Global Times (环球时报, Huanqiu Shibao) is a Chinese newspaper published on weekdays that focuses on international issues and foreign reaction to developments in China. While not itself official, it is sponsored by and produced under the auspices of People’s Daily (人民日报, Renmin Ribao), the official daily newspaper of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee.I want to note the clarity being expressed in the editorial itself:
China's anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBP), known as the "carrier killer," is close to operational, said the commander of the US Pacific Command, Admiral Robert Willard, in Tokyo recently. While US aircraft carriers appear more active in China's offshore waters, concern over China's ASBP is rising in the West.
China has never pursued a policy of confrontation with other world powers, including the US. However, it does need a strategic deterrence. In a bid to protect its own strategic interests, China should not only build its anti-ship missile capacity, but also possess a range of other carrier-destroying measures as well.
For quite some time the intelligence agencies in the US and other Western countries have conjectured over China's anti-ship missile capacity. China ought to convince the international community of its reliable carrier-killing capacity as soon as possible to end the speculation.
Such capacity is necessary for an emerging power, and it is necessary infrastructure for China's military modernization.
Since US aircraft carrier battle groups in the Pacific constitute deterrence against China's strategic interests, China has to possess the capacity to counterbalance.
Such capacity could inhibit US thoughts of keeping China in check through aircraft carriers, and therefore greatly reduce the possibility of confrontation between the People's Liberation Army and US military forces in the Western Pacific.
While developing its anti-ship missile capacity, China should also let Westerners know under what circumstances will such weaponry be used.
That is pretty clear language, I think. Now compare it with the language used in the National Security Strategy (PDF 2010) by the Obama administration, and note that at best, China is mentioned as a benign economic competitor - and even the paragraph where Chinese military growth is noted comes under the header "Build Cooperation with Other 21st Century Centers of Influence."
One of the chief complaints in the Gates DoD is how much ambiguity there is in the military relationship with China, but the problem is just as much us as them. We do not send clear signals to China, say one thing in public and take actions with clear intentions in private (AirSea Battle doctrine development, for example), and execute a policy from the top down within the Obama administration with ambiguity towards China.
China speaks with clarity regarding weapon systems specifically designed, after considerable state investment, to attack US weapon systems like aircraft carriers and only US systems like aircraft carriers. We can't even mention China as a potential competitor in our own national security strategy. If ambiguity is potentially a cause for a miscalculation, then why does US policy towards China actively contribute to the ambiguity?
What message does our ambiguity send? I think that answer could be debated, but I for one believe that the overall message isn't one that benefits US interests in the future relationship between us and China. Messages of stated intentions only work when they are clear and aligned with actions, but our ambiguity in action doesn't mesh with our clearly stated intentions of cooperation as outlined in the National Security Strategy.
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