Observing a Possible Evolution With Sea Basing

The Navy’s Sea Base concept is a key organizing principle of the planned future fleet. The Navy describes it as the foundation from which offensive and defensive fires are to be projected. As enemy access to weapons of mass destruction grows, and the availability of overseas bases declines, the Navy finds it compelling both militarily and politically to reduce the vulnerability of U.S. forces through expanded use of secure, mobile, networked sea bases. Sea Base capabilities include enhanced afloat positioning of joint assets; offensive and defensive power projection; command and control; integrated joint logistics; and accelerated deployment and employment timelines. Netted and dispersed sea bases will consist of numerous platforms, including nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, multi-mission destroyers, submarines with Special Forces, and maritime pre-positioned ships.

A key focus of this report is that the sea base is the sea, not the things on it. The fleet architecture was designed to take advantage of the dynamics of operational maneuver that exploit not only the land commons but the sea commons. Operational maneuver that includes the sea surface expands greatly the maneuver space available to our forces thereby providing our forces with more options and complicating the enemy’s ability to maintain surveillance of our forces.

In utilizing the sea as a base, it is important to maintain connectivity through networking, not to mass at the same physical location. The latter would simply recreate offshore the vulnerabilities of a forward garrison on land to conventional barrage attack or to attack from weapons of mass destruction, albeit at a somewhat greater stand-off distance.

Full use of the potential of the sea as a base involves the inclusion of joint and allied forces. While it includes amphibious assault, it is much more than that. Modernizing old amphibious ships and maritime prepositioning ships is only a small part of the overall concept of sea basing. The fleet’s ability to operate anywhere, including along the littoral breaks down the land-sea boundary, expanding our maneuver space, and providing multiple means of bringing military force to bear on the enemy. The architecture of the sea base is open so it can scale to the dimensions appropriate to the mission.

Alternative Fleet Architecture Design, Stuart E. Johnson and Arthur K. Cebrowski, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, August 2005

Before we begin, we want to make it clear that if you look for discussions online for Sea Basing, it is a good bet you will find yourself looking in our archives. Nobody on the internet is a bigger supporter. We offer this reminder because our take is contrary to almost all opinions and reactions I've read on this article.

In today's CHINFO Clips an InsideTheNavy article from earlier this week was included. The article, Navy Seabasing Official: MPF(F) Program Faces Likely Cancellation, is read like a dire prediction that Sea Basing is fading as a priority.

Navy officials are talking about delaying the purchase of three large-deck amphibious assault ships essential to the Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) program, a move that would likely doom the program, according to Cmdr. Mark Becker, seabasing pillar lead for Navy Wafare Development Command.

The MPF(F) program is “unfortunately, not going well in my opinion” and faces cancellation in the coming years because the program is becoming Navy-centric, which could prompt the joint forces to stop providing the necessary funding, Becker said May 21 here at IQPC’s Fleet Requirements Summit.(...)

Becker told Inside the Navy after his presentation that MPF(F) looks to be headed for funding problems due to the changing role of the MPF(F) -- from a forcible-entry role involving the joint forces to a Navy-specific supporting role. Moving the three large-deck amphibious ships out of the future-years budget plans, as Navy officials are discussing, would appear to push joint forces out of the picture, the commander said.

“So even if you still go with MPF(F), you might cancel the large-deck amphibs, because they don’t even need it for forcible entry,” Becker said, “and if it’s not going to conduct forcible entry, let’s save that money.”

Becker said this is the “first indication” that joint forces will balk when asked to help fund what will be a Navy-specific program, which would leave the sea service with too large of a funding burden to bear.

“The Navy is not going to just [fund MPF(F)] on its own,” he said.

We have some sympathy for Cmdr. Mark Becker, he has put a lot of effort into the MPF(F) project and now that the project is approaching a critical time period, a fate which may be decided next month, there appears to be some reconsiderations taking place in the Navy. From his perspective this can be seen as a project heading for cancellation, but we see this development as a sign of evolution. There is a lot of good that has occurred even if the MPF(F) in its current design is canceled, specifically the definition of Sea Basing has evolved, and the possibilities for Sea Basing have expanded conceptually.

MPF(F) was an industry driven concept, which we observe means industry clearly has the creative talent to think out of the box, adjust to a new direction, and come up with creative solutions to complex problems. The requirement is still there, the necessity to support joint forces leveraging the Sea as Base is without question still the goal. What we observe happening is a change in approach, rather than starting with a top down Marine centric MEB requirement approach, it appears to us like the Navy and Marines are looking for a bottom up approach, and we observe that to be an exercise in wisdom and a possible evolution towards a true joint solution.

Observe the pattern, the article paints a gloomy outlook for Sea Basing because the MPF(F) may not be bought in its conceptualized form. Pass out the tissues. We observe this is what it looks like to see the Navy and Marines adjust to conditions, establish realistic expectations, approach a new operational concept carefully, and work within its means. How terrible...

Where to go from here?

The reason for the potential LHA(R) delay is probably directly related to the nuclear power issue for amphibious ships. There are several things happening at once, and somewhere something was going to give. The Marines want 11 of each amphibious ship, which means they need at least 2 LHA(R)s and 2 more LPD-17s beyond what has been funded through FY08. It is very possible one LPD-17 will be funded in FY09. The Navy has other evolving Sea Basing requirements, specifically the Global Fleet Stations which is currently producing results right now. The MPF(F) does not address that Sea Basing requirement, nor does it meet the offshore staging bases requirement exercised today for fighting piracy. Not rushing into the brand new MPF(F) concept with $14 billion or more of the shipbuilding budget is hardly a bad decision.

The article goes on to highlight options for existing maritime prepositioning force requirements.

He said that leaves the Navy with three options: convince Congress to continue to lease the MPF squadrons, which Congress does not want to do, according to the commander; come up with the funding to buy the leased ships; or replace the ships with newer ships “of some shape or form . . . where we buy better ships that are still just prepositioned ships.”

Sea Basing will be at least as complicated as taking carrier aviation to sea was a century ago. While ISN makes the delay or potential cancellation of MPF(F) sound terrible, it isn't. Slowing down to take a bottom up approach instead of rushing to meet a top down requirement is how Sea Basing should have been developed in the first place.