Killing the Bismarck

Iain Ballantyne makes a controversial claim in his new book, Killing the Bismarck. I haven't read the book yet, but there's a summary of the main argument in the latest Warships: IFR. Ballantyne argues that there is meaningful evidence that Bismarck was trying to surrender to the Royal Navy task force on May 27, 1941, and that Royal Navy officers had enough information to determine German intent. Ballantyne bases his argument on the eyewitness reports of several officers and men aboard Rodney and King George V who claim to have seen the crew of Bismarck raise a black flag (indicating surrender), and also signal a Morse code message to Rodney. At this point in the battle, Bismarck's aft two turrets continued to fire, although without any accuracy.

To be sure, Ballantyne does not argue that HMS Rodney, HMS King George V, and the rest of the task force acted improperly in destroying Bismarck. The task force lacked fuel, and a boarding operation would have been immensely complex, even assuming a compliant German crew. The threat of Luftwaffe and U-boat attack would also have complicated any effort to seize Bismarck. The battleship could not simply have been left afloat, as she might have been recovered and repaired by the Germans.

Still, the image of a battered Bimarck being towed into Rosyth is tantalizing; I wonder how Churchill, always risk acceptant, might have reacted if he had come to know of an opportunity to seize the German ship. I'm somewhat curious about how norms of surrender in battle shifted between the 19th and 20th centuries; even as late a Tsushima, it was deemed appropriate to surrender a substantial force in the face of insurmountable odds. By the time of the battles of Coronel, Falkland Islands, and Dogger Bank, the norm appears to have been to fight to the last even in hopeless situations.

Over at LGM I have a thread discussing the legal and ethical problems that a German surrender might have presented the Royal Navy.