Distributed Operations in Narrow Seas

Wars on multiple fronts and irregular threats have forced the US military to evolve some unique command and control structures and atypical deployments. Even the Army is thinking about decentralized C2. Anyone who has worked with conventional army forces at the operational level knows it’s a major stretch to have them think in term of deploying anything smaller than a BCT.

The past 8+ years of war has taught us many things as an Army.

One particular lesson we’ve learned is that decentralized threats

are best countered by also decentralizing our own capabilities. To

adapt to what we’ve learned, the Army is training its leaders to

think, act, and operate more decentralized. Now, through the

promotion of mission orders, commander’s intent and a new pilot

program titled “The Army’s Starfish Program”, we are taking additional

steps to promote decentralization as yet another tool to counter

decentralized and networked threats.

- LTG Martin Dempsey, Commanding General, Army TRADOC

At this point, the average naval observer is probably thinking “so what; the navy has always done distributed operations; that’s just the way we deploy.” And of course that thought would be spot on - to an extent. The Navy employs ships independently, over expansive ocean areas. But the majority of these ships are commander commands containing hundreds of Sailors (equivalent to an Army battalion); not exactly a force construct one would consider especially nimble or adaptive. And it’s only been fairly recently that naval planners have begun to deemphasize deploying ships via the CSG/ESG construct. The chaos of an irregular environment calls for decentralization at a much lower level of both force structure and leadership autonomy. A military force’s ability to successfully combat irregular threats directly correlates to the decentralization of that force. In recognition of this environment, the Marine Corps is experimenting with company-level distributed operations, which could some day supplant, if not replace the MEU construct. Special operations forces are traditionally even more decentralized, with 12 man ODAs and 16 man platoons as the typical unit for force application.

Littoral fighting requires decision making condensed in time and space. Operations in confined sea spaces require acquiring, tracking, and when necessary, engaging numerous mobile targets on land and afloat. Simultaneously, naval operators must discern which targets are legitimate combatants and which are fishermen, merchants, or enemies masquerading as the above. In short, the fog of war thickens in near-shore environments. These dynamics apply whether one is fighting conventional coastal navies or non-state maritime actors. However the latter often enjoy advantages that a conventional navy cannot, primarily in that they blend in with local traffic.

Certainly these sorts of operations aren’t new. The pages of naval history are replete with battles in near shore areas - from Mosquito Fleet engagements in the Everglades during the Seminole Wars, to Savo Island, to the Gulf of Tonkin. Is today’s US Navy configured and trained to fight tomorrow’s littoral battles? Yes, we have built the littoral combat ship (sort of), a fairly robust NECC, and some other capabilities that enhance the Navy’s ability to operate where the sea meets the land. But other areas, such as surface navy force structure, command and control, and TTPs are not optimized to succeed in coastal regions. I don’t see much here that indicates that the Navy, or at least the Seapower and Expeditionary Forces Subcommittee, is emphasizing irregular challenges.

It’s likely that future terror and insurgent groups will recognize the operational and strategic advantages sea power brings to their movements. To fight a persistent campaign in this sort of environment requires unconventional approaches. Navy command and control schemes must be flattened and better networked. The more independently deployed vessels can operate, the faster they can react to dynamic situations. If the US Navy is to remain relevant against decentralized threats and still be able to cover a wide number and variety of distributed missions globally, it will have to build a larger quantity of less expensive surface vessels to complement the high end capabilities such as DDGs. These ships will be much smaller, less expensive, and hence more numerous than the LCS; ie, something like the “Fords” of the Henry Hendrix’s Influence Squadrons. And optimally, we would not be fighting alone in the littorals even when engaging an enemy nation state. When at all possible, surrogates or partners familiar with the battle space should be employed. These relationships must be developed and nurtured.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Department of Defense or any of its agencies.