Equal Capability and Intent Is Nice, but Not Necessary

I am a bit disturbed by the latest comments of Indian Chairman of Chiefs of Staff Committee and Navy chief Admiral Sureesh Mehta. I do not subscribe to the strategic thinking being discussed here.

Admitting that India neither has the “capability nor the intention” to match China’s military strength, Chairman of Chiefs of Staff Committee and Navy chief Admiral Sureesh Mehta said here today that “common sense dictates” that India needs to cooperate with China rather than confront it.

“In military terms, both conventional and non-conventional, we neither have the capability nor the intention to match China, force for force. These are indeed sobering thoughts and therefore our strategy to deal with China would need to be in consonance with these realities,” Mehta said, delivering an address on National Security Challenges organized by the National Maritime Foundation.

In his address, perhaps his last in public as Navy chief — he retires month-end — Mehta said: “Common sense dictates that cooperation with China would be preferable to competition or conflict, as it would be foolhardy to compare India and China as equals...Whether in terms of GDP, defence spending or any other economic, social or development parameter, the gap between the two is just too wide to bridge and getting wider by the day,” the officer said.

You can read the entire article, but you will find the line of thought does not deviate from the stated course of what Navy chief Admiral Sureesh Mehta is suggesting are 'sobering thoughts.' I am not in agreement with the strategic thinking of the Indian military in this recommended approach to China.

Military asymmetry in interstate relations does not mean the weaker side must bend to the dictates of the stronger, nor should the weaker state seek to propitiate it. Wise strategy coupled with good diplomacy is the art of offsetting or neutralizing military or economic power imbalance with a stronger state. Just because China is more powerful militarily does not mean India must be subservient to the demands of China, and if someone in India truly believes that line of thinking, how do they explain the relationship between Pakistan and India, where India is clearly more powerful? Surely Pakistan should be bowing to India, right?

Hardly...

Cooperation may indeed be the best path for India as it relates to China, but not because China is stronger militarily or economically or as some admission that war is bad. No shit war sucks - thanks for the memo, but one doesn't need to jump straight into military confrontation simply because one is engaged in competition or even disagreement, and by no means does that line of thought mean submit into cooperation as a form of capitulation. Cooperation by definition should be mutually beneficial, and I fail to see how cooperation as a way to avoid any confrontation at all, as expressed by Admiral Sureesh Mehta, is forwarding Indian interests, particularly in the context of standing up against Chinese territorial claims of properties currently held by India.

Later in the speech Admiral Mehta gets it right when suggesting deterrence and closing military gaps are effective ways to counter Chinese moves to grow a footprint in the Indian Ocean, but with neighbors like Pakistan there is only so much one can expect to accomplish alone. What the strategic thinking outlined by Admiral Mehta is missing though is an end to strategy, because the only objective in the strategic thinking reported in the media is the avoidance, at virtually any cost btw, of confrontation. India may not get that choice, so India's strategy must define the ways that will manage confrontation should such a confrontation takes place.

If equal "capability and intent" were conditional requirements for defeating a stronger opponent, then there would be no such thing as a theory of war, much less the practice of diplomacy.

North Korean Ship Intercepted by India

This is an interesting development.

Indian investigators are investigating a North Korean vessel they say had ignored warnings and sailed close to an unusual location off its remote island chain in the Bay of Bengal.

The vessel, which had a crew of 39, was carrying a cargo of sugar, said K.R. Nautiyal, the deputy inspector-general of the Indian coast guard at the Andamans.

It was bound from Thailand to Iraq but changed course and anchored off Hut Bay without responding to calls from coast guard authorities, he said.

"There were several inconsistencies," Nautiyal said, adding that the vessel would be allowed to leave once the investigation is completed.

Indian authorities first intercepted the ship on Wednesday and fired warning shots into the air when it did not answer radio calls, according to the coast guard.

It is under investigation at Port Blair, the main administrative center of the archipelago. Worth keeping an eye on. The ship detailed is the MV Musen. Video report here. The Indian Coast Guard made the intercept.

Click image to see location of Hut Bay (where the North Korean ship illegally anchored) and Port Blair (where the ship was taken for inspection).

India, Pakistan, INS Arihant and the Security Dilemma

As probably most readers of this blog know, the Security Dilemma is a concept much discussed in the field of international relations. Brought to wide attention (although not first described) by Robert Jervis in 1978 with his article "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," it describes a mechanic by which interstate conflict can arise or worsen. At its base, the proposition is that actions taken by states to increase their own security can, at the same time, result in a decrease (real or perceived) in the security of their rivals. Arms races can be a result of the security dilemma, as can wider security spirals.

Although India has been quick to declare that the INS Arihant is a deterrent weapon system, a second-strike capability, this may not be the case against all its potential targets. An important part of the 'utility' of a strategic weapon system is the target set it is applied to. While against a distant, heavily armed opponent such as China the Arihant's 12 K-15 missiles may be useful only as a countervalue deterrent, against an opponent with a smaller critical target set this may not be the case.

Pakistan's reaction to the sub has been mixed, with official statements decrying the launch as an arms racing move but editorials within Pakistan stating that the submarine poses no significant threat to Pakistan. Another series of articles has the Pakistani navy head stating that the submarine poses 'no security threat' - although that statement appears most often in Indian news reports such as this one, with a Beijing byline. Heh.

Let's take a quick look at capabilities and targets. Against Pakistan, a nation with a small and slow-reacting nuclear capability, the 12 SLBMs carried aboard the Arihant pose quite a different level of threat. The current range for the K-15 seems to be around 700 km with a 1,000kg payload, rising to 1,200 km with a 150kg payload. While a 700 km range isn't enough to reach the northern half of Pakistan from the ocean, a 1,200 km range certainly can hit nearly all of the country other than a small region north and west of Islamabad (and, of course, Jammu and Kashmir, although it seems highly unlikely that Pakistan would stage nuclear weapons out of these disputed territories). Most importantly, however, it can certainly reach Sargodha and the "Weapons Storage Complex" there.

The FAS estimated that Pakistan had enough fissile material for a force of approximately 60 warheads in 2007. If we assume that these are stored in groups of 5 or more weapons, we have a target set that the Arihant has a very good chance of eliminating. Probably not totally; 100% functionality on an SLBM loadout isn't likely, and 100% Pk for those weapons is even more unlikely - but as the number of storage locations drops, the feasibility of this targeting option goes up.

Unlike the U.S., Russia and most other nuclear nations, Pakistan is balancing a set of problems. On the one hand, nuclear weapons offer it a security 'hedge' against external intervention. India has visibly exercised restraint during prior crises due to the presence of credible nuclear response by Pakistan. However, Pakistan also suffers from internal security threats, most especially in the more desolate northern areas which would offer the greatest concealment and operational security for its small arsenal. In addition, many observers agree that for additional security, Pakistan stores its weapons disassembled, with cores separate from the remainder of the systems. Given the expertise and tools required to properly mate the components of these weapons as well as the requirements for securing them against sabotage and theft, there is pressure on Pakistani commanders to keep the number of such sites low to mitigate risk.

It's a delicate balance. Moreoever, it's one whose likely outcome, at present, would present Indian strategic planners with a small number of extremely high-value targets, at least so long as Pakistan maintains its forces in a low state of alert. And here lies the core of the security dilemma facing Pakistan. The Arihant's missiles, assuming India can engineer a 150kg warhead or boost their range slightly, offer Indian planners an opportunity for a 'splendid first strike' if they can acquire intelligence on the current location of the Pakistani nuclear arsenal. While this may not (and probably wouldn't) be a tempting option during times of low tension, as tension begins to ratchet upwards for whatever reason, Indian planners may - no, I'll say will - begin to consider that a strategic first strike might be able to minimize their danger. It's their job. Whether or not policymakers act on this option is a completely different question - but at the very least, it gives India a potential option at an early phase of a crisis which Pakistan's only real defense against is to actively deploy and/or disperse its arsenal. That action, in turn, reduces Pakistan's nuclear force security against internal threat, and depending on the state of Pakistani Command and Control, may force Pakistan to delegate release authority to remote actors - with all the risk that that entails (those who are curious about that risk are encouraged to read Bruce Blair's classic "Strategic Command and Control" for operational risk, or Scott D. Sagan's "The LImits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents and Nuclear Weapons" for organizational risk).

This post has minimal numbers in it. I don't claim to have satisfied even myself that the Arihant provides an actual qualitative change in the strategic balance in the Indian Ocean. However, it certainly seems like a question worthy of further research. Perhaps one good starting point would be to examine the state of Pakistan's early warning systems, and their capability versus a near-offshore SLBM launch.

Nukes Go To Sea

There are a few noteworthy submarine stories over the past week, but none are bigger than the launch of India's Advanced Technology Vessel INS Arihant.

The 6,000 tonne Arihant was launched by India's Prime Minister Manmohan Singh at a ceremony on the south-east coast.

It was built entirely in India with Russian assistance and a second one is due to be constructed shortly.

It will undergo trials over the next few years before being deployed and will be able to launch missiles at targets 700km (437 miles) away.

Until now, only the US, Russia, France, Britain and China had the capability to build nuclear submarines.

This beings India closer to becoming the first nation in decades to develop a nuclear triad, and the first nation to do so in the Indian Ocean area. While this development does not shift any balance of power in the region, it certainly gives both Pakistan and China something to think about. There is something else though, it will also give India a case for becoming a permanent member of the UN Security Council, a discussion the current permanent five members are not looking forward to.

In other nuclear submarine news, Russia has launched their second Project 885 Yasen (NATO code name Graney) submarine, the latest Russian attack submarine.

The 119-meter-long, 13.5-meter-wide sub will carry a crew of 90, dive to 600 meters, displace 13,800 tons, and run at up to 31 knots. Designed by the St. Petersburg-based Malakhit Design Bureau, the submarine will have eight torpedo tubes and carry 24 long-range cruise missiles of several types, anti-ship missiles, and mines. Malakhit's general director and chief designer, Vladimir Pyalov, said the sub's weapons will have longer ranges and the ability to destroy land targets as well as naval ones.

Pyalov said at the launching ceremony that Severodvinsk will undergo sea tests in summer 2010 and then will be commissioned by the Northern Fleet, the RIA Novosti official news agency reported. All of the submarine's weapons, including cruise missiles, have been tested successfully.

Severodvinsk was the first Project 885 Yasen (NATO code name Graney) submarine launched back in 1993, but has been held up due to lack of funding. As has been pointed out on the blog several times, the Russian Navy continues to get the lions share of defense funding in Russia, and of the defense budget a full 25% of the budget is being spent on shipbuilding both new vessels and restoring older vessels. 85% of that shipbuilding funding is then being spent on nuclear submarines, with most of that money being spent on the Borei (project 955) strategic nuclear submarines and its troubled ballistic missile, the Bulava.

Still, Russia is coming out with a new class of ballistic missile submarine (Project 955), a new class of nuclear attack submarines (Project 885), and a new class of diesel submarines (Project 677). Additionally, the Akula II class nuclear attack submarine K-152 Nerpa appears back on schedule for delivery to India later this year.

India Fighter Competition News

These are two very interesting news items in India.

First is the drama of Lockheed Martin in India, related to the 126 Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) competition, a fighter contract worth an estimated $11 billion.

The second is this interview in Defence Professionals of Manu Sood, Editor of the India-based online news service 8ak (http://www.8ak.in). It is a lot of talk about Kitty Hawk. I don't know about some mystical Quad Initiative, but it does raise something important.

The US should already be talking to Australia about rotating a F-18 E/F squadron to the USS George Washington (CVN 73) on a regular basis, and begin mentioning the idea to the Indians. Execute the Cooperative maritime strategy and take a bit of risk in peacetime by investing in partnerships with those who in turn, invest in us.

Project 17A of Indian Navy

I read this piece of news a few days ago and found it shocking. Here is the article:

India has cleared its largest ever indigenous defence contract worth Rs 45,000 crore to manufacture seven advanced stealth frigates for the Navy at shipyards in Kolkata and Mumbai.

The P17A warship project, which will be India’s most advanced and stealthy frigates, has been cleared by the Defence Acquisition Council (DAC) on Friday.

Sources said that brushing aside a request by the Navy that two of the indigenously designed frigates may be manufactured abroad, the DAC has decided that all seven warships will be manufactured in India by the Mazagon Dock Limited, Mumbai (MDL) and the Garden Reach Shipbuilders and Engineers (GRSE), Kolkata.

The Defence Ministry has allocated a budget of Rs 45,000 crore for the project and the work will be divided between the two shipyards. The P17A frigates will be even more advanced than the P17 Shivalik class warships that are currently being inducted by the Navy.

For those keeping scores at home, it's around $10 billion for 7 ships or around $1.4 billion per ship. This is an increase over the original announcement in 2006 that put the price tag of each ship at around $900 million. I think India has had some experiences recently with cost escalations in naval projects. They want to make sure to allocate all the necessary funding, so that it does not have cost overrun this time.

To put this into perspective:
A 054A costs around $200-250 million depending on the conversion rate.
I think Singapore paid $1 billion for 6 Formidable class ships back in early 2000s, although that only includes the ToT, weapon systems and the first unit.
The first batch of Talwar cost $1 billion for 3
The second batch of Talwar cost $1.6 billion for 3 (although a lot of that is due to USD depreciation)
The Project 17 Shivalik class apparently costs $650 million each
The most recent order of 4 FREMM class by Italy cost 1.4 billion EUR -> 350 million EUR per or about 500 million USD depending on the conversion we use.
The entire horizon class program cost around $4 billion for 4 ships
KDX-3 is around $900 million
The 6 Type-45 destroyers cost UK 6.46 billion pound, which is anywhere from 8 to 10 billion USD depending on the conversion rate.

It looks like the going rate for a modern stealthy frigate with medium range air defense and good ASW capabilities is around $500 million. The going rate for a larger AAW ship with area defense is around $1 to 1.5 billion.

With the price that India is willing to pay for these 7 ships, it should turn out to be a very capable ship. If you look at the specifications of Shivalik class, its weapon and sensor fit is similar to your average modern frigate like the La Fayette derivatives, Talwar and 054A. $650 million looks to be more than what the other countries paid for comparable frigates, but I think part of the cost goes toward improving Indian shipyard to be able to handle such projects in the future. With more than double the cost, Project 17A looks like it will be a whole different beast. Just looking at the price tag alone, it looks to be an AAW ship with long range SAM and Aegis like combat system. On the other hand, I kept reading Indian sources that said this ship will only be around 5600 ton in displacement. That would make sense because larger Project 17A class would intrude in the territories of Project 15A, which is in the 7000 ton range. Even now, it seems that Project 15A is really not that relevant when the smaller Project 17A might turn out to do the same job much better. So, I think it would be interesting to see what Project 17A turn out to be. If it turns out to be like Horizon class or AAW version of FREMM, it would be well worth the money after we factor in higher than projected inflation, cost of upgrading the shipyards, transfer of technology and such. However, if it turns out to just be a more powerful version of Project 17, I think they are really paying far too much for these ships.

Latest Anti-Piracy Efforts

The weather must be pretty good out in the Indian Ocean off the African east coast, because the daily reports streaming in are beginning to suggest the activity of both sides is very high.

Are you reading these stories? Most of them are frustrating, for example, the Indian Navy has captured 9 pirates who attempted to hijack the cruise ship Melody. That's the good news, but check out the events that proceeded the pickup.

The European Union's Maritime Security Centre (MSC) said the pirates were intercepted by a Spanish warship, the Numancia. The suspects, who were "in poor health," were released as a result of lack of evidence, but the Seychelles coastguard then picked them up.

"The capture operation was conducted in co-operation with a... French maritime patrol aircraft and a warship from the Indian Navy which also discovered an abandoned skiff not far from the scene," the MSC said.

In other words, first the Spanish caught the pirates, then the Spanish released the pirates. Then the Seychelles coast guard caught the pirates, and now the Indians have taken them into custody. There is a Vince Lombardi quote waiting to be shouted with these stories.

Pirates attacked a tanker on Monday, but news reports tell the story of the Russian crew fighting off the pirates with fire hoses. The Russian Navy destroyer Admiral Panteleyev went hunting for the pirate attackers and ended up picking up 29 pirates. The equipment found is noteworthy.

"Seven Kalashnikov rifles, various pistols and an aluminum ladder were discovered during a search of the ship," RIA Novosti quoted the source as saying. Satellite navigation equipment and a large amount of ammunition was also seized.

"This allows us to assume that this group of pirates undertook two unsuccessful attempts to seize the TF Commander tanker with a Russian crew that was traveling through this region yesterday," RIA quoted the source as saying.

Depends on the court, but if the pirates are sent to a court in Russia these pirate dudes are done. In Kenya, the Russians may be assuming too much.

38 pirates captured, but unfortunately, there are questions whether any of them will be charged. Still, it is good to see both Russia and India in the fight.

India Expands Navy Anti-Piracy Role

The Indian Navy is going to take up a greater anti-piracy role in the Indian Ocean, in this case answering a request for help by the island nation of Seychelles.

The Seychelles Armed Forces today said it had requested the Indian Navy to patrol the exclusive economic zone of the country. The Navy confirmed that INS Nirdeshak has already been sent to the region.

While details of the area to be patrolled and the deployment of additional warships in the region will be discussed at a later stage, the Nirdeshak, which is a survey vessel of the Navy but is “adequately equipped” to undertake anti-piracy missions, will begin operations immediately.

This is in direct alignment with India's defined maritime strategy that focuses on leveraging naval forces for maritime security throughout the maritime domain in the Indian Ocean. This is a development worth observing long term.

Somalia pirates have been hijacking yatchs lately in that area.

America Continues Questionable Foreign Policies

I don't understand the State Department's thinking here. The Times of India is making a good point.

Strange are the ways of the US. Just when India had shed its long-standing opinion of the US being an unreliable arms supplier, given its propensity to impose sanctions at the drop of a hat, Washington has let loose a strange missile.

The Navy was all set to launch sea trials of the first of the three Shivalik-class stealth frigates being built at Mazagon Docks (MDL) when it got a rude shock on learning the new Obama administration had directed American company General Electric (GE) to stop all work on the gas turbine engines which power the warships.

Sources said MDL and Navy are now scrambling to get Italian company Fiat Avio to oversee the "operationalisation'' of the two GE LM-2500 gas turbines of the 4,900-tonne frigate, named INS Shivalik, to ensure its sea trials can begin within a month or two.

GE, on its part, told Indian authorities that the US state department had asked it to freeze all work on the turbines it has supplied till the Obama administration reviewed its military ties with different countries.

I think the review of military ties with different countries is good, but doesn't mean people need to stop working with other governments while we review our policies, indeed the whole "everyone stop what you are doing" approach is the stuff of amateurs. Connectivity is a good thing, and a unilateral disconnection of business activities in the middle of work being done with other countries is not smart power, indeed disruptions send the wrong signals to friends and create friction when and where it is unnecessary.

This is what amateurs do, they interrupt business so they can learn the business, but call it good leadership. I'm not sure if the Obama administration noticed, but GE was at around 35 dollars a share this time last year, and closed today at 10 dollars a share. The entire foreign policy of the Obama administration will almost certainly involve the Indian Ocean, and they need to disrupt these type of engagements with the Indian Oceans largest military and economic power, a democracy and important trading partner, to decide what?? exactly, whether or not we should continue a trend of positive relations?

I noted the Export Law Blog brought up this issue. They are apparently not aware that this same policy also impacts the United Kingdom and Australia. If this is "smart power" in the Obama administration State Department, I'd hate to see what happens when those folks make a stupid mistake. Hillary Clinton should be asked why she is suspending military related economic activity with all of our very important friends countries globally.

China and India Exchange Pings

Welcome to the neighborhood.

An Indian Kilo class submarine spooked Chinese warships that were sent to patrol pirate infested waters in the Gulf of Aden and the two navies engaged in an hour long game of 'hide and seek' in international waters last month, Chinese media reports have said.

In the first such incident involving Indian and Chinese warships that has come to light, media reports from China said that its warships 'forced' the Indian submarine to surface after over an hour of manoeuvres during which anti submarine choppers were scrambled from the Chinese destroyers.

Some Chinese news reports are claiming the Chinese forced the submarine to surface, but the Indian Navy official denies that report later in the article. I tend to believe the Indian story, unless China was actually shooting at the submarine I have a hard time believing the submarine would surface for any reason near two PLA Navy destroyers.

RockyMountainNavy has more details. I see this as falling into the context of expected behavior. The Indian Navy is monitoring the PLA Navy operate in the Indian Ocean? Of coarse they are.

The details suggest that the Indian Kilo is not as quiet as some folks claim, or that Chinese sonar is a lot better than most people claim.

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Update: Meanwhile, India denies the incident, suggesting it never happened at all. While potentially true, if true it says little about India, because they absolutely SHOULD BE shadowing PLAN destroyers while they are in the Indian Ocean.

I have no inside information, but I have no doubt that when the Russians came sailing into the Gulf of Mexico, we were watching.

India/Russia SSN deal now in question?

At least one Indian press source (one which I don't have a reliability rating for) has indicated that the deal for India to lease two Akula-II (or Project 971I Schucka-B) class SSNs may be in jeopardy. The stated cause is the accident aboard the Nerpa, which has (according to the Indians quoting Russians) destroyed the ability of the shipyard to field a qualified crew for testing - and the fact that the yard is 'running short of cash.'

What?

Apparently, in order to reconstitute a proper trials crew, 'refresher courses of up to a year' would be required. The second reason is more telling to me, however - given the prior elbow negotiations over the cost of the Gorshkov/Vikramaditya, this looks to this outsider an awful lot like an attempt to gain bargaining leverage over the cost overruns on the carrier deal. India wants the Nerpa and any sister boats in order to jumpstart its own SSN/SSBN force training and engineering establishment, so the ramifications go beyond a simple unit acquisition.

I will be looking for further explicit linkages between the two deals (or further explicit descriptions of the two as 'one deal') with discussion of budgets, cash shortages and/or payments to bolster my confidence that this is the case. But this is what it looks like here.

India buying from US

A while back, India bought 6 C-130J from LM for $1 billion. They are now continuing this spending spree paying $2.1 billion for 8 P-8I. This is certainly significant in that it beat out multiple other companies from different countries. It is also replacing the current Russian MPAs in service with IN. I'm not saying that Russia is loosing the Indian market, because it still has many deals like Talwar, MKI, PAK-FA, T-90 and Mig-29K/Gorshkov. However, US is finally making some in roads in this market. It might take some market share away from French and Israelis. It's hard to say what the next major import from US is, but the Light Helo Competition could be a major prize for Bell.

India inks largest-ever defence deal with US
5 Jan 2009, 0055 hrs IST, Rajat Pandit, TNN


NEW DELHI: The UPA government has quietly gone ahead and signed the biggest-ever defence deal with US: a $2.1 billion contract for eight Boeing P-8I long-range maritime reconnaissance (LRMR) aircraft for Navy.

TOI had reported on December 27 that the huge deal was finally on the verge of being inked after protracted negotiations and clearance from the Cabinet Committee on Security.

The actual signing took place on January 1, with defence ministry's joint secretary and acquisitions manager (maritime systems) Preeti Sudan and Boeing integrated defence systems vice-president and country head Vivek Lall signing the contract, sources said.

But, strangely enough, the defence ministry is keeping the deal under wraps. Incidentally, the previous NDA regime had also signed a flurry of mega defence deals -- like the $1.5 billion one for Russian aircraft carrier Admiral Gorshkov and $1.1 billion one for three Israeli ‘Phalcon' AWACS (airborne warning and control systems) -- in the run-up to the April-May 2004 general elections.

Sources said the P-8I contract was "a direct commercial agreement with Boeing", with "some issues of end-use verification yet to be fully sorted out" with the US government.

As reported earlier, India and US are negotiating the End-Use Verification Agreement (EUVA) and the Communication Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA), which are required under American laws to ensure compliance with sensitive technology control requirements.

The two pacts are required since India is now increasingly turning to US to buy military hardware and software. Though India does not have problems with safeguards, it does not want them to be "intrusive".

In terms of the contract size, the P-8I deal supplants the $962 million deal signed with US in 2007 for six C-130J `Super Hercules' aircraft for Indian special forces.

India will get the first P-8I towards end-2012 or early-2013, with the other seven following in a phased manner by 2015-2016. The contract also provides an option for India to order four to eight more such planes.

Armed with torpedoes, depth bombs and Harpoon anti-ship missiles, the P-8I will also be capable of anti-submarine warfare and anti-surface warfare. They will replace the eight ageing and fuel-guzzling Russian Tupolev-142M turboprops currently being operated by Navy.

The P-8I planes will help in plugging the existing voids in Navy's maritime snooping capabilities, having as they will an operating range of over 600 nautical miles, with `5.5 hours on station'.

Customised for India and based on the Boeing 737 commercial airliner, the P-8I will actually be a variant of the P-8A Poseidon multi-mission maritime aircraft currently being developed for US Navy, which has ordered 108 of them to replace its P-3C Orion fleet. India, of course, remains unhappy over the US decision to sell more P-3C Orions, armed with Harpoon missiles, to Pakistan.

At present, the Navy uses the TU-142Ms, IL-38SDs and Dorniers for surveillance operations in the Indian Ocean region. It is also now in the hunt for six advanced medium-range maritime reconnaissance planes, for around Rs 1,600 crore, to further boost its snooping capabilities.

Russia pushes India SSN lease deal

This story from Reuters-India tells us that Russian President Medvedev is talking up the possibility of leasing not only the ill-fated Nerpa but 'several' Project-971 submarines to India, for 10-year leases. Although there isn't any press on India's response to this - the Nerpa deal was on, off, on, etc. after the recent accident - it's got to be tempting, as Galrahn reminded us earlier. It's a way to get into a serious nuclear submarine force for much less money and time than would required to build it domestically; and if they do decide to go the domestic route for attack boats (in addition to the oft-discussed ATV likely-SSBN) the lease deals would provide an excellent means to acquire a trained nuc cadre. It would also allow for quick acquisition of escorts capable of keeping up with the ATV when she goes to sea on deployment.

Submarines in the Indian Ocean

The Pakistan / India naval balance has been and is continuing to be an excellent look at a regional naval competition between states with differing goals. Strategy Page offers an update on the submarine acquisitions of both sides. Pakistan is retaining consistency, moving to acquire three modern SSKs via licensed production of the German Type 214. Although I'm not sure if the Pakistani 214s will have the fuel cell systems of the several European models of this boat, it seems that they will get the AIP systems and, possibly, retrofit these onto some of their older Agosta 90B boats.

Pakistan's navy is a small frigate navy with a submarine force which appears optimized for either commerce raiding or attacks on high-value warship targets. Although they possess two AORs, they do not possess significant power projection assets. This is in line with their navy's position in the region, that of a defensive force (and spoiler) against India.

India, on the other hand, has a much more varied set of naval capabilities. Through construction and purchase, they have built up a respectable amphibious capability, and are working on setting up forward outposts to support sea control missions around the Indian Ocean basin (notably on Madagascar to support African coast antipiracy missions). Their submarine force is at present a conventional one, but they have experience (via a lease for several years) at nuclear submarine operation. They have indigenous nucs under construction and have recently been in the news for their maneuvering to acquire ex-Soviet SSN hardware. Rumorintel has them planning to use their domestic nuclear submarine production cap to produce at least one SSBN for nuclear deterrence.

India is also upgrading its SSK fleet, choosing to pursue the French Scorpene with AIP as well. Their submarine fleet is presently some three times the size of Pakistan's, at 16 boats not counting those under construction. Their indigenous production and 10 boats of the ex-Soviet Kilo boats (in Indian service, the 'Project 877'/ Sindhu class) has left them with a relatively new and capable force (despite arguments in the Indian journals and press about the 'lack of capability' of the 877s).

Are these new acquisitions upgrades, increases in capability, or simple fleet maintenance? It's a bit clouded, but we can make some guesses.

Pakistan's acquiring three new boats is numerically simple replacement of their oldest - two Agosta 70 boats commissioned in 1979 and 1980. At that, these boats are coming up on thirty years of service, and with their new boats not scheduled to come online for four to five years, this makes the new acquisitions a relatively straight fleet-maintenance purchase by numbers. The AIP capability, especially the refits, are a different story. It's harder to tell if this is a capability acquired simply because it has become relatively common and affordable on SSKs, or if it reflects different thinking on the part of the Pakistani navy.

Although not comparable to nuclear propulsion, AIP (Stirling and fuel cell operation) does offer a significant upgrade to a SSK. These boats can operate quietly, if conservatively, for several days submerged - which in combat scenarios with a coastal neighbor is nothing to sneeze at, especially when that neighbor has high-value naval assets such as large amphibs and aircraft carriers. Pakistan's navy has not done well in prior clashes against the Indians, but those clashes are also not properly characterized as high-effort naval combat. Gunboats and frigates have gone head to head in sea actions, mostly.

India has now (and will in future) the capability to credibly prevent Pakistan from operating at sea either commercially or militarily in the case of full-scale conflict. India, however, is also concerned with other adversaries; in addition to the antipiracy mentioned earlier, India worries about the rising influence of China in Africa and in the Indian Ocean, and their fleet reflects this. They have long maintained at least one active CV, and their efforts to acquire new ones (Gorshkov) are well-documented. In the case of high-effort conflict, I would expect the Pakistani navy to attempt to engage Indian navy assets to prevent them from supporting ground operations and in general to attempt to whittle down India's capabilities and influence in the region. India, on the other hand, would attempt (as in the past) to fix and engage the smaller and less capable Pakistani fleet in order to achieve local sea control in support of anti-commerce and shore strike missions.

At first glance, if and when India manages to acquire nuclear attack submarines, they won't directly increase the threat to Pakistani naval assets, which will mostly operate in the littoral anyhow. The Indians will, however, gain the ability to credibly oppose the PLA(N) in their own ocean, and will gain sea denial at long ranges through SSN patrol. At present, however, their determination to both modernize their SSK force as well as pursue a blue-water SSN capability indicates at least two components to their goals. The SSK force is good for commerce attacks and for sea denial in the littorals, where Pakistan operates. The SSNs are a statement of intent to pursue sea denial farther afield, and perhaps even threaten SSBN assets of their opponents.

I remain interested in India's acquisition of SSBN capability. Given that their most likely target sets (Pakistan and China) are relatively nearby, their patrol patterns and technological requirements are somewhat eased. India gaining a secure second strike capability is of high importance against Pakistan, since land-based missiles (even mobile ones) are high-value and fragile targets in the event of an all-out conflict. While it will not necessarily increase their counterforce capability against Pakistan or China, it will up the deterrent power of Indian nukes - and if they only have one or two SSBNs, those will become high-value targets for other submarines.

I will be watching closely to see if Pakistan and India and China slip into the patterns the U.S. and U.S.S.R. evolved during the cold war of shadowing each others' assets both for potential counterforce and for simple warning surveillance.
Image from Wikipedia of an Agosta 90B

Russia and India Reach Final Stage in Gorshkov Negotiations

Every once in awhile I come across some very interesting analysis on the Russian website shipbuilding.ru, and this weeks article by Gennady Nechaev is no exception. The article basically states that Russia and India have reached the moment of decision with the Admiral Gorshkov aircraft carrier, and the last chance for Russia to sell the aircraft carrier to India is approaching in the form of President Medvedev's visit to India scheduled in a few weeks.

The article contemplates the "what ifs" should India decide not to pay the $2 billion price tag Russia is demanding to complete the carrier. Two stand out, the first which the author doesn't think has any real value, is for Russia to keep the carrier. This is not an uncommon position among Russian analysts, given the choice the consensus seems to be a new aircraft carrier would be more of a burden on the Russian fleet at this time than a blessing. Indeed, it seems to be a common view that the Russian desire for six aircraft carriers is Utopian, unrealistic, or worse.

The second option would be to sell the aircraft carrier to China. This is the concluding thought of the analysis, and doesn't dig very deep. I don't think China would buy it, which raises the question, now what?

It is an interesting question to contemplate, raising the possibility that India has more negotiating power than is assumed in this deal. The title of the article is "The Unwanted Carrier" and is very appropriate, because if India doesn't buy it, it raises the question who will actually pay the rest of the money necessary to field the ship, and the answer is ultimately... nobody.

Seems to me that puts India in a very good position, made even better if they can get the Kitty Hawk back on the table as a distant possibility.

Still Early in the Mumbai Terror Attacks

It is still way too early to offer any analysis of the Mumbai terror attacks. Like most incidents, early reporting is often inaccurate in regards to what happened, and it takes time for investigators to sort of fact and fiction, and adding speculation and rumor never helps. All we can really do is continue to observe news reporting like this video from the Telegraph, which gives a good summery.

With that said, there does appear to be a maritime interest in this attack that I intend to follow closely. The details are sketchy at best, but news reports like this one, this one, and this one give some hint that the Indian Navy and Coast Guard are very active off the coast of India near Pakistan investigating a couple of maritime aspects to the attack.

While it is still unclear, it looks like there may be two specific maritime aspects of this story to watch for, an act of piracy and a possible amphibious assault terrorism style. There is a lot to think about, but if there was indeed a maritime aspect to the attack there will be important lessons for both the Navy and the Coast Guard in tweaking our own homeland security against potential terrorist attacks of this nature.

Something else that might be interesting to keep an eye on. If you recall, text messaging made a big impact during Hurricane Katrina. Well, it appears Twitter has had a significant impact on the information flow in real time during the attack (see here and here).

Real time, Open Source Intelligence during a terrorist attack on a major city... There is something significant in that statement worth pondering, and worth local responders to consider very carefully regarding the dissemination of information in real time during future crisis. After all, just like text messages to specific people, a cell phone can be a Twitter client to the masses.

Somali Piracy and Fish Stories

There is a lot of discussion about the Thai Fishing Trawler that the Indian Navy blew up. The owner of the ship is claiming it was not a mothership.

But it turns out now that the “mother ship” may not have been in pirate hands very long. According to the CNN report, the ship was the trawler Ekawat Nava 5, which had been headed from Oman to Yemen to deliver fishing equipment when it was attacked by pirates off the Horn of Africa, according to Wicharn Sirichaiekawat, owner of the Ekawat Nava 5. The pirates were still taking control of the ship when the Tabar moved in, he said.

The media didn't really dig very deep here. The question is not whether the Indian Navy should have blown up a trawler that was shooting at it, particularly one towing two motor boats. The Indian Navy has the right to self defense, even in the face of the stupidity required for pirates to shoot at a warship with their AK-47s.

The real question here is why a Thai fishing trawler is near Somalia. Are we seriously supposed to believe that fishing trawlers make their money doing cargo hauls between Oman and Yemen? Really? That is a tough sell without a lot more proof than CNNs reporting is providing.

The more likely reason the Somalian pirates raided the ship is because it was illegally fishing in the Somalia Exclusive Economic Zone. Did any reporters ask Wicharn Sirichaiekawat, owner of the Ekawat Nava 5, questions about why his fishing ship from Thailand is way the hell over off the coast of Somalia? If a reporter wants to talk about Somalian piracy, they need to do some basic research into fishing off Somalia, because it is part of the story.

A Thai fishing trawler off the coast of Somalia transporting fishing gear between two countries, and it just so happens to be happening during a fishing season when catches right now are running 50% to 150% better than normal. To borrow a pun, that story sounds fishy to me.

5th Fleet Focus: Communication Problems

This is a really interesting article that covers some of the concerns India has with all its good publicity after taking action against pirates. There is a lot to consider here, and a good place for our government to begin the conversation.

The Tabar’s action has been greeted with cheer — from Australia where a newspaper said India’s action was the “template” for the battle against piracy, to the International Maritime Bureau that has asked other navies to learn from India, to the US where the state department spokesperson congratulated India.

At naval headquarters in New Delhi, however, the optimism generated by the Tabar’s action is tempered by a concern over how the Indian Navy will fit into the complex naval grid in the Gulf of Aden. There is also concern that the presence of so many warships from all over the world will invariably lead to “snooping” — efforts to assess the potential of battleships and record radar and communication signatures.

It is for this reason that the Indian Navy now wants to cover the tracks of the deployment of a second ship to the region after first letting it be known that a Delhi-class destroyer would be off Somalia in four days. There are three Delhi-class destroyers in the Indian fleet — the INS Delhi, INS Mumbai and the INS Mysore.

“There are about two-dozen warships there from about a dozen or more countries,” a senior naval officer in Delhi said. “We have to know how to co-ordinate with them.”

The final paragraph of the article has some bite.

In purely military terms, a huge asymmetry exists in the battlefield of the Gulf of Aden — the pirates are armed with AK-47s, speedboats and “mother vessels” that are usually dhows, while the navies have frigates, destroyers, cruisers and helicopters. Yet, they are clueless, in the absence of leadership, on what to do to secure the sea lane.

In other words, the international task force needs a Command Ship. If it wasn't such a national embarrassment, I would volunteer the USS San Antonio (LPD 17). Since it isn't available, I would suggest that perhaps the US Navy should surge a ship for this role. Which ship? Well that is an interesting question, I would volunteer the USS Wasp (LHD 1) for the role beginning next year, and begin the process of working on the communication solutions now.

In the meantime, the USS San Antonio (LPD 17) is clearly the choice to be made, if she can be made available. If not, can the USS Iwo Jima (LHD 7) be spared for the role? Just one more example why this blog advocates for big motherships, the necessity for international command ships in the future will exist.

The Gorshkov Fine Print

There are some emerging details regarding the Gorshkov deal with India. According to the latest news reports, the delivery has been pushed back to 2012 and India has yet to make any new payments.

Russia today said the delivery of Admiral Gorshkov aircraft carrier to the Indian Navy would be delayed till 2012 as the vessel could be refitted only sometime in 2010.

It also said that since last year New Delhi has not made any payments although the extra work to the tune of USD 1.7 billion has been done by the shipyard.

The article goes on to highlight a few other details. The launch of the Gorshkov is now said to be around the December time frame, which confirms what we heard last month. The launch is speculated to take place when Russian President Dmitry Medvedev visits India later this year. After launch, the carrier will be moored for refitting, and then will conduct sea trials, and eventually aviation trials using the Russian Navy trained crews that currently serve on the Russian aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov.

India is in a tough spot, they owe $1.7 billion for a carrier that is delayed until 2012. I still wonder what $1.7 billion would do for the soon to be retired USS Kitty Hawk. One would think $1.7 billion would be enough money to put 20 more years into the ship, and probably get the ship in service with the Indian Navy long before Gorshkov would be ready.

If coupled with a major aircraft deal for F/A-18 Super Hornets, it would certainly be a big boost for the defense industry during a time of decreasing defense budgets. It would also boost defense ties in a major way between India and the United States. Considering how important India is to the security of the Indian Ocean region, that last part is clearly where the US would get the biggest boost.

The real question is whether the US should even try to pull off such a deal, and would India go for it? I'm not sure, probably not. I recognize there would be political fallout in relations with Russia, China, and Pakistan if such a deal was made, however if we are being realistic, the only country of the three this has an impact worthy of consideration is China. Is it possible to build closer relations with China and also sell India the Kitty Hawk? If that is possible, that would be the best case scenario. It is difficult, not impossible, to see such a scenario emerge as an option.

Were there Indian Navy personnel aboard Russian Accident sub?

AFP and Reuters are both reporting on an accident aboard a Russian nuclear submarine undergoing sea trials. Apparently the firefighting system was inadvertently activated; that's all the information available so far. The submarine is underway back to port, and suffered no reactor damage; however, around 20 people were killed aboard the sub. The Reuters story says that during the sea trials, of the 208 people aboard, 81 were servicemen. The others, according to the Russians, were technical specialists and naval technicians.

Galrahn posted earlier about the Indian Navy paying Russia to prepare for delivery of a leased SSN, and that that submarine had been sent to the Primorye Territory. That area is in far southeastern Russia, near Japan. The news reports say that the stricken sub is steaming back to a Russian Pacific Fleet base. My questions, and they're obvious ones: Was this the submarine intended for delivery to India? (Sure looks like it so far). Was the submarine damaged? (Don't know.) Were there any Indian personnel aboard? (Again, don't know.) If yes to any of the above, will this affect the lease deal? (Interesting and don't know.)

Let me be clear: My condolences and best wishes to all those who fared aboard this submarine along with their families, their friends and colleagues. In the eyes of the sea, we are all merely men; and as such, brothers.