Ignoring the Strategic Lessons of History

The theatre of war may be larger or smaller, its difficulties more or less pronounced, the contending armies more or less great, the necessary movements more or less easy, but these are simply differences of scale, of degree, not of kind. As a wilderness gives place to civilization, as means of communication multiply, as roads are opened, rivers bridged, food-resources increased, the operations of war become easier, more rapid, more extensive; but the principles to which they must be conformed remain the same. When the march on foot was replaced by carrying troops in coaches, when the latter in turn gave place to railroads, the scale of distances was increased, or, if you will, the scale of time diminished; but the principles which dictated the point at which the army should be concentrated, the direction in which it should move, the part of the enemy's position which it should assail, the protection of communications, were not altered. So, on the sea, the advance from the galley timidly creeping from port to port to the sailing-ship launching out boldly to the ends of the earth, and from the latter to the steamship of our own time, has increased the scope and the rapidity of naval operations without necessarily changing the principles which should direct them; and the speech of Hermocrates twenty-three hundred years ago, before quoted, contained a correct strategic plan, which is as applicable in its principles now as it was then. Before hostile armies or fleets are brought into contact (a word which perhaps better than any other indicates the dividing line between tactics and strategy), there are a number of questions to be decided, covering the whole plan of operations throughout the theatre of war. Among these are the proper function of the navy in the war; its true objective; the point or points upon which it should be concentrated; the establishment of depots of coal and supplies; the maintenance of communications between these depots and the home base; the military value of commerce-destroying as a decisive or a secondary operation of war; the system upon which commerce-destroying can be most efficiently conducted, whether by scattered cruisers or by holding in force some vital centre through which commercial shipping must pass. All these are strategic questions, and upon all these history has a great deal to say. There has been of late a valuable discussion in English naval circles as to the comparative merits of the policies of two great English admirals, Lord Howe and Lord St. Vincent, in the disposition of the English navy when at war with France. The question is purely strategic, and is not of mere historical interest; it is of vital importance now, and the principles upon which its decision rests are the same now as then. St. Vincent's policy saved England from invasion, and in the hands of Nelson and his brother admirals led straight up to Trafalgar.

It is then particularly in the field of naval strategy that the teachings of the past have a value which is in no degree lessened. They are there useful not only as illustrative of principles, but also as precedents, owing to the comparative permanence of the conditions. This is less obviously true as to tactics, when the fleets come into collision at the point to which strategic considerations have brought them. The unresting progress of mankind causes continual change in the weapons; and with that must come a continual change in the manner of fighting,—in the handling and disposition of troops or ships on the battlefield. Hence arises a tendency on the part of many connected with maritime matters to think that no advantage is to be gained from the study of former experiences; that time so used is wasted. This view, though natural, not only leaves wholly out of sight those broad strategic considerations which lead nations to put fleets afloat, which direct the sphere of their action, and so have modified and will continue to modify the history of the world, but is one-sided and narrow even as to tactics. The battles of the past succeeded or failed according as they were fought in conformity with the principles of war; and the seaman who carefully studies the causes of success or failure will not only detect and gradually assimilate these principles, but will also acquire increased aptitude in applying them to the tactical use of the ships and weapons of his own day. He will observe also that changes of tactics have not only taken place after changes in weapons, which necessarily is the case, but that the interval between such changes has been unduly long. This doubtless arises from the fact that an improvement of weapons is due to the energy of one or two men, while changes in tactics have to overcome the inertia of a conservative class; but it is a great evil. It can be remedied only by a candid recognition of each change, by careful study of the powers and limitations of the new ship or weapon, and by a consequent adaptation of the method of using it to the qualities it possesses, which will constitute its tactics. History shows that it is vain to hope that military men generally will be at the pains to do this, but that the one who does will go into battle with a great advantage,—a lesson in itself of no mean value.

The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783, pages 8-10, by A. T. Mahan

It is with this quote, from one of the greatest maritime strategist of this country, that we think about the capabilities the Littoral Combat Ship brings to the fleet as a whole and the maritime domain individually. The Littoral Combat Ship is a mothership for unmanned systems, a new concept for naval forces to extend the scouting capabilities of the fleet. Unmanned systems represents both the strategic and tactical idea of our time by specifically enabling the point in contact that Mahan discusses connecting strategy to tactics. Motherships will be the platform at sea in the 21st century that enable Admirals from shifting from strategic plan to tactical execution of military power.

However, even as the mothership brings this new capability to naval forces, we ask the question whether the mothership becomes the legitimate replacement for cruisers within the context of strategic fleet constitution and tactical fleet capability requirements. Based on history, we do not believe this is possible. History has proven time and time again that ships of the flotilla are not a substitute for the requirements fleet commanders place on cruisers. Following Mahan's advice, we seek guidance through the prism of history in a search for sage advice regarding how to build our credible naval forces.

If the object of naval warfare is to control communications, then the fundamental requirement is the means of exercising that control. Logically, therefore, if the enemy holds back from battle decision, we must relegate the battle-fleet to a secondary position, for cruisers are the means of exercising control; the battle-fleet is but the means of preventing their being interfered with in their work. Put it to the test of actual practice. In no case can we exercise control by battleships alone. Their specialisation has rendered them unfit for the work, and has made them too costly ever to be numerous enough. Even, therefore, if our enemy had no battle-fleet we could not make control effective with battleships alone. We should still require cruisers specialised for the work and in sufficient numbers to cover the necessary ground. But the converse is not true. We could exercise control with cruisers alone if the enemy had no battle-fleet to interfere with them.

If, then, we seek a formula that will express the practical results of our theory, it would take some such shape as this. On cruisers depends our exercise of control; on the battle-fleet depends the security of control. That is the logical sequence of ideas, and it shows us that the current maxim is really the conclusion of a logical argument in which the initial steps must not be ignored. The maxim that the command of the sea depends on the battle-fleet is then perfectly sound so long as it is taken to include all the other facts on which it hangs. The true function of the battle-fleet is to protect cruisers and flotilla at their special work.

Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, Chapter 2, Theory of the Means - The Constitution of Fleets, by Julian Stafford Corbett

The last cruiser built by the US Navy was the Oliver Hazard Perry frigate, a patrol frigate intended to be a lightly armed escort capable of sustaining 20 knots intended to provide ocean escort of ships ranging from amphibious ships to logistical ships to merchant ships. From the beginning it was decided the ship would be given a multi-role capability, despite the ship being unable to carry the SM-2 utilized by larger warships. Essentially, the ship would be credible against the weapon systems most dangerous to naval forces; aircraft, surface ships, and submarines.

The role of scouting may enable naval forces to reduce the time necessary to make contact with enemy naval forces, but the role of scouting alone cannot do the necessary work to take action when contact is made. Information gleaned through improved scouting alone does not empower naval forces to take credible action, decisive combat power is still required.

We believe the key question facing the Navy today is whether the US Navy believes, in defiance of history, in defiance of histories greatest maritime strategists, has the evolution of technology evolved in a way that has made the cruiser obsolete, or adjusted conditions enough that Corbett's statement regarding the exercise of control by battleships alone is no longer relevant?

The Littoral Combat Ship is not a cruiser. The LCS lacks the credible firepower necessary to exercise actions that must be undertaken by a rated warship of the battle-fleet. The Oliver Hazard Perry class was not a perfect warship, but it was a frigate with credible combat power, and still is for many nations. If the US Navy replaces these frigates with the Littoral Combat Ship, how will the US Navy exercise control of the sea with battleships alone?

The question is not why does the US Navy need a frigate, as some claim. History and maritime strategy both side with the argument that the cruiser role must be filled by frigates with credible combat power. The question is why does the US Navy not need a frigate in the modern era. Why is history irrelivant? Why is Corbett wrong regarding fleet constitution? Why is the Littoral Combat Ship, a ship only suitable to filling only the scouting role of cruisers, a credible replacement for all cruisers in the 21st century? Why are all the historical roles of cruisers no longer a strategic requirement for the US Navy?

The Maritime Strategy does not answer these questions. These questions require answers. We believe that until these questions find credible answers rooted in strategy, there will continue to be questions regarding naval shipbuilding.