Book Review

The The Heart and the Fist is the story of Eric Greitens’ world travels where he encounters the best and the worst of humanity while discovering his own passions and strengths. Eric is one of those amazingly impressive individuals who seems to master anything he attempts. Upon graduating with a PhD from Oxford, the Rhodes Scholar and collegiate boxing champion could have remained comfortably ensconsed in academia, or made a fortune in the corporate world. Instead, he chose to serve his country as a Navy SEAL.

This book is not typical of the special operations genre, although it contains uniquely detailed insight into NSW’s rigorous training regime at BUDS and Naval Special Warfare’s involvement in the war against al Qaeda in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere. One of the most interesting chapters from an IW perspective was the description of Eric’s leadership of a MK V detachment in support of Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines. The deployment was unique in that it included the longest transit ever (1,400 NM) of a naval special warfare craft, from Singapore to Zamboanga, visiting a number of small ports in Indonesia which had never seen a US Navy presence. This transit serves as a reminder that 21st Century naval diplomacy takes many forms.

The book will also appeal to those involved in development and humanitarian work, which increasingly overlaps the same places America finds itself immersed in counter-terrorism or counter-insurgency operations. Although the book presents an inspiring story of character and humanitarianism, I think the most important take away is the challenge for readers to strive for lives of service and leadership. Eric continues to serve as a Lieutenant Commander in the Navy Reserve and runs an organization called The Mission Continues, challenging disabled veterans to continue serving in their own way.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.

ACSC

I'm at the Air Command and Staff College today, explaining why the Air Force should be abolished. Fun times; full report hopefully tomorrow.

Disputing the "Hearts and Minds" Strategy

Cross-posted at The Conservative Wahoo:

We had a nice discussion of the current operations in Afghanistan on The Conservative Wahoo Live! radio program last night, with several listeners very much espousing the "win their hearts and minds" strategy that has become part of the background noise in Washington's current fascination with counterinsurgency theory (COIN). Here is a rational, well-argued criticism of modern COIN from today's New York Times.

I was a student at the Joint Forces Staff College in the Summer of 2006, about the time the COIN cabal began their ascendancy. After a day-long symposium on the subject in which no fewer than five separate speakers parroted the "hearts and minds" line, I stood up in the Blue Bedroom (the main auditorium, so named because of its color and the propensity of the lighting/atmosphere to put students to sleep) and asked the unlucky lecturer a simple question:

"Has an insurgency ever been broken through a policy of fear, terror and murder?"

His answer was a very quick "yes", and as if to prove his credentials as a COIN expert, he named a half dozen or so. I then asked, "How come we don't study those?"

He was aghast. His answer was basically, "Because that kind of fighting is inconsistent with American values and ideals."

I then went on. "But we firebombed Japanese and German cities night after night, killing tens of thousands of civilians at time. We dropped two atomic weapons on an opponent who was obviously losing the war. Is it a question of from how far away the fear, and terror and murder is delivered? Is that the prime determinant of whether something is "consistent" with our values?"

My point is this: winning the hearts and minds of a population is a proven strategy for breaking an insurgency--because it has been proven to work. But it hasn't always worked. Shouldn't our forces then also at least discuss other methods of breaking insurgencies? Or is it the discussion of such distasteful methods that is actually inconsistent with our values and ideals, rather than the conduct?

I'm all in favor of the "hearts and minds" approach being the default, textbook US method of addressing COIN. I'm not in favor of ignoring history.

Bryan McGrath