Still working my way through the NOC. I was happy to see a recognition of non-state threats to maritime security, an issue that was not adequately addressed (in my opinion) in CS-21. Among them:
We believe that both state and non-state adversaries are likely to employ a hybrid of and irregular methods to counter the United States’ advantage in conventional military operations. Thus, we must be prepared to overcome a range of adversaries employing a variety of capabilities and tactics.
And…
Many of today’s maritime threats come from non-State actors that do not respect national borders, are not military in nature, and seek to blend into the normal course of legitimate activity in the maritime domain. Criminal actors are constantly learning, adapting and growing as they use the vastness of the oceans to their advantage, cloak themselves within the anonymity afforded to most maritime activities, exploit advances of globalization, and flourish in weak coastal States with poor governance.
—Admiral Thad Allen, USCG, 2007
As one would expect, the NOC frequently refers to deterrence. Naval forces clearly play a role in deterring conflict with other nation states. But without evidence of decisive kinetic action to back up forward deployed naval presence, any number of surface combatants or even CSGs sitting off a coast is unlikely to deter terrorists, insurgents, or criminal actors exploiting their own brand of sea power. Just ask these guys.
The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Department of Defense or any of its agencies.
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