The July 28 House Hearing

The House Armed Services Committee hearing back on July 28th was quite interesting - at least to nerds like me. If you haven't seen it, the webcast is available on the HASC website. The hearing on surface fleet readiness was prompted by the Balisle Report.

I've had about 5 weeks to think about the Balisle Report, and the only thing I know for sure 5 weeks later is that I have more questions now than I did after I read the report. I find it interesting that ADM Harvey was who pushed for the independent review with ADM Willard, and then had retired VADM Balisle lead the Fleet Review Panel.

What is interesting to me is that the report is ultimately critical regarding many failures of leadership over a span of nearly 2 decades until today - which if you think about it, means that ADM Harvey had VADM Balisle (ret) lead a team to issue a report that was critical of the job performance of VADM Balisle (ret) and ADM Harvey - because among many others, those two are among the leaders responsible during the period where problems occurred.

Was the ultimate purpose of the report to clarify and justify changes to fleet readiness that ADM Harvey knew needed to be made? Was the intended function of the report to ultimately help produce the evidence necessary to make those changes? The answer is probably - YES, which is noteworthy because it highlights the level of effort necessary (efforts which includes producing a report that intentionally casts doubt on ones own ability to properly do a job) just to properly fund an obviously broken maintenance system in the Navy today.

When was the last time a 4 star in our military pushed for an independent report that was directly critical of the job performance of the 4 star who pushed for the report? Just a small detail, but since the report basically calls into question the job performance of those who have served as head of Fleet Forces Command - what was the CNOs last job before he became CNO? I understand he wasn't there but for a few months, but at what point do the excuses end and does taking ownership of problems begin? The Balisle Report doesn't really build confidence in the Navy when you think about who those leaders were who dropping the ball. Just saying...

Ownership though is what distinguished ADM Harvey in the hearing - because he took ownership of the problem. When you account for the style of ADM Harvey - which I have noted over the last few years is one of a leader who leads from the front - the final result of the hearing is that ADM Harvey spent July 28th throwing his name in the hat for the next CNO. It is never too early - because the big change is only 13 months away. ADM Harvey made a really good impression with the HASC - something I think is clearly obvious in the webcast.

Something else I found really interesting about the hearing is how no actual specific information was revealed in discussion regarding what the Navy is specifically doing to solve the fleet readiness problems. Don't get me wrong - there is clearly work being done - but no details of that work was mentioned. Part of me sees this as a problem - because whatever the Navy is going to do about the conclusions of the Balisle Report, they certainly didn't tell anyone what that would be. However, another part of me noted a sharp change in the way VADM Burke, VADM McCoy, and ADM Harvey talked about the manpower, training, and maintenance topics surrounding surface fleet readiness...

They spoke with an authority of being results oriented. It is the distinguishing difference between the usual generic speak of Navy leaders giving Congressional testimony and the tone established during this hearing. The blunt speak - despite being absent detailed substance - was different and exceeded my own expectations of the hearing. I'm used to Navy leadership saying nothing in long hearings, but I'm not used to hearing Navy leaders talk about accomplishing goals (at least in a believable way). Seriously - go watch more hearings if you dispute that very fair and accurate characterization of Navy leaders testifying in front of Congress.

In all - including about an hour and a half of testimony - we only learn one specific change taking place regarding the fleet readiness issue. Buried, and I mean six feet deep within the submitted written statement (PDF) and never once mentioned during the hearing itself is this not so trivial organizational change:

Clear lines of authority and accountability for ship man, train, equip and maintain issues. Specific corrective actions include establishing clear and unambiguous Type Commander accountability for ship man, train, equip and maintain issues and standing down CLASSRONs and transfering manpower/functions to a "Readiness ISIC", Afloat Training Group and Type Commander as appropriate.

Wait... what!?! So let me get this straight... For no obvious or stated reason, the Navy is going to stand down CLASSRONS - even though we have spent over half the 21st century to date standing them up? Yep... and that was basically the only specific detail of change learned from the entire hearing.

I guess I'm the only person who read this fairly major organizational change in the report and thought to myself such a change certainly deserves a bit of explanation, but it would appear nobody in the House Armed Services Committee caught this rather enormous rearrangement of the deck chairs. The hearing spends a great deal of time discussing the Littoral Combat Ship - but in paragraph 1 on page 4/4 of the written statement - LCSRON just got tossed overboard with the trash.

WTF?