Tuesday, September 21, 2024

Campaign Nonsense

If you believe this, you are an idiot.
Democratic members of Louisiana's congressional delegation believe they may have found a solution to keep the beleaguered Avondale shipyard near New Orleans in business.

"The Navy will make public tomorrow its plans to move up construction of double-hulled tankers from 2017 to 2014 and the guarantee that two LPD ships currently under construction at Avondale will be completed there," Sen. Mary Landrieu and Rep. Charlie Melancon said in a news release.
It goes on.
Landrieu and Melancon said in a joint letter the chance to bid on the tanker contract would make Avondale "more attractive to prospective new shipbuilding buyers." They acknowledged they didn't yet have all the answers.

"While today's announcement is not a silver bullet, it is a small step in the direction of making Avondale viable years into the future," they wrote.
The tankers will be built by NASSCO, so the idea that the competition will somehow make Avondale more attractive to buyers is a load of political nonsense. The only way Avondale becomes attractive to potential buyers or shipbuilding jobs in the Gulf coast region are saved is if Congress does one or more of the following things:

1) Expand the Coast Guard - build a bunch of new cutters not currently part of Deepwater. With the average age of cutters 65' and longer currently at 41 years, this is something Congress should be doing anyway.

2) Move up the LSD(X) replacement program and fully fund it. The Navy and Marines have already agreed to use the LPD-17 hull form as a baseline for the LSD(X). I personally think this would be a smart thing to do over the next 10 years, because it is not very likely the money for LSD(X) replacements will be there once we see how much the SSBN(X) replacements cost in the 2020s.

3) Congress commits to building the bimodal fleet. This means adding 10% to the shipbuilding budget, roughly $1.8 billion, for the construction of lots of vessels for low end warfare and peace maintenance of the global commons. One of the really nice side effects would be the economic boost regionally this would give because there would be multiple shipbuilding programs come about - including extra larger vessels for the MSC to support the small vessels. While the New Navy Fighting Machine is one option, I think it should be kept simple by building 6 $100 million corvettes, 2 armed JHSVs, and 2 T-AKEs every year for 10 years and make those 100 ships the foundation of your low end capability.

Without doing one of those three options, Avondale will live on shipbuilding welfare sucking the Congressional nipple for mothers milk - and will be a far cry from a stable shipyard capable of offering stable jobs.

Navy Down Ten Commands

If the US Navy loses 10 vessels and 10 commands, does anyone in the US Navy really care? If it is the Cyclone class PC boats, in an honest moment - I don't think folks in the Navy think it is a big deal.
The Navy is pulling its entire fleet of coastal patrol ships from service, including the five forward-deployed to the Persian Gulf, to repair hull cracks and other damage associated with long service and hard use, Navy Times has learned.

Inspections turned up “significant structural damage” to the PC fleet, and “all vessels have experienced frame buckling and damage to the hull. Corrosion is also evident,” said an announcement by Chris Johnson, a spokesman for Naval Sea Systems Command.

The ships, which entered service in the early 1990s, are past their service lives, and engineers are worried about their ability to handle the full range of speeds and sea states for which they were originally designed, Johnson said.

Is it a big deal? Yes. It is. The case for saying it is a big deal is not easy to make though, because it begins with ones position on how important one believes PCs are to a blue water power projection Navy. The Navy gives a lot of lip service to the respect they have for the danger that small boats can present in a combat situation, but the truth is the respect is based on potential dangers that largely are not respected as realistic. I honestly believe that part of the reason the US Navy doesn't have a high opinion of the capabilities of small vessels is that the US Navy only operates small vessels in specific situations where the requirement is absolute - like the Cyclones that are forward deployed to the Persian Gulf.

Perhaps I am naive, but I strongly believe there is a role for small combatants in the US Navy. I am not sure the Cyclones are the best example, indeed they might be the worst example, but even as expensive, lightly armed PCs they have played a critical role for the US Navy in Operation Iraqi Freedom. They were also found as necessary when the capability wasn't available and needed. Again, while the PCs may not be the best example, I still strongly believe that if the US Navy put more support behind smaller combatants there would be two notable benefits to the fleet at large - more command experience at sea and more creativity among those with more command at sea. Nothing personal to most SWOs, but I find the folks who have had command of PCs at LCDR are a little more out of the box than those who never held those commands. The experience matters.

A few points. First, I am very skeptical of the idea that the Navy can throw a few million at the Cyclone hull fatigue problem and get the Cyclones back in business. Given the way we have seen the Navy treat the big cruisers and destroyers the last few years, and the cultural disdain for small craft like PCs from big Navy, I have a feeling that once someone takes a closer look we are going to see bigger problems than has been reported. The Coast Guard thought it was a quick patch and plug job for their 110s too. That didn't turn out well, and I have serious doubt this will either.

For a few years we have discussed that the Navy is due a PC replacement program. Well, nothing ever came of it and a life extension for the small craft was chosen as the best course ahead before these new problems popped up. Down 10 hulls, it is fair to highlight that plan didn't work out - and also raises questions if the Navy could rapidly field small vessels in wartime when right now it is unlikely they could rapidly field Cyclone replacements even if the Navy wanted to. That last is one of my main concerns with the Navy in general - the current Navy leadership doesn't really believe in a "PLAN B" when it comes to shipbuilding, so if the US ever needs to build new ships to counter an emerging threat, the cupboard is remarkably bare with very limited options.

What To Do?

First, the Navy should do their patch job on the hulls and sell (or give) the Cyclones to a partner. The Cyclones are very expensive to operate and were never a good fit for the US Navy.

Second, the Navy should buy a replacement sooner rather than later. Don't get me wrong, I love the Baynunah class, Hamina class, Armidale class, and even the Visby class - but I'm not convinced that is the right direction. As much as it pains me to say this, the US Navy doesn't really need a PC and doesn't really need a corvette either - what they really could use are more JHSVs.

I've been giving a lot of thought to something reported back in February of this year - an interview by Chris Cavas of Bob Work discussing Cyclone replacements. Recall the quotes:
There was a big debate within the department on patrol craft, PCs. People said these are very good for irregular warfare. But when we looked at it we said we wanted to have self-deployable platforms that have a lot of payload space that you can take to the fight whatever you need - SEALs, Marines, [a] Riverine squadron. So we decided to increase the Joint High Speed Vessel program, at the same time SLEPing [service life extension program] the 13 PCs we have, so they're going to be with us well into the 2020s. But the Joint High Speed Vessels will take over for them, because we like their self-deployability aspects - they can be a sea base, they can be an Africa Partnership Station, they're extremely flexible.
At the time this was said - I hated the idea. Now that I have had some time to think about it, I really like this idea. This wouldn't be the same JHSVs the Navy is currently buying, but they would be similar. These would be armed with stabilized cannons, RAM, and operate UAVs while acting as a RHIB mothership, not to mention carry a bunch of other capabilities inside a high speed vessel with a helo deck. They would be designed to carry larger numbers of people at the expense of the large cargo payloads of the MSC JHSV variants, but instead of the unmanned high speed mothership model the LCS is supposed to be, this would be more of a manned capability. Put your Force Recon on one of those and go hunt pirates.

To me, that type of platform enables a truly dynamic joint sea basing capability for maritime security operations that frigates, Littoral Combat Ships, PCs, and corvettes simply cannot deliver in the 21st century; and enables delivery of the desired capabilities we want in forward operating environments in the 21st century.

So speaking for me - I'd like to this version of the JHSV get bumped up in priority to meet the need of replacing the PCs sooner than later, and see the Navy sell off (or give away) the PCs sooner than later. Indeed, when Lockheed Martin is announced the LCS winner - perhaps the US Navy can hold off an Austal GAO challenge by moving forward on navalized JHSVs sooner.

The Navy's Fuzzy Green Math

Last week a bunch of "green" news surfaced all over the internet regarding a major contract with the Navy that Solazyme was about to announce regarding Algae-fuel - and given I am interested in both the Navy and algae fuel, I've been watching the DoD contract listings. But alas - nothing.

And yet CNET is saying this happened?
Algae biofuel producer Solazyme announced Wednesday it's delivered 20,000 gallons of algae-based shipboard fuel to the U.S. Navy.

Solazyme's Soladiesel Renewable Naval Distillate fuel will go toward the Navy's ambitious goal of getting 50 percent of its energy from renewable resources by 2020.

But algae fuel is not just useful for the Navy's ships.

This past summer Solazyme also delivered 1,500 gallons of algae-based jet fuel to the U.S. Navy for testing. If testing goes well, Solazyme's algae-based advance biofuel could be powering some of our nation's military aircraft.
That is the completion of an old contract, not an announcement for a new contract.

I don't know where the money is coming from, but somehow the Navy is reported to have paid $8.5 million for 20,000 gallons of algae produced marine fuel (of which they have now taken delivery), and then has this new contract for $10+ million more for "research and development of using biofuel feedstocks." That was after paying who knows how many million last year for 1,500 gallons of algae-based jet fuel last year, of which has also already been delivered so I've heard.

But something isn't right here, indeed something smells all wrong. Why are there no public contract announcements outlining exactly how much money the Navy is spending with Solazyme, and even more important - why is the Navy throwing money at this company in the first place?

Look, you don't have to convince me that algae-fuel will one day replace oil based fuels, I already believe that is true (and understand there is still a lot of skepticism). What you do have to convince me though is how in the world Solazyme is ever going to be anything other than a really neat technology that is also cost effective, because it is a really neat technology that has almost no chance of ever being cost effective. Algae-fuel companies are renowned for offering gross exaggerations with their estimations, and while Solazyme clearly has the technology to produce lots of algae-fuel - their cost models examined in the backdrop of their super electricity consuming laboratories don't even come close to passing the smell test.

It costs Solazyme more than a gallon of oil based fuel to create a gallon of biofuel, so why is the Navy investing so heavily in a company that is the antithesis of carbon neutral green energy? I think the technology Solazyme has is cool as hell - because cooking fuel just sounds cool as hell - but come on..., is 'neato' how we measure investments in government or does substance matter?

Do the math - the Navy is paying $425 per gallon for Marine biofuel from Solazyme, and the goal for Solazyme is to ramp up their production up to 1,000,000 million gallons a year. To put it in perspective, a single DDG-51 uses more than 1,000,000 gallons fuel when assigned on deployment to CTF-151 off the Horn of Africa (see USS James E Williams in FY09) - and that's the high end goes for Solazyme right now. This is the slowest possible road towards The Great Green Fleet Ray Mabus discussed.

I understand the idea that the US Navy would buy algae-fuel from Solazyme to test engines of various platforms for viability, but because I am not seeing contract money - I can only assume the money is actually part of a grant. With that said, if the United States is throwing grant money at an algae-fuel company that has no chance in hell of ever being commercially viable and competitive short of war with Iran, then our green energy priorities are really screwed up.

Solazyme either has someone in Congress in their back pocket, of the folks in the green energy section of the Navy need to explain themselves better because they are begging for criticism.

When it comes to algae-fuel, the US Navy should be looking at every single algae company doing work in ponds they can find - because if the US Navy doesn't understand why pond based algae fuel technologies will be part of the US Navy's greater disaster response package one day, then their vision of algae-based fuel technologies is remarkably limited. The US Navy green energy policies need to be about energy and food and water - and the "and food and water" part should be pretty damn important to the US Navy.

Either the Navy is not really spending the money on algae-fuel (in other words, some other government agency or budget is), or that spending is not being reported properly because there is no way someone can convince me the Navy is ordering more that 20,000 gallons from Solazyme without spending big millions. Solazyme has some of the most interesting green technology in the world, but until it takes less than 1 gallon of gasoline to produce 1 gallon of bio-gasoline I have serious questions regarding government investment - particularly the Navy who has so much more to gain from the technologies surrounding pond based algae.

I am a huge believer in green technology for algae fuels, but I am not optimistic the US will be the world leader when this technology booms in 10 years. Our energy policies at the political level are fundamentally broken in this country (and the Navy investing millions in Solazyme is part of the problem). Ridiculous solutions like Cap & Trade is only one example of just how far our nations aim is off vs what the target should be.

Monday, September 20, 2024

In the Spirit of Luce...

Check out this link to the first edition of the U.S. Naval War College's /Luce.nt/, a student-run, online, peer-reviewed Journal of National Security Studies.

Not sure why, but the first publications came from an Army Major, an Air Force Major, and a Singapore Navy Lt Col. Why didn't any US Navy students write anything? Oh well, good reading nonetheless.

Sunday, September 19, 2024

Talk Like a Pirate...

My daughter celebrates Talk Like a Pirate Day with an assist from the Heritage Foundation...