SSGN SOF Capability Claimed Overrated

The February issue of Proceedings has a very interesting article by Commander Michael J. Dobbs, U.S. Navy (Retired), who highlights the shortcomings of the SSGN, a position rarely sold during the conversion process. We like this article for a number of reasons, including because it discusses some of the limitations of the SSGN in the littoral. We have never been very excited about the SSGN as a special operations platform, but SOCOM is in vogue, and special operations sells.

Even if an SSGN never delivers a single SEAL to an unfriendly shore, what it will contribute to strike, ISR, and Fleet flexibility justifies the conversions. That is fortunate, since it looks like realizing the SSGN's potential for Special Operations is years away and might never be more than partially achieved.

The ASDS program is clearly struggling, and its way ahead is unclear. Although time and money could eventually provide the ASDS capability, other obstacles to the SOF mission (e.g., SSGN's poor suitability for shallow-water/high-contact density operations, and keeping two crews proficient for a very broad spectrum of complex missions) may be impossible to hurdle. Before more money is invested in ASDS and other SOF mission enablers on the SSGN, the Navy should rethink the general suitability of this dual-crew platform for delivering SEALs to extremely challenging littoral environments. Although the importance of SOF to America's security is unquestionable and certain to grow, the SSGN may not be a viable—or at least not cost-efficient—way to insert and extract these forces.

We lack strong opinions on the ASDS other than recognizing it has been a troubled system we would like to see successfully deployed in numbers and with an affordable price tag. However, following the theme of CDR Dobbs, we concur that even without special operations the SSGN is a success, in fact we have made the case based on the Maritime Strategy that the SSGN is a key enabler for building a better surface fleet.

However, we also observe the SSGN offers a unique capability that should be more readily discussed, something that should not be overlooked. The SSGN represents an enormous platform capable of delivering enormous payloads, and as such has the capacity to act as an underwater mothership for large numbers of unmanned vehicles. Unmanned systems offer the unique capability of contributing as both peacemaker and warfighter surveillance roles, and as such scale to all categories of war for the Navy. We see the requirement to contribute in major war critical for any mothership, because motherships will bear a high cost that must be justifiable for the expense. As a mothership for multiple unmanned platforms and a launch platform for long range cruise missiles, the SSGN represents a tool of war greater than necessary for insertion platform for special forces.

If they Navy needs a serious platform to deliver special forces, the Navy should build an AIP submarine built for the littorals. A serious approach could even leverage the SSGN as a way to support more than one AIP submarines over long underwater durations. If Russia can build a 950 ton AIP submairne for delivering special forces, the Navy should be able to figure out how to connect two AIP submarines, at the combined size of only one-ninth the size of a SSGN, to be forward deployable to theater underwater.The worst case scenario is the design base gets to look at a new project, which is more than we can say about the submarine design base in the industry today.