Thursday, September 23, 2024

Did the DoD Whiff on PLA Navy Submarines?

I went back and reviewed the annual report to Congress, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China for 2010 (PDF) and it looks like the DoD whiffed on PLA Navy submarine developments - and whiffed badly. If the point of the document is to inform the public and Congress on Chinese military developments, it seems to me a few important points were left undisclosed.

On page 3 the report states:
China has 13 SONG-class (Type 039) diesel-electric attack submarines (SS) in its inventory. The SONG-class SS is designed to carry the YJ-82 ASCM. The follow-on to the SONG is the YUAN-class SS, as many as four of which are already in service. China may plan to construct 15 additional hulls for this class. The YUAN class SS are armed similarly to the SONG class SS, but also include a possible air independent propulsion system. The SONG SS, YUAN SS, and SHANG SSN will be capable of launching the new CH-SS-NX-13 ASCM, once the missile completes development and testing.
I'm willing to believe there are 4 Yuan class submarines, but what appears to be completely inaccurate is that China may plan to construct 15 additional hulls of the Yuan class. The problem is the picture of the submarine Feng posted on Sunday (see picture above) is not a Yuan class (regardless what Chinese bloggers call it), and is also not a Song class nor a Kilo class.

We are looking at something new and distinct, and the more I studied this picture the more it looks to me like it might be a PLA Navy variant that combines characteristics of the Yuan class with characteristics of the brand new Russian Lada class SSK. That picture probably has the cyber cops in Russia going over the computer systems at the Russian Rubin Design Bureau with a fine tooth comb, because it looks fairly clear to me like the Центральное конструкторское бюро "Рубин" took a Swiss cheese approach to security and failed to prevent China from stealing some submarine designs.

When I raised this point with someone who knows a hell of a lot more about submarines than I do, I was pleased to learn that Janes seems to think there are some similarities as well.
While not much larger than the 3,000- to 4,000-ton Type 041 Yuan class, the new boat appears to incorporate Russian design influences, including a stouter hull with a reduced aft taper similar to the Project 667 Lada/Amur class, plus an elongated sail and hull-mounted retractable hydroplanes similar to the Project 636 Kilo class. However, in contrast to the sail of the Kilo, the new Chinese SSK incorporates hydrodynamic elements such as an intricately-faired leading edge with concave and convex curves.
Here is all we actually know - the evolution of Chinese shipbuilding in producing technologies is taking place on a curve that continues to exceed the expectations and projections made by the DoD in their public documents like the annual report to Congress on the Chinese military. When China continues to outpace expectations and projections, it raises serious questions about whether the United States will be timely should China - with their 65 operational shipyards - decide to expand their naval production at a higher rate.

I think as we see China continue to incorporate the latest modern Russian technology, it is within that context we note that Russia is looking towards the west for help with their military. Our strategist can now legitimately start pondering the question - at what point does Beijing become a greater national security concern to Moscow than Washington, DC? We should also seek the answers to another question - are we accurately projecting the PLA Navy technological evolution, and if not, what are our options in addressing their technological gains that appear to be outpacing our estimates and expectations?

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