Modern Rating System For Surface Combatants

In the process of discussing surface combatants from the perspective of naval theory and strategy, we have decided to adopt a rating system for modern surface combatants for clarification purposes. This blog is adopting a "solemn, universal and unalterable" classification in the spirit of Samuel Pepys, who as Secretary to the Admiralty created a ship rating system in 1677 for administrative and military use within the Royal Navy. We note Pepys's classification system was updated many times, including in 1817, a full 140 years after it was developed. We note this to highlight we are not trying to be perfect, and the rating system is subject to change in the future. Below is an example, from wikipedia, of the rating system during the Napoleonic Wars.

Type	Rate	Guns	Gun decks	Men	Displacement in tonnes
Ship of the line	1st Rate	100 to 120	3	850 to 875	2,500
	2nd Rate	90 to 98	3	700 to 750	about 2,200
	3rd Rate	64 to 80	2	500 to 650	1,750
	4th Rate	48 to 60	2	320 to 420	about 1,000
Frigate	5th Rate	32 to 44	1 or 2	200 to 300	700 to 1,450
	6th Rate	20 to 28	1	140 to 200	450 to 550
Sloop-of-war	Unrated	16 to 18	1	90 to 125	380
Gun-brig or Cutter		6 to 14	1	5 to 25	220

Observe the ratings system is simple with only a one major metric: guns. We observe modern naval warfare is characterized primarily by missile warfare, and the battle force missile payload of a warship is still the best comparative measure of combat power. Thus, we are adopting Bob Work's battle force missile ship rating system for surface combat vessels, thus defined:

Bob Work's Battle Force Missile Ship Rating System For Surface Combatants

First-rate battle force ships (battleships): Ships armed more than 100 battle force VLS cells, and/or more than 100 battle force missiles;

Second-rate battleships: Ships armed with 90-99 battle force VLS cells, and/or 90-99 battle force missiles;

Third-rate battleships: Ships armed with 60-89 battle force VLS cells, and/or 61-89 battle force missiles;

Fourth-rate battleships/frigates: Ships armed with 48-59 battle force VLS cells, and/or 48-60 battle force missiles;

Fifth-rate battleships/frigates: Ships armed with 20-47 battle force VLS cells, and/or 20-47 battle force missiles;

Sixth-rate frigates: Ships designed specifically for the protection of shipping role, armed with either VLS cells or legacy missile systems, and armed with local air defense SAMs and anti-submarine and anti-ship cruise missiles for convoy defense; and

Unrated Flotilla: Warships optimized for a single role, usually either anti-submarine or anti-surface warfare, or for general-purpose naval missions. The distinguishing feature of these ships is that they carry only terminal missile defenses—either in the form of rapid fire guns or short-range terminal defense SAMs.

The following range break points are used to distinguish between SAMs: area air defense SAMs have ranges greater than 48 kilometers (km; approximately 30 miles); local air defense SAMs have ranges between 16 and 48 km (10-30 miles); and a terminal defense SAM has an effective range of less than 16 km (10 miles).

A "battle force missile" is a missile approximately 13 inches in diameter or greater, which covers area SAMs, ASCMs, anti-submarine rockets, and land attack missiles. As PVLS is 28 inches in diameter, for the time being PVLS cells count as 1.5 battle force missiles for purposes of highlighting the combat power of ships with PVLS. Under those terms, the DDG-1000 would be a first rate battle force ship with 120 battle force missiles. AGS and other weapon systems are not rated at this time.

As we noted earlier, in the spirit of Samuel Pepys this rating system is a "solemn, universal and unalterable" classification for rating modern surface combatants on this blog. This is done solely for the purposes of consistency and clarification in future discussions, although we welcome any suggestions for how to integrate AGS into the Bob Work's rating system defined above.

The Past, Present, and Future Fleet Constitution

My friend Mike has strong opinions in favor of naval transformation, many of which I have been known to disagree with. We often see the same problems, but we have often come to two very different conclusions regarding what those problems are, and what needs to be done to fix them. Today Mike is taking a shot at the current constitution of the US Navy, and I disagree with his analysis.

The defensive over an offensive mindset has been ingrained in the Navy's leadership at least since the latter Cold War period and prevails with us to this day. It is an attempt to maintain out-of-date naval platforms and strategies far beyond their relevance in modern warfare (the fleet we want rather than the one we need). Deep into the Cruise Missile Age, the USN clings to the doctrine of massive carrier battlegroups, with only a limited striking power compared to the great expense to defend them, i.e. the Aegis cruisers and destroyers, plus nuclear powered attack submarines. Of even more dubious value, are large expeditionary amphibious ships, sold to the public for US Marine peacekeeping duties, despite the fact that for over half a century the USMC has acted mostly as a land-based adjunct to the Army in all our nation's major wars.

Mike starts with his post with displeasure of the Maritime Strategy and ends it by going point by point on each system listed to describe the weaknesses, but this paragraph stuck out as the where I am in primary disagreement. In making his points, he breaks out of his strategic approach of defensive vs offensive mindset into a detailed tactical analysis why these are the wrong platforms for the Navy. Mike and I have gone back and forth on aircraft carriers and submarines, so no need to go through it again, and we have very different ideas on expeditionary warfare, but my biggest issue with his analysis is that I have a hard time finding fault with the current surface fleet as it has come to be. In review of how the fleet got to this point, we believe the Navy gradually trended to the requirements that defined the time, an evolutionary process for staying relevant to changing conditions and requirements that needs to be applied today.

I disagree with Mike's assessment that the Navy emerged from the cold war with a defensive mindset, in fact I observe just the opposite. Starting before the Gulf War, reinforced by Kosovo followed by Iraq and Afghanistan (not to mention Desert Fox and other operations), the Navy has been offensive minded with its fleet constitution plans from at least the end of the cold war. We observe it is in fact the emphasis of the cruise missile to support the warfighter that has created the force Mike observes as the problem.

We observe it was because of the MK41 VLS, specific to support the Tomahawk cruise missile, that the Spruance class destroyers were converted from a defensive ASW platform into an offensive strike platform in the 80s. It was the liberal use of tomahawks in the 90s that continuously validated the purchase of 62 DDG-51s, each sporting between 92 and 96 VLS cells. We have heard good arguments in the past that claim the reason the FFG-7 has been neglected since the early 90s is in fact due to the lack of VLS cells.

When discussing the constitution of the surface fleet, the 22 CG-52s and 62 DDG-51s represent the primary battle line of the United States Navy, for both today and the future. We have previously highlighted this fleet of 'battleships' as the greatest surface Navy in history, providing more cruise missile firepower than the next 17 largest Navies combined. This reinforces our position that the current battle line of the US Navy is not the problem,

As we look at the Navy, we find little fault in how the Navy has developed its current fleet to this point. Supported by the ideas of Network Centric Warfare, empowered by warfighter technologies including AEGIS and CEC, and deployed for purposes of land attack; we observe the fleet of today reflects the demands of yesterday. As we look back, we cannot identify where the Navy should have changed, but as we look forward we have concerns. The Maritime Strategy is still very unpopular, including within the Navy, and the materials and resources being developed for the warfighter and the peacemaker are not very well aligned with the strategy, including this upcoming fiscal year.

The new Maritime Strategy transitions the Navy into a revolution of security affairs, the specific "soft power" aspect of the Maritime Strategy that Mike doesn't like. From our point of view, Mike should be incredibly pleased with the decisions the Navy has made, not frustrated. We observe the Navy to be in the best possible position to implement the Maritime Strategy, in fact it will not find itself in a better position in terms of the budget for decades. With the battle line established, specifically the 84 AEGIS ships discussed above, the Navy finds itself in the unique position to build the rest of its surface force to implement the strategy, as the current surface combatants making up the shipbuilding budget of the next several years doesn't include any money for replacing current ships of the battle line.

However, instead of spending money for naval specific forces to implement the new Maritime Strategy, the Navy has instead chosen to deploy the Amphibious fleet without Marines and leverage the Military Sealift Command fleet for these emerging soft power roles. In fact, the Navy has chosen not to change a single aspect of its future force to support the new Maritime Strategy, a fairly clear signal that the Navy either rejects its own strategy, or at minimum lacks the courage or conviction to match resources to the Navy's own strategy.

The suggestion that the DDG-1000 (a new ship for the battle line) or the Littoral Combat Ship (a mini mothership) is in line with the new maritime strategy is a suggestion we reject outright. To suggest otherwise is to proclaim the new Maritime Strategy is calling for more ships of the battle line, or that the Maritime Strategy suggests that all surface combatants will only forfill two roles, that of the top rated battleship or that of an unrated specialized ship, with nothing in between.

We are students of maritime strategy, we absorb it and discuss it often, and I can not find a single maritime strategist in history that suggests the optimal constitution for fleets is all battleships supported by small specialized unrated ships, yet that is what the resource alignment tells us about the Navy's new Maritime Strategy at this time. Consider for a moment how amazing this is, that if our current Naval leadership truly believes existing plans for fleet constitution is wise, that the DDG-1000 and LCS is truly the way ahead in context of the existing CG and DDG fleet, that leadership would fail by any measurement all historical study of the constitution of fleets in the context of maritime strategy.

Unlike Mike, we don't have a problem with the past or present, nor do we have a problem with the future as outlined in spirit by the new strategy. However, if material resource allocations do not change to reflect the Maritime Strategy then it will prove our faith in the strategy is misguided, because it would prove the Navy strategic intentions and visions as stated are not genuine.

Fleets Win Wars With Firepower and Mobility

Milan Vigo reminds us what wins naval wars as he examines the shrinking US Navy and the shipbuilding strategy heading into the future. From National Defense Magazine.

The Navy needs a larger number of ships, not only for winning a war at sea against a stronger opponent but also for carrying out diverse missions in peacetime, ranging from humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, security assistance, enforcement of maritime agreements, counterpiracy, vessel traffic service, multinational exercises, countersmuggling and counterdrug, to regional deterrence through forward presence in selected parts of the world’s oceans. In operations short of war, the Navy’s mission includes prevention of transnational terrorist acts on the high seas and in international straits and larger ports, support of counterinsurgency or insurgency, and peace enforcement operations.

The Navy today lacks both the numbers and the type of combat ships to successfully carry out all its diverse missions in times of peace and war. The reasons for such a long-standing unfavorable fleet structure include the Navy’s preference for building an ever-larger number of high-capability but large and expensive ships optimally suited for operations on the open ocean; the associated costs of building such large ships; the use of purely business considerations in determining fleet size/composition and deployment patterns; the belief that new technologies are a substitute for numbers; and a false reading of the future strategic environment.

...The Navy’s efforts to increase the number of ships in the battle force are also greatly complicated by the widely held belief among high Defense Department and Navy officials that in the information age, the number of ships is not as important as their combat power based on the new technologies. The belief that technology by itself can substitute for the quality given by numbers of platforms is based on sheer ignorance of both military history and strategy. Above all, it is based on misplaced confidence in the powers of technology.

...In the past, the Navy had a large number of decommissioned destroyers and frigates in reserve that could be put into active service in the case of a national emergency. This is not the case today. Over the past six years, some 80 decommissioned naval vessels were sunk. This number included a 31-year-old fleet of 27 destroyers, while 22 others have been scrapped or sold. In contrast, during the Clinton administration only, eight 46-year-old hulks were sunk. Many of these ships could have been reactivated by undergoing a life-extending refit and returned to service for another 15 years. This policy of scrapping relatively new ships should be reversed soon to provide additional ships for the fleet.

...The gains in combat power of a netted force essentially depend not on raw organic power, such as firepower and mobility, but on one’s ability to decide and act faster than one’s adversary. Such an increase in one’s combat power depends on many intangible factors, but primarily on the human element. Among other things, micromanagement, excessive command and control, and poorly educated and trained commanders and staffs can not only drastically reduce but also even eliminate any potential gain achieved through superior information technologies.

Experience has repeatedly shown the fallacy of relying exclusively on technological superiority and arbitrarily reducing the size of one’s forces. Technology must always be properly integrated with other, mostly intangible, elements of one’s combat power — specifically, combat leadership, unit cohesion, morale and discipline, doctrine, and training. Otherwise, the new technologies will be of little or no help in defeating a stronger and more agile opponent. Experience conclusively shows that numbers have their own quality. Hence, the importance of the numerically larger fleet should not be dismissed as irrelevant in the information age.

The entire article is excellent. Regulars to this blog will recognize several themes covered in the past. Well done, very well done.

- Milan Vigo is a professor of operations in the Joint Military Operations Department at the U.S. Naval War College.

Warship Design Decisions Are Never Easy, and Rarely Perfect

In World War II virtually every major category of warship (except for mine warfare) changed roles from the intended role leading into the war, to the utilized role by the end of the war. The most well known example is how the Aircraft Carrier and Battleship swapped roles. Prior to the war the aircraft carrier was intended to perform a scouting, support, and defensive role for the fleet to enable the Battleships to engage the enemy fleet, however by the end of the war the Aircraft carrier was the primary offensive platform against both land and sea targets.

The Battleship, originally intended to be the major offensive strike platform from sea, leveraged new technologies like radar to become a primary early warning vessel (a scouting role) for the fleet, and also transitioned into a supporting role for amphibious operations, while also becoming the primary AAW warship for the carrier fleets. While it is easy to be distracted by the big guns of the Iowa class, it was her killbox capability in AAW defense that made the ship a devastating platform by the end of the war.

What is less well known is how the roles of other combatants changed as well. Heavy Cruisers were originally designed to be scouts for the fleet, but by the end of the war the Heavy Cruiser had hardly done any scouting in any engagement of the war, rather had performed virtually every other role. The light cruiser was intended to be a destroyer leader, but by the end of the war was a primary AAW escort for aircraft carriers. Destroyers were originally designed to defend the van and rear of the battle line against torpedo attacks by other destroyers, but by the end of the war they were primarily a AAW and ASW defensive platform. Even submarines, intended to provide forward reconnaissance and an early strike platform against enemy warships were ultimately given the task to destroy merchant ships and disrupt enemy lines of communication.

One would think the Navy had learned the lessons of WWII, but there are a number of examples since WWII where a ship designed for a certain role in war has ultimately been used for an entirely different purpose.

We have previously described the example of the Oliver Hazard Perry class. Originally intended to be a convoy escort platform never intended to operate independently in a war zone, the ship class went on to do exactly that. In No Higher Honor by Bradley Peniston, the book does a masterful job outlining the decision making process behind the intended role of the Perry class frigates, and the role ultimately provided during the Tanker Wars.

Another modern example is the Spruance class destroyer. Originally designed to be the primary ASW defensive platform for the fleet, the combat record of the class tells a completely different story.

In October of 1987 the USS Leftwich (DD-984) and USS John Young (DD-973) participated with the guided missile destroyers USS Hoel (DDG-13) and USS Kidd (DDG-993) in Operation Nimble Archer. Both Sprunace class destroyers, despite the lack of adequate AAW defenses, sailed at night through the Strait of Hormuz to attack a pair of Iranian oil platforms. Using their 5" guns, the combined force put thousands of shells on both platforms before special forces were sent over to gather intelligence and destroy the platforms. After the attack, the destroyers returned the following night back through the Strait of Hormuz.

In 1991 and 1999 the Spruance class was also utilized in the Gulf War and Kosovo conflict respectively. Rather than defend against enemy submarines, as originally intended, the Spruance class was instead utilized as a launch vehicle for Tomahawk cruise missiles against enemy defenses. Throughout the entire career of the warship class, despite being designed and deployed specifically for ASW, the ship never engaged and sank a single submarine. There are numerous other examples. In 1966 the USS Tortuga LSD (26), a ship designed for Marine amphibious operations, was positioned at the mouth of the Co Chien River to support Navy riverine and coastal interdiction operations in operation Game Warden. The Burke class AAW destroyer has never shot down an aircraft, while the USS Kitty Hawk (CV 63) was used as a Sea Base to support Army, Marine, and SOF forces into Afghanistan following 9/11.

We note that in every case, the design which did not attempt to overemphasize a specific ship characteristic allowed these ships to be flexible and support some other role during the lifetime of the class. That is particularly true with surface combatants, even the limited multi-mission weapon payload ultimately allowed for independent operations, while the extra space of the Spruance class allowed it to ultimately support cruise missiles. The Arleigh Burke class today is being adapted to shoot down ballistic missiles, a role never envisioned when the class was originally built.

We are observing other examples today. Amphibious ships are designed and built solely for the purpose of amphibious warfare, which ironically is the least likely role these ship will be utilized for in their lifetime. Observing the last 6 deployments of an L class ship not related to a scheduled Expeditionary Strike Group deployment, five of the six ships deployed were done so for reasons in the service of the Navy rather than the Marine Corp, and if you go back further than the last half dozen deployments this trend holds true.

The Pearl Harbor (LSD 52) Partnership of the Americas deployment, the USS Fort McHenry (LSD 43) African Partnership Initiative deployment, the USS Carter Hall (LSD 50) 5th Fleet deployment (PDF), the current USS Whidbey Island (LSD 41) 5th Fleet deployment, and the USS Harpers Ferry (LSD 49) deployment for CARAT have all been amphibious ship deployments in support of Navy operations, not specifically Marine operations. The only exception we have observed was the USS Wasp (LHD 1) deployment to ferry MV-22s to Iraq.

In other words, the we have observed the last 5 independent deployments by LSDs have been primarily for the purposes of providing a naval mission. The LSD, an amphibious ship with the major design characteristic being its rather large well deck or rather large cargo deck, depending upon class, is in fact becoming a major asset for the surface Navy utilized in a role never intended during the design of the platform.

We offer this observation for consideration because this week we intend to spend extra time discussing expeditionary warfare strategies. JROC will be getting together in February to discuss the MPF(F) composition, and because there are so many issues involved that are rarely discussed in the open source outside of large professional studies, we intend to discuss as many of the issues as possible.

After all, decisions at design time matter, but should never be made with the intention of perfection. It is with some irony we point out the last two incidents of the surface Navy employing their weapon systems are not Cruisers, Destroyers, or Frigates, rather the USS Carter Hall (LSD 50) against some skiffs off the coast of Somalia, and the USS Whidbey Island (LSD 41) firing some warning shots at a boat getting a bit too aggressive in the Straits of Hormuz. In both instances the ships were either positioned or positioning themselves for operations under the category of Sea Basing.

Why does that matter? Because the JROC should recognize today's surface Navy not only has active duty Captains with considerable modern day Sea Basing experience in the form of the afloat staging bases in the 5th fleet, but these Captains also have more real time combat experience at sea than most Captains in the Navy. We believe if JROC fails to utilize these officers as obvious resources for a discussion of modern Sea Basing it would be a tragedy of wisdom.

Best Value: Joint Strike Fighter vs F-22A

A poster over at HarpoonHQ pointed out this document which I think is worth the read, particularly for you aviation guys. Price vs. Performance: The Value of Next Generation Fighter Aircraft, Thesis by J. Michael Stelly, Captain, USAF. The thesis has an interesting comparison of the Joint Strike Fighter and the F-22A based on value for price.

No hints regarding the analysis conclusions in the thesis, those interested are better off reading it without any hint from me.

The Basics of Naval Weapon Technology

When I engage in naval tactical discussions that include technology discussion, I usually start with a single question. Have you ever read Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat by Wayne P. Hughes? In the industry, the answer is usually no, but when it is yes I usually find myself talking to a retired officer or someone who truly understands which technologies in naval warfare matter, and which are simply hype. The reason Captain Hughes book applies is simple, the fusion between tactics and technology Hughes lays out applies as well today as it does when the first edition was written, and the second edition is even better. Bottom line, the utilization of technology in naval tactics requires understanding the conditions, and without that type of objective context to the application of technology in tactics, a technology discussion alone is ultimately futile.

Lets discuss it anyway.

On Sunday DefenseReview.com ran an article called "U.S. Aircraft Carriers Vulnerable to Attack?: The Ticking Time Bomb" which basically claims carrier air power in the form of large carriers has been made by weapons like anti-ship missiles and the Shkval torpedo. The article propagates a number of myths common on the internet about naval weapon systems, and emphasizes the wrong technologies critical in naval tactical discussions.

When you talk about anti-ship missiles you are ultimately weighing factors in performance, specifically speed vs stealth plus range, guidance, and countermeasures. The debate some attempt to exercise is in determination of which weapons are better and why. What is ironic about the naval weapon technology debate is usually the metrics used by some in their proclamation of a weapon system being better is also the reason why it isn't. When you apply the wrong metrics, that can happen. Lets start by comparing supersonic vs subsonic missiles.

The advantage supersonic missiles have over subsonic missiles is speed. The greater the speed of the missile the less the engagement window exists to intercept the missile. The disadvantage of speed is that detection is made much easier, particularly via IR (although there are other methods). In other words, the advantage of supersonic missiles to reduce the engagement window ends up ultimately being negated because the missiles are easier to detect, thus easier to intercept.

The advantage subsonic missiles have over supersonic missiles is stealth. The greater the stealth of a missile the more difficult it is to detect and intercept. The disadvantage of subsonic missiles is that the engagement window is bigger due to its reduced speed. It is noteworthy that since 1982 that most subsonic anti-ship missiles that weren't detected at launch have effectively hit its target, and oh btw, most were not detected at launch. Unfortunately for supersonic missiles, modern detection systems are very apt in detecting the enormous signature generated when launching a supersonic weapon at sea.

Guidance is also critical. The best weapon systems utilize multiple options for guidance in a weapon system, whether it is IR, radar, GPS, Inertial, etc.., the more options for guidance the more effective the weapon system. There are various decoys and electronic warfare options for non kinetic defense against simplistic guidance systems, which is why it is becoming more common to see more complicated guidance capabilities on weapons.

Applying these basics, it becomes easy to debunk myths propagated in articles like the defense update article. For example, the SS-N-22 Sunburn (a.k.a. 3M-82 Moskit a.k.a. P270 Moskit) is the most overrated anti-ship missile you will ever read about. First, it is easily detected not only via IR but by its radar system. The missile has virtually no stealth at all. The missile only has radar guidance, making it easier to defeat without kinetic intercept, and finally the Sunburn has a very limited range and has no countermeasures. In other words, in the various technical categories that determine whether the weapon used to evaluate the capability of a weapon technology, the Sunburn ranks kindof low in each category but speed.

Compare the Sunburn to the latest Exocet missiles. The Exocet has inertial guidance that helps prevent jamming, the missile has protection from EW, it has more than twice the range of the Sunburn, and it has excellent stealth.

The VA-111 Shkval Supercavitating Rocket Torpedo can be judged by the same criteria. The super fast underwater weapon has terrible range, no guidance at all, no stealth at all, and no countermeasures at all. When ranking torpedo's, the Shkval belongs in the same category as the Mk 8 used in the Falklands by the Royal Navy.. better speed, same guidance, smaller warhead.

The Shkval is overrated, a use once weapon that does physical impact to a warship with a WWII era navy mine warhead. In other words, it is an effective weapon against smaller ships, the ships most likely to be able to avoid a hit from an unguided torpedo. It will take multiple hits to sink a larger vessel, and a larger vessel is likely to have escorts guaranteed to know the submarines position and kill it. Sorry, but if using a weapon gets you killed, the weapon might be overrated.

Future anti-ship missiles, and in fact future supercavitation weapon technologies, are attempting to find balance in all of the advantages without the disadvantages. Example, slower approach for stealth, inertial guidance in transit, EW protection, but will be fast (supercavitation or supersonic) in the terminal phase with multiple terminal guidance options.

Needless to say, I disagree with the defense update assessment that large carriers are obsolete solely because of technology advancements in anti-ship weapon technology. Technology has never been and still isn't the primary deciding factor in naval warfare, tactics is that factor.

I expect to see myths in naval weapons technology hit a fever pitch over the next few months as more and more people believe a war with Iran may become reality. The threat of the Sunburn or Shkval may frighten some as their characteristics are touted as overwhelming capabilities to which the US Navy has no counter, but those technologies don't rank in the top concerns I have regarding the threats facing the US Navy from Iran.

The disproportionate effect of mines (both dumb and smart) and submarines simply by their presence alone in naval warfare, combined with the relative simplicity to transport and deploy smaller weapons like the small and simple C-701 from truck sized mobile vehicles near the Iraqi Oil Terminals highlights how a focus on strengths and weaknesses in technology are irrelevant to the wise application of tactics to the battlefield.

The US Navy and the Harpoon III

No, not the PC game.

Among major powers, the US Navy may have the least sophisticated ship launched anti-ship missile inventory in the world. In a May 2006 article in Sea Power, it was reported that the Navy would begin development of a new Block III of the Boeing Harpoon missile. Since 1991, there hasn't been much need for anti-ship missiles though, with the Russian Navy hugging the docks, it isn't like there has been a peer competitor out there that would require extra funding for the anti-ship missile inventory. With an emerging China, the return of the Russian Navy to sea, and the potential for conflict in areas of heavily commercial congestion, the need for more precision in ship launched anti-ship missiles is becoming apparent.

Enter the Boeing Harpoon Block III. The Block III development program started in FY2007 and will continue through FY 2009, with orders to follow. $36.2 million was invested in FY2007 for the program, and currently $53.3 million is allocated for RDT&E; in the FY2008 budget. Below is the justification text of the Harpoon Block III, which covers some of the upgrades to the existing Harpoon 1C baseline.

MISSION DESCRIPTION AND BUDGET ITEM JUSTIFICATION:

FY 2007 New Start Program. The Harpoon Block III Weapons System is intended to upgrade and expand the capabilities of the Navy’s only anti-ship, all weather missile to improve its precision in a congested, littoral environment. Modification of the RGM-84D Harpoon 1C baseline missile will provide for Global Positioning System (GPS) accuracy, target selectivity in a littoral environment, and in-flight target position update solutions as well as positive terminal control. Specific improvements provide for significant target discrimination as well as minimized target-to-shore separation capability, Battle Hit Indications (BHI), connectivity with future network architecture, and Land Blanking capability. Harpoon Block III will provide for a concept of operations which will support existing ISR Platform target detection; target & weapon position update (ie. UAV, Helo, Fixed wing), and ISR Platform to Weapon Correlation Mapping.

This development effort will lead to a procurement of 400 Harpoon Block III upgrade kits, beginning in FY 2009, that will retrofit existing Harpoon USN missile inventory.

FY07-FY09 RDT&E funding will support full development of Selected Availability Anti-Spoof Security Module (SAASM) development and integration, Data link integration, and Test and Evaluation.

While not mentioned in the FY2007 budget justification worksheet, DID has reported in the past the "growth path is envisioned that will add integration with the naval Mk 41 Vertical Launch System and related systems."

Boeing is getting excited about this, the forecast for anti-ship missiles in the next decade is good, and Boeing may be able to garner as much as 15% of that market with the Harpoon Block III (China, Russia, and France are traditionally leaders in this market, although the recent entrance of India to the market may impact their sales). At the same time, I have to admit I am a bit alarmed that the forecast for anti-ship missile sales over the next decade is considered a good thing. By the way, that forecast is an interesting read.