According to an AP report, the Navy has now issued a formal request for proposals to General Dynamics' Bath Iron Works and Lockheed Martin calling for construction of three Littoral Combat Ships to be carried out over the next several years. Meantime the RAND Corporation has just released a study on how the Navy can get the best from the LCSs when they eventually enter service.
In the new RFP, the Navy envisions a competition in which the winning bidder is awarded contracts for two of the ships while the other will build just one ship.
The Navy is operating under a Congressionally-imposed cost cap of $400 million per ship.
It is unclear where the $400 million figure MarineLog is using comes from, but the Congressionally-imposed rule actually says $460 million including the costs the government incurs in acquiring ships. This is not an unexpected development, in fact, it is wise to get the RFP ASAP because it may decide the fate of the LCS this year. Congress isn't very happy with the LCS program right now, and they are basically saying, if you canceled 2 ships last year, why build 2 ships this year.
The answer one would expect is cost-plus contracts vs fixed cost contracts, but there are questions whether the new RFP is for cost-plus contracts or fixed cost contracts, and we asked around a bit only to find that no one seems to know...yet. What we do know is this is the purchase plan regarding what to do with the 1 LCS funded in FY08 and the 2 LCSs still yet to be funded in FY09. Solicitation of the RFP now is smart from the Navy's point of view, should BIW for example start telling their Senators and Congressman that they believe they will get the 2 ship contract, the Navy budget for 2 LCSs in FY09 has a better chance of not getting cut in favor of different ships.
We have no opinion one way or the other regarding this decision. We are on record saying the Navy's only mistake in fleet constitution strategy was when they decided to build big surface combatants and small motherships, instead of building big motherships and small surface combatants. The way we look at it there are two shipbuilding program budgets for the surface combatant fleet, one for surface combatants (DDG-1000s) and one for motherships (LCS). Because we don't believe the conditions exist in the Pentagon to change the 313-ship plan (think CJCS), the only way we believe change will happen is when the Navy stops the DDG-1000 program and forces the Navy to build frigates instead (LCS MMC). Don't tell me nonsense about design issues, the Navy went from concept to water in less than 5 years with the LCS which was much more complicated than people claim due to integration of new technologies like modularity, and the LCS MMC is a mod of that design using mature technologies.
Until the Navy builds frigates with the surface combatant budget, the Navy is doing it right to keep building LCS motherships with the mothership budget, that requirement exists and still needs to be met.
The MarineLog article then goes on to talk about a RAND report released last summer. We previously discussed it here. The report is not what we would call impressive, but it is what we would call interesting. For the most part there is some excellent analysis in the report, but a lot of it is based on figures prior to the changes to the LCS program, so in effect it is mostly theory. We also note some of the theories are pretty damn assuming, the Pacific war scenario for example, when the LCS rushes out in front of the CSGs to sweep mines in no mans land under the Air Force of China. I don't know about you, but show me the Admiral in the fleet today who is going to send the Flight 0 LCS to search and destroy for minefields in no mans land in a sea war against China, and I'll show you an Admiral who thinks the 3000 ton LCS and its crew are expendable.
Basically, RAND put out a new Research brief on their big report from last year, which is the only thing that can explain why MarineLog thinks the report is news. A quick look at the brief will highlight how much the LCS program has changed since the reports release, particularly when you look at the mission module set. For those who are unaware, we have heard now from several sources regarding the new mission module plan the Navy has put together. 64 total broken down 24 MIW, 24 ASuW, and 16 ASW. It is also weighted nearly 3/2/1 in priority of acquisition ASuW/MIW/ASW. In other words, when the Navy has purchased 15 ASuW modules, they will have purchased around 5 ASW modules.
Like we have always said, the rhetoric about the LCS and submarines is smoke up your stack my friend, don't drink the punch. It is nice they are taking MIW seriously though, and in my opinion, the LCS may well be remembered as the best minesweeper ever built. It is pretty damn expensive for a ship designed to fight small boats though, one would think for small boat swarms you would want a platform that can deploy many armed USVs to swarm back, you know, from a larger mothership. That 1-2 USVs from the LCS doesn't inspire the armed USV concept much in my opinion.
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