BMD Context

Ballistic Missile Defense is, judging from the commentary on my last post on the subject, a good topic. Responses ranged from well-argued positions on both sides of the 'is it/can it be effective' debate to honest requests for information on the subject from interested observers. I've decided to write a couple posts laying out a brief intro to the subject as I look at it, so that there is context for the (admittedly, sometimes snide) posts I may make on various events related to it.

Steeljaw Scribe has been writing a good systems introduction to BMD over at his blog; I'd first suggest you look that up for a description of the systems involved and the technical challenges. I'm going to approach it from a 'problem' perspective, and my perspective tends to be fairly tightly tied to strategy and policy rather than concentrating on the technical performance of the systems in question as an end result.

Ever since the Reagan 'Star Wars' announcements, BMD (known by more acronyms than you can shake a kinetic kill vehicle at) has been wildly argued. There wasn't really any real-world data until Desert Storm, when the Patriot systems were used to engage incoming short-range ballistic missiles (Scuds) fired by Iraq. Most studies of its effectiveness concentrate on the U.S. run Patriot batteries in Saudia Arabia, and the IDF-run batteries in Israel.

On the one hand, the Patriot system performance might not tell us much about a full-on BMD system's viability and cost. After all, the Patriot only had missile defense capability 'bolted on' to it via a software upgrade; the Patriot itself was designed as a high-performance anti-aircraft SAM. In addition, Patiot is a 'point defense' system; it is not designed to provide area coverage.

On the other hand, however, many of the decisions to invest in BMD technology have been influenced by the Patriot's role in Desert Storm. As such, claims of its success or failure had a magnified impact on the course of BMD funding, technology and policy in the U.S.

Disclaimer: I was trained by Theodore Postol, who is now (in)famous for his analysis of the Patriot missile engagements and his declaration that in fact very few of the engagements (between zero and ten percent) resulted in a successful intercept. I was run through (and tested on) these analyses by Postol himself, so there is no doubt a bias on my part in that before I could perform such work myself, I was being taught to do so by someone who had taken a clear stand. I can say with assurance that his stand was the result of the analyses he had done, not because of his thoughts going in - but of course, many people don't agree with his analyses either. I'll leave it at that.

So. Whither BMD? I am a product of the Cold War, and one thing I took from that experience is that in certain, narrowly-defined situations, nuclear deterrence can and does work. I also consider nuclear deterrence to be not an immutable fact of life, but a dynamic process that must be engaged in as a continuing effort - and one that requires active attempts to understand the opponent's position. Although deterrence 'worked,' it also had several results that many would consider sub-optimal when the 'assumptions' changed. Most notably, we saw the ballooning of both blocs' nuclear arsenals to levels parodied by commentators and even deplored of by strategists in the 1970s through early 1990s. These inventory rises came about not because of feelings of insecurity, or the gratification of power, or even because of massive changes in strategy. They came about because the mathematics of nuclear exchanges is very sensitive to small changes in both the facts on the ground and in assumptions - and because we were fortunate enough to avoid having 'test cases' of nuclear warshots, many assumptions on both sides would fluctuate as various theories and goals changed. Those fluctuations could (and did) have huge effects in reality as they propagated out through the math.

BMD is the same way. Small changes in assumptions, goals or theory can have enormous physical effects in reality which in some cases could only be tested by catastrophic events. Also, since BMD is an integral part of deterrence, those same changes will propagate out further and impinge not only on performance and planning, but on the intentions and understandings of the opponents - especially in this age of information flow.

So when I respond to events in the BMD arena, I am looking at them not only in terms of the performance of the system in question, but also in terms of how those results are interpreted by policymakers on all sides - and how, likely, any countermoves to the system will play out. More in the next post on examples of what I mean, and the ways in which I tend to separate the various forms of BMD in my interpretations.

H/T Defense Industry Daily for the iconic Powerpoint image.