Manned and Unmanned Battle

An X-47B unmanned drone launch
from a U.S. aircraft carrier

There has been significant improvement in the operating capabilities of unmanned vehicles and systems in the last 20+ years. This technology has reached a level of development where it can be harnessed as a valuable force multiplier for U.S. military action. A doctrine of “Manned and Unmanned Battle” is proposed to create an organizing principle, roles, missions, and operational concepts for the employment of manned and unmanned systems in concert to achieve United States (U.S.) strategic, operational and tactical military objectives. Manned forces will constitute the principal military force for operations in both peace and war for the foreseeable future. Unmanned units however are likely to grow in capability and numbers over the course of the next forty years. They represent a significant force multiplier in combat operations and should be asymmetrically employed to reinforce U.S. strengths and to offset weaknesses. While a combination of manned and unmanned units might begin as a marriage of convenience, this cooperative effort has the potential to blossom as drone and artificial intelligence technologies further develop.

Historical Origins 

Colonel John Boyd, USAF

     The Air Land Battle doctrine developed jointly by the U.S. Army and the U.S. Air Force in the mid 1970’s provides the inspiration for Manned and Unmanned Battle. Air Force strategic theorist Colonel John Boyd began this activity by recommending that small, highly mobile forces should pick away at a major enemy offensive through “hit and run” raids that would disrupt opponent timetables and operational focus.  The Air Land Battle doctrine that developed from Boyd’s work, as well as that of Army Training Doctrine Command leaders like Generals William DePuy and Donn Starry postulated that Air and Special Forces would additionally attack an opponent’s reserves and rear marshalling and logistics points in order to slow and blunt a hostile land offensive. Friendly conventional land forces would face a reduced and less focused enemy attack and would have a greater chance of repelling that assault.

     The present U.S. military must also leave behind “traditional” concepts of battle and embrace a coordination of manned and unmanned assets working together to blunt hostile opponent activity in land, air, maritime, and space environments. In Manned and Unmanned Battle, the “manned” component is analogous to the conventional ground forces of Air Land battle and the “unmanned” component” is the equivalent to the air and Special Forces element of the 1970’s concept. Massed autonomous units deployed operationally and tactically may be used to blunt massed opponent missile firings, disrupt communications, attack enemy command, control, communication, intelligence, and logistics nodes and generally disrupt the movement of opponent reserve forces to active battle locations.

    

Deployment

     Autonomous units should be fully integrated into present conventional manned forces rather than be deployed as separate strategic systems. These include ground, air, surface and subsurface maritime drone units. Some theorists have suggested that drone units would travel over intercontinental spaces to arrive in theater for combat operations. Current battery limitations and network threats and challenges would make such employment difficult. Present high endurance U.S. naval and air platforms provide the ideal deployment venue for advanced autonomous vehicles. Global U.S. strategic interests have resulted in an equally worldwide deployment of conventional U.S. military platforms. These units (medium and large warships, submarines and aircraft) can be positioned close enough to hostile territory to reduce drone deployment time, but distant enough from opponent forces to preclude detection and counter-attack. They also have the potential capabilities and storage space to rapidly deploy the large numbers of drones required for operational and tactical effectiveness on the battlefield. Aircraft carriers for example, might deploy large numbers of unmanned aerial vehicles. Amphibious warfare ships could deploy surface and subsurface unmanned platforms from their well decks. Automated units should also be deployable from conventional weapon launchers. Cruise missile launch devices such as the Mk 41 vertical launching system (VLS) and conventional submarine torpedo tubes might deploy rocket and torpedo-resident drones.

Roles and Missions 

     Principle roles and missions of automated units in wartime operations may include, but not be limited to the following:

-       Disrupt opponent C4ISR (Command, Control, Communication, Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance, and reconnaissance) systems and nodes through direct attack.

-       Provide defensive actions for conventional manned U.S. systems. Massed drones may eventually be employed for antiair and anti-missile defense.

-       Attack opponent logistics and reserve force marshalling locations.

-       Form a deployable and re-programmable/re-positionable marine minefield off opponent ports and near critical enemy maritime trade and supply routes.

-       Conduct strategic attacks on opponent centers of gravity at any point in a conflict

-       Cause general chaos and confusion in opponent rear areas, thus disrupting enemy battle rhythm. A drone force dispersed by air drop and other means could re-assemble, and conduct ad-hoc combat operations using pre-programmed functions and drone to drone communication. Such a force might spread fear and be disruptive even in small numbers. The U.S. air-dropped forces behind the beaches of Normandy on D-day is an operative example.

     This concept is presented in a skeleton, outline form to stimulate further discussion. Present unmanned vehicle features and near/remote term advancements offer great promise in expanding U.S. combat capabilities. The best interim method for harnessing the power of unmanned platforms and payloads is through direct integration with existing high endurance maritime and air platforms. Massed unmanned platforms with minimal network support offer commanders significant combat capability in both offensive and defensive actions.