Pakistani Deterrent

I don't completely hold to the notion that more nuclear weapons produce a more peaceful world. Nuclear countries tend not to fight, but expanding the number of nuclear powers increases the chance of accidents, misunderstandings, and general unpleasantness. The stability-instability paradox also needs to be taken seriously; nuclear power can undertake brinksmanship if they don't believe that general war is possible. Finally, while I think that the established nuclear powers have some responsibility for (not to mention interest in) helping emerging nuclear powers deploy their weapons in the safest possible manner, I don't think that this extends to shipping a "triad in a box" to whomever manages to detonate a nuke. All that said, I'm not sure that I hold to the gist of Galrahn's argument regarding Pakistani submarine acquisitions:

For those who got lost in the trade speak, basically China is exporting submarines specifically designed to deliver nuclear weapons. The submarines will be armed with cruise missiles designed, built, and delivered by China to Pakistan intended to launch Pakistan nuclear warheads.

The most troubling part of this article is that it is very probably accurate. The article is worth reading in full, as it also claims China is giving the Pakistan Navy two Jiangkai I-class Type 054 frigates.

Okay... but let's be clear about just what is troubling. Pakistan may, with Chinese assistance, be building a submarine based nuclear deterrent. India is doing the same thing, only with Russian assistance. Whereas India's program is similar in nature to the submarine based nuclear deterrents of Russia, China, the US, France, and the UK, Pakistan seems to be opting for a path similar to that of Israel. The submarine leg of the nuclear triad, as we know, is the most survivable, although cruise missile equipped subs are more vulnerable and less useful due to the fact that they must close with their targets before launching.

And so, what's the problem? While Pakistani second strike capability isn't great if your goal is to nuke Pakistan, on balance I think reducing Islamabad's paranoia is a good thing. If the concern is Pakistan's tight relationship with China, I think that ship has already sailed; China and Pakistan have compelling reasons for the close strategic relationship they've maintained for the past fifty years. If the concern is the political unreliability of the Pakistani Navy, then this is something we obviously need to take seriously and deal with productively. The idea of a Pakistani submarine equipped with nuclear armed cruise missiles and operated by a rogue crew is genuinely alarming. The best way of dealing with this might be to expose the Pakistani Navy to the best practices of established nuclear powers for maintaining control of their submarine based nuclear deterrents (which would presumably go somewhat beyond repeated viewings of Crimson Tide and Hunt for Red October). Reminding the Chinese of the potential negative effects of a nuclear armed sub controlled by Islamists might also be called for.

But in any case, as with most threats we should be as specific as possible regarding which value is actually threatened, and how that threat is manifested. This is important in terms of the ongoing discussion about the merits of a cooperative vs. competitive/hegemonic maritime strategy; is the problem posed by nuclear-equipped Pakistani submarines fundamentally of a competitive monitor/hunt/kill nature, or is it a cooperative training/socialization nature? This matters quite a bit, and not just for Pakistan. I think, for example, that in light of nuclear deterrence theory, focusing US capabilities around hunting and killing Soviet boomers in the Arctic probably wasn't either the best use of resources or particularly wise on its own merits. This is to say that even in the context of strategic relationship that are broadly hostile/competitive, there are almost always substantial gains to be realized through a cooperative focus.