The DDG-1000 Debate Begins a Day Early

Just when you thought you had everything figured out regarding the hearing on the DDG-1000 on Thursday morning, John Murtha decides to do his own thing. In a move we think is best described as a proverbial two handed middle finger gesture to everyone in the House, Senate, Industry, and Navy who thought they were involved in the narrative, the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee rejected both the funding for a 3rd DDG-1000 in FY09, and the Navy's plan to replace the remaining planned DDG-1000s with DDG-51s. Megan Scully has the report.

The House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee Wednesday rejected the Navy's new plan to revive production of its DDG-51 Arleigh Burke destroyer next year, but also fell short of backing the more expensive DDG-1000 model service leaders are now hoping to cancel.

During its brief closed-door markup, the panel approved a $487.7 billion fiscal 2009 Defense spending bill -- $4 billion below the Pentagon's request -- that cuts $2.5 billion sought by the Pentagon to buy a third DDG-1000.

But the subcommittee approved $450 million for advanced procurement funding of the DDG-1000.

Note the last sentence, the $450 million is still in the budget markup. The House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee is sending a message: they remain open to possibilities. It is unclear what those possibilities they have in mind, but this debate is chess, and this is one of those unexpected early moves. The report continues with the rest of what we call the "Murtha Move."

Defense Appropriations Subcommittee Chairman John Murtha, D-Pa., cited billions of dollars already invested in the DDG-1000 program -- as well as the costs of shutting down the production line at two shipyards, which he estimates at $600 million -- as reasons why his mark did not support the Navy's latest destroyer plan.

The Defense Department, Murtha added, would have to be "very convincing" to change his mind. "In conference [with Senate appropriators], we may decide to make a change, but I doubt it," he said.

Instead of pumping money into destroyer production lines, the panel opted to boost other shipbuilding projects, including an additional $1.6 billion for an LPD-17 amphibious warfare ship, $941 million to buy two T-AKE auxiliary dry cargo dock carriers and $397.6 million for long-lead items for the Virginia class submarine program.

Nothing is ever really decided in Washington until the ink hits the paper, but we note this as a very smart way to send broadsides at battleships. As we have noted this week, and despite what a certain editorial suggested this week, neither the DDG-1000 or the DDG-51 is actually replacing an existing ship about to retire. The ships the DDG-1000 is suggested to replace were already retired long ago, including the 50 year old pair of Iowa class battleships, but also the Spruance class destroyers which were retired early to save money. The ships in the Navy today about to be retired include the Austin class LPDs, the Perry class frigates, the Tarawa class LHAs, the Kilauea class ammunition ships, and Los Angeles class submarines. In other words, amphibious ships, logistics ships, and submarines. It is noteworthy that the amphibious force is being downsized, the logistics force is being downsized, and the submarine force is being downsized to pay for more battleships.

The Navy will decommission or retire exactly zero current cruisers and destroyers for the next 15+ years under current plans, and will commission and additional 10 DDG-51s and 2 DDG-1000s over the next five years that are already paid for and in some stage of construction.

The "Murtha Move" essentially tells the Navy that Congress will not be building any battleships this year and shifts money that would be used for building battleships to build a new amphibious ship, more logistics ships, and potentially another submarine. Many Congressman and Senators will hate this plan. Murtha stands on solid footing here, the 10th LPD-17 is the #1 priority on the Marines unfunded list, and 'we think' #2 on the Navy unfunded list. The submarine shortage is something that has been discussed every year in Congress so far this century, and the Navy robbed funding for previously purchased T-AKEs to pay for other projects, much to the anger of both the House and the Senate.

We are looking for two things tomorrow. First, Admiral Roughead started this process, he is the source for Gene Taylor and everyone knows it, even though the press can't report it yet (only because they can't prove it, they all know it too). Will Roughead throw Vice Admiral Barry McCullough to the wolves and allow his career to be handicapped by the contradiction crossfire he will almost certainly be called out on? If Vice Admiral Barry McCullough is the primary Navy contact during that hearing, he will never get another promotion. However, Roughead might reward him with a better posting in the future. We think there is an interesting dynamic at play here that will tell us a lot about Roughead. We think he should testify and lead by example.

A major part of the CNO role is to be the spokesman for the Navy, and never has the Navy needed that spokesman more than tomorrow morning. Anyone who spends any time talking to sailors hears the confusion, and the lack of confidence in leadership is evident. It is also often observed the desire for strong leadership is prevalent, and expectations are high, but within grasp. Will Roughead cease the opportunity he has been given?

Second, the $450 million is a carrot. Given the necessity for a "very convincing" argument, will the Navy come swinging with the strategic stick? The Navy has never linked strategy with shipbuilding in a public discussion since the release of the Maritime Strategy. Not Once. Does the Navy have a compelling case to make? Or will the discussion focus on the industrial, not strategic plan? Failure to make a compelling case tomorrow in that setting is validation the Navy doesn't have a compelling case for itself and its strategic vision that includes shipbuilding.

We observe the "Murtha Move" is the only option so far in this discussion that aligns Navy shipbuilding to strategy, but we don't like that it punts the industrial questions. We think complex problems like the Navy's current shipbuilding situation demands a comprehensive solution, and the "Murtha Move" is not that. However, this move does set up an interesting discussion tomorrow. The hearing will begin at 10:00am EST.

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Addendum: People read John Murtha's name, think of a certain episode regarding some fine Marines, and tend to go on a ballistic partisan political rant. Don't. The partisanship of Navy shipbuilding is a fictional creation of partisans. The political debates are almost never divided by political parties, rather are driven by regional interests. Political centric rants belong on another blog, and if you can't find one to sufficiently let it out, just send it in an email. For this discussion partisan political rhetoric adds nothing of substance to the discussion of the issues specific to Navy shipbuilding, and a zero tolerance policy for political rants will be enforced for this discussion. Put simply, stay on topic.