Sea Basing Slows Down,Studies Continue

Apparently last year the Navy and Marine Corps completed two MPF(F) studies. Inside the Navy (subscription) has an interesting article up with some insights of those studies, and word that a third study is underway.

The first study was designed to assess MPF(F) alternatives in the context of a mature campaign. It examined operations under three alternatives: the MPF(F) program of record; a similar collection of ships without organic big-deck amphibious shipping; and an MPF(F) with legacy Maritime Prepositioning Squadron-capabilities “enhanced with the means to conduct in-stream offloads/transfers at a distance of 25 [nautical miles] from the shore,” he said.

“The [first] study concluded that campaign objectives were met by all alternatives with varying levels of risk,” Doyle said.

The second study was designed to help determine how to distribute large-deck aviation ships between the amphibious force and MPF(F), he said. The effort assessed nine different amphibious/MPF(F) force mixes in 29 events across a range of military options -- including aggregating to support a major-combat operation.

The study concluded that “several” -- but not all -- of the alternatives “were capable of satisfying the majority of requirements generated by the 29 discrete events over a two year period,” Doyle said.

However, he noted, “there was insufficient residual capacity to support increased forward presence requirements (e.g. increased numbers of deployed expeditionary strike groups, global fleet stations, etc.) as envisioned in the Maritime Operating Concept.

What are we learning from this report? Easy, Sea Basing is not simple, will not be simple, and the desire to rush into it has finally been set aside. It was claimed early in the process Sea Basing will be at least as difficult as it was to bring aviation to sea in the early 20th century, so what is wrong with taking the time to get it right with so much money at stake? I think the slow down is a good thing. Here are the details provided on the third study.

Doyle said the third MPF(F) study -- the one under way now -- was designed to develop a baseline model for a specific major-combat-operation scenario. The baseline, he said, will serve as the initial assessment of the joint-force capability required for the scenario.

This third study looks at two MEB assault echelons working with an MPF(F) program of record and a legacy Maritime Prepositioning Squadron in support of forcible-entry operations, he said.

Build a base at sea or use the sea as a base? That is the question. Is anyone asking that question, or are we concerned with the specific metrics as determined by Rumsfeld's bunch following Turkey? The very last sentence of the article appears to highlight why Sea Basing needs to take it very slow.

Yet he noted that the Marine Corps’ perspective is “that other unresolved issues remain that are outside of the scope of these three studies, to include how crews for MPF(F) shipping will be trained/sourced and specifics as to how maintenance of the ships and embarked equipment will be conducted.”

Please don't spend $14-18 billion on this program until very difficult questions like this have very good answers. I still believe both the Navy and Marine Corps would be better off taking the slow approach. Build Forward Operating Bases at Sea to support the Long War, and take the time to mature the technologies that allow a joint service approach that allows everyone to utilize the sea as base.

While it is unclear what will be decided from the studies, that a closer look is taking place is a good thing. Sea Basing is an important future capability, but we believe it will be more if the Turkey example is seen as the exception, and not the rule. The fact is, the Sea Base needs to be designed to best utilize traditionally loaded vessels of which is most of the commercial shipping fleet worldwide, and hopefully not try to create some new limited capability that lacks backwards compatibility with legacy platforms.

Grasping the Delusion by Believing in Illusions

I'm really enjoying the March 08 Proceedings, credit the US Naval Institute for a third straight month of a great quality. There is no question 2007 will go down as the worst content year for that publication in at least the last several decades, but 2008 is on its way to being a banner year.

In the always popular "Nobody Asked Me, But..." article, Commodore Manohar K. Banger, Indian Navy (Retired) decides to discuss the Royal Navy and it is nothing more than a swift kick of reality to the UK gonads.

The Royal Navy today, with 25 major warships, cannot truly claim to be a blue-water navy. There has been a drastic reduction in the fleet thanks to the Strategic Defence Review of 1998. Consider that the Indian Navy is now a 100-ship navy yet still considered by the major powers to be a brown-water force. Numbers are important when showing your flag in foreign waters for deterrence purposes (or goodwill visits on the positive side). Of course, one can always debate the quantity versus quality issue. But in the final analysis, numerical superiority is likely to prevail in any eventuality.

This is a critical point, one starting to creep into most of the west, particularly in how it views a rising east.

An August 2006 Naval Review article written by Admiral Sir Jonathon Band, the First Sea Lord, stated that Britain is pre-eminently a maritime nation and shall have unhindered use of the seas. Doubt arises as to how Britain is to make unlimited use of the sea when it does not have the numbers either in its mercantile fleet or the Royal Navy. The challenge is compounded by the successively shrinking defense budgets over the years. The slogan "Small but Better" (alternatively "do more with less") initiated by the Royal Navy in 1982 has now brought the service to its present state. In reality, the slogan is flawed. "Smaller" will invariably precede the achievement of "better." This to some extent explains the urgent need to review the defense budget, notwithstanding the statement of the First Sea Lord that "resources will remain tight in the face of competing demands on Public Expenditure."

The Royal Navy has been reduced from a giant to a dwarf over the years, with associated sectors of the shipbuilding and auxiliary manufacturing industries on the downward slide. The challenge before the First Sea Lord is enormous: to first stem the decline and then build up in the next phase before it's too late.

The Royal Navy will almost certainly be downsized by a full 20% this year as they lose 4 Type 22s and 1 Type 23. This will reduce the fleet to only 20 ships. The CVF has been 'delayed' which we believe is code for 'soon to be canceled", regardless of what is being said. There is simply no evidence the end of the fall is anywhere in sight, and the only thing a delay to CVF does is raise costs, which gives more reason to cancel later.

While some may not believe it, we still believe that as the delays mount costs, someone will call for a review which leads to further delays, and ultimately the review will say what many have already said; the Royal Navy needs a larger fleet and can't afford it with the CVF. We think the odds are better than 50% that only 1 CVF is built, and the second aviation platform to be built is more likely to be a UXV than a CVF.

We are hearing all kinds of rumors of integration problems with the Type 45, specifically the ASTOR and PAAMS/Sampson, which may be why we are also now hearing talk of the MK41 from inside the Commons. This basically means 6, not 8 Type 45s, and the line will shift to UXV when there are no exports. As far as JSF, talk about an easy cut to the budget particularly as the second engine remains unpopular in the US. As we said, we do not see an end anywhere in sight.

Delays and problems means more cost for naval programs, which further leads to more lost when it comes to future purchases, because the government absolutely refuses to increase funding for a nation at war.

The arrogance of western politicians, but most particularly in the UK, that the equipment is so much superior that numbers don't matter would sound very familiar in German halls in the 1930s. It is also very telling that the west believes somehow that absent large defense forces that they have become immune to war in the future, as if political rhetoric will somehow protect their nation. Has the world really changed so much in the last 50 years that we can ignore the history of the human race over the last several thousand?

When observing the rate of construction of the Navy's of India and China, we can't help but observe how often the west claims the "Small but Better" superiority, ignoring in fact that victory in war at sea is most often decided by who wins the war of attrition, not by who has the superior technology. If the Royal Navy gets engaged in a war of attrition, they will lose to most Navies of Europe, and it only gets worse over the next decade.

2nd Fleet Focus: Venezuela Mobilizes Military

This is hardly surprising, Chavez never skips a beat in grabbing a headline. If we didn't import so much of our oil from Venezuela, this wouldn't be worth close observation.

Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez ordered his country's embassy in neighboring Colombia to close and told his military to move tank battalions to the border after a Colombian air strike into Ecuador, an ally of Venezuela.

``This could be the beginning of a war,'' Chavez said in comments broadcast today by state television. ``We are on alert, and we'll support Ecuador in any circumstance.''

Colombia launched an air strike yesterday on an Ecuador camp of Colombia's biggest guerrilla group to kill one of its leaders, Raul Reyes. Diplomatic relations between Chavez and Colombian President Alvaro Uribe have unraveled since Uribe withdrew his support for Chavez's negotiations with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia to secure the release of hostages.

Right before Hurricane Katrina, Chavez called the training of the USS Bataan (LHD 5) with Mexico the potential invasion of Venezuela by the United States, so anytime I read a comment by Chavez that says "beginning of a war" I think of the boy who cried wolf.

CNN is also reporting 10 tank battalions have been ordered to moved to the border. The rush to react by American citizen observers is hard to watch. I've even read people try to call into action the Rio Treaty, also known as the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance which is a defense treaty between several nations of this hemisphere. It is suggested if Venezuela invades Columbia, the US is obligated under treaty to respond. Ironically, Chavez is invoking the same treaty on behalf of Ecuador. If there is ever a treaty that defines the futility of defense treaties in the modern era, the Rio Treaty is the posterchild.

Isn't it interesting, several days ago the US took out a terrorist inside Pakistan, and even though Pakistan was pissed we attacked a terrorist target in their territory, Americans thought it was the right thing. Further to the irony, this is exactly the position of the Obama campaign to deal with Al Qaeda in Afghanistan.

In this case we have a case where Columbia attacks a FARC leader, recognized as a terrorist by the US government. This is basically the same position of the US against Al Qaeda. We should not be surprised there are some unhappy a nation hit a target in a neighbor though, so the outrage was all but mute.

Israel hit Gaza today, killing as many as 80. We are seeing predictable patterns. We are actually seeing consistency. Clearly despite 9/11, no one really does all it can to 3rd world countries, including in Africa, South America, the Middle East, and SE Asia, to stop supporting non-state military actors, what we generally term terrorists even though they represent insurgencies. Anyone who claims the US is being consistent on that front needs to explain the PKK. The advocacy that takes up for either side in this issue highlights the lack of strategy by the US government. Who is ready to defend Columbia, and watch the price of gasoline go up? Who is ready to watch Chavez topple the government in Columbia? Would America really watch Germany invade Poland again 70 some off years later?

We expect the Navy to be dispatched to quietly, it is unlikely we will see a headline from the Navy, rather we'll learn from a Pentagon leak as the media rushes to give away intelligence regarding US troop movements. The news will play directly into the Chavez propaganda campaign once the leak occurs.

From solely a Navy perspective, this will be very interesting to observe. We believe, as many do, the next CNO will either be Adm. James Stavridis or Admiral William "Fox" Fallon.

Adm. Fallon was seen as a peacemaker in his time in the Pacific, and is now seen as the premier warfighter in his role for CENTCOM. Adm. Stavridis has a reputation solely of that as a peacemaker. If this situation develops into something, or is prevented from doing so in some way, this strikes us as one of the those tests the rest of Adm. Stavridis career may be judged by.

Upgrading Duncan Hunter's Navy

Marinelink is reporting the Navy is upgrading Duncan Hunters fleet.

Great Eastern Group, Inc., Fort Lauderdale, Fla., is being awarded a $10,843,223 modification to previously awarded contract N61331-07-C-0011 for crew support, operation and maintenance of the SeaFighter (FSF-1)...

Work will be performed in Panama City, Fla., and is expected to be completed by Aug. 2010. Contract funds in the amount of $314,052 will expire at the end of the current fiscal year. The Naval Surface Warfare Center, Panama City, Fla., is the contracting activity.

The official DoD release:

Great Eastern Group, Inc., Fort Lauderdale, Fla., is being awarded a $10,843,223 modification to previously awarded contract N61331-07-C-0011 for crew support, operation and maintenance of the SeaFighter (FSF-1). The SeaFighter (FSF-1) is a wave-piercing catamaran (262 ft long/950 ton displacement/15 ft draft) powered by a Combined Diesel or Gas (CODOG) power plant. The SeaFighter (FSF-1) operates as a technology demonstrator/risk reduction platform. Work will be performed in Panama City, Fla., and is expected to be completed by Aug. 2010. Contract funds in the amount of $314,052 will expire at the end of the current fiscal year. The Naval Surface Warfare Center, Panama City, Fla., is the contracting activity. The Naval Surface Warfare Center, Panama City, Fla., is the contracting activity.

August 2010? That seems like a really long time for a ship less than 1000 tons to be worked on. Anyone have any details why, other than to park Duncan Hunters Navy on the beach?

While we enjoy giving Duncan Hunter a hard time over his little Navy, we would add that if John Murtha really wanted to get the Navy's attention, he could always suggest canceling the DDG-1003, build his LPD-26, and build 6 of these to beef up the Navy's homeland security and MIW strategy. Considering how many hits our recent MIW disccusion got this month, it appears the topic is very popular among naval and coast guard centric observers.

If someone other than Duncan Hunter just suggested it, at least then the rest of Congress could ask the following questions.

1) How does the Sea Fighter class not fit into the Homeland Security aspect of the Maritime Strategy? A modular payload ship with high speed that can support fast humanitarian response, MIW, and SOF in any number of theaters appears to fit very well into the Maritime Strategy. Why doesn't the Navy think so?

2) How does the DDG-1000 class fit into the Maritime Strategy?

We don't actually advocate building more Sea Fighters, well maybe... more commands are very important, but we would absolutely love to know the answer to the two questions posed above.

While Duncan Hunter's Navy isn't popular within the Navy, it is very hard to intellectually argue these little fast platforms somehow don't fit in the new maritime strategy better than the DDG-1000. Yes we are aware FSF-1 isn't fully NVR, however we have done some research on this, and even once you apply NVR to these little bastards they cost less than $160 million each. That is cheaper than a F-22A, and yet it meets almost every necessary metric for the GWOT the Nation is fighting today. While this blog has obviously not been a big fan of Duncan Hunters earmark baby in the past, I admit I'm warming up to ship a bit.

A build of 6 would replace half the Ospreys recently retired, and these little FSFs can do what the Ospreys could do, and a hell of a lot more.

5th Fleet Focus: Order of Battle

Order of Battle in the 5th Fleet Area of Responsibility.

The Truman Carrier Strike Group

USS Harry S. Truman (CVN 75)
USS San Jacinto (CG 56) - 6th Fleet
USS Hue City (CG 66)
USS Carney (DDG 64)
USS Oscar Austin (DDG 79)
USS Winston S. Churchill (DDG 81)
HMS Manchester (D95)
HMCS Charlottetown (FFH 339)
USNS Arctic (T-AOE 8)
USS Montpelier (SSN 765)


Tarawa Expeditionary Strike Group

USS Tarawa (LHA 1)
USS Cleveland (LPD 7)
USS Germantown (LSD 42)
USS Port Royal (CG 73)
USS Hopper (DDG 70)
USS Ingraham (FFG 61)


In Theater

Ocean 6
FGS Emden (F 210)
HDMS Thetis (F357)
ITS Commandante Borsini (P491)
FS Mistral (L9013)
FS Dupleix (D641)
FS Jean Bart (D615)
FS Guepratte (F714)
FS Commandant Bouan (F797)
USS Whidbey Island (LSD 41)
HMS Campbeltown (F86)
HMS Argyll (F231)
HMAS Arunta (FFH 151)
USS Scout (MCM 8)
USS Gladiator (MCM 11)
USS Ardent (MCM 12)
USS Dexterous (MCM 13)
HMS Ramsay (M 110)
HMS Blyth (M 111)

This list is not current. There are well over a dozen ships in the eastern Mediterranean Sea, and it is very possible several have crossed the Suez and we are simply not aware. The Orion 08 task force was out of Malta as of yesterday, and may already be in the Red Sea. If not, they will be next week. The Orion 08 task force is listed below.

HMS Illustrious (R06)
HMS Edinburgh (D97)
HMS Westminster (F237)
HMS Trafalgar (S107)
HMS Atherstone (M38)
HMS Chiddingfold (M37)
RFA Wave Knight (A389)
USS Cole (DDG 67)
FS Jean Bart (D615)
FS Surcouf (F 711)
SPS Mendez Nunez (F104)

Note the USS Cole (DDG 67) is staying in the Mediterranean Sea for now, and the Jean Bart (D615) already crossed a couple weeks ago.