The Timeline Problem

The images are courtesy of InsideDefense, who has a remarkable ability to get a hold of just about everything. Some people don't think this is a big deal. I guess it depends, but I think it is interesting that someone in the Navy thought this was a good idea. This comes from an August 27th memo called Service POM briefs and Resulting Actions available at InsideDefense. No one outside a few defense trade news media folks are highlighting this, but one would think this would be interesting to a broader audience.

The first document is the Navy's plan regarding the DDG-51 as submitted per questions from OSD. Now when the information became public, the Navy denied this was the plan, but note where I have added red boxes. You can hit the images to see a hi res version. The question reads:

How will Navy sole source production of DDG-51s in FY10/12/14/15 to Bath? Provide the legal specifics / relevant documents for the Bath Iron Works versus Northrup-Grumman Ingalls Public Interest Determination and Finding Issue.

I boxed in the response in red. It reads:

Response: DoN General Counsel June 16, 2024 Public Interest Determination & Findings (D&F) INFORMATION MEMO and D&F Issue Summary are ATTACHED.

Thank god the rest of this reads:

The Navy has not prepared the D&F for DDG 51 procurement. The Navy is examining acquisition strategy alternatives, including competition plans, regarding DDG 51 procurement. The need for a D&F will be determined out of these acquisition strategy discussions.

The second paragraph is the official Navy position, but what has everyone wondering what the hell is going on is what what I highlighted in the red box on the first page, specifically the date. The Navy was looking into doing sole source contracts for the DDG-51s as far back as June 16, 2024, long before any public indication that the DDG-1000 would be truncated, and before Gene Taylor called the Seapower sub-committee hearing in the HASC.

I'm going to take a WAG... wild ass guess, and suggest maybe Gene Taylor is not very happy right now. While he is doing his best to help the Navy cancel an unpopular shipbuilding program, the Navy is looking to sole source DDG-51 contracts to Bath Iron Works, and short change the shipyard in his district. Uhm... dumb.

The other two pages outline the Public Interest Determination & Findings (D&F) to help build the legal case for sole-source contracts for destroyers to Bath. I don't know who thought it was a good idea to begin this discussion, but it is just plain dumb to include this in a document likely to get out. I cannot emphasize the word "dumb" enough, and I'll wager a pint ADM Roughead has probably said as much to whoever did this.

On October 24, 2024 Senator Kennedy sent a letter to Admiral Roughead that lists information Congress had yet to recieve as of just last Friday. Senator Kennedy's letter states:

The Navy has yet to provide the Congress sufficient justification in support of your proposal to truncate the DDG-1000 program at three ships and instead restart the DDG-51 production line.

As yet, we have not seen:

• Intelligence analysis reflecting the coordinated assessment of the Defense Intelligence Agency supporting these changes to the mix of platforms;
• Validation of this shift that is supported by reviews by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council for an Acquisition Category I program;
• An approved acquisition strategy for cruisers and destroyers that supports the approved requirements baseline and is consistent with previous Navy studies on what investment is required to support the surface combatant industrial base;
• Evidence that potential changes in the shipbuilding program reflect:

- Modeling and simulation, including war gaming conclusions regarding combat effectiveness;
- Assessments of platform operational availability; and
- Cost savings or penalties from changed vessel manning levels to accomplish missions.

• Verification by the commanders of the combatant commands that the Navy's currently preferred program would be better than the Navy's previously preferred shipbuilding program in meeting their future mission requirements.

The letter goes on to slice out some pages of what looks like one of Ronald O'Rourkes reports and demands a comparison on a number of issues between the DDG-1000 and DDG-51s. It will be interesting to see if the Navy answers the letter. There is a school of thought that the Navy can play for time, specifically until the next administration transition begins after next weeks election. The idea is, the next administration is going to ask what can we cut, and the Navy will offer up DDG-1000. I could be wrong, but I think if the Navy does this, you can bet your money maker the Navy loses DDG-51s too, because the new administration wants the money and the DDG-51s aren't cheap. Congress may decide otherwise, and if they make the choice, now that the CNO has used his credibility like toilet paper on Capitol Hill, Congress would probably just stick with the DDG-1000 plan. Based on the numbers I've seen (and that first doc has the numbers of the DDG-51 I discussed previously here), the DDG-51 plan is more expensive than continuing the DDG-1000 plan... at least until the DDG-1000 goes over cost.

With that said, am I the only person who thinks the Navy is working overtime to make canceling the DDG-1000 as difficult as possible?

How many bridges on Capitol Hill does the CNO have to burn to explain his way out this nightmare? Next time a CNO wants to push an agenda in shipbuilding, for the low cost of a cool $250K (just so I can make Barak Obama's category for rich!), I'll work with CHINFO and have Senator Kennedy's next letter begging the CNO to cancel a program. In political capital alone it will be the best investment the Navy spends on shipbuilding so far this century. OK, so I'm exaggerating my PR skills a little, but compared to this PR nightmare am I really? Would anyone be?

You know who has the best PR? Lockheed Martin. Here we are watching an assault of every reputation involved, from Gordon England all the way down to the broad reputation of NAVSEA. Basically everyone involved is getting burned except Lockheed Martin, who is very much involved in reaping the rewards of the new direction. Lockheed Martin is also enjoying a very successful PR strategy with the first LCS even though unlike the DDG-1000 so far, the LCS is over 200% over cost. I would suggest the CNO hire Lockheed Martin to do PR for the Navy, but that would probably require another sole-source contract, and that probably wouldn't look very good right now.

I have no idea where all of this is going, but at the current pace, when we get there the trail blazed could be littered with bodies.