The Tactical Approach to Navy Programs

For the second consecutive Monday, Christopher P. Cavas has published an editorial that has dominated the Navy centric discussion. Last week Chris focused on credibility, which we assigned responsibility to the Navy leadership. This week the article takes on shipbuilding.

As I read through the article, I kept thinking about something Admiral Morgan once told me in a blogger roundtable discussion, "Every budget is a strategy." If that is true, then why is every program approached tactically? Where are the comprehensive, layered details that build cohesion in planning? Those discussions are absent, when the PEOs are the ones doing all the talking, the focus is on one program in a vacuum.

The DDG-1000 is a great example. From the article.

The DDG 1000 program manager, a captain, is trying to stir up support with a little-used, capabilities-based presentation dating from mid-2005. But he's getting little active support from the admirals - a fact noted on the Hill.

"That effort should be coming from the requirements flag officers," said one senior congressional staffer.

The DDG-1000 program manager is Captain Jim Syring, and we have noted his advocacy in the past. We have a lot of sympathy for Capt. Syring in this situation, because he finds himself on an island as the lone advocate in the wilderness of the DDG-1000 program. Basically, he does his job, and he gets no help at all from his chain of command.

The DDG-1000 is a collection of tactical metrics, whether it is the advanced gun system for NSFS or the unique hull form for stealth. There is no strategic operating environment offered in the vision of the DDG-1000. It is our observation the Navy's own maritime strategy killed the DDG-1000 program, because the refusal to name enemies created the absence of an environment where this ship would operate. Had 21st Century Seapower mentioned China specifically, the DDG-1000 would find its strategic environment. Absent a peer competitor, the DDG-1000 is a program in search of a strategic vision.

There are other examples. The DDG-51 is a tactical solution to current shipbuilding problems that include no alternatives for surface combatants less than 14,000 tons. Nuclear power is a tactical solution for rising energy costs. The CG(X) has only been described as a tactical replacement, there has yet to be any official discussion regarding the strategic vision of the CG(X), a point highlighted in the May issue of Proceedings. Whether you are talking about keeping the P-3s in service, the H-60 consolidation, or any number of other Navy programs, everything is approached tactically, absent a strategic operating environment and the vision of that environment.

The Navy will not see a way out of its mess until it finds a strategic vision for the unfolding maritime environment. It really is a shame too, because with existing equipment the Navy is doing more with what it has than it ever has. That is a good thing, and will become more necessary as what the Navy has continues be less and less until a vision can be found.