Some revisionist history food for thought

I’m Lazarus and I’m honored to be a contributor on Galrahn’s site. I’m a retired surface navy officer who decided to go back to school and get a PhD in Military history. Some may recognize me either from my posts here, or over on sailorbob.com where I have been hanging out since 2005 and frequently discussing (or arguing) with Galrahn over the pros and cons of the Littoral Combatant Ship program. My chief interest, both as an academic and a poster here is in presenting examples from history that influence today’s military issues. While history does not repeat itself, certain patterns of conduct by nations and individuals frequently repeat their cycles. Historians, both amateur and professional have access to a wide knowledge base and their advice has the potential to improve many aspects of defense policy.

    A good example of a piece of history that ought to be re-examined by historians is the defense reform movement of the 1980s and the notable legislation it produced. The effort’s primary product, the Goldwater Nichols Act of 1986 has for all intents and purposes become canon law for the U.S. military. It is referred to reverently in U.S. Defense publications as if it were the Declaration of Independence or the Magna Carta. Its legislative creators thought that empowering the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and his staff to manage service issues would end inter-service bickering, prevent future Vietnam wars, and free the nation from the tyranny of military novices like Lyndon Johnson picking military targets over lunch. Critics like Navy Secretary John Lehman countered that the legislation would not cut defense costs and would prevent the individual military services from effectively allocating resources and personnel to their respective areas of warfare expertise. What resulted was more of a compromise. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) gained considerable power at the expense of the military service chiefs but the organization of the JCS remained unaltered despite the efforts of reformers to replace it with a council of retired officers who would not have service-centric views.  Although intended to improve Cold War military planning and organization, it made its strongest claim for legitimacy in a post-Cold War conflict.  Goldwater Nichols was widely touted by its legislative backers as one of the keys to victory in the 1991 Gulf War by preventing excessive service chief and civilian meddling in the conflict and organizing the disparate U.S. military service into a victorious joint force. Buoyed by these pronouncements Goldwater Nichols sailed on through the 1990s and 2000s, unlike many other Cold War-era programs and organizational doctrines without significant review.

     How did Goldwater Nichols really fare? U.S. led coalition forces quickly defeated Iraqi forces in 1991, but technological advancements in weapons, sensors, and communication networks, as well as a disorganized enemy with poor morale played a far greater role than the re-organized Pentagon leadership. President George H.W. Bush did not micromanage his military commanders as Lyndon Johnson had, but he may also have allowed them to end the war too soon and in conditions too favorable for the Saddam Hussein government. Coalition commander General Norman Schwarzkopf rather than a civilian official or group negotiated the armistice agreement with the Iraqis. The terms he approved allowed the Iraqi Army to fly helicopters after the end of the conflict, supposedly to repatriate scattered and disorganized Iraqi soldiers. Instead the Iraqi Army was able to use these helicopters in suppressing uprisings by Shiite and Kurdish groups in the wake of the Iraqi defeat. These uprisings might have toppled the Hussein government and obviated the need for a second war in 2003.

     Goldwater Nichols has not stopped inter-service bickering and the joint processes it created and/or sustained such as the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) are more about ensuring that each service gets its fair share of the budget rather than determining what the nation’s defense requirements really are. The legislation was supposed to prevent future Vietnams, but the vast joint bureaucracy it created was unable to effectively anticipate or plan for an Iraqi resistance after major combat operations in the 2003 conflict had ended. If one reads former George W. Bush Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith’s superb book War and Decision, it is apparent that the Joint Staff had a decidedly passive role in shaping the the Iraq war effort. The vaunted Iraqi “Surge” of 2007 that has been credited by many in fatally wounding the Iraqi insurgency was the brainchild of think tanks and retired military officers, rather than the Joint Staff.

     In short a revision of the Goldwater Nichols Act is extremely desirable, but not for the reasons usually suggested. The June 2 Defense News article on U.S. military “bloat” suggested a review of Goldwater Nichols with an eye to cutting burgeoning joint staffs. An analysis of how Goldwater Nichols came about and how effective (or ineffective) it has been in organizing and the United States for war might prompt calls for a fundamental overhaul of the legislation. Perhaps John Lehman might even get a “profile in courage” award for opposing Goldwater Nichols rather than his current casting as its nefarious villain.