a good idea to put a $2 billion ship like USS Chafee (DDG 90) in green water for fire support? Our destroyer force is being primarily resourced to fight sophisticated air targets, not shoot guns to shore in littorals which are always the most risky.

What a false choice current US force structure forces on warfighters for gunfire support - either send in $3 billion DDG-1000s with advanced gun systems or send in the less expensive, terribly armed 57mm hauling LCS. Honestly, where are Reapers on LHDs, because right now the only other option is to task the RW community for their capabilities.

I encourage folks to read the whole Military Times article and give it some serious thought. When I read that article, I ask myself why the US Navy and US Marine Corps spends so much money building and maintaining amphibious ships to deploy structured air-sea-land battalions if the MEUs are unable to accomplish the sustained irregular warfare missions by sea as described in that article. That situation in 2007-2009 off Somalia appears to have been crying for a Sea Base, and yet none existed. Why?

It seems to me that scenario is both the past and the future of irregular warfare in any ungoverned or weakly governed littoral nation, and if expeditionary forces (amphibious readiness groups) aren't properly configured to be relevant for the missions found in that situation - maybe Marines are no longer relevant because Marines are not organized towards the most probable mission sets.

Then again, perhaps they are organized but are poorly utilized, because using Marines for the work as described in that article would appear to require as many changes to policy as much as it does changes to doctrine.

Lots of angles for conversation here I think.

An Influence Squadron!

Exciting:

Russia is sending a flotilla of warships to its naval base in Syria in a show of force which suggests Moscow is willing to defend its interests in the strife-torn country as international pressure mounts on President Bashar al-Assad's government.

Arab League sanctions and French calls for the establishment of humanitarian zones in Syria have increased international pressure on Assad to end bloodshed that the United Nations says has killed 3,500 people during nine months of protests against his rule.

Russia, which has a naval maintenance base in Syria and whose weapons trade with Damascus is worth millions of dollars annually, joined China last month to veto a Western-backed U.N. Security Council resolution condemning Assad's government.

Izvestia newspaper reported on Monday, citing retired Russian Admiral Viktor Kravchenko, that Russia plans to send its flagship aircraft carrier the "Admiral Kuznetsov" along with a patrol ship, an anti-submarine craft and other vessels.

"Having any military force apart from NATO is very beneficial for the region as it prevents the outbreak of armed conflict," Kravchenko, who was navy chief of staff from 1998-2005, was quoted as saying by Izvestia.

An indication that Russia continues to support the regime, and also that any multilateral effort to conduct a no fly zone regime change would have to go through a venue other than the United Nations Security Council. Still, it's a risky move, because if Assad falls, the new regime will likely remember the visit of the Kuznetsov for just as long as the Indians remembered the deployment of the USS Enterprise into the Bay of Bengal in 1971. You have to wonder about the decision-making procedures in the Kremlin; how much information do the Russians have about the foundations of the regime, and how much of this is generated by anti-NATO animus as opposed to an effort to engage in regional influence?

Winding Down the Year

I'm going to slow down my posting as we approach the holiday season. The reason is actually two fold. First, my wife is due to have our third child at the end of December, and I still have many things to get done before then. Second, Christmas is approaching and I am absolutely committed to finish reading all the books I have purchased and not yet read this year so I can restock via a delivery from Santa.

With the budget basically being a 90 day hanging curve-ball, I figure now is as good a time as any to step back awhile.

But I also believe now is a good time because the Navy is also winding down for the year. The USS George H. W. Bush (CVN 77) is on her way home while the USS George Washington (CVN 73) has wrapped up her patrol, and not likely to sustain another patrol until closer to the new year.

The USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) will soon deploy, but otherwise there are few US Navy deployments I have my eye on, although there is one in particular I think everyone should be following closely.

On Sunday, January 8th the USS Bataan (LHD 5) deployment will be 291 days (41 weeks and 4 days) old. On that day the USS Bataan (LHD 5) will pass the USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72) as the longest big deck deployment since the Vietnam War (290 days in 2003).

Friday, January 20th the USS Bataan (LHD 5) deployment will be 303 days (43 weeks and 2 days) old. On that day the USS Bataan (MHD 5) will pass the USS Okinawa (LPH 3) as the longest amphibious ship deployment ever (302 days in 1990).

The Navy public affairs folks have informed me the USS Bataan (LHD 5) will come close but not break the record for longest deployment since WWII set by USS Midway (CV 41) at 327 days in 1973. My experience with Murphy's Law is that you never say never.

If for any reason the USS Bataan (LHD 5) finds itself in contingency mode and unable to return on schedule, the day the ship would potentially break the USS Midway (CV 41) record of 327 days in 1973 would be February 15th, 2012 - the day after Valentine's day 2012.

It is noteworthy, the USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72) came as part of the support for Operation Iraqi Freedom, while USS Okinawa (LPH 3) happened as a result of the response to the first Gulf War. The USS Bataan (LPD 5) deployment went early in response to Libya, which we downplayed politically as only a minor military operation, and is staying late because of a legitimate lack of amphibious ships to cover rotation requirements for ARGs. If you recall, the extended deployment of Bataan ARG was announced early by the Navy who because of Libya, was forced to keep the USS Kearsarge (LHD 3) ARG late from August 27, 2024 through May 16, 2024 - a nearly 9 month deployment.

This is the Tipping Point. The Naval services - all three of them - are doing more with less for longer periods of time, and do not have the support necessary on Capitol Hill to sustain the requirements being driven by Presidential policy. Something has to change - either on the policy side or the resource side, but either way something has to change.

Something to think about.