CS-21's Core Themes and Vision Are Enduring

The following contribution from Captain Victor Addison, OPNAV N51 Advanced Concepts, comes as a response to the discussions on the blog regarding CS-21 that began with Bryan McGrath's original post Scrap the Maritime Strategy.

There are many good points regarding CS-21 that have been made by Mr. McGrath, Galrahn, and Prof. Rubel, so I'm going to offer a few opinions on two key issues that have been raised:

Should we scrap, review, or revise the strategy?

All strategies are subject to informal review continuously from the moment they are created. My personal opinion is that CS-21's core themes and vision of the global security environment are enduring. Although CS-21 was published in 2007, it is consistent with SECDEF's views in "A Balanced Strategy" and the Obama Administration's stated policies on cooperative security. Additionally, our efforts to implement this strategy are bearing fruit in several key areas. As one important example that was highlighted by Prof. Rubel in another forum, the most recent International Seapower Symposium was attended by 101 countries and 90 CNOs! The core theme was "connecting navies and building partnerships" with a focus on enhancing maritime domain awareness. Operationally, our maritime coalition partners are integrated in task forces to an unprecedented extent-particularly in C5F.

From my admittedly parochial perspective, the other service strategies created during this time period are better candidates for revision. "The Nation's Guardians: America's 21st Century Air Force" (PDF) concluded that our future is dependent on procuring the F-22. Opening threat: "We better be prepared to dominate the skies above the surface of the earth or be prepared to be buried beneath it." The Army's FM 3-0 (PDF) focused on stability ops and counterinsurgency. Based on the complexity, cost and duration of counterinsurgency campaigns, I think our next grand strategy will be to avoid them. The Marines (Vision and Strategy 2025) looked far into the future and saw: MAGTFs! While this unfair comparison doesn't necessarily validate CS-21, it does illustrate the challenges of strategery.

Predictions of the future are rarely better than educated guesses (it was once said that a Russian historian is "one who predicts the past."), but I think our vision of cooperative security and seapower to shape an uncertain security environment is close to the mark. So, my answer to the opening question is: we are on the right course and do not need to revise or scrap CS-21.

Is CS-21 affordable?

In true Pentagon fashion, my answer is: it depends on how we implement it. The last time I checked, my copy of CS-21 did not have a shopping list-and nor should it. This is an overarching, tri-service strategic vision (I agree with Mr. Work on this one (PDF). Since I'm Peter Swartz trained, however, I must point out that the classification of visions, strategies, and concepts is imprecise-so they don't fit into blocks on a periodic table.) How you implement a strategic vision determines the cost. There is always tension between resources and requirements in a military budget and choices must be made. Your overarching strategy should be a "reach." It's not always about the 30-yr shipbuilding plan or developing the next weapons system. How we implement CS-21 also depends on other things like our mindset, training, ideas and actions. Regarding the economic climate, if this strategy was written based on the S&P 500 index-and I don't think it was-that would have been a mistake.

I think the real evidence of whether this is an enduring strategy will come in the next few years as we begin to "reset" forces from CENTCOM. I predict that as the other services return to garrison, the Navy will remain forward deployed-as CS-21 emphasizes-securing our interests around the world. There have been times in history when we have had a garrison Navy and this is the one thing our nation can not afford right now. Although it didn't say it explicitly in CS-21, preventing wars is not only as important as winning wars-it's often cheaper, too. Deterrence is hard to explain (proving a negative), but we certainly know what an absence or failure of deterrence looks like.

One more indication that CS-21 is still relevant comes from this blog itself. A classic "Washington Rule" that is distributed to new action officers in the Pentagon is: "A pretty baby has many parents." The converse is also true, so if your baby looks like Jay Leno. We have dueling entries in the media from architects of CS-21 who are apparently still proud of their work-and should be. Creation of a strategy shouldn't mark the endpoint of strategic thought, however. CS-21 is a broad tent under which three different services operate, so there is plenty of room for further strategic concept development. The best way to implement a strategy is to keep it alive in everyone's minds and work to build on it.