6th Fleet Focus: Observing Operations in the Med

This is something we intend to keep an eye on.

The US Navy is sending three warships to the eastern Mediterranean Sea in a show of strength during a period of tensions with Syria and political uncertainty in Lebanon.

Adm. Michael Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told reporters the deployment should not be viewed as threatening or in response to events in any single country in that volatile region.

"This is an area that is important to us, the eastern Med," he said when asked about news reports of the ship movements. "It's a group of ships that will operate in the vicinity there for a while," adding that "it isn't meant to send any stronger signals than that, but it does signal that we're engaged, we're going to be in the vicinity and that's a very, very important part of the world."

Another military officer, speaking on condition of anonymity because full details about the ship movements are not yet public, said the USS Cole is headed for patrol in the eastern Mediterranean and that the USS Nassau, an amphibious warship, would be joining it shortly. The officer said a third ship would go later, but he did not identify it by name.

The USS Cole (DDG 67) had been part of the HMS Illustrious (R06) Orion 08 deployment. That raises the possibility there are other ships from other countries that might react to the situation in Lebanon, and I am thinking specifically about France who has been all over Syria about staying out of Lebanon.

The third ship could be any number of ships. The USS San Jacinto (CG 56) is currently operating in the Black Sea. The USS Gonzalez (DDG 66) and USS Nicholas (FFG 47) both deployed to work with the NATO fleets recently. One of the other ships in the Nassau ESG that recently deployed could also be rotated into that theater.

However, we believe the most likely ship the Navy sends as the third ship will be the USS Whidbey Island (LSD 41). The first order of business for the Navy if hostilities breaks out is evacuation, not confrontation, and the other three ships have specific missions that probably will go on without interruption unless hostilities breaks out. If that is indeed the 3rd ship, it will be several days before we learn of it because it will take several days to arrive to that location.

It is very interesting the USS Nassau (LHA 4) is being sent. We note, the ship does not have Marines onboard, in fact we aren't really sure what the Nassau has onboard for this deployment, so it will be interesting to see how the ship (and what tools) will be utilized in this type of peacemaking scenario. I know we are very interested.

We only have two requests for those ships moving into that theater. Keep a sharp eye out for ASMs and mines, because the last ASM fired and last mine found were both in the 6th fleet AOR.

The Most Important Naval Discussion in a Decade

I'm not sure but it is entirely possible that CDR Salamander and I are not as far apart as the titles of our observations may indicate. I don't disagree with his comments warning of legislative solutions, but we note change will only come from the legislature as long as Mullen, the architect of the 313-ship plan, is CJCS. I also observe, one cannot bring a strong bias against Murtha if one is to measure these comments in good faith.

In observing an article by Geoff Fein, I observed the beginning of what might be the most important naval discussion in the last decade. On Wednesday, John Murtha discussed the 313-ship plan, and in the process asked several good questions. We quote the 5 noteworthy comments from the article:

"A couple of suggestions staff has made is to take one of the DDG-1000s out and put in two more T-AKEs because they are stabilized platforms. I don't know if that is the right answer," he [Murtha] said. "Our industrial base is so small now, there is so little competition, and we obviously need competition. But on the other hand, we need to build as many ships as we can, so we need to look at all the options."

In its FY '09 budget, the Navy has requested $14.2 billion to build seven ships. Of that amount, $2.55 billion is for full funding of a third DDG-1000 and advanced procurement for the fourth ship of the class.

"If we took the ships the administration sent over, we would never get to what the Navy says it needs," he added. "So we are going to try...Bill and I are going to try...and convince the committee that we need three or four more ships. [We need to] find a way to get to take us to 313 ships in much less years."

"There are three (DDG-1000s) now in '09. If you take one out what does that do to the shipbuilding distribution," Murtha said. "If you take one out and go to two T-AKEs, what does that do to...capability of the force?"

If you take one of the other DDG-1000s out, it would fund a 10th LPD-17 and two T-AKEs, Murtha said. "We are looking how we can shift this and not affect you," he said. "What happens to the shipbuilding industry, how will it affect them?"

Lets break this down. Murtha is looking to do what must be done for the future fleet to have more than 313-ships, he is looking to cancel the DDG-1000. His idea is to replace the DDG-1000 in FY09 with 3 ships, the 10th LPD-17 and 2 additional T-AKEs, all of which the Navy has listed in its unfunded priorities listings.

This article is so damn good, if Geoff Fein could get an award for writing about the Navy, this would be the winner. The article gives us 5 very insightful comments from the Navy's point of view on the subjects Murtha discusses.

"NASSCO likely could not execute four in one year," Allison Stiller, deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development & Acquisition), told lawmakers. "They would have to spread them out. We felt they could go to two year; that's why we put two in '09," she added.

Stiller said any reduction in DDG-1000s would be an issue for the surface combatant force as well as Bath, which is one of the Navy's surface combatant providers, she said.

After the hearing, McCullough told reporters the cost to do a Service Life Extension Program on the four amphibious ships was less than buying a new LPD-17. "It's around $1 billion to get 27 years of ship life out of those [ships], and that includes operations and maintenance...it might be $1.2 billion, but it's a billion dollars," McCullough said "Currently one LPD-17, on our unfunded list, is $1.7 billion. So for me to get 27 years of ship life is about a billion...by extending the estimated service life of those four ships. To buy a new one is $700 million more, and that's not counting the operations and maintenance."

While the CNO supports Marine Commandant Gen. James Conway's requirement for 11 aviation capable amphibious ships, 11 LSD-class and 11 LPD-class ships, the Navy has to balance that in its budget, McCullough added.

LPD-25 doesn't deliver until 2012, so there is a backlog of ships, she added.
The Navy wouldn't be shutting down the LPD-17 production line once the final ship is built, Stiller noted.

Lets break this down. According to Allison Stiller, NASSCO cannot build more than 2 T-AKEs in one year, and there are already 2 T-AKEs in the FY09 budget. While the Navy claims to support the 10th LPD-17 (and supposedly the 11th too) requirement of the Marine Corps, they would prefer to extend the lives of 4 older ships an average of only 6.75 years per hull, even though they will still be retired within the next decade (basically a plan to stall the problem), than to get a new ship that would last for the next 40 years. The Navy does not intend to shut down the LPD-17 production line in the future, meaning the Navy intends to use the LPD-17 for other purposes in the future (BMDCGN? Hospital ship? Command Ship?).

Additionally, the Navy can't stop production of the DDG-1000 because it will hurt Bath Iron Works, which we agree is an important consideration. Is it just me, or is the solution plainly apparent to everyone, just waiting for someone to shout it out loud?

We believe any major changes to the 313-ship plan will require solutions that benefit the Navy, the Industry, and Congress. If it cannot do all three, it will never happen. In this case, assuming it is even possible, we see a solution that might do exactly that.

Congress needs options. Lets face it, for the last decade Congress failed to give itself low mix alternatives by not forcing the Navy to produce designs for frigate sized warships. This is a lesson that needs to be learned, retained, and never repeated, and if necessary forced upon the Navy starting this fiscal year. Congress must always have options in regards to building ships, because it can never be assumed that all programs will work out.

The Industry needs work. The idea that $2.5+ billion dollars annually for the next five years tied up in only 5 warships will help the industry, helping competition, and sustaining the workforce is dead wrong. The only way to boost shipbuilding is to build more ships, it is the only factor that is universal, while all other factors can only contribute to industry stability as long as that factor exists. The DDG-1000 must be canceled, and the Navy must build any ships above and beyond 313 before 2020 as afterwards all money must go directly to replacements.

The Navy 313-ship plan doesn't even meet the requirements of the Navy's own maritime strategy, so the Navy really can't even defend it intellectually. I'll debate any Admiral all day long on the merits of building more battleships for an already battleship centric fleet within the context of the new maritime strategy, and I'd win that debate even though Admirals are a hell of a lot smarter than me. The sole reason I'd win is because the position really can't be defended due to strategy. The Navy may defend specific metrics of specific programs, but all they do in those discussions is raise even more compelling questions whether the current approach matches strategy.

Seems to me the answer is obvious. Cancel the DDG-1000 after two ships. Take the $2.55 billion this year, spend $1.7 billion on LPD-26 to recover the $1 billion that would be used on the 4 old amphibious ships. Take the recovered $1 billion and leftover $855 million and build 1 General Dynamics LCS MMC and 1 Lockheed Martin LCS MMC. Build the General Dynamics ship at Bath to insure they have some work, and equally important, let Lockheed Martin decide where to build its ship based on where export orders for Israel and India may come from.

Seems to me building two more first in class now would be a good idea, to at minimum offer an alternative to the low mix to the LCS concept, but also very important, set the industry up for potential exports of MMC versions. It would be hard for the industry to complain, as it begins the process of spreading the work around, and most importantly, gives the Navy a fifth-rate to evaluate as part of its future fleet constitution, something we believe is very important in the context of strategy. We see this as a winning approach from all sides, if it can be done. We also note that if it is to be done this year, it would only happen if John Murtha pushed for it.

Where are the Cruisers?

By the theory of naval war it must be reiterated we mean nothing but an enunciation of the fundamental principles which underlie all naval war. Those principles, if we have determined them correctly, should be found giving shape not only to strategy and tactics, but also to material, whatever method and means of naval warfare may be in use at any given time. Conversely, if we find strategy, tactics, or organisation exhibiting a tendency to reproduce the same forms under widely differing conditions of method and material, we should be able to show that those forms bear a constant and definite relation to the principles which our theory endeavours to express.

In the case of Anson's threefold organisation, the relation is not far to seek, though it has become obscured by two maxims. The one is, that "the command of the sea depends upon battleships," and the other, that "cruisers are the eyes of the fleet." It is the inherent evil of maxims that they tend to get stretched beyond their original meaning. Both of these express a truth, but neither expresses the whole truth. On no theory of naval warfare can we expect to command the sea with battleships, nor, on the communication theory, can we regard the primary function of cruisers as being to scout for a battle-fleet. It is perfectly true that the control depends ultimately on the battle-fleet if control is disputed by a hostile battle-fleet, as it usually is. It is also true that, so far as is necessary to enable the battle-fleet to secure the control, we have to furnish it with eyes from our cruiser force. But it does not follow that this is the primary function of cruisers. The truth is, we have to withdraw them from their primary function in order to do work for the battle-fleet which it cannot do for itself.

Well established as is the "Eyes of the fleet" maxim, it would be very difficult to show that scouting was ever regarded as the primary function of cruisers by the highest authorities. In Nelson's practice at least their paramount function was to exercise the control which he was securing with his battle-squadron. Nothing is more familiar in naval history than his incessant cry from the Mediterranean for more cruisers, but the significance of that cry has become obscured. It was not that his cruisers were not numerous in proportion to his battleships—they were usually nearly double in number—but it was rather that he was so deeply convinced of their true function, that he used them to exercise control to an extent which sometimes reduced his fleet cruisers below the limit of bare necessity. The result on a memorable occasion was the escape of the enemy's battle-fleet, but the further result is equally important. It was that the escape of that fleet did not deprive him of the control which he was charged to maintain. His judgment may have been at fault, but the strategical distribution of his force was consistent throughout the whole period of his Mediterranean command. Judged by his record, no man ever grasped more clearly than Nelson that the object of naval warfare was to control communications, and if he found that he had not a sufficient number of cruisers to exercise that control and to furnish eyes for his battle-fleet as well, it was the battle-fleet that was made to suffer, and surely this is at least the logical view.

- Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, by Julian Corbett

This blog adopted Bob Work's rating system for surface combatants (with permission) primarily for discussions like this, exploring fleet constitution through the prism of history and strategy. Julian Corbett defined first, second, third, and fourth rate ships as those that constitute the battle-line, and he described Cruisers as fifth and sixth rate vessels, with everything below that as unrated.

Using our rating system, we believe the same theories of Maritime Strategy he described above fits well for modern rating for ships in comparison. Based on our rating system, the Navy today has either commissioned or has ordered 86 first and second rate battleships consisting of 22 CG-52s, 62 DDG-51s, and 2 DDG-1000s. The Navy's strategy for fleet constitution in the future is to build 55 seventh rates (what Corbett would call unrated, or the flotilla) in the form of the Littoral Combat Ship. The US Navy has decided to build a fleet without the Cruisers that have dominated all previous naval eras. We note this because upon no era of naval history has a fleet without cruisers, or a ship capable of filling the sum of the roles Corbett assigns to Cruisers, has ever established and maintained Command of the Sea over an adversary during an extended period of naval war.

We therefore find ourselves constantly asking the question; Where is the cruiser? The Navy appears to have determined (without explanation) that the Principles of Maritime War have changed so much due to modern technology that Command of the Sea can be achieved with only battleships, and with that Corbett's principles regarding the roles of Cruisers within a fleet are no longer valid, indeed replaced by unrated platforms. Our problem with this view is that it must be done in the absence of historical study, as it has been proven for hundreds of years of maritime warfare that the Principles of Maritime War have not changed as maritime eras, often defined by technology changes, have.

It is important to note that historically, even in the more modern eras of war at sea, whether one is discussing WWII, Korea, Vietnam, the Falklands, or the Tanker Wars with Iran; the Cruiser as defined by Corbett continued to establish itself as the primary warfighter vessel required for command of the sea. Without any explanation why, this principle of maritime war is absent US Navy future plans.

We find the apparent lack of applied historical study to current fleet constitution in this context as unwise, but don't take our word for it...

It is then particularly in the field of naval strategy that the teachings of the past have a value which is in no degree lessened. They are there useful not only as illustrative of principles, but also as precedents, owing to the comparative permanence of the conditions. This is less obviously true as to tactics, when the fleets come into collision at the point to which strategic considerations have brought them. The unresting progress of mankind causes continual change in the weapons; and with that must come a continual change in the manner of fighting,—in the handling and disposition of troops or ships on the battlefield. Hence arises a tendency on the part of many connected with maritime matters to think that no advantage is to be gained from the study of former experiences; that time so used is wasted. This view, though natural, not only leaves wholly out of sight those broad strategic considerations which lead nations to put fleets afloat, which direct the sphere of their action, and so have modified and will continue to modify the history of the world, but is one-sided and narrow even as to tactics. The battles of the past succeeded or failed according as they were fought in conformity with the principles of war; and the seaman who carefully studies the causes of success or failure will not only detect and gradually assimilate these principles, but will also acquire increased aptitude in applying them to the tactical use of the ships and weapons of his own day.

The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783, by Alfred Thayer Mahan

We acknowledge that both Mahan and Corbett make a greater point within and outside these quotes that Navy's should apply the technologies of a particular era to their fleets constitution, and therefore the application of their principles of maritime strategy support the argument for the Littoral Combat Ship concept, a concept of a mothership for unmanned vehicles. However in the scope of applying those principles, it leads us right back to our original question regarding the principle characteristics that govern success within the context of fleet constitution.

That question being... Where are the Cruisers?

Funding Submarnies The Smart Way

Lawmakers from Connecticut and Rhode Island are getting out front of the FY09 budget to protect last years funding for moving up the date to build 2 Virginia class submarines a year. If this is right, we like the approach.

In addition to protecting current funding, submarine backers are seeking more money as Congress crafts a new defense spending bill for fiscal year 2009.

Submarine supporters want $79 million in new funding to speed up construction on a second sub. They're also seeking an additional $53 million for design work on next-generation submarines.

While the number of SSNs matters a lot, what is very important is R&D and sustainment of the design base for submarines, and we like that the lawmakers are looking for money in that area. As we have observed with the Virginia class, investment of millions in the submarine design base can save billions in submarine construction costs, and in effect that is exactly what we are seeing with the Virginia Block III. For example, the roughly 200 million spent the last decade on submarine R&D will result in savings of between $4-5 billion for the first 7 years of two submarine annual construction rates.

Not only are the Block III Virginia class submarines less expensive, but they are more capable. In our opinion, R&D in shipbuilding is an excellent investment, not only for Congress and the Industry, but also for the Navy.

India and Russia Make Nice, For Now

Everything looks to be back on track.

India and Russia have ended a protracted dispute over the cost of a Soviet-era aircraft carrier which will be now sold at a higher price to the Indian navy in 2011, officials said Thursday.

Indian Defence Secretary V. K. Singh, returning from Moscow, said a new undisclosed price had been agreed for the 44,570-tonne Admiral Gorshkov.

Does anyone honestly believe India is goign to ever get the Admiral Gorshkov? I don't, the good faith in this deal existed last time too. We will have to wait and see, but there are no positive signs one can point to why this will work out. This part is just funny.

"India is sending more than 100 trained personnel from its shipyard to the Sevmash shipyard to join 1,200 Russian personnel who are working on that ship," a ministry official said.

So let me get this straight... India is sending 100 shipworkers to Severodvinsk, most of whom probably don't speak Russian, to work on an aircraft carrier during winter at the most northern shipyard in the world? Let me know how that works out.

Here is what we know. The 1200 folks who work for Sevmash shipyard have all been working on the Borei class SSBNs under construction there. No one has been working on the Admiral Gorshkov for months, and Russia has already spent all the money India originally paid. The Russian budget is getting another boost this year, and if it turns out to be anything like last year, a lot of the money will go to Sevmash shipyard so Russia can rapidly field the Borei class, which is Russia's top defense priority.

There is a shortage of skilled shipbuilding labor in Russia. In fact, as we understand it the problem is Russia went years without being able to properly train shipbuilders. Given the choice, which project does India believe Sevmash shipyard is going to assign its best workers, a new SSBN for the motherland or an old carrier for a foreign country?

The fighter deal part of the Kitty Hawk horse trade won't be decided until either the end of this year or next year, lets see how the construction of the Gorshkov has come along at that time before closing the book.

Because there are no positive signs, and let me use the word none for clarity, that give confidence to the future delivery of the Gorshkov to India, we still maintain this isn't over, and every rupee poured into Russia on this project is a rupee wasted. We still believe this will end badly for India. Guess we will have to wait and see.