So Stealthy the Libyans Wouldn't Even Have Known They Weren't There...

I'm just gonna come out and say that this argument hasn't aged well:

Employing a squadron of stealth fifth-generation F-22s along with other select capabilities would help reduce the need to expend significantly more resources while reducing operational risk. Coercive diplomacy backed by naval presence, decisive air power, and accurate weapons in the region would allow the U.S. and others to negate Libyan air defenses and air forces. The world-class capability inherent in the F-22 also bears a psychological-intimidation factor that sends a clear message that no Libyan aircraft will fly without consequences.

Simply talking about a no-fly zone should highlight the urgent need to recapitalize the U.S. Air Force with modern aircraft (in addition to upgrades of the legacy fleets). Using fifth-generation F-22 aircraft for a no-fly zone mission would allow the Air Force to operate above the Libyan skies with impunity. An F-22 Raptor does not need to destroy enemy air defenses first, because it is not vulnerable to this threat, unlike some fourth-generation aircraft.

I suspect that the four month grounding of the F-22 in the midst of the campaign might have made things... awkward. I wouldn't bother with this (obviously, replacement aircraft could have been found) were it not for the fact that the op-ed was such a bald effort to shill for the institutional interest of the USAF.

Lockheed Martin Takes a Broadside in the Senate

When Dr. Ashton Carter testifies in front of the Senate that your program is unaffordable in this fiscal climate, the only hope left is to find enough politicians that will sell out. Something drastically changes, or the Joint Strike Fighter is done.

"Over the lifetime of this program, the decade or so, the per-aircraft cost of the 2,443 aircraft we want has doubled in real terms," said Ashton Carter, the under secretary of defense for acquisition, technology and logistics.

"That's our forecast for how much the aircraft's going to cost.

"Said differently, that's what it's going to cost if we keep doing what we're doing. And that's unacceptable. It's unaffordable at that rate."

The cost of the plane has jumped to $385 billion, about $103 million per plane in constant dollars or $113 million in fiscal year 2011 dollars, said Christine Fox, the Defense Department's director of cost assessment and program evaluation.

Republican Senator John McCain called the figure "truly troubling," considering the original price was $69 million per airplane.

"The facts regarding this program are truly troubling," said McCain. "No program should expect to be continued with that kind of track record, especially in our current fiscal climate," said McCain.

"It seems to me we have to start at least considering alternatives"

CNA almost had it right. The tipping point wasn't the point at which the Navy fleet was unaffordable, it was the point where naval aviation became unaffordable. Most folks don't realize that the Navy consistently spends more budget money on aviation than the Air Force does, but they in fact have for many, many years.

Here is the biggest problem facing the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps not to mention all the other nations invested in the Joint Strike Fighter program. The cost per aircraft is now so high that it doesn't justify the expenditure, meaning the combat capability of the less capable F-15, F-16, and F-18 alternatives exceeds the combat capability investment one gets with plowing ahead with the Joint Strike Fighter. Quite frankly, there simply isn't enough difference in the payload, range, speed, electronics, or stealth that separates the 5th generation JSF from it's 4th generation alternatives to move ahead.

The UCAS, on the other hand, has game changing range and endurance, not to mention lower manpower costs so even if it runs at a higher cost that estimated per platform, the capability opportunity in the investment is so much more than lesser alternatives that the cost justification is there.

The only thing left is for reality to set in among elected officials, not to mention entrenched interests in defense. The Joint Strike Fighter is the modern A-12, and only the F-35B VSTOL version (which is also the most expensive variant) is the capability that is unique and lacks a legitimate replacement. It is also the most likely version of the JSF to find international interest in continuing the program at very high cost even if the F-35A and F-35C is canceled.

Perhaps there is another way ahead, but right about now the Air Force would be wise to propose a F-22 high and F-15/F-16 low mix of fighters just to streamline maintenance to three specific platforms.

Politics of the F-22 in Libya

Somebody is being misleading:

Instead, political reasons likely kept the most advanced jet on Earth out of the fight, according to Deptula, an early advocate of using the jet to enforce the no-fly zone in Libya. Basically, the F-22’s stealth would have negated much of the official need for coalition help since the jet is almost completely immune to Libya’s ancient air defenses, argues the Deptula, who retired last October.

“Because of the high degree of stealth of the F-22, its supercruise and ISR capabilities, it would not have required the destruction of the Libyan enemy air defense system to operate inside Libyan airspace,” writes Deptula in an email to DoDBuzz. This is especially true “given the make-up of the current Libyan air defenses (predominantly made up of SA-2, 3, 5, and 6s). Accordingly, F-22s would be free to either engage any Libyan aircraft that took-off, or they could destroy LAF aircraft and/or helicopters on the ground at will.”

Fortunately, later in the piece Reed points out why this is quite misleading:

While the F-22 is “optimized” for air-to-air combat as Air Force Secretary Michael Donley pointed out last week, they can carry two 1,000 pound JDAMs for air-to-ground missions. No, this isn’t nearly as good as a bomber or strike fighters like the F-15E but it still packs a punch and could have hit ground targets.

Still, other jets such as the Strike Eagle and Marine Corps AV-8B Harrier carry a lot more of the air-to-ground munitions that have been used to chase down Gadhafi’s ground forces. Keeping them in the air unmolested means taking out Libyan air defenses, not just Libyan fighters. Some aviation experts also argue that the F-22s would require nearly as many “enablers” (support aircraft) as legacy fighters to carry out the Libyan mission.

Precisely; the F-22 might render other aircraft unnecessary if the no fly zone was actually a no fly zone, but of course it's not. Because the mission apparently includes direct ground support for Libyan rebels, it necessitates the participation of non-F-22 aircraft, which necessitates the destruction of the Libyan air defense network.

The other issue I have with Deptula is the corruption of the term "political." Even if Deptula were correct on the merits, and the F-22 could perform the mission without assistance from other aircraft, creating conditions for the inclusion of coalition partners is an entirely sensible political objective. Indeed, for my part anything that forces Britain, France, and the rest to take on as much of the heavy lifting as possible in genuinely sensible from an American point of view.

Exporting the F-22?

If pressing Japan to build nuclear weapons is a good idea*, then I can't really see the problem with selling Tokyo the F-22. A sale to Tokyo pretty much mandates sales to South Korea and Australia, which may be a plus depending on your point of view.

*Sounds like a ridiculously terrible idea to me, but I'm willing to entertain "pro" arguments in comments.

Another Great Gates Speech

I think Gates speech at a Meeting of the Economic Club of Chicago might be one of his best yet. Read the transcript. A few bits worth thinking about.

So where do we go from here? Authorization for more F-22s is in both versions of the defense bill working its way through the Congress. The president has indicated that he has real red lines in this budget, including the F-22.

Some might ask, why threaten a veto and risk a confrontation over a couple of billion dollars and for a dozen or so more -- a dozen or so more planes?

The grim reality is that with regard to the defense budget, we have entered a zero-sum game. Every defense dollar devoted to -- diverted to fund excess or unneeded capacity, whether for more F-22s or anything else, is a dollar that will be unavailable to take care of our people, to win the wars we are in, to deter potential adversaries, and to improve capabilities in areas where America is underinvested and potentially vulnerable. That is a risk I cannot accept and one that I will not take.

And with regard to something like the F-22, regardless of whether the number of aircraft at issue is 12 or 200, if we can't bring ourselves to make this tough but straightforward decision -- reflecting the judgment of two very different presidents, two secretaries of defense, two chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the current Air Force secretary and chief of staff -- where do we draw the line? And if not now, when?

If we can't get this right, what on earth can we get right? It is time to draw the line on doing defense business as usual. The president has drawn that line, and that line is with regard to a veto. And it is real.

I think this part is on the money.

A final thought. I arrived in Washington 43 years ago this summer. Of all people, I am well aware of the realities of Washington and know that change -- that things do not change overnight. After all, the influence of politics and parochial interests in defense matters is as old as the republic itself. Henry Knox, the first secretary of war, was charged with building the first American fleet. To get the support of Congress, Knox eventually ended up with six frigates being built in six different shipyards in six different states. (Laughter.)

But the stakes today are very high -- with the nation at war, and a security landscape steadily growing more dangerous and unpredictable. I am deeply concerned about the long-term challenges facing our defense establishment, and just as concerned that the political state of play in Washington does not reflect the reality that major reforms are needed, or that tough choices and real discipline are necessary.

We stand at a crossroads. We simply cannot risk continuing down -- going down the same path, where our spending and program priorities are increasingly divorced from the very real threats of today and the growing ones of tomorrow. These threats demand that all of our nation's leaders rise above the politics and parochialism that have too often plagued considerations of our national -- the national defense, from industry to interest groups, from the Pentagon to Foggy Bottom, from one end of Pennsylvania Avenue to the other.

The time has come to draw a line and take a stand against the business-as-usual approach to national defense. We must all fulfill our obligation to the American people to ensure that our country remains safe and strong. Just as our men and women in uniform are doing their duty to this end, we in Washington must do ours.

Gates has become the guy who stands at the front of the 4th of July parade and carries the flag. People don't necessary believe in Gates, but a lot of people see the flag and follow it.

Gates has made several tough decisions lately, the F-22 in particular is a very tough call and I think it will cost the US more money than less in the long run, but whatever. What I really appreciate about what Gates is doing though is that he is trying to move the DoD from its rooted position, and the F-22 is the best example of a deeply rooted program. If that program moves, anything can be moved, and everyone knows it.

The fight isn't really about the F-22 anymore. The fight is about who controls the strategic priorities of the defense budget. It is a political fight that has nothing to do with the ideology of Democrats and Republicans, unless that ideology is about power and money. All Gates wants to do is move the DoD, and it doesn't matter to where it moves, only that it gets off the road it is on. Any direction will do, because once the move takes place, then the thinking begins.

I am a big fan of the F-22, and I think we should build around 400, but I support Gates move to cut it because this debate is no longer about the F-22. Anyone in favor of reforming the DoD supports Gates move to cut the F-22, and anyone who likes the business as usual entrenched interests value system of defense budgeting favors the F-22. That is what the F-22 has come to mean, a symbol for change or status quo.

Do We Need More F-22s?

I really like this Greg Grant article on DoD Buzz. It lists out the talking points for the F-22 and highlights many of the flaws in some of the arguments made for supporting the platform. However, the article also has a paragraph that I believe is where serious consideration is warranted on the F-22 program.

The oddest thing about this whole debate is that it’s not about whether or not to develop and produce the admittedly impressive air-superiority fighter. That has already happened. The F-22 is operational and current plans are to build the final of 187 Raptors by 2011. The argument F-22 advocates make is that 187 is not enough and that only by buying more Raptors will strategic catastrophe be avoided in what has become the ultimate “bean counting” game, conjuring memories of measuring the NATO vs. Warsaw Pact balance, with the difference, of course, that no adversary currently exists to bean count against.

Now Greg Grant is a smart guy, but he clearly hasn't been hanging out with many strategic thinkers to make the last comment. The threat based analysis strategic planning approach is a failing myopic view that reporters like Greg Grant should call people out on when they suggest it in the Pentagon, because unfortunately it is something some people in DoD are doing a lot of lately.

Two things happened last week that grabbed my interest regarding the F-22, and neither was the stunt in the House to keep the F-22 line open in the HASC bill. The first thing I find pretty incredible is the rumor mill that in virtually every force structure analysis and operational planning capability study prepared by the Air Force for the QDR, the necessity for more than 187 F-22s continues to pop up. In other words, the analysis consistently says the Air Force needs more F-22s to meet existing requirements, and only the Secretary of Defense is saying otherwise.

I didn't really believe the rumor though, surely this isn't true or someone would be speaking up, right? Next thing I know, this article shows up in CQPolitics.

Gen. John D.W. Corley, the four-star chief of Air Combat Command at Langley Air Force Base, Va., wrote a letter to Sen. Saxby Chambliss , R-Ga., about the impact of Obama and Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates ’ decision to limit the number of F-22s in the U.S. inventory to 187.

“In my opinion, a fleet of 187 F-22s puts execution of our current national military strategy at high risk in the near to mid term,” Corley wrote in the June 9 correspondence. “To my knowledge, there are no studies that demonstrate that 187 F-22s are adequate to support our national military strategy.”

When 4 star Generals are saying this with full knowledge of previous firings by Secretary Gates, people should be giving this issue a lot more attention, and more importantly, asking tougher questions of Gates even after he gets dismissive.

For years the F-22 requirement was always 381, a specific estimate intended to provide teh Air Force one F-22 squadron per Air Expeditionary Force [AEF]. That is a perfectly rational analysis that never gets enough attention. What has been bothering me in the F-22 discussion is why nobody is asking the question: What are the absolute consequences of building only 187 F-22s? Because there was no study that recommended 187, you can bet your press pass that no one ever studied the consequences to existing operational profiles by stopping the purchase at 187. Well, absent anyone else doing it, I solicited a few opinions from some Air Force dudes and I think there is something there.

First, it should be noted the F-22A is in the field and is operational, in fact, there is very often if not always a 1 squadron requirement from the PACOM Combatant Commander for the F-22. If that is the requirement today, and has been the requirement for over a year now, we can expect this requirement to exist for many years and potentially increase or decrease depending upon the intentions of China and North Korea over the next few years.

Well, we don't have very many F-22A squadrons, which means our limited number of squadrons will be on a sustained, regular rotation to and from the Pacific as the Air Force meets existing mission requirements with fewer platforms. Has anyone stopped to consider the effects of this sustained rotation? If so, that study was classified.

We have every expectation that the F-22A is going to provide the nation with decades of service in providing air superiority, but with fewer platforms and a very high operational tempo, that is a very unreasonable expectation. Due to fewer total F-22s, we are going to pile on the years of flight time on these planes much quicker than originally intended, which has several consequences.

1) We will have to start a program for the F-22A replacement sooner than we expected, likely at very high cost removing any potential cost savings of not building more F-22As. Why? Because if you know jack about the F-22, you know the Air Force has spent on average more developing the F-22 than it does actually building the damn thing (about $200m per plane R&D, while a new F-22 costs less than $175m today). Anyone who suggests truncating the F-22 for cost purposes is making a very shortsighted, like incorrect opinion.

2) The F-22s we have will be fatigue faster and require a lot of money to sustain their full lifetime due to having to conduct the same mission requirements with fewer platforms. This is not the cold war when the Navy F-14s added redundancy to Air Forces air superiority fighters, there is no other air superiority fighter except the F-22 in the US military today. The idea behind the F-22 was that the Navy could move towards a multi-mission capability aircraft as the F-22 provides the absolute air superiority required to win major war against other powers with air capabilities. The existing requirement for the F-22 does not change simply because we build fewer, and it is noteworthy that as the F-22 is canceled, the DoD failed to produce any alternative, whether a F-16 Block 60 or even more F-18s to fill that gap, to make up for the reduced number of F-22s.

Lets be honest, if the Air Force was dropping the F-22 to build F-16 Block 60s, or even the latest F-15 models instead, the argument would be centered completely on capability vs numbers. But with aviation shortfalls in the Air Force, Navy, and even the Marine Corps right now, the DoD is canceling the F-22 with zero alternatives presented, and zero reductions in requirements from the combatant commanders. In the end, the DoD is telling Congress the Air Force of the future will do more with less, and we do it for cost purposes. That doesn't add up, and I honestly see the whole suggestion as something of an insult to the intelligence of Congress. Does the DoD really think Congress is that stupid, or does the DoD believe they have that much power over them? The second part could be true, there are a lot of freshman Senators and House members you know, and the historical record suggests the DoD is better than anyone in exploiting that.

But here is the real problem with the F-22 debate, and actually, it may be a reflection of a much larger narrative driving the long view. I was very happy to see Stephen Biddle hit this point in his CFR article today. If we were any good at predicting the future, and suggesting we knew what the 'threat' would be, there would never be a debate regarding what was needed in defense procurement. Since fortune telling is an inexact science, only fools look out decades and suggest what the world will look like.

When people ask who or what the F-22 is intended to fight, it ignores a very important point about the F-22. Whatever that fight looks like, history tells us that if it was to happen 10 years from now we likely don't even see it today, and it could be remarkably dangerous and we still wouldn't see it today. We live in a very strange time where the three enemies that topped our list of bad actors over the past decade; Iraq, Iran, and North Korea; are all nations that we have been engaged militarily against for several decades. North Korea going back to the 1950s, Iran since 1979, and Iraq every year since 1991. Expectations that the trend of knowing which specific enemy we will be engaged in conflict with in the future are highly dubious in my opinion, because the current global economic situation is changing the future even as we speak.

I am disappointed that the Naval War College did not put up Kenneth Rogoff's presentation on their Current Strategy Forum page, because that presentation was fantastic. I hope they put it up, because when economists take a strategic view into the future, I think sound defense planning discussions result.

The debt is reducing the value of the dollar, and of all the plans of the current administration, there is no plan for dealing with the debt. The value of the dollar will likely remain low for awhile compared to other currencies, and that will have an effect on energy prices. We are already seeing the price of oil rebound, up to around $70. When the global economy rebounds, knowing that the debt will still exist, what do you expect that will do to the price of oil as demand globally shoots up, likely to a higher point than anytime in history? You know, Obama may be very prescient in how he has dealt with the automobile industry, because when oil becomes static at a minimum $150+ a barrel that brand new hybrid fuel GM could look like one of the smartest domestic political moves in decades.

But at $150 a barrel, a bunch of countries are going to be flush with cash, including countries like Russia, Venezuela, Iran, and many others. Unless you haven't watched the news recently those authoritarian oil nations don't really care about their people and have no problem using a club or pistol to prove it. We can expect those nations to spend their influx of cash on military capabilities to consolidate their power internally while expanding their influence regionally, and we can expect that because that is their historical pattern.

This will be particularly dangerous with countries like Russia, because they are soon to modernize their nuclear forces. That is no small achievement. We are soon going to have to modernize our nuclear forces, and the costs of such an undertaking are going to limit what else we can do, particularly when the Navy has to replace the SSBNs.

For Russia, that means they get to build all kinds of conventional capabilities instead, and since their R&D for aircraft has remained solid over the years, very modern latest generation fighters is likely to be a big part of that purchase (and exports to virtually any buyer are also very likely) because it is one of the few industries Russia has a workforce that can step up quickly.

Want to know what keeps strategic forecasters up at night? Ask them what they expect to happen in all the oil rich authoritarian places of the world when the next global economic rise makes those nations flush with cash while the US struggles to pay debt, manage the bills, and play the global strategic balancing act role.

Don't use the argument that the F-22 is for fighting some unknown adversary, because the bottom line is We Don't Know. All we can do is plan and address the capabilities we know we need to meet our requirements, and not get sucked into the often fluid and constantly changing threat matrix that ebbs and flows too rapidly for our defense acquisition process to attempt to maintain pace with.

Take the long view. Do we need more F-22s? If not, how do we meet the mission requirements that fewer F-22s than originally planned cannot meet as to not strain our smaller but vital F-22 force over the expected duration of that platforms life? Requirements planning begins with our requirements for the capabilities we need, not by adapting to the fluid threat matrix of the other guy. If we are basing requirements planning on the emerging threats instead of the emerging trends, the enemy is already inside our OODA loop and we need a new requirements planning process, and not the one where the analysis is trumped by theories absent supporting analysis.

Send in the F-22 to Africa

Chris Albon, who knows a thing or two about third world countries, humanitarian operations, war, and health has found a serious humanitarian mission for the F-22. This looks to me to be an idea worth a serious thought.

Guest Author Series: Air Superiority 101 and Other Thoughts about Blowing Stuff up from the Air

The F-22 discussion generated a lot of discussion on the blog last week, but it also generated a lot of discussion in my Inbox. Because I am not an expert on aviation, Andrew Niemyer offered to weigh in to the topic with an essay taking the always valuable experts perspective I prefer. Below are his thoughts on the topic.

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Galrahn’s piece on the arguments over continued acquisition of the F-22 contained an interesting statement, “…I admit to being concerned about the state of air superiority looking into the future. This problem is specific to the US Air Force, because I don't believe the US Navy is going to be able to provide air superiority for itself too much longer into the future against peer competitors, for a several reasons.”

It has occurred to me that since “ID” is mainly surface warfare oriented, with the occasionally foray into things that intentionally sink and those that fly, that a brief discussion is in order regarding what are actually highly defined terms of art when used by practitioners. It is my modest hope that this will help us understand each other when we venture into these kinds of fruitful discussions. This discussion in not meant to be some sort of primer about how major airstrikes are conducted nor will I address some of the major issues attendant to such operations. Rather I hope to illuminate the terminologies meant when I was involved in such operations and later on when I taught some of these same ideas to Battle Group staffs. The basics have not changed, while the applications to achieve the ends continue to evolve.

When used in conjunction with offensive air operations, we need to look at two similar sounding, but dissimilar terms. “Air Superiority” as defined in the NATO Glossary of Terms and Definition is "That degree of dominance in the air battle of one force over another that permits the conduct of operations by the former and its related land, sea, and air forces at a given time and place without prohibitive interference [italics mine] by opposing air forces." On the other hand, “Air Supremacy” is thus defined: “…that degree of air superiority wherein the opposing air force is incapable of effective interference.” [Italics again mine] Similarly, The Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (short title: Joint Pub 1-02 or JP 1-02 (PDF)) defines Air Superiority like this: “That degree of dominance in the air battle of one force over another that permits the conduct of operations by the former and its related land, sea, and air forces at a given time and place without prohibitive interference by the opposing force.” Note that the only substantive difference is that we speak of an “opposing force” versus an “opposing air force.” [Emphasis mine] JP 1-02 defines Air Supremacy succinctly: “That degree of air superiority wherein the opposing air force is incapable of effective interference.” No quibbles between NATO and our own definition there in the least; everyone’s agreed at least on how it’s defined.

One last term we need to keep in mind is “Air Parity,” and has been called the lowest level of control, meaning control of the skies only above friendly troop positions, or in other words, a stand-off. You’re not coming into my back year without getting into one heck of a fight, and vice versa.

To put the terms in “Airdale speak:” Air Superiority means we will win the fight for control of a particular bit of three dimensional airspace and not have losses so bad that we can’t come back tomorrow morning and do it again. Air Supremacy means that the bad guys will not fly under virtually any circumstance, because if they do, they will die. We are the big dog on the block, period. Air superiority is not necessarily a permanent condition, while air supremacy can be thought of as the ultimate goal of any long term air campaign, much as was sought and attained a near-generation ago in the initial air phase of Operation Desert Storm.

Air superiority can be thought of in three different ways: Control of space, control of time, control of geography or a combination of those three. Depending on the commander’s intent and tasking, we can seek to attain air superiority over a region (which is usually done in the course of a campaign, not an individual air strike or limited series of strikes), over a political area, e.g. a nation, again a campaign objective or a specific piece of territory, say a particular area surrounding a specific target.

If the senior leadership is reacting to a specific set of circumstances and we have been tasked with conducting a specific single or set number of strikes, then those planning the strike may look to attain air superiority in a determined geographic area for a specific time frame, for example, from 0045 to 0130 local time. Why waste energy, effort and resources when it is unnecessary to do so?

Depending on the methods used to conduct the strike, we may also desire to add in the element of air superiority within a specific block of airspace. An example would be, given the use of precision stand-off weapons, a desire to have air superiority within a block altitude of 15,000 feet above ground level to 50,000 feet, e.g. above AAA range but within SAM altitudes. The SAM threat is more manageable than AAA in this example.

Thus, depending upon the tasking the planners receive from higher authority, they might decide that to achieve that tasking, they want to attain air superiority over the port complex at East Whoozit and environs, from 10,000 feet and above, from 0215 to 0300.

The methodology for attaining air superiority is a complex subject and is, quite naturally, one that has been the subject of considerable research, scholarship and experimentation. It is a topic that has been writ, regrettably, with the blood of thousands of lives as this relatively new area of conflict has developed over the last century. The sometimes dry theories of academics and the polemics of true believers have been embraced, implemented and then faced complex and unforeseen realities in the skies of Europe, the Pacific, the Mediterranean rim, the Middle East and Asia. The brute force of numbers and the finesse of advanced technologies have played their respective rolls and as of yet there is no clear, firm permanent doctrine that will address the issues that each individual theater of operations and Order of Battle of opposing forces bring into the planning and execution equations.

What we do know is what has and has not worked in the specific situations in which those theories were applied. Accurate threat assessment, driven by good, solidly derived intelligence collection is one key. What are the defender’s air defenses like? What is their command and control system for air defense? Is there a single vulnerable node in detecting an attack and directing those defenses? What is their airborne detection and direction capability? What are their airborne defenses like? Are they a competent and well trained force? What’s the geography surrounding the target? Can we use that to our advantage in seeking to gain air superiority? Should we employ fighter sweeps? What kind of CAP should we have for the strike? Keep them close or let them range? How do we suppress the enemy air defenses? Do we seek soft or hard kill? What resources do we have? If we are tasked to go back, what kind of losses in the first attempt can we sustain? These questions that face planners at all levels are just the tip of the proverbial iceberg.

Thus we can see that while the base term “air superiority” is easy to define, it overlies a vastly more complex conceptual structure that those who are really given the mission, well away from the warm glow of a computer screen and the blogosphere, must deal with in the very real terms of treasure, equipment, logistics and human lives.

A final thought: One thing “ID” readers need to bear in mind is that while huge strides have been made in the last 15 years or more in bringing the full focus of Joint warfare into harness, there are some things each service’s air components do better than others. Want Close Air Support? (CAS) I’m calling the Marines; it’s what they do. Want a prolonged air campaign, with 24/7 surveillance, tanking (on their terms, of course) and strike, that goes on and on? Dial “2” for the Air Force. Need a short, sharp shock tomorrow morning, or better yet, tonight? Call the Navy, because contingency air strikes and self-sustaining short termed campaigns waged until the USAF gets its logistics systems in place is what we historically have done very, very well. Yet, as the Navy and Marines proved over Afghanistan, they can and will conduct campaign ops for a sustained period of time, utilizing tanker, electronic warfare and early warning, command and control assets either integral to the embarked Air Wing or tasked from Joint or Coalition assets to achieve the Commander’s tactical and campaign objectives. So long as replenishment and OpTempo can be sustained, the attainment of air superiority and supremacy has a reasonable chance of being achieved; depending of course on the EOB those forces are assigned to deal with. One really, really final thought: The blogosphere has proven to be a great place to think about and discuss the “big ideas.” It has rapidly become a marketplace for theories and concepts big and small. But in the end, all the big words (“enterprise”, “objectify” and “transformational”) aside, it is the core of junior officers, senior and junior enlisted people who actually are given the job to make things work in “the big world.” For all our huffing, puffing and hyperventilating they are the ones who come up with new ways, ideas and tactics for innovative uses for what we, the people, give them. From my direct observation, none of us should ever underestimate the power of a couple First Class Petty Officers, a Chief and a Lieutenant [or a couple of Gunnys and a Captain] to come up with some pretty damn good “hey, what if we try this” ideas.

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Andrew Niemyer biography: After prior enlisted service, Andy was commissioned in 1973, and following extensive duty at NAS North Island began his flight training in 1975, receiving his wings as an NFO in 1976. From then until 1992 he flew in a variety of carrier and land based Navy aircraft, as well as USAF reconnaissance platforms. These included the EA-3B Skywarrior reconnaissance aircraft, the KA-3 pathfinder/tanker platform and as a bombardier/navigator in the A-6E. He was a qualified Senior Tactical Electronic Warfare Evaluator (SEVAL) in the EA-3B, a Strike Leader in the Intruder as well as a designated Flight Test aircrew for all makes and models of the Skywarrior, finishing his Navy flying with in excess of 3100 hours and over 100 arrested landings in the A-3 series alone. He later worked on the development and initial deployment of a combined Navy/Coast Guard pre-expeditionary command and control program. Subsequently he taught strike warfare fundamentals to Battle Group staff on the east coast. He later was involved in C3IW, IT and transformational issues for DCNO, SPAWAR and CNAVRES. He retired six months after the fall of Baghdad in 2003.

Air Force: We Need 60 More F-22s

Both Colin Clark at DoD Buzz and Amy Butler at Aviation Week are reporting today that General Norton Schwartz suggested more F-22s were needed on Tuesday, adding more commentary the F-22 discussion begun by Mark Bowden in his article in The Atlantic from over the weekend.

“We looked at this in a dispassionate and analytical way” and produced a number that “I feel is credible,” Schwartz said during a Defense Writers’ Group breakfast this morning in Washington. The general said he would not release his new number until presenting it to Defense Secretary Robert Gates - but he noted he would not disagree with statements from Navy Adm. Michael Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who told Congress 60 more F-22s were needed.

This would include orders of about 20 aircraft per year for three years. Lockheed Martin currently has orders for 183 of the twin-engine aircraft.

In his The Atlantic article, Mark Bowden used the requirement number of 381, which was a requirement established by the previous administration. Current plans would end the production line of the F-22 at 183, and if 60 more were added that would bring the total up to 243, still 138 short of the previously discussed requirement. The cost for 60 more F-22s would cost somewhere between $11-$12 billion spread out over three years.

The proposal to build more F-22s is likely to be well received in Congress, because in Congress the F-22 represents a job program unlikely to be stopped during a down economic period. The F-22 program directly effects 25,000 jobs, and indirectly impacts an additional 70,000 jobs spread out over all 50 states according to Mike Dunn, President of the Air Force Association who shared some of the details of the debate in a PodCast with Stephen Trimble's DEW Line Blog.

Congress has previously given March 1st, 2009 as a deadline for the Air Force to decide on whether to continue the F-22 program. Assuming a three year build period, that would line up the F-35 procurement to begin in 2013 and 2014 as planned, although that assumes no delays in that program (history suggests that would be a bad assumption).

This bit of news adds interesting context for the current F-22 discussion, which flared up again today when Mark Bowden responded to criticism of his article in The Atlantic through the Lowy Institute of International Policy blog. Sam Roggeveen had some comments regarding the original article, and has the response as well. Also weighing in with an opinion today was Matthew Yglesias, who cited the Center for American Progress research released during the transition period that stated $12 billion on F-22s would be better spent on other priorities. Despite high expectations otherwise, I thought the CAP report was one of the less intellectually inspiring and less strategic of think tank reports (and I read every single one of them) released during the presidential transition period, and that is probably why Obama filled out the DoD with CNAS folks while CAP laid off staff for Christmas.

In rereading Mark Bowden's article today, I kept thinking about what Matt Duss said in the blog comments on Tuesday when he called the article "an embarrassingly uncritical bit of propaganda journalism." In reading the article a few more times, I think Matt Duss is wrong about that, his criticism of a paper being a stooge for military industrial complex propaganda and industry would have been better directed at the Washington Post, LA Times, and UPI. Mark Bowden is telling stories about the aircraft and its mission, not pushing talking points of industry like those news services, and it is that type of first hand sourcing that explains why I read the content printed in The Atlantic. I think what we are seeing from Mark Bowden is the result of being out of Washington and actually embedded with the airmen flying the F-22, and what the article does very well is give their side of the story.

I have a theory about the Air Force and Navy. Every problem you can find in both organizations seems to be centric to Washington DC. When you get out with the Navy or the Air Force in the ports, on the air bases, in the ships, and on the planes it is a completely different world with a completely different tone. The Generals and Admirals are just different, but best of all, you get to talk to the Colonel's and Captains, Major's and CDR's, and the view becomes more visible with clarity in opinion. When I read this post on PACAF Pixel's today I realized what drove content in Mark Bowden's post, and it had nothing to do with a political view or industrial view.... he spent a lot of time talking to F-22 pilots. From Lt. Col. "Corky" Corcoran, commander of the 525th Fighter Squadron at Elmendorf Air Force Base, Alaska:

It was an honor and a privilege to host Mark Bowden and his research assistant, Terrence Henry, when they visited Elmendorf AFB last summer. Terrence contacted me several months prior to the visit to begin researching Mark's potential story on the erosion of US Air Dominance. After several discussions I offered up the idea of a visit to Elmendorf during PACOM's NORTHERN EDGE exercise as an excellent opportunity to give both Mark and Terrence a crash course in air combat training and tactics. They accepted.

Neither Mark nor Terrence had any background in Air Combat training or tactics, but they proved to be quick studies.... We started off their visit by introducing them to the 3rd Wing Commander, Brigadier General Tom 'Pugs' Tinsley, and the 3rd Operations Group Commander, Col Jim 'Scorch' Hecker. They interviewed both leaders and were very impressed with their knowledge and professionalism. After those interviews we simply roamed the halls of the RED FLAG - Alaska complex, home to all the units deployed to Elmendorf for the exercise, and introduced Mark and Terrence to folks from every Air Force walk of life. They interviewed F-15 and F-16 Aggressor pilots, E-3 Air Battle Managers, Intelligence officers, Radar experts, threat experts, and of course the F-15, F-16 and F-22 pilots flying the 'Blue Air' role in the exercise. We watched 30-40 minutes of a live NORTHERN EDGE mission on the 'big board' at RED FLAG and explained exactly what the pilots were doing. Mark and Terrence asked very insightful questions and by the time we left the room it was clear they understood what had just taken place before their eyes -- not only the significance of the exercise but the level of difficulty involved and the skill required to succeed.

Lets just be blunt here... that is one hell of an opportunity and an experience that is going to shape any view in a 5 page article for The Atlantic.

Finally, we took them to the flight line to watch the launch of the large force exercise. This allowed them to get an up close and personal look at the aircraft they had watched on the big board. The unique opportunity to see F-15s, F-16s, F-18s and F-22s side-by-side on the ramp clearly highlighted the generational leap our joint force has made with the F-22. This also allowed them to briefly interact with the maintainers who keep the fleet in the air -- and Mark and Terrence couldn't have been more impressed with those Air Force professionals.

After David Axe spent a lot of time around the F-22, he was a changed man. Is David Axe an industry shrill for the F-22? Of coarse not, he is one of the most knowledgeable independent journalists who covers the Air Force, which is why he is accurately calling out Loren Thompson for being dishonest when framing the F-22 issue.

I think the PACOM Pixels blog fills in 'the rest of the story' regarding what shaped Mark Bowmen's view of the F-22, and as I read the article again and again, I simply don't agree with those who suggest that The Atlantic was printing propaganda, not when there are many legitimate obvious examples of dishonesty and industry driven media attention that so clearly represent what the propaganda on this issue looks like.

Congress is observing the F-22 discussion in the context of a works program, and the Air Force appears to be calling for 60 more F-22s over the next three years. Unless Obama or Gates comes out directly to overrule the Air Force, it is a good bet we will build more of these fighters whether we need them or not. This is by definition the kind of messy nonsense we are used to seeing when there is no clear political leadership or obvious understandable vision from our military services.