China Reading Worth the Time

We are really enjoying China Security since finding it online, and the latest issue is excellent. In the latest edition, the first section offers 21 informed 500 word essays that debate China's future. A PDF of this section is available here. We find several of the essays insightful, and will probably discuss several before it is all said and done, but we quote part of this one contributed by Thomas Barnett because we user user comments may add to the discussions we like to have on the blog.

America needs to encourage China’s effective re-branding as an accepted worldwide provider of stability operations. The problem today is two-fold: 1) major portions of America’s military require China to remain in the enemy image to justify existing and new weapons and platforms; and 2) the Chinese military is hopelessly fixated on “access denial” strategies surrounding Taiwan, meaning it buys the wrong military for the strategic tasks that inevitably lie ahead.

So long as both nations insist on such mirror-imaging, their respective militaries will continue to buy one military while operating (or, in China’s case, needing to operate) another force that remains under-developed. Such strategic myopia serves neither great power’s longterm interests, which are clearly complimentary throughout the developing world.

We set up the Naval discussion by highlighting Dr. Barnett's predictions for the outcome.

The good news is that both China and the United States are within a decade’s time of seeing new generations emerge among their respective political and military leaderships. These future leaders view the potential for Sino-American strategic alliance far differently than do the current leadership generation. If Washington and Beijing can navigate the next dozen or so years without damaging current ties, I fully expect to see a Sino-American strategic alliance emerge.

I do not present this as a theoretical possibility, but as my professional judgment based on years of extensive contacts through both nations’ national security establishments.

We have made the case that we believe the next 12 years matter to the fleet constitution of the US Navy for the next three decades. We do not see a way around this situation facing the Navy without massive reductions in CVNs, AEGIS surface combatants, or submarines including SSBNs. We also make an unapologetic argument that the existing CVN/AEGIS force is sufficient for the peer competitor challenges of the future, and that by building more submarines as a safety measure, the Navy should spend the shipbuilding budget over the next 12 years on building a fleet better designed to handle small wars and irregular challenges at sea.

If Dr. Barnett's prediction comes true regarding the eventual relationship between the US and China (a prediction we subscribe to), we believe the naval force structures we recommend including large motherships, small combatants, and submarines including SSGN replacements will be highly capable against all challenges likely to be faced in the 21st century.

However, if Dr. Barnett proves wrong about the future relationship between the US and China, the Navy really only has 12 years to shape a force for the next 3 decades that might include a conflict between the US and China. What does the US Navy need to do over the next 12 years to prepare for a possible future that includes a confrontation with China? Where does the 313-ship plan help or hurt the US in either scenario?

Food for thought.